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PART II.

# CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

# RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

OF THE

# LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES

IN

# TURKEY.

10

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# Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.

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## No. 1.

*M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, June 27, 1853.)*

*Paris, le 25 Juin*, 1853.

M. le Comte,

LE Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, en livrant à la publicité la dépêche circulaire que M. le Comte de Nesselrode vient, par ordre de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas, d'envoyer à toutes les Légations de Russie à l'étranger, a donné à ce document la valeur d'un manifeste adressé à l'Europe elle-même ; aussi ai-je pensé qu'il était nécessaire de vous faire part des réflexions générales que sa lecture m'a suggérées.

Je remarquerai, tout d'abord, que de l'exposé même du différend de la Russie avec la Porte, tel que le représente M. de Nesselrode, il résulte que la mission de M. le Prince Menchikoff à Constantinople n'avait qu'un but—le règlement des difficultés relatives au partage des Saints Lieux de Jérusalem entre les diverses communions Chrétiennes—et que ce but a été rempli à la satisfaction du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. La question qui se débat aujourd'hui est donc toute nouvelle; elle ne se rattache, par aucun côté, à celle de Jérusalem, et elle touche par tous à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté du Sultan. C'est le jugement qu'en ont déjà porté, à Constantinople même, les Représentants de la France, de l'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, et de la Prusse.

Comment prétendre, en effet, que pour garantir aux Chrétiens du rit Oriental la possession de quelques sanctuaires déterminés, il faille les couvrir dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire Ottoman d'une protection officielle qui substituerait l'autorité morale de l'Empereur de Russie à celle qui revient légitimement au Grand Seigneur? Quelle corrélation existe-t-il entre deux faits si différens, et en quoi le plus important pourrait-il être considéré comme un appendice, comme une conséquence nécessaire de celui qui l'est le moins?

A l'appui de ses prétentions, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg invoque ses anciens Traités avec la Porte, rappelle des analogies historiques, et fait valoir des griefs. Ce sont, M. le Comte, ces trois ordres d'arguments que je me propose de passer en revue aussi succinctement que possible.

Quand on examine les Traités que la Russie a conclus avec la Turquie, on voit que, si elle a quelque fois stipulé pour des sujets du Sultan, ces derniers appartenaient soit à des provinces que les chances de la guerre avaient momentanément fait perdre à la Porte et à la rétrocession desquelles des conditions pouvaient être posées, soit à des provinces qui, pendant la durée des hostilités, s'étaient compromises envers le Gouvernement Ottoman et que la politique et l'humanité commandaient de protéger contre son ressentiment.

Aucune de ces stipulations n'a le caractère de généralité qu'on essaye aujourd'hui de leur attribuer, et le Traité de Koutchouk Kainardji, notamment, ne confère à la Russie qu'un droit de protection limité et défini sur une église desservie par des prêtres Russes, qu'il était question de fonder dans le faubourg de Galata. Cela ne veut pas dire assurément que dans la pratique et par la force des choses, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg n'ait été naturellement amené à s'intéresser pour les Chrétiens du rit Grec qui forment dans la Turquie d'Europe la majorité de la population. Mais si la Porte, de son côté, a du tenir compte

des sympathies de la Russie pour l'Eglise d'Orient, elle n'a pas jusqu'à présent souscrit d'engagement qui lui ôtât le mérite de sa tolérance, et lui imposât, au lieu de devoirs librement remplis à l'égard de ses propres sujets, des obligations envers une Puissance Etrangère. C'est là que réside toute la question, et en énoncer simplement les termes, c'est en démontrer déjà toute l'importance.

Les analogies auxquelles se réfère la circulaire de M. le Comte de Nesselrode, s'appliquent-elles mieux à la situation présente?

S'il est survenu entre les Princes du Saint Empire, à l'époque de la réforme, des pactes relatifs à l'exercice du culte nouveau dans leurs possessions, faut-il rappeler d'abord que cet Empire était une association d'états régie par un même chef, et ensuite que les transactions dont on parle ont été le résultat de longues guerres intestines ou de combinaisons politiques dans lesquelles le caractère électif de la dignité Impériale exerçait nécessairement une grande influence?

Quant à nos capitulations avec la Turquie, M. le Comte, vous savez qu'elles ne nous ont jamais donné le droit de protection sur les sujets Catholiques du Sultan. Si la France a pu rendre à cette fraction minime de la population Ottomane des services du genre de ceux que la Russie s'honore elle-même d'avoir rendus à ses coréligionnaires, sa protection directe et officielle ne s'est jamais exercée que sur des établissements étrangers desservis par des prêtres également étrangers et dont le chef spirituel réside à Rome. La protection de la Russie, au contraire, s'appliquerait à un clergé composé de sujets du Sultan et soumis hiérarchiquement à un patriarche qui dépend aussi de la Porte. Il n'y aurait donc aucune assimilation possible entre la position des deux Puissances.

Je consigne ici du reste un important passage d'un mémoire de M. le Comte de Saint Priest, Ambassadeur du Roi Louis XVI à Constantinople de 1768 à 1785, et qui détermine nettement le caractère de notre Protectorat. Voici comment s'exprime M. le Comte de Saint Priest:

"On a décoré le zèle de nos rois de l'expression de protection de la religion Catholique en Levant; mais elle est illusoire et servait à égarer ceux qui n'approfondissent pas la chose. Jamais les Sultans n'ont eu seulement l'idée que les monarques Français se crussent autorisés à s'immiscer de la religion des sujets de la Porte. Il n'y a point de Prince, dit fort sagement un de mes prédécesseurs, M. le Marquis de Bonnat, dans un mémoire sur cette matière, quelque étroite union qu'il ait avec un autre Souverain, qui lui permette de se mêler de la religion de ses sujets. Les Turcs sont aussi délicats que d'autres là-dessus.

"Il est aisé de comprendre que la France, n'ayant jamais traité avec la Porte qu'à titre d'amitié, n'a pu lui imposer des obligations odieuses de leur nature. Aussi le premier point de mes instructions me prescrivait d'éviter tout ce qui pourrait causer de l'ombrage à la Porte en donnant trop d'extension aux capitulations en matière de religion."

Cette citation me dispense de toute autre explication sur un point qu'elle éclaire avec une si incontestable autorité.

Ainsi donc, M. le Comte, ni les anciens Traités, ni les analogies que l'on invoque, ne peuvent servir de bases aussi solides qu'on le pense aux prétentions du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg.

Reste la question des griefs. Ce que la Russie reproche à la Porte, c'est un manque de procédés. Chaque Gouvernement, sans doute, est le seul juge des exigences de sa dignité; mais il faut, cependant, que la réparation demeure toujours proportionnée à l'offense. Or des excuses ou des regrets constituent ordinairement la réparation d'un tort de forme. C'est pour la première fois que l'on voit exiger d'un Souverain, dans un cas semblable, l'abandon de son influence morale sur la plus notable partie de ses sujets.

J'ajouterai que, si la Russie fait à la Porte un grief de ses tergiversations dans l'affaire des Lieux Saints, la France ne serait pas moins fondée à lui adresser les mêmes reproches, et que si elle s'en est abstenue, c'est qu'elle a pris en considération les embarras d'une Puissance qui, entraînée par deux courants contraires et d'une force égale, ne croyait pouvoir garder son équilibre qu'en contractant tour à tour des obligations contradictoires.

Le même esprit de modération a porté le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale à tenir compte de la différence des temps, des changements opérés, depuis un siècle, dans les rapports des diverses Puissances, et de la Russie en particulier, avec l'Empire Ottoman; et, bien que nous puissions alléguer, à



l'appui des réclamations des pères de Terre Sainte, les clauses d'un Traité formel, nous n'avons rien demandé qui dût priver les Grecs des avantages que les événements avaient placés entre leurs mains; loin de là, nous avons consenti à ce qu'on leur ouvrit un sanctuaire, celui de la Mosquée de l'Ascension, dont l'accès leur était interdit, et que les efforts tout récens d'un Ambassadeur de France, M. l'Amiral Roussin, avaient en partie restitué au culte Chrétien. Quant à cette clef de la grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem dont on a tant parlé, on a seulement oublié de dire que les Grecs en possédaient une toute semblable, et que celle des Latins, loin de leur assurer la propriété d'un temple toujours réservé à l'autre communion, ne leur accordait qu'un simple droit de passage. On n'a pas rappelé non plus qu'en réparation de l'oubli d'une promesse donné à la Légation de Russie par le Divan, quand l'Ambassade de France en recevait une différente, l'un des deux firmans destinés à régler la question des Lieux Saints a concédé, sur la demande de M. le Prince Menchikoff, au Patriarche Grec de Jerusalem la surveillance exclusive de travaux de reconstruction qu'exige l'état de la grande coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre. Tous ces faits, M. le Comte, s'ils ne peuvent pas plus invalider nos titres, sous peine du renversement des principes généralement reconnus du droit public, que ne le ferait même un Traité conclu sans notre participation, constituent néanmoins autant de dérogations plus ou moins importantes, si non aux récents engagements de la Porte envers nous, que notre dignité nous imposait le devoir de faire respecter intégralement, du moins au texte précis de nos Capitulations de 1740. Si, donc, ses intentions eussent été moins conciliantes, s'il n'eut été pénétré de cette idée qu'aucune des Parties Contractantes de la Convention du 13 Juillet, 1841, ne pouvait user de tous ses droits antérieurs à cette transaction Européenne sans courir le risque de compromettre le repos que la garantie collective des Puissances a eu pour but d'assurer à l'Empire Ottoman, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale aurait eu la pleine faculté non seulement d'opposer des réserves qui sont d'un usage constant en diplomatie, mais de faire, à son tour, entendre des menaces.

C'est une autre ligne de conduite que la France a suivie, et la modération dont elle a fait preuve, outre qu'elle lui ôte toute part de responsabilité dans la crise actuelle, lui donne également le droit d'espérer que les sacrifices qu'elle a faits pour le maintien de la tranquillité en Orient, ne seront pas perdus, et que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, mu par des considerations analogues, saura enfin trouver un moyen de concilier ses prétentions avec les prérogatives de la souveraineté du Sultan, et trancher autrement que par la force un différend dont tant d'intérêts attendent aujourd'hui la solution.

Je vous autorise, M. le Comte, à communiquer cette dépêche à Lord Clarendon.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

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No. 2.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 101.)

*Foreign Office, July* 2, 1853.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency's despatches from No. 102 to No. 111 both inclusive, the last of the 17th ultimo, were received at this office in the night of the 30th ultimo, and have been laid before the Queen.

I have to acquaint your Excellency in reply to your despatch No. 102 of the 16th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government approve of the note addressed by Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode in reply to his note of the 31st of May.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 3.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 102.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 2, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to the Sultan at the audience with His Highness of which a report is contained in your despatch No. 103 of the 16th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 4.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 103.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 2, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government concur in the reasons which induced you to consider the offer made by the Porte to send an Embassy to St. Petersburgh expedient at the present moment.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 5.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 125.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 2, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government highly approve the letters which you addressed to Count Nesselrode, and of which copies are inclosed in your despatches Nos. 302 and 306, of the 18th and 21st ultimo, with the object of inducing the Emperor of Russia to act with greater moderation in the pending discussions with the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 6.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 126.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 2, 1853.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to No. 317 of the 25th ultimo, inclusive.

I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings and the language held by you to Count Nesselrode, as reported in your despatches Nos. 313 and 314, of the 24th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 7.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 113.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 18, 1853.*

INCLOSED herewith is a translation of a firman addressed to the agent, or chief, of the Protestant subjects of the Porte, simultaneously with those which were delivered several days ago by Reshid Pasha to the heads of the other religious communities, not Mussulman, in Turkey.

I also forward herewith a translation of the Turkish memorandum by which the several firmans have been communicated to the Representatives of Austria, Great Britain, France, and Prussia, by order of the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

*Memorandum of the Porte to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Translation.) *June 12, 1853.*

HIS Imperial Majesty the Sultan, in order to afford a fresh proof of his Royal benevolence towards all classes of his subjects, has issued Imperial orders adorned with the Royal cypher, addressed to the Greek, Armenian, and Catholic Patriarchs, to the Protestant Agent, and to the Chief Priest of the Jews, confirming their religious privileges, and the rights and immunities belonging to their churches and other places appertaining to them.

Copies of these firmans are inclosed for your Excellency's perusal.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

*Imperial Firman addressed to the Agent of the Protestants.*

(Translation.)

TO the Agent of the Protestants, Stephen; may his honours increase!

Decreed:—

God, the dispenser of mercies, in placing my august person, in pursuance of his eternal will, upon the glorious and exalted throne of the Imperial Caliphate, having confided to my Royal hands and Sovereign rule as a sacred and special deposit—to him be the thanks and glory!—numerous countries and cities and many people of all classes and nations, ever since the glorious day on which I ascended the throne, according to the Imperial duties imposed upon the Caliphate, my Government has never ceased (by the Divine Grace), conformably with my Royal will and sincere and benevolent intentions, to give practically their constant and careful attention that all classes of my Imperial subjects should enjoy full protection, and that they should be more especially one and all at perfect ease with regard to their religious and spiritual affairs.

The beneficial effects and advantages accruing thereby have been at all times manifest, and it is my ardent and Imperial desire that no abuses whatever should arise out of negligence or carelessness. I therefore wish and require that the special concessions granted by me in favour of my faithful Protestant subjects, concerning their worship and religious affairs and all other concerns relating thereto, should be at all times preserved inviolate; and my peremptory Imperial orders have been issued, to wit, that no contravention whatever of those concessions should take place, and that any persons acting in contravention thereto should know that they will thereby incur my Royal displeasure.

In order to remove all grounds of excuse on the part of those who should

lie guilty of negligence in these matters, communication hereof has been made to the necessary authorities; and this high decree has been issued from my Imperial Divan in public confirmation of my Royal intentions for the complete and truthful execution hereof.

You, the aforesaid agent, shall on receipt of these presents act always in conformity with this Imperial order, and be careful in abstaining from any contravention thereof. On the occurrence of anything inconsistent with this peremptory decision you will hasten to make immediate representation thereof to our Sublime Porte.

Be it therefore thus made known unto you, giving full credence to my Imperial cypher.

Given in the third decade of the illustrious Moon of Shaban in the year 1269 (beginning of June, 1853).

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No. 8.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 115.)

*Therapia, June 20, 1853.*

My Lord,

NOTHING has yet come to my knowledge in confirmation of the intelligence transmitted to the Porte a few days ago by the agent of Prince Ghika, and purporting that the Russian army had already crossed the frontier of Moldavia, and were within two hours' march of Jassy.

This deficiency in our advices from the scene of action is the less important, as I learn from the correspondence received with your Lordship's instructions to the 8th instant by Queen's messenger Capel, that the Russian Government had declared its intentions of passing the frontier and occupying one or both of the Danubian Principalities the moment an unfavourable answer to Count Nesselrode's letter of the $\frac{14}{26}$ ultimo should be received at Odessa.

Of this intention I have admonished Reshid Pasha, and I have also communicated on the same subject with M. de la Cour.

I find them both disposed to act on my opinion, such as I have already announced to your Lordship in the anticipation of that very measure which Russia has now declared its resolution to adopt.

The military occupation of any part of the Ottoman Empire without the consent of the Porte would, no doubt, justify a recourse to hostilities. But the preservation of peace, so long as it is possible to preserve it with a chance of settling by negotiation the existing difference, is of such deep importance that I have not hesitated to advise forbearance on the approaching invasion of the Ottoman territory. It is notorious that the Principalities are placed under circumstances of a special character with reference to the neighbouring Powers, and the consequences of a foreign military occupation within their limits are in practice by no means so likely to disturb the interests of the Porte as if a similar act of aggression were committed against those parts of the Empire which are directly administered by this Government. It may be added that, in a military point of view, resistance could not be offered to Russia in that quarter under present circumstances with any prospect of success.

Reasoning from the above distinction the Porte, I conceive, may defer the moment of actual and reciprocal hostilities without discredit or increase of risk, until an opportunity is afforded for learning the sentiments entertained by Her Majesty's Government as well as by that of France.

Agreeably to the same course of policy, I have advised Reshid Pasha not to withdraw the Hospodars immediately on the entrance of the Russian forces; and I have prepared an instruction for the guidance of Her Majesty's Consuls at Jassy and Bucharest.

Of this instruction I inclose herewith a copy, and solicit your Lordship's attention to its contents, as offering a more complete account of the motives and limitations under which I have framed it, in the hope of your Lordship's approval.



It is scarcely necessary for me to state that by protesting, instead of going to war, on the occupation of the Principalities, the question of bringing up the squadron to Constantinople is at least adjourned.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 8.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Gardner.*

*Therapia, June 20, 1853.*

Sir,

NOTWITHSTANDING the delusive appearances of quiet mentioned in the last report which I have received from you, there is no longer room for doubt as to the intentions of the Russian Government with respect to the two Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. An occupation of one or of both those provinces by the armies of Russia will take place with very little, if any delay; not, as on a former occasion with the consent and participation of Turkey, but for purposes adverse, if not hostile, to the views and interests of the Porte.

I have reason to presume that the Sultan's Government will not take full advantage of their right to resist such an invasion, and that, in a spirit of peace and conciliation, they will rather be disposed to learn the opinion of friendly Powers before they commit themselves to any act of defensive hostility.

It is natural to expect as a result of this principle, that the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia will not be instructed to retire so long as they are allowed to keep up an unrestrained intercourse with the Porte, and so long as the existing institutions of each province are respected.

It appears to me that in the supposed case you will have no difficulty in remaining at your post, and in the discharge of your Consular functions, without any diminution of that respect and independence which attach to your official station under ordinary circumstances.

Should the policy adopted by Russia, on taking military possession of the provinces, be such as to oblige the Porte to withdraw its immediate representatives, the Hospodars, I shall not omit to furnish you with a fresh instruction adapted to the occasion; and, meanwhile, you will only act with necessary prudence in preparing with as little display or movement as possible, for a temporary suspension of your Consular functions, and perhaps your eventual retirement from the scene of their exercise.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 9.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 255.)

*Vienna, June 28, 1853.*

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL, in speaking to me of the note of Reshid Pasha of the 16th instant to Count Nesselrode, has expressed his fears that it will not be accepted by the Russian Government as terminating the differences with the Porte. He thinks there are contradictions in this note, and particularly where it is said that it was impossible "de consigner dans un engagement diplomatique les privilèges religieux;" when afterwards it is stated that the note proposed to Prince Menchikoff "contenait toutes les assurances demandées," and again where it is said, "la Sublime Porte n'hésitera jamais à maintenir et à donner les assurances contenues et promises dans le projet de note." Count Buol says, that assurances given in a diplomatic note between two Ministers charged with the Foreign Affairs of their respective States, constitute an engagement, and therefore that there need have been no difficulty in giving those assurances and in transmitting the late firmans, and in stating that what was therein

contained was a concession and a promise of the Sultan to his subjects, and therefore an engagement taken towards them, which engagement he could not doubt the Emperor would consider as an inviolable pledge which could not be forfeited.

Count Buol stated that he should instruct Baron Bruck to bring his sentiments before Reshid Pasha, and inform him that if he would give the assurances he had formerly promised, and declare that the Ambassador whom he proposed to send to St. Petersburgh would be charged to state them to the Emperor, at the same time that he would submit to him the firmans and the acts of grace the Sultan had lately issued, together with the declaration of the firm determination of maintaining them which was involved in his engagement towards his own subjects, he would in the strongest manner recommend to the Russian Cabinet to accept this mission and these assurances, and thus to bring to a close in a manner which would be honourable to both Parties, the unfortunate disagreement at present existing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 10.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 260.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 30, 1853.*

THE Emperor of Russia, some time ago, requested His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria to depute a General officer to be present at the military inspections and reviews which are about to take place at St. Petersburgh, and in conformity with this desire Lieutenant-General Giulay, the Governor of Milan, has been designated for that mission, and he has this day left Vienna to fulfil its duties.

This officer is charged with an autograph letter from his Sovereign to the Emperor of Russia, strongly recommending him as possessing his entire confidence.

Although General Giulay has no political character, yet he has been made acquainted with the tenor of the despatches of which he is the bearer to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, M. de Lebzeltern, and he will use whatever opportunity may be afforded him to recommend to the Emperor the views of his Government, and to bring before him the dangerous complications which would undoubtedly arise from the occupation of the Principalities upon the refusal of the Porte to conform to the ultimatum transmitted by the note of Count Nesselrode of the 31st of May, and the hope that, by the mediation of the Allies of His Imperial Majesty and of the Sultan, such an arrangement may be arrived at as shall be satisfactory to both Parties.

In case these anxious desires of this Government should not be obtained, and General Giulay should find the occupation of the Principalities already accomplished or decided upon, he is then instructed to seek an opportunity strongly to urge the Emperor of Russia not to enter those provinces with any force which would create an apprehension that his views surpassed the object of obtaining a guarantee for the reparation he desired; an object which would as completely be fulfilled by a small body of troops as by an army.

As General Giulay is one of the most distinguished officers in the Imperial army, it is hoped that his influence may be beneficially exerted to promote the objects of his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 11.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 260.)
My Lord, *Berlin, July 1, 1853.*

THE Austrian Lieutenant-General Count Giulay, who had been suddenly summoned from Milan to Vienna, is expected to pass through Berlin this night on his way to St. Petersburgh by Stettin.

The ostensible object of Count Giulay's journey is to attend the summer reviews near St. Petersburgh, but it is believed that the Austrian Government are desirous, in consequence of the absence of Count Mensdorff from his post, to have a confidential agent near the Emperor of Russia at the present critical moment, and a person of greater importance than the functionary now in charge of the Imperial Legation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 12.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 261.)
My Lord, *Berlin, July 1, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL went to the country some days ago, and I have consequently been unable to hold any communication with his Excellency since the arrival of your Lordship's last despatches.

I saw M. de le Coq, the Under Secretary of State, this morning, but he assured me that no intelligence of importance connected with Eastern affairs had reached the Foreign Department, except a copy of the answer returned on the 16th ultimo by Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode's letter of the 31st May. He read this communication to me, observing that it appeared to him to be a dignified, well-reasoned paper, and that although he had no hope it would be received as it ought to be at St. Petersburgh, he must consider that it contained assurances that should satisfy the Russian Government, if they were disposed to accept anything short of their demands.

We had some conversation on the possible occupation of the Principalities, and it appears to be the impression here that there is no question at present of any other warlike demonstration being attempted, but that Russia will quietly hold these Turkish provinces, and refuse to evacuate them until the Porte shall be induced to yield to her demands.

We conversed about the feeling that would be excited in Austria by this occupation, and he said that he thought that in one way it would have a salutary effect, as it could not fail to be hurtful to her interests, and must impress on her the necessity of uniting with the Western Powers in endeavouring to arrest the further advance of Russian predominance in the East.

Baron Budberg, whom I saw yesterday, and questioned as to whether orders had been sent from St. Petersburgh to occupy the Principalities, said that he had no positive information on the subject, but he gave me to understand that he believed they had been dispatched on the 24th ultimo. He was not, however, at all certain on the subject, though he appeared not to entertain the least doubt, if they had not been already sent, that there would be no delay in forwarding them, observing that the presence of the combined squadron at the Dardanelles was looked upon as a menace, before which the Emperor could not have the appearance of yielding.

The Russian Minister said further that he had just heard from Baron Meyendorff, from Vienna, that Count Buol had expressed his disapprobation of the Porte's having rejected the note as altered by Prince Menchikoff, at Odessa, for he considered the terms of it were nearly those which the Porte had at one time agreed to accept.

I think it right to report this to your Lordship, as it may possibly be the impression which Baron Meyendorff has described to his Government as having been produced by this document at Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 13.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 189.)

*Foreign Office, July 4, 1853.*

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO on the 28th ultimo read to me a despatch from Count Buol, reporting a conversation with the Baron de Bourqueney, who had been desired by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to inform him of the combined action of France and England upon Turkish affairs, and to point out the advantages that would ensue from a combined action between the Four Powers, having for its basis the Treaty of 1841, which in the opinion of M. Drouyn de Lhuys imposes upon the Powers who signed it an obligation to make identical efforts for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire.

Upon this Count Buol observes that the Treaty of July 13, 1841, strictly imposes upon the Five Powers no other obligation than that of conforming to the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire for closing the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to foreign ships of war so long as the Porte remains at peace; but that the Treaty originated in the unanimous desire of the Great Powers to establish by a solemn act their union and the entire identity of their intentions for the establishment of European peace.

Count Buol adds that the Austrian Government fully admit that the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire is an essential condition of general peace, and that they will zealously aid in maintaining that Empire in the present moment of difficulty, although they cannot give to the Treaty of 1841 an interpretation more extended than the one above mentioned.

It follows, however, Count Buol says, that if the actual complication should unfortunately end in war, Austria would claim for herself and would recognize in other Powers who signed the Treaty of 1841 an entire liberty of action; and that if she did not act conjointly with the Three Powers, it was because she believed that acting singly was likely to lead to more useful results. Nevertheless, in eventually using this liberty of action for the re-establishment of peace and the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as an element of European equilibrium, all the efforts of Austria in the present phases of the question must tend to prevent things from coming to this extremity.

With this object Count Buol informs Count Colloredo, that on the 16th instant he had instructed the Baron de Lebzeltern to renew to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh the most earnest entreaties (les plus vives instances) that the Russian troops should not enter the Principalities, provided that the Sultan upon refusing to sign the project of note of Prince Menchikoff, should show himself animated by an undoubted desire to come to a frank understanding with Russia; that the serious attention of the Court of St. Petersburgh had at the same time been drawn to the grave consequences of an eventual occupation of the Principalities, whether the Porte should regard it as a declaration of war, or whether it submitted to it as a hard and inevitable necessity without opposing to it a material resistance.

The Austrian Government has advised the Porte to adopt the latter alternative, in case the united efforts of the Cabinets should unfortunately fail in dissuading the Emperor of Russia from occupying the Principalities, and has recommended the Turkish Government to consider the assurances of the Emperor, that in occupying the Principalities he no more intended to make war on the Porte than he aimed at territorial aggrandisement; that so long as the Porte did not itself proclaim war, the Treaty of 1841 would in the opinion of the Austrian Government retain its obligatory force upon the Powers which signed it.

Upon that hypothesis means of negotiation would still exist, and the Powers would have time to bring their conciliatory action to bear upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, which in the meantime would be in a moral impossibility to send troops beyond the Danube.

In the other alternative the Porte would doubtless open a field for disasters of an incalculable extent.

The despatch closes with the expression of a hope that instructions in



conformity with the views of the Austrian Government may be sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I told Count Colloredo that Her Majesty's Government would learn with much satisfaction that instructions of the nature described in Count Buol's despatch had been sent to St. Petersburgh, as it was impossible not to expect that the moral influence of Austria, well directed, would have weight with the Emperor of Russia, who must naturally be disinclined to expose Austria to the serious dangers that the occupation of the Principalities would inevitably entail upon her.

I also informed Count Colloredo that generally Her Majesty's Government concurred in the interpretation of the Treaty of 1841 given by Count Buol, and admitted that the Articles alone had a binding and obligatory force upon the Powers that signed the Treaty; but at the same time I must observe that the preamble not only denoted the spirit and intentions of those Powers, but it also recorded a principle of European policy, and that Her Majesty's Government at the present moment were animated by the same spirit and had in view the same objects as in 1841.

These objects then, as now, were the maintenance of peace and of the Ottoman Empire, and that in furtherance of them the Austrian Government might reckon upon our most cordial cooperation. Our advice to the Sultan had been given in the same sense as that offered to His Highness by the Austrian Government with respect to the occupation of the Principalities, and we had recommended him in the first instance strongly to protest, but not to exercise his undoubted right of declaring war against Russia whenever this utterly unjustifiable act of violence should be perpetrated; but I requested Count Colloredo distinctly to understand and to convey to Count Buol that this forbearance on the part of the Porte must not be reckoned upon for any length of time, as the occupation of the Principalities without a declaration of war meant nothing but that the Emperor of Russia intended to give himself all the benefits of a state of peace without incurring any of the risks of war, and that he desired to keep the Treaty of 1841 in full vigour, and the Dardanelles closed against the fleet of England and France, while he gained time for preparing his armament and for making fresh demands on Turkey, whose resources would gradually become exhausted.

It was impossible, I said, that the Porte could long submit to the continuance of such a state of things, and it was the earnest desire, therefore, of Her Majesty's Government, in the event of the Principalities being occupied, that the result of any fresh negotiations that might be undertaken should be ascertained with the least possible delay.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 14.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 190.)

*Foreign Office, July 4, 1853.*

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 251 of the 27th ultimo, reporting what passed between your Lordship and Count Buol on the Turkish question, and I have to instruct your Lordship to convey to Count Buol the best thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the clear and satisfactory explanation he has given of his views and the policy of the Austrian Government. Her Majesty's Government being sincerely desirous to cooperate with that of Austria towards the maintenance of peace and of the Ottoman Empire, and anxious therefore that their respective views, and as far as possible their mode of action, should be identical, would have felt themselves wanting in duty towards Austria if they had not unreservedly communicated to Count Buol the reports which had reached them from an apparently authentic source, and which tended to throw doubt upon the assurances which Her Majesty's Government had received with so much satisfaction from Count Colloredo and from your Lordship.

Her Majesty's Government have now an additional pleasure in having performed this duty, as it puts them more fully in possession than before of the sentiments of the Austrian Cabinet, and of the course which it has hitherto adopted, and that which it proposes to pursue in order to induce the Emperor of Russia to take a more correct view of his demands upon Turkey, of the great danger to which he exposes the peace of Europe, and in fact of his own position; for that position must be unsound and erroneous which compels the allies of His Imperial Majesty, who are most interested in maintaining friendly relations with Russia, to unite in condemnation of his proceedings.

Upon the nature of Prince Menchikoff's proposals Count Buol's own judgment is so correct, and the resolution of the Porte not to accede to them has throughout been so firm and unwavering, that the determination of the Russian Government to throw upon Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the sole blame of their rejection would be incomprehensible if it were possible that it could be sincere. Notwithstanding that this strange fiction is still persisted in, and that the Emperor appears possessed with the erroneous idea that England is opposed to any claims he may justly be entitled to urge upon Turkey, Her Majesty's Government will not be deterred from pursuing their peaceful policy, and endeavouring that the difficulty shall be solved with due regard to the honour of the Emperor and the safety of the Sultan. Under the circumstances, however, and having regard to the position of intimacy in which Austria stands with respect to Russia, Her Majesty's Government feel that the moral influence of Austria must at this moment be greater than that which England or any other Power can exercise at St. Petersburgh, and they cannot too strongly recommend that the Austrian Government should persist in their remonstrances against the ill-advised course which the Emperor of Russia seems determined to pursue, and which may shortly be attended with such disastrous results to Europe.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 15.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No 105.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 4, 1853.*

I RECEIVED last night by the messenger Webster your despatches from No. 112 to No. 116, both inclusive, the last of the 20th of June.

I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have received with satisfaction the firman issued by the Sultan in behalf of his Protestant subjects, inclosed in your despatch No. 113 of the 18th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 16.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 106.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 4, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 115 of the 20th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the advice given by you to the Porte, and the instructions which you have addressed to Her Majesty's Consuls in the Principalities, with reference to the expected entrance of the Russian forces into those Provinces.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 17.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 505. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, July 4, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith an article from the "Moniteur," by which your Lordship will see that 40,000 stand of arms have been ceded by the French to the Turkish Government.

This article has been written in consequence of a demand made by M. de Kisseleff of M. Drouyn de Lhuys as to the truth of the statement which he had seen in the "Constitutionnel," to the effect that arms had been furnished by the French Government to Turkey, and French officers sent into the service of the Porte. M. de Kisseleff added, that these facts, if true, constituted an act of war on the part of France.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, "That he could not at the moment reply as to the question of facts, but that he had at once a word to say on the assumption of M. de Kisseleff, that, should they prove true, they were acts of war. France had constantly supplied States in alliance with her with arms on their demand, and French officers had for many years been in the Turkish service. Besides, Russia had no right to treat the Oriental question to-day as a question of peace, to-morrow as one of war. Russia had herself declared, that in occupying the Principalities she was not at war with Turkey. Why then was France to show hostile intentions if she supplied Turkey with a certain quantity of arms?"

"But," said M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. Kisseleff, "I will answer your question by another. Why have you bought such enormous quantities of quinine in France? It can only be in preparation for a campaign in the marshy regions of the Danube. Answer my question, and I will answer yours."

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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Inclosure in No. 17.

*Extract from the "Moniteur."*

*Paris, le 2 Juillet.*

LE Gouvernement a déjà plusieurs fois décliné toute responsabilité dans les articles de la presse, en dehors du journal officiel. L'importance qu'on a semblé attacher à de récentes publications rend une nouvelle déclaration nécessaire. Il est également utile de démentir et de rectifier les faits qui pourraient donner une fausse direction à l'opinion.

Ainsi, un journal a annoncé que le Gouvernement avait vendu 50 ou 60 mille fusils à la Porte Ottomane. Il y a eu, en effet, une cession de 40 mille fusils; mais, dans cette circonstance, le Gouvernement ne s'est pas écarté de l'usage invariablement suivi à l'égard des Puissances amies de la France.

On a dit aussi que des officiers Français avaient reçu du Ministre de la Guerre l'autorisation de prendre du service dans l'armée Turque. Ce fait est entièrement controuvé.

Lorsque le Gouvernement a des communications à faire au public, il se sert exclusivement de la voie du "Moniteur."

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No. 18.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 506. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, July 4, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read me this morning the copy of a despatch which he addressed yesterday to Count Walewski for communication to your Lordship, and in which he recounts the substance of a conversation which he

had had with M. de Kisseleff on the subject of a supposed proposition made by M. de Bourqueney for the settlement of the Oriental question.

As your Lordship will have seen this despatch, I need not enter into any detail of its contents; but it led M. Drouyn de Lhuys, while alluding to the preference given by Russia to M. de Bourqueney's proposal over that attributed to Lord Westmorland, to remark on the manner in which every opportunity was seized by Russian agents to separate France from England. He then said that he had received a confidential despatch from the French Minister at Berlin, dated the 30th ultimo, detailing a conversation which he had had with the Russian Minister, in which the possibility of an arrangement under M. de Bourqueney's plan was likewise alluded to by Baron Budberg. During the conversation, Baron Budberg appears to have thrown out hints that it would not be difficult for Russia and France to understand each other on the Oriental question, adding a profusion of expressions complimentary to the Emperor of the French, and of assurances of friendship which not only his own Emperor but all the Russian nation felt for the French nation.

M. de Moustier seems to have replied with a great deal of tact, that the Emperor Napoleon had no particular predilections, but wished to be well with all the Courts of Europe. So much suspicion had been shown of the sinister intentions of France in respect to the observance of existing Treaties, that he was not sorry that France should have an opportunity of proving that she not only respected, but, the necessity arising, was willing to defend them.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys assures me that the only trace in M. de Bourqueney's correspondence of the plan attributed to him, appears in a despatch dated the 11th ultimo, where that Minister recounts the substance of a long conversation which he had had with M. de Meyendorff, in which the plan in question was one of the expedients for a settlement put forward on the part of the Russian Minister at Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 19.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 507. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 4, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS was good enough to read to me this morning a despatch which he had received from the French Consul at Bucharest, giving an account of the feeling of the people of Wallachia at the expected arrival of the Russians. It appears to have been one of despair.

M. Poujade details further a confidential conversation which he had had with Prince Stirbey, in which the same feeling is predominant; but the curious part of the conversation was, that the Prince said that there was but one safe course for the Porte to pursue, that being to declare the independence of the Principalities under their Hospodars, and to place that independence under the protection of the Great Powers. He urged M. Poujade to write in this sense to his Ambassador at Constantinople.

If M. Poujade's impressions are correct, there is certainly no feeling in favour of the Russians in the Principality of Wallachia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 20.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 318.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 27, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a Manifesto issued this morning, but dated yesterday, Sunday, announcing the advance of the Russian armies into the Danubian Principalities.

The words underlined in the translation are considered by Russians as indicating in the original, that the troops have already entered the Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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Inclosure in No. 20.

*Manifesto.*

(Translation.)

IT is known to all our faithful subjects that the defence of the Orthodox Religion was from time immemorial the vow of our glorious forefathers.

From the time that it pleased Providence to intrust to us our hereditary throne, the defence of these holy obligations, inseparable from it, was the constant object of our solicitude and care; and these, based on the glorious Treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by other subsequent solemn Treaties with the Ottoman Porte, were ever directed to insure the inviolability of the Orthodox Church.

But to our great grief, recently, in despite of our efforts to defend the inviolability of the rights and privileges of our Orthodox Church, various arbitrary acts of the Porte have infringed these rights, and threaten, at least, the complete overthrow of the long perpetuated order so dear to orthodoxy.

Our exertions to restrain the Porte from similar deeds have proved fruitless, and even the solemnly pledged word of the Sultan to ourselves was soon faithlessly broken.

Having exhausted all persuasion and, with them, every means for obtaining pacific satisfaction of our just demands, *we have found it needful to advance our armies into the Danubian Principalities*, in order to show the Ottoman Porte to what its obstinacy may lead.

But even now we have not the intention to commence war.

By the occupation of the Principalities we desire to have such a security in our hands as will insure us in every event the restoration of our rights.

It is not conquest that we seek, Russia needs it not; we seek satisfaction for a just right so clearly infringed. We are ready even now to arrest the movement of our armies, if the Ottoman Porte will bind itself solemnly to observe the inviolability of the Orthodox Church.

But if blindness and obstinacy decide for the contrary, then, calling God to our aid, we shall leave the decision of the struggle to him, and, in full confidence in his omnipotent right hand, we shall march forwards for the Orthodox Church.

*St. Petersburgh, Sunday, June* $\frac{14}{26}$, 1853.

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*French Translation of Manifesto published in St. Petersburgh Journal of* $\frac{14}{26}$ *June*, 1853.

PAR la grâce de Dieu, nous, Nicolas Premier, Empereur et Autocrate de toutes les Russies, &c.

Savoir faisons:

Il est à la connaissance de nos fidèles et bien-aimés sujets que, de temps immémorial, nos glorieux prédécesseurs ont fait vœu de défendre la foi Orthodoxe.

Depuis l'instant où il a plu à la Divine Providence de nous transmettre

le Trône héréditaire, l'observation de ces devoirs sacrés qui en sont inséparables a constamment été l'objet de nos soins et de notre sollicitude. Basés sur le glorieux Traité de Kaïnardji, confirmé par les transactions solennelles, conclues postérieurement avec la Porte Ottomane, ces soins et cette sollicitude ont toujours eu pour but de garantir les droits de l'Eglise Orthodoxe.

Mais, à notre profonde affliction, malgré tous nos efforts pour défendre l'intégrité des droits et privilèges de notre Eglise Orthodoxe, dans ces derniers temps, de nombreux actes arbitraires du Gouvernement Ottoman ont porté atteinte à ces droits, et menaçaient enfin d'anéantir complétement tout l'ordre de choses sanctionné par les siècles, et si cher à la foi Orthodoxe.

Nos efforts pour détourner la Porte d'actes semblables sont restés infructueux, et même la parole solennelle, que le Sultan nous avait donnée en cette occasion, n'a pas tardé à être violée.*

Après avoir épuisé toutes les voies de la persuasion, et tous les moyens d'obtenir à l'amiable la satisfaction due à nos justes réclamations, *nous avons jugé indispensable de faire entrer nos troupes dans les Principautés Danubiennes*, afin de montrer à la Porte où peut la conduire son opiniâtreté. Toutefois, même à présent, notre intention n'est point de commencer la guerre; par l'occupation des Principautés nous voulons avoir entre les mains un gage qui nous réponde en tout état de cause du rétablissement de nos droits.

Nous ne cherchons point de conquêtes; la Russie n'en a pas besoin. Nous demandons qu'il soit satisfait à un droit légitime si ouvertement enfreint. Nous sommes prêts, même dès à présent, à arrêter le mouvement de nos troupes, si la Porte Ottomane s'engage à observer religieusement l'intégrité des privilèges de l'Eglise Orthodoxe. Mais, si l'obstination et l'aveuglement veulent absolument le contraire, alors, appelant Dieu à notre aide, nous nous en remettrons à lui du soin de décider de notre différend, et plein d'espoir en sa main toute puissante, nous marcherons à la défense de la foi Orthodoxe.

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No. 21.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 108.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 6, 1853.*

I HAVE received from Mr. Consul Saunders a copy of his despatch to your Excellency No. 16 of the 16th of June, respecting the exactions to which the Christian population within his district continues to be exposed; and I have to instruct your Excellency again to press upon the Porte the urgent necessity of not giving cause for complaint to its Christian subjects. It is deplorable that at such a moment as the present it should be necessary to address to the Porte remonstrances on this point.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 22.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 109.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 6, 1853.*

ALTHOUGH Mr. Consul Saunders will probably have reported direct to your Excellency upon the withdrawal of the regular troops from the districts in his neighbourhood, I nevertheless transmit to you copies of his despatches to me on that subject, and I have to instruct you to state to the Turkish Ministers, that Her Majesty's Government cannot but view with great apprehension the removal of these troops, and the substitution for them of undisciplined Albanian levies.

Your Excellency will request to be informed what precautions have been taken by the Porte to protect the inhabitants of those districts from the excesses usually committed by these irregular bands; and you will warn the Porte, that the recurrence of such scenes as have formerly been witnessed as the result of

* The word "perfidiously" or "faithlessly" is omitted in this translation.



the employment of Albanian Irregulars, would not only be serious as affecting that portion of the Sultan's subjects who might suffer from them, but might also lead to grave political consequences.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 23.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 320. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 27, 1853.*

GENERAL CASTELBAJAC acquaints me, in the strictest confidence, that he learned yesterday from the Chancellor, that, in the course of a conversation which took place lately at Vienna between M. de Bourqueney and Baron Meyendorff, the former of these Ministers struck out an idea for settling the differences between Russia and the Porte, which was considered by the Russian Envoy so practical that he immediately communicated it to his Government, by whom, as the Chancellor proceeded to state, it was regarded as perfectly acceptable.

According to M. de Bourqueney's plan, a Turkish Minister should be dispatched to St. Petersburgh, as bearer of the note twice proposed in vain by Russia.

It was, however, to be agreed, that this note was to be delivered only upon the clear understanding that a corresponding answer (the terms of which should be previously agreed upon) should be returned on behalf of the Emperor, in which His Majesty should express the sense which he attributed to the protecting power conferred upon him, and should at the same time give satisfactory assurances of the temperate use which he should ever make of them.

While declaring to General Castelbajac the readiness of the Emperor to lend himself to a solution of difficulties of this kind, brought about by the mediation of a friendly Court (that of Austria was probably to be understood), the Chancellor expressed strongly the opinion that His Imperial Majesty would never be induced to submit the examination of his differences with the Sultan to a conference of the Allied Ministers.

In this respect, the Emperor probably displays his sagacity, as it is difficult to believe that the sentence of a tolerably impartial tribunal could be otherwise than unfavourable to the exorbitant demands of Russia.

I am eager to take this opportunity of stating to your Lordship that I carefully avoid speaking to my French colleague of those operations of the Russians on the shores of the Sea of Aral which are so well calculated to give umbrage to Her Majesty's Government. I observe this reserve, because I should be sorry that the French Mission should infer that there existed any grounds of difference between England and Russia, which were not common to France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 24.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 321. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 27, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing to your Lordship a copy of the confidential letter which was addressed to me on the 26th instant by the Chancellor, giving some explanations as to the rights to which Russia is entitled by the Treaty of Kainardji, and of those enjoyed *ab antiquo* by the Greek subjects of the Porte,

which it was now endeavoured to place under the solemn and recognized Protectorate of the Emperor.

Count Nesselrode alludes to the Greek Protocol No. 3, in proof of England having been an acquiescent party to the Protectorate rights, a portion of which were made over by the Crown of France to that of Greece; and in my reply, a copy of which I have likewise the honour of transmitting, I have remarked that the Protocol in question offers at least tolerably conclusive evidence that, as regards a point of such European importance as any question relating to the independence of Turkey, no decision has hitherto been taken excepting after negotiation between the Powers interested in the existence of the Ottoman Empire.

It is always desirable to avoid all unnecessary discussion; had it been otherwise, I might have referred to the nature of the Protectorate exercised in Turkey, as explained in Colonel Rose's despatch No. 89, of the 27th September last, upon the authority of the French Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 24.

*Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(Confidentielle.)

Mon cher Sir Hamilton, *St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{14}{26}$ *Juin*, 1853.

LE meilleur moyen de résoudre les questions, est de ne point les compliquer gratuitement en leur donnant plus de portée sérieuse qu'elles n'en ont entre gens de bonne foi, et de ne point les pressurer, pour en faire sortir à toute force d'avance toutes les conséquences possibles ou imaginables.

Permettez-moi de vous dire que votre Gouvernement va chercher bien loin la signification de ce terme *ab antiquo*. Quand nous demandons le maintien des droits, privilèges et immunités accordés au culte Grec *ab antiquo* par les Sultans, nous voulons dire le maintien des droits, &c. &c., dont ce culte jouit actuellement et qu'une jouissance *ab antiquo* a consacré par la coutume; mais nous n'avons nulle intention d'aller déterrer *ex antiquo*, ou chercher *in antiquum* (Je ne suis pas bien sûr de parler correctement Latin), des droits dont la religion et le clergé ont pu jouir originairement autrefois, mais dont ils ne jouissent plus aujourd'hui.

Le maintien strict du *status quo* actuel, tel qu'il résulte des privilèges accordés successivement aux Grecs par les Sultans et confirmés par leur successeur régnant aujourd'hui, c'est là tout ce que nous réclamons. Nous voulons conserver, non ressusciter. Nous ne demandons rien de nouveau, comme aussi rien de retroactif.

Nous en tenons à la base du présent, sans prétendre exhumer du passé des privilèges que l'Eglise a pu obtenir momentanément à l'origine de l'établissement des premiers Sultans en Europe, mais qu'elle a cessé de posséder à l'heure qu'il est par l'effet du temps, des changements administratifs, ou de la désuétude.

Veuillez relire le Protocole du 3 Février 1830, No. 3, relatif aux affaires Grecques; et sur lequel j'ai déjà appelé votre attention. En fait de droits, immunités, privilèges, cet Acte pourra vous donner l'exacte mesure des garanties que nous demandons, et que nous avons, vous et nous, accordées sans difficultés à la France.

Vous avez vous-même, à une époque, ou apparemment vous ne regardiez pas comme attentatoire en principe à l'indépendance du Sultan le protectorat que la France, plus explicite et plus franche qu'aujourd'hui, déclarait exercer traditionellement en Turquie sur les Catholiques sujets du Sultan, imposé avec nous à la Grèce indépendante le maintien d'immunités telles que nous les demandons. Il a été arrêté par vous, Grande Bretagne (et cela par un acte diplomatique autrement significatif qu'une simple note), que la religion Catholique jouirait dans le nouvel état du libre et public exercice de son culte, que ses propriétés seraient respectées, que les évêques seraient maintenus dans l'integrité des fonctions, droits, et privilèges dont ils avaient joui auparavant



sous le patronage des Rois de France, &c. &c. Eh bien! c'est là précisément la genre de droits, immunités, ou privilèges, dont nous demandons le maintien en Turquie pour notre culte, son clergé, et ses possessions, le tout sous l'égide du Sultan, ce qui est, certes, plus poli pour lui que le patronage si nettement articulé des Rois de France.

Vous faut-il un précédent? Nous nous en tiendrons à celui-là.

Et lorsque l'on fait dire à la Porte, comme dans sa dernière note aux Représentants des quatre Puissances: "que stipuler avec un Gouvernement étranger par sened, convention, note ou declaration quelconque, les droits, privilèges et immunités en faveur d'une communauté sujette à la Porte, lors même qu'il ne s'agirait que de la religion, du culte, et de l'église, cela touche aux droits d'indépendance et aux bases fondamentales de la Puissance qui s'engage,—on renverse par là la base et l'on repudie en principe le Protocole auquel, d'accord avec nous, l'Angleterre comme la France ont apposé leur signature.

Permettez-moi encore une remarque. La France possède avec la Turquie des capitulations, confirmées successivement, mais dont la première origine remonte jusqu'au seizième siècle, et qui, si elles étaient prises à la lettre, lui donneraient à la rigueur le droit d'exiger le rétablissement de l'état de possession des Lieux Saints sur le pied où il se trouvait du temps de François I. Mais la France sent bien, tout en insistant sur son droit, que le poursuivre retroactivement et prétendre ramener les choses où elles en étaient à l'origine de sa première capitulation, sans tenir compte des changements qu'y ont apportés les siècles, ce serait exiger l'absurde. Pourquoi voulez-vous, mon cher Sir Hamilton, nous prêter à nous des vues plus déraisonnables, et quelle déplorable méfiance porte votre Gouvernement à supposer que, le terme *ab antiquo* s'appliquant probablement dans notre pensée à une époque de beaucoup antérieure au Traité de Kainardji, nous pourrions y puiser le droit incontestable de réclamer des privilèges accordés au clergé Grec dès les premiers temps de la domination Mahométane, privilèges tombés en désuétude aujourd'hui, mais qui ravivés par nous, et touchant à la puissance séculière comme spirituelle de clergé, nous permettraient d'exercer un contrôle suprême sur quatorze millions de sujets Turcs. Veuillez donc vous persuader, qu'en fait de privilèges nous ne réclamons que ce qui existe, non pas ce qui a pu exister autrefois.

Quant au Traité de Kainardji, il est très vrai, si on le prend à la lettre, que les droits et privilèges du culte Grec n'y sont point mentionnés en termes exprès, mais la protection donnée à la religion et à ses églises implique bien, aux yeux de tout homme de sens et de bonne foi, celle des droits et privilèges des dites églises.

Du moment où le Sultan s'est engagé vis-à-vis de nous à les protéger, il nous a par là même conféré le droit de veiller à la manière dont il remplirait cet engagement.

Et pour ce qui concerne le mot de "religion Chrétienne," employé dans l'article du Traité, nous ne ferons pas au Cabinet Anglais l'injure de supposer qu'il veut subtiliser sur ce terme. Il est bien évident qu'en stipulant pour le culte et des églises en Turquie, le rit Catholique y étant déjà placé sous une autre protection que la nôtre, il n'a pu être question que du culte et des églises auxquels nous appartenions nous et nos co-religionnaires sujets du Sultan.

En résumé, mon cher Sir Hamilton, nous ne voulons en ce moment que ce qu'implique suffisament le Traité de Kainardji. Nous ne demandons en fait de privilèges que ceux dont le clergé jouit actuellement (qu'ils lui aient été accordé récemment ou *ab antiquo* peu importe) et en fait de patronage, uniquement celui que l'Angleterre a déjà reconnu à la France, en vertu du Protocole de Février 1830, et qu'elle trouvait à cette époque très conciliable avec les droits et la dignité du Sultan comme du nouveau Gouvernement indépendant que nous étions occupés avec elle à fonder et à constituer.

Après une expérience de quatre vingt années, envisager tout d'un coup ce simple patronage comme un protectorat religieux et politique entièrement nouveau, qui ferait désormais de l'Empereur de Russie le vrai Souverain de la Turquie, et reduirait le Sultan aux conditions d'un vassal, nous ne pourrions que déplorer une telle exagération d'idée.

Si l'on va plus loin et que l'on veuille nous faire la guerre pour nous l'enlever, on met l'Empereur dans l'obligation de le defendre à toute outrance, parceque ce patronage fait partie de l'héritage de ses aïeux comme de la force de son

empire, et l'on aura, pour écarter un danger imaginaire, provoqué un danger certain, allumé un incendie dont les conséquences sont incalculables, et dont la responsabilité ne nous appartiendra, certes, pas.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 24.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.*

(Confidential.)
My dear Count Nesselrode, *St. Petersburgh, June 14/26*, 1853.

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of the confidential letter of this date, which you have done me the honour of addressing to me.

The object upon which, at this moment, my thoughts are the most intent being, that any misunderstanding between our two Governments should be removed by frank explanations and assurances, I abstain from offering you several observations which are suggested by your communication.

Were it necessary, I might demonstrate the great difference which exists between a *de jure* Protectorate exercised by one Sovereign over a few thousand of Catholics, and that which it is proposed should be granted to another Sovereign by whom it would be exercised over several millions of his co-religionists.

This point, however, I only allude to; and passing over others in complete silence, I will only dwell upon one which, in your Excellency's opinion, appears to affect the consistency of Her Majesty's Government.

The English Government, you very correctly observe, were a party to the transfer from the Crown of France to that of Greece, of a portion of that protection exercised during centuries by the French Sovereigns over a certain number of the subjects of the Porte. You give to be understood, that it would be little reasonable were objections to be now raised to attributing to the Emperor of Russia a similar right of protection with regard to those subjects of the Sultan who profess the Greek creed.

I am hardly qualified to give an opinion upon the subject of the extent of the Protectorate rights enjoyed by France in virtue of her ancient capitulations; but a more important consideration presents itself forcibly to my mind.

If the independence of Turkey has been ever held to be an object of such European importance, that even a fraction of a privilege obtained from the Porte could not be transferred from a mighty Monarch like him of France, to a Sovereign of new creation and of such inferior power as the King of Greece, without the concurrence of Russia and Great Britain—a concurrence obtained by previous negotiation, how, I would ask, could it be otherwise but that the late sudden and unexpected attempt of one of the Great Powers to obtain for itself the immediate possession of a privilege of great magnitude, should give rise to surprise and hesitation on the part of Governments interested in, and pledged to the support of the Ottoman Empire?

It appears to me, that only one answer can be returned to the inquiry, and that the answer is of a nature to satisfy every impartial person that the difficulties which exist between the Crown of Russia and the Porte, ought to be settled by peaceable means, and not by violence; and that the questions pending are such as should be examined by the Great Powers, the Allies of Russia and the co-supporters of Turkish independence, as well as by Russia herself.

This inference is, I think, clear and unexceptionable; while, as regards the Queen's Government, the entire confidence which has been reposed in the assurances of the Imperial Cabinet may be taken as the surest pledge of the desire felt by Her Majesty's Ministers, that every just



demand which can be made by the Emperor, should be fully acquiesced in by Turkey and by the Powers which have undertaken to support her independent existence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 25.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 322. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 27*, 1853.

AS at this moment every line which proceeds from the Russian Chancellerie is of interest, I beg to forward to your Lordship a copy of the private note addressed to me by Count Nesselrode, and which accompanied his confidential letter of the same date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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Inclosure in No. 25.

*Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

*Dimanche, le 14/26 Juin*, 1853.

VOUS m'avez demandé, mon cher Sir Hamilton, quelques éclaircissements sur un point sur lequel il paraît que nos Gouvernements ne se comprennent pas. Permettez-moi de vous les offrir sous la forme d'une lettre confidentielle que je tâche de rendre aussi complète que possible, afin d'écarter tout malentendu entre nous.

C'est d'autant plus nécessaire que la réponse de la Porte n'est pas satisfaisante.

Si vous vouliez passer chez moi en ville demain à trois heures j'aurai l'honneur de vous en donner connaissance.

Mille hommages, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Ci-joint le Firman que vous m'avez remis l'autre jour.

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No. 26.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 324. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 28*, 1853.

ONE of my colleagues who, from the circumstances of his having passed many years here, and having married a Russian, is considered as almost belonging to the country, has remarked to me in strict confidence, that having had the greatest admiration for the Emperor's character, and the utmost confidence in the prudence of the Chancellor, he is lost in astonishment at the sudden adoption of a line of policy which at once puts His Majesty in contradiction with the professed objects of his whole political career. He has arrived at the conclusion of the Emperor being impelled by some motives which have not yet transpired, and a knowledge of which he is endeavouring by every means to arrive at.

My colleague, who lives more in Russian society than in that of his brother diplomatists, further acquaints me that the only clue which he has been able to obtain is this,—that the Emperor, by what means he does not know, has been possessed with the idea of Her Majesty's Government

having undertaken to deprive him of that influence which he ought to enjoy at Constantinople; and that in seeking to resist these attempts, His Imperial Majesty's policy is naturally directed rather against England than against France.

I remarked in reply that this appeared to me an excuse for, rather than an explanation of, a disingenuous policy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 27.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 326.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June* 28, 1853.

UPON calling upon the Chancellor yesterday, I learnt from him that orders for the occupation of the Principalities had been sent off on the 27th instant. According to a report which prevails here, these orders had been despatched some days previously; this, however, can hardly be the case after the written assurance given to me by Count Nesselrode on the 14th instant.

The Chancellor placed in my hands the inclosed copy of the answer returned to his letter by Reschid Pasha. He had, he said, no objection to urge against its style; still, however, it was a refusal of the Imperial propositions, and as such involved a resort by the Emperor to those measures which had been announced. At the same time his Excellency clung to the hope of matters being settled peaceably. He had little doubt that this result would be obtained if the occupation of the Principalities should not be regarded by Great Britain and France as a *casus belli*.

His Excellency proceeded to speak of the plan of reconciliation (it might probably with more propriety be called of submission) devised by M. de Bourqueney. He expressed his warm satisfaction at the idea, and observed that it was one which would be accepted willingly (à deux mains) by the Imperial Government.

He next adverted to the manifesto which had just been published.

This paper, a translated copy of which was forwarded to your Lordship by post yesterday, was intended for the Russian people; the circular which was about to be made public, was directed in some measure to foreign States, and would be found to contain the most positive assurances as to the Emperor's intention of not seeking any territorial aggrandizement.

This may be so—but some degree of incredulity may be excused in those who having followed the late proceedings of the Russian Government have had the opportunity of seeing how impossible it is to reconcile professions with acts.

Of this difficulty fresh proof was offered me yesterday, when once more the Chancellor stated that the concessions on the part of the Porte insisted upon by the Emperor, were to be considered solely with reference to the question of the Holy Places, and to the precautions which it was necessary to take, to avoid a repetition of causes of complaint like those which had been given by the Porte.

This statement appears to be hardly reconcilable with the terms of the Russian manifesto, from which it might be inferred that the very existence of the Greek Church was in danger from the fanaticism of the Turks. If it is desired, however, to contrast the language of the Russian Cabinet with its acts, the materials are certainly not wanting.

Nothing can be more striking than to listen, as I frequently have occasion to do, to the ardent wishes for the preservation of peace expressed by the Chancellor, and to observe that these are accompanied, first, by the publication of the circular already in your Lordship's hands, next by the issue of orders for the occupation of the Principalities, then again by the issue of an appeal (and that upon false grounds) to the religious feelings



of a people eminently sensible to any danger with which their Church is threatened, and then by the preparation of a fresh circular destined for publication.

Many impartial persons who witness what is passing here have remarked, that whilst it is given to be understood that Russia has been forced into an unfortunate conflict from which she has every desire to escape before it assumes a more serious form, provided only that the conciliatory disposition of her Allies allow her to do so with credit, every step she takes tends only to render the task assigned to the friends of peace the more difficult.

It now is given to be understood (for I cannot say that it is directly stated) that the occupation of the Danubian Provinces will afford a fresh and favourable opportunity for negotiation.

May this prove to be the case, but I must confess that it strikes me that were the wishes of the Imperial Cabinet intent upon peace, occupation would not have been actually undertaken until sufficient time had been given for the deliberations of friendly Governments; nor again am I by any means satisfied that when the occupation has been effected it will be found that the Russian Councils have become more reasonable than they are at present.

I am compelled, however, much against my will, to pay but slight attention to words, and am led to doubt whether this very occupation may not hereafter be put forward as a fresh obstacle between the Imperial Government and concession.

To return to the conversation which I held with the Chancellor, it remains only for me to state that his Excellency in alluding to the firman which it was in contemplation to issue in favour of the Greek Church, observed that, as must be known to me, the Emperor's Government could not accept of any firman in the light of an adequate reparation; that what one firman granted another, as had been seen, could overthrow; and, consequently, that the Emperor desired that the concessions made by the Porte should be sanctioned by some instrument having the force of an international engagement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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Inclosure in No. 27.

*Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode.*

*Constantinople, le* $\frac{7}{19}$ *Juin*, 1853.

JE me suis empressé de mettre sous les yeux de Sa Majesté mon Auguste Maître la dépêche que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 19 Mai dernier.

Sa Majesté le Sultan a toujours montré en toute occasion les plus grands égards pour Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, qu'il considère comme son allié sincère et comme un voisin bien intentionné. La Sublime Porte, ne mettant nullement en doute les intentions généreuses de l'Empereur, a ressenti un profond chagrin de l'interruption des relations, survenue malheureusement parce qu'on n'a pas bien compris peut-être l'impossibilité réelle où elle se trouvait à propos de la question soulevée par le Prince Menchikoff de consigner dans un engagement diplomatique les privilèges religieux accordés au rit Grec. Toutefois elle éprouve la consolation de voir que pour sa part elle n'a nullement contribué à amener un semblable état de chose. En effet, le Gouvernement Ottoman a montré, dès le principe, les meilleures dispositions et toutes les facilités relativement à toutes les questions que le Prince Menchikoff était chargé de régler d'après les ordres de l'Empereur. Et même, dans une question aussi délicate que celle des privilèges religieux de l'Eglise Grecque, s'inspirant encore de ses sentiments pacifiques et ne refusant pas les assurances qui pouvaient faire disparaître et réduire à néant tous les doutes qui auraient pu s'élever à cet égard, la Porte espérait surtout de la sagesse reconnue

du Prince Menchikoff que cet Ambassadeur se montrerait satisfait du projet de note qui lui avait été transmis en dernier lieu, et qui contenait toutes les assurances demandées. Quoiqu'il en soit, ce fait regrettable s'est produit.

Il est vrai que son Altesse le Prince Menchikoff a, la seconde fois, abrégé la minute de Sénéd qu'il avait donnée d'abord, et, en donnant à la fin un projet de note, il a fait quelques changements, soit dans les termes, soit dans la rédaction et le titre de la pièce; mais le sens d'un engagement s'y trouvait toujours. Et, comme cet engagement diplomatique ne peut s'accorder ni avec l'indépendance du Gouvernement Ottoman, ni avec les droits de son autorité souveraine, on ne saurait donner aux motifs d'impossibilité réelle présentés sur ce point par la Sublime Porte, le nom de refus et faire de cela une question d'honneur pour Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie.

De plus, si on se plaint de cette impossibilité, en l'attribuant à un sentiment de défiance, la Russie, en ne tenant aucun compte de toutes les assurances offertes de la manière la plus solennelle par la Sublime Porte, et en déclarant qu'il était indispensable de les consigner dans un Acte ayant force d'engagement, ne donne-t-elle pas plutôt une preuve patente de son manque de confiance envers le Gouvernement Ottoman? Et celui-ci n'a-t-il pas, à son tour, le droit de s'en plaindre?

Toutefois il s'en remet, pour répondre sur ces deux points à la haute justice si connue de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, ainsi qu'à la haute raison et aux sentiments éminemment pacifiques de votre Excellence, que chacun d'ailleurs a pu reconnaître et apprécier.

Sa Majesté le Sultan, par un firman Impérial revêtu de son auguste hatti-chérif, vient de confirmer de nouveau les privilèges, droits et immunités dont les religieux et les églises du rit Grec jouissent *ab antiquo*.

La Sublime Porte n'hésitera jamais à maintenir et à donner les assurances contenues et promises dans le projet de note remis au Prince Menchikoff peu avant son départ. La dépêche reçue de la part de votre Excellence parle de l'intention de faire passer les frontières aux troupes Russes. Cette déclaration est incompatible avec les assurances de paix et de bon vouloir de Sa Majesté l'Empereur. Elle est, en vérité, si contraire à ce que l'on est en droit d'attendre de la part d'une Puissance amie, que la Sublime Porte ne saurait comment l'accepter.

Les préparatifs militaires et les travaux de défense ordonnés par la Porte, ainsi qu'elle l'a déclaré officiellement aux Puissances, ne sont donc nécessités que par les armemens considérables de la Russie; ils ne constituent qu'une mesure purement défensive. Le Gouvernement du Sultan, n'ayant aucune intention hostile contre la Russie, exprime le désir que les anciennes relations, que Sa Majesté regarde comme si précieuses et dont les avantages sont si nombreux et si manifestes pour les deux parties, soient rétablies dans leur état primitif.

J'espère que la Cour de Russie appréciera avec un sentiment de confiante considération les intentions sincères et loyales de la Sublime Porte, et tiendra compte de l'impossibilité réelle où elle se trouve de déférer aux désirs qui lui ont été exprimés. Que cette impossibilité soit appréciée comme elle mérite de l'être, et la Sublime Porte, je puis l'assurer à votre Excellence, n'hésitera pas à charger un Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de se rendre à St. Pétersbourg pour y renouer les négociations et chercher, de concert avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, un accommodement qui, tout en étant agréable à Sa Majesté, serait tel que la Porte pourrait l'accepter, sans porter aucune atteinte, soit aux bases de son indépendance, soit à l'autorité souveraine de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Votre Excellence peut tenir pour certain que, pour ma part, j'appelle ce résultat de tous mes vœux. J'aime à croire que, de son côté, il en est de même.

Je prie, &c.

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No. 28.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 510. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 6, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS in speaking on the Oriental question to some of my colleagues has expressed himself in the following sense.

The position of Russia is such that she must either accept or refuse the right of the Five Powers to interfere under the Treaty of 1841 for the defence and protection of the integrity and independence of Turkey.

If Russia accepts our interpretation of our rights under that Treaty, a valuable result will have been obtained. If she refuses it, a warning will be given to Europe of the necessity of insisting on some more obligatory act. This might consist of a Treaty by which the Five Powers would bind themselves to respect and maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the independence of its Government, to refer all points of difference which may arise between them and Turkey to the arbitration of a conference, and, in the event of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire from internal causes, to abjure all schemes of individual benefit.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has also expressed the opinion that if Russia should refuse to be a party to such a Treaty the remaining Four Powers should sign it without her.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 29.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 511. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 6, 1853.*

IN my confidential despatch No. 506 I had the honour to call your Lordship's attention to a project, attributed to M. de Bourqueney, for the solution of the Oriental question. Since then an attempt has been made to induce the public to believe that that able diplomatist had, in truth, hit upon a plan acceptable to all parties, and that the Emperor's sanction had been given to it. I thought it right, therefore, to ask M. Drouyn de Lhuys, this morning, how far this latter assertion was compatible with truth.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he had had an interview yesterday with M. de Kisseleff, at which he fully explained to him the Emperor's sentiments; and that there might be no mistake about them, he proposed writing a despatch to General Castelbajac, in which those sentiments would be more fully developed. They are to the following effect.

The Emperor could not advise the Porte to accept the plan submitted from St. Petersburgh in the name of M. Bourqueney, and which consists in the full acceptation by the Porte of the note Menchikoff, under the understanding that the Russian Government shall, after that note shall have been transmitted signed to St. Petersburgh, give such explanations as may seem to them befitting the circumstances and the necessity of the case; but if the Russian Cabinet is willing to submit for previous consideration the answer which, underthe above-mentioned plan, would be made to the Porte, and that answer contained satisfactory assurances as to the scope and object of the Russian demands, while its stipulations were as binding on Russia as those contained in the Menchikoff note were obligatory on the Porte, His Majesty would be ready to consult with the Governments of England and Austria as to the propriety of recommending the Porte to accept this solution of its differences with Russia.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said further, that he had recommended to M. de

Kisseleff that the Russian Government should, in refusing to receive the Special Embassy offered by the Porte, state to the Ottoman Government, in precise and accurate terms, the interpretation given at St. Petersburgh to the demands made by Prince Menchikoff. If those demands proved, after explanation, to be as harmless as they were represented by Russian diplomacy, the Porte might be advised to accede to them.

M. de Kisseleff regarded such a solution as impossible.

I should add that nothing has been received from M. de Bourqueney since I last wrote, making any mention of the project to which his name has been attached.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No 30.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 117.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 24, 1853.*

WE are still without any positive information of the entrance of the Russian army into Moldavia, though everything indicates the approaching execution of that measure, and we are in daily expectation of hearing that it has actually taken place.

Meanwhile a new incident has occurred. The Internuncio, acting under instructions, has presented to Reshid Pasha an extract of a despatch addressed to him by Count Buol. The purport of the communication is an overture or proposal tending eventually towards a mediation by Austria. Reshid Pasha lost no time in sending it to me; and, subsequently, he extended the communication to my colleagues of France and Prussia. Baron de Bruck also made a similar communication successively to each of us. The extract of Count Buol's instruction is inclosed herewith in copy.

My first object was to ascertain the impression made on Reshid Pasha by this overture, and I found that he was no more disposed than before to recede from the principle hitherto maintained by the Porte. I learnt, moreover, that although Baron de Bruck had pressed him for an immediate answer, his Highness had declined giving one, until he should have conferred with his colleagues, and taken the Sultan's pleasure.

My second object was to obtain from Baron de Bruck some explanation of the ground on which Count Buol had placed his hope of a successful mediation. I could learn nothing beyond an anxiety to prevent war, and an impression that the Emperor of Russia was embarrassed, and would be glad to find some means of extrication. Could we hope by a prompt acceptance of the Austrian idea to afford Prince Menchikoff a motive for delaying the occupation of the Danubian Principalities? Nothing appeared to warrant any such hope.

In spite of these unpromising circumstances—of the recollection that neither Prince Menchikoff nor Count Nesselrode would hear of the slightest variation in the terms of that draft of a note which constituted the last Russian ultimatum, and of the certainty that neither could the Porte recede, nor could we advise her to recede, from the point at issue—I conceived that, independently of any prospect of success, no inconsiderable advantage might be made to accrue by proper management from the Austrian suggestion.

Far, therefore, from making any difficulties, I proposed a meeting of the four Representatives, which accordingly took place at my house this morning.

It is unnecessary to trouble your Lordship with the particulars of what occurred during our conference, which, being unauthorized by any special instructions, was carried on rather in the spirit of a desultory conversation than in that of a regular discussion. For my own part, I felt deeply the importance of keeping every chance of accommodation open as



long as possible, of having it clearly understood at the same time that there could be no question of ceding the diplomatic engagement required by Russia, of keeping fairly in view the position of the Sultan's Government with respect to its allies and to its people, of not giving to such communication as we might agree in adopting any character but that of a mere suggestion proceeding from the four Representatives, and, finally, of bringing simultaneously before the Porte a strong expression of our belief that real and comprehensive improvement of the condition of the Sultan's non-Mussulman subjects could be no longer deferred.

It is but justice to state that I found the French Ambassador, the Austrian Internuncio, and the Prussian Envoy, animated as to these several points with sentiments of the most satisfactory description, and I infer from the harmony which prevailed among us, that whatever difference of opinion arising from difference of position may exist as to the ulterior means of supporting the Sultan in his struggle with Russia, your Lordship will find little difficulty in directing the joint moral action of the four Powers towards the adjustment of the present question, if it be capable of adjustment by diplomatic means, and to the establishment of a more complete understanding and concurrence between them and the Porte in that broad European sense and Christian spirit which Her Majesty's Government have never ceased to promote and to recommend. I found them at the same time most reasonably alive to the expediency of keeping open a door for Russia's accession to the same system of policy hereafter, and of our being, as much as possible, careful not to give umbrage in that quarter by any premature display of our concurrent understanding in contrast with the insulated position of Russia.

The immediate results of our meeting are consigned to a memorandum without signature, which I inclose herewith for your Lordship's information, though I am not at liberty to represent it as invested with any formal character. In fact, it is a simple unofficial record of the purpose of our meeting, and of certain points on which our opinions agreed.

Since we separated I have received from Mr. Pisani a report, which I inclose, in copy, herewith, and I have seen a Russian circular, dated from St. Petersburgh the 30th ultimo, o. s., and published as a supplement to the "Odessa Gazette." Both these papers show that the Porte on its side, and Russia on hers, persist in maintaining respectively the one essential point in dispute, and the latter removes whatever doubt might by possibility have remained of the Emperor's determination to send his army into the Principalities.

Under these circumstances, I repeat that the object of entertaining the Austrian suggestion, so far as to place it under the notice of the Porte as an idea proceeding, by adoption, from the Representatives of the four Powers at Constantinople, is not with a view to any immediate result, but to afford an opportunity for diplomatic action in a form at once the most effective and the least unpalatable to Russia. It would seem, if solemn declarations are still to be trusted, that the Emperor of Russia, if not resisted by force, will confine his military aggressions on Turkey to the occupation of the two Principalities, and as it is all but certain that the Porte will not offer resistance to that measure, we may safely conclude that, barring accidents, no nearer approach to hostilities will take place for the present. It is obvious, at the same time, that the occupation itself is not only an aggressive act, constituting a case of war, and justly entitling the Porte to act at once on that principle, but that it has the effect of placing the Porte in a state of embarrassing and hazardous apprehension, imposing heavy burthens on the Empire, and unsettling its most important relations at home and abroad. So painful and exhausting is the attitude thus forced upon the Turkish Government, that if not relieved by more successful negotiations, or assisted without reserve by their allies, they can hardly be expected to hold out for any great length of time, and they will finally be reduced to the necessity of either surrendering what they conceive to be essential to the Sultan's independence and Sovereign right, or acquiescing in an act of spoliation wholly at variance with the declared principles of 1841, and, in fact, decisive of that great question which the five leading Powers of Christendom then

hedged round with the most solemn pledges of their honour and good faith.

I venture, therefore, to submit that the course which I am now taking in concert with my colleagues of Austria, France, and Prussia, is the one best calculated to anticipate the views of Her Majesty's Government, and to meet the exigencies of the case, by affording Russia an opening for re-consideration, in so far as her own precipitancy admits of it, without that additional delay which would be incurred by a reference to our respective Courts.

If this last effort for a peaceful solution fail, it is difficult to foresee any issue of the struggle, acceptable either to the Porte or to Europe, but that which is to be obtained by the active cooperation of England and France, with a general concurrence from other Powers; and a long uncertain perspective of dangers and sacrifices, not indeed to be avoided, but not the less to be deplored.

I have to remark, in conclusion, that Baron de Bruck has made mention of a letter received by the Emperor of Austria from the Emperor Nicholas, about the time of M. de Meyendorff's return to Vienna, as being not improbably an expression of conciliatory sentiments on the part of the latter. I need not add that in uniting with my colleagues to submit Count Buol's suggestion to Reshid Pasha as a communication proceeding from the Four Powers, I do not propose to anticipate in any degree His Highness's own notion of the manner in which it may be carried into effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 30.

*Count Buol to Baron Bruck.—(Communicated June 22, 1853.)*

(Extrait.)

DANS le cas où la Sublime Porte aurait donné une réponse négative il faudrait recommander de la manière la plus amicale à son Altesse M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'examiner encore une fois le projet de la note du Prince Menchikoff, et de la comparer avec celui que la Sublime Porte avait rédigé dans l'intention le l'adresser au Prince avant son départ. A cette comparaison son Altesse M. le Ministre devrait pondérer sérieusement, par lui-même, les variantes pour pouvoir se prononcer en quels points il considère comme essentielle la différence entre ces deux projets, et si cette différence en existe plus dans les expressions que dans la substance.

Pour le cas que M. le Ministre serait disposé de proposer quelques changemens dans la note Russe que la Porte croirait pouvoir accepter, et qui présenteraient l'espoir d'être agréés à St. Pétersbourg, votre Excellence est autorisée à recevoir ces propositions, et à nous les communiquer pour y appuyer notre médiation ultérieure; et pour préparer un accueil favorable à l'Ambassadeur que la Sublime Porte a l'intention d'envoyer à St. Pétersbourg.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 30.

*Memorandum from the Four Representatives to the Porte.*

*June* 24, 1853.

AYANT reçu de la Porte communication officielle de la lettre adressée en dernier lieu par M. le Comte de Nesselrode à Reshid Pasha, et la réponse du Ministre Ottoman à son Excellence le Chancelier de Russie,



et plus tard ayant aussi reçu de la part de son Excellence l'Internonce d'Autriche et de Reshid Pasha communication d'un extrait de dépêche adressée par M. le Comte de Buol à M. le Baron de Bruck, nous nous sommes réunis pour en constater le fait, et pour échanger mutuellement nos idées sur ces communications.

Nous nous sommes arrêtés à la proposition :

1. De suggérer au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Sultan de faire préparer un projet de communication basé sur l'idée d'une fusion du projet de note du Prince Menchikoff avec celui de Reshid Pasha, dans l'espoir de trouver une rédaction qui pourrait être acceptable à la Russie, sans s'écarter du principe que la Porte a jugé être essentiel au maintien de ses droits souverains.

2. De porter cette suggestion à la connaissance du Ministre Ottoman au moyen d'une instruction identique adressée aux interprètes respectifs, en nous réservant de la faire accompagner d'une instruction séparée, par laquelle nous ferions connaître à la Porte nos conseils rélatifs à l'amélioration nécessaire de l'état de ses sujets non-Mussulmans.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 30.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 23, 1853.

RESHID PASHA informs me that M. de Steindl called to-day to urge his Highness to give him an answer whether the Porte was inclined to try the proposed experiment for the renewal of negotiations with Russia, as contained in the extract of the despatch communicated yesterday by Baron de Bruck.

The Pasha replied to M. de Steindl, that his answer was already given to Baron de Bruck himself, namely, that he could not take upon himself either to reject or to adopt the proposal, without previously taking the advice of his colleagues, and submitting the same to the Sultan. But in his opinion, he was led to believe that this experiment would not answer the purpose of Russia; that the Porte had already offered official and formal assurances, which have not been considered as containing sufficient guarantees. Consequently the only thing which could satisfy the Emperor of Russia would be a treaty engagement; to this the Porte, added he, cannot yield, for the reasons repeatedly stated.

Subsequently, M. de Steindl communicated another despatch, which Baron de Bruck had just received, approving the line pursued by the Porte until now in the question at issue; and stating, at the same time, that Russia does not entertain any hostile views against Turkey, but would enter the Principalities as a material guaranty until she could obtain some moral one.

Despatches arrived from the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia contain nearly the same information, that Russia has no intention to go to war, but only to occupy the Principalities until she could compel the Porte to offer the guarantees required by the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

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No. 31.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 118.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 24, 1853.*

HAVING observed in Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Brunnow of June 1, as communicated by the latter to your Lordship, a passage which, more tangibly than others of the same cast, conveys a very erroneous impression of my conduct during the late negotiations between Prince Menchikoff and Reshid Pasha, and one scarcely less malevolent of Reshid Pasha's opinions at the same juncture, I thought it due to the cause of truth and fair-dealing to put the matter at rest on the most obvious and indisputable authority.

I applied for a statement of the real facts to Reshid Pasha himself; and his Highness having mentioned Mr. Alison as also cognizant of the truth, I applied to that gentleman likewise for the same purpose.

I have now the honour to inclose the correspondence, which is, fortunately, as short as it is decisive.

I have to request that it may be submitted to Her Majesty the Queen, and also to the members of Her Majesty's Government.

Your Lordship knows how heavy a responsibility weighs on me at the present important and delicate juncture. I am earnestly desirous of meriting the confidence it implies; and I should despise the calumny propagated by Count Nesselrode, were it not purposely intended to deprive me of that confidence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 31.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.*

(Confidentielle.)

M. le Ministre, *Therapia, ce 20 Juin, 1853.*

DANS une dépêche communiquée du Cabinet Russe, j'ai eu occasion de remarquer le passage suivant:

"Enfin, au dernier moment quand le Prince Menchikoff avait consenti à abandonner même le Sened modifié pour se contenter d'une note, quand Reshid Pasha lui-même, frappé des dangers que le départ de notre Légation pouvait faire courir à la Porte, conjurait l'Ambassadeur Britannique avec instance de ne pas s'opposer à la remise de la note formulée par le Prince Menchikoff, Lord Redcliffe l'en a empêché, en déclarant que la note avait la valeur d'un Traité, et qu'elle était inacceptable."

Dans l'intérêt de la grande question du jour, et dans celui de la vérité, je prie votre Altesse de vouloir bien me mander par un mot de réponse à cette lettre si les assertions que je viens de citer sont conformes au fait, ou fondées en erreur.

Je profite, &c.
(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 31.

*Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Confidentielle.)

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Balta Liman, le 21 Juin, 1853.*

J'AI pris connaissance des assertions qui font l'objet de la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date d'hier.

Il est manifeste que, de même que votre Excellence, je ne voulais non plus



voir s'interrompre les relations amicales entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie, et que, pendant toute une semaine, depuis ma nomination au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères jusqu'à ce jour du départ du Prince Menchikoff, j'ai épuisé mes efforts à chercher un mode d'accommodement qui, sans porter atteinte à l'indépendance et aux droits sacrés de Sa Majesté Impériale mon Auguste Souverain, pût satisfaire la Cour de Russie.

Mais quant à la première des deux assertions en question, selon laquelle j'aurais conjuré votre Excellence de ne pas s'opposer à la remise de la note formulée par le Prince Menchikoff, je n'ai qu'à faire appel à la conscience de votre Excellence elle-même pour constater qu'une telle démarche n'a pas eu lieu de ma part.

Pour répondre à la seconde, il me suffit de faire mention que le projet de note en question m'étant parvenu de la part du Prince Menchikoff vers le soir de Vendredi Mai 20, veille du jour du départ de cet Ambassadeur de Buyukdéré, et ce projet ayant été transmis tout de suite de ma part à votre Excellence le lendemain Samedi, dans la matinée, Mr. Alison vint me demander de la part de votre Excellence quelle était mon opinion sur le projet de note en question. Je lui répondis sans hésitation que, quoique la dénomination ou la forme de l'Acte exigé fût changée, l'engagement à prendre restant en fond le même, il était impossible pour la Sublime Porte de l'accepter; et j'ai recours à Mr. Alison lui-même pour qu'il veuille bien répéter ce qui précède.

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) RECHID.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 31.

*Mr. Alison to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Therapia, June 22, 1853.*

I HAVE perused Reshid Pasha's letter to your Excellency of yesterday's date; and I recollect very well having conveyed a message from his Highness to your Lordship to the purport alluded to in it. The Pasha's view of Prince Menchikoff's note was expressed without the communication on my part of any opinion which might have been entertained by your Lordship with regard to it.

A conference of the Representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia, having met that day [May 21] at the British Palace, I had occasion to repeat to them, in your Excellency's presence, the opinion expressed by the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. ALISON.

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No. 32.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 119.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 24, 1853.*

I LEARN from M. Pisani that Reshid Pasha is highly gratified by the line which I propose to follow with respect to Count Buol's suggestion. His Highness says, that he has submitted that communication to the Sultan, and declared his opinion that, unless the mediation be proposed and supported by the Four Powers, the Porte ought to have nothing to do with it.

The Prince of Moldavia's agent has again apprised the Porte of his having received news by express of the entrance of the Russian army into that Principality. Intelligence coming in such a manner and through such a channel ought to be true; and yet there is a letter of the 22nd instant from Odessa, which states that all further movement on the

frontier had been countermanded, without fresh orders from St. Petersburgh.

This state of uncertainty can hardly last much longer; but while it lasts it is very perplexing, especially as rumours continue to prevail of preparations, which, if true, would imply ulterior operations of a more decidedly hostile character.

Upon the whole, I conclude that the Russian Cabinet, not knowing exactly how the occupation of the Principalities will be taken, is preparing in some measure for the worst. On this point, however, I am happy to say, that there is every appearance of the Porte's intending, in pursuance of my suggestion, to forego its right of war for the present; and, protesting against the occupation, to appeal to the Four Powers, who, together with Russia, concluded the Treaty of 1841.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 33.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 122.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 24, 1853.*

CONCEIVING the opportunity to be favourable, I waited some days ago on the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs, for the purpose of congratulating them on the firmans by which the Sultan had recently confirmed their respective privileges and immunities. I availed myself of the visit to call their attention to the ill-treatment, which, in sundry places and on frequent occasions, individuals of the Jewish or Protestant faith had experienced from persons of their religion, and sometimes from public officers deriving their authority from them. I endeavoured to impress upon their Holinesses the duty of inculcating the great Christian doctrine of doing as they would be done by, and I insinuated the difficulty which I should find in protecting or promoting their interests, if they continued to encourage the abuses of persecution by an habitual neglect of that precept.

I am happy to assure your Lordship that they took my admonitions in good part, and promised to write to the authorities which depended upon them, in a sense agreeable to my wishes. They received from me in return a promise, which I had no difficulty in giving, to do what depended upon me in order to dissuade the Protestant converts from using disrespectful language towards those who still adhere to the forms of worship, which they had conscientiously deserted.

The Armenian Patriarch, who has returned my visit, placed in my hands the accompanying paper.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 33.

*The Armenian Patriarch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

Excellence,

POUR tout ce que la nation Arménienne, depuis quelque tems, jouit de libertés religieuses et d'améliorations civiles est redevable à la haute protection de la grande et noble nation Anglaise, dont vous êtes le digne Représentant et le Ministre fidèle de ses sentiments bienveillants.

Pour ces bienfaits considérables, tout en vous témoignant sa reconnaissance, la nation Arménienne ne cesse de nourrir de justes espérances d'obtenir de la même main bienfaisante bien d'autres améliorations auxquelles elle sent un besoin pressant.



En vérité, Excellence, quoique la nation Arménienne soit assez contente de sa position religieuse, en égard des libertés qu'elle a jusqu'ici obtenues, grâce à l'intervention puissante de votre Excellence, cependant il lui en faut encore beaucoup d'autres améliorations, bien autrement réelles et constantes pour sa sécurité personnelle et pour son bien-être matériel. En l'absence de ces conditions de véritable progression, la nation Arménienne se trouve inévitablement obligée de retrograder et de s'engager chaque jour de plus en plus dans la pénible voie de perdition, au lieu de progresser et de prospérer. Dans un état de choses si défavorable, la suppression d'une nation aussi justement célèbre par ses infortunes, son caractère moral et par sa fidélité envers son Souverain, de la liste des nations, étant en contradiction avec les sentimens généreux de votre noble cœur, nous espérons qu'une information confidentielle sur l'état véritable de la nation Arménienne ne peut pas être considérée comme en désaccord avec les vues magnanimes et les sentimens de justice dont le moindre acte de votre Excellence est empreint.

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No. 34.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 125.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 24, 1853.*

I HAVE already forwarded to your Lordship a translation of the firman lately promulgated in favour of the Sultan's Protestant subjects, and I have now the honour to transmit herewith, in translation, another firman promulgated at the same time in favour of the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs as well as of the Haham Bashi, or Chief Rabbi of the Hebrew community.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 34.

*Impérial Firman sent by Reshid Pasha to the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople.*

(Traduction.) $\frac{26\text{ Mai}}{7\text{ Juin}}$ 1853.

QUE l'on s'applique toujours et perpétuellement à l'exécution fidèle des résolutions contenues dans ma présente ordonnance Impériale, et que l'on s'abstienne et se garde de toute contravention.

Honneur de l'élite de la nation du Messie, soutien des grands du peuple de Jésus, Patriarche Grec de Constantinople et ses dépendances, moine Germanus, que Dieu te conserve ton rang! Quand mon ordonnance Impériale vous parvient il faut que vous sachiez ce qui suit.

L'Etre Suprême, l'unique dispensateur des bienfaits célestes, en daignant placer selon ses volontés éternelles mon auguste personne au trône Impérial glorieux et puissant du Califat, ayant confié entre mes mains souveraines et équitables comme un dépôt sacré et spécial tant de provinces et de villes et d'innombrables classes de sujets de différentes nations, depuis le jour à jamais glorieux de mon avènement au trône, ainsi qu'il est du devoir du Califat et de la haute mission de Souverain, mon Gouvernement n'a jamais cessé, conformément à ma volonté Impériale sincère et bienveillante, de consacrer tous ses soins et de veiller attentivement à ce que toutes les classes de mes sujets soient autorisées d'une protection complète, et surtout, à ce qu'ils jouissent de la plus parfaite

tranquillité par rapport à leur culte et leurs affaires spirituelles sans exception.

Les résultats favorables et heureux de cet état de choses ont été toujours évidents: et l'objet de ma sollicitude Impériale est que les abus qui, à la suite de quelques négligences, ont su peu à peu se produire sous ce dernier rapport, soient totalement détruits et disparus sans pouvoir se renouveler à l'avenir.

Les privilèges spirituels et spéciaux accordés par mes illustres ancêtres au Clergé de mes fidèles sujets Chrétiens du rit Grec, et confirmés et consolidés aussi par moi, les immunités et les droits affectés aux Eglises et monastères et les terres et possessions y annexées, aux autres établissemens religieux, aux lieux de dévotion de cette catégorie, et aux moines et prêtres spécialement, en un mot, les privilèges et concessions de même nature qui sont insérés dans les Berats contenants les anciennes conditions du Patriarche et des Métropolitains, doivent d'après ma volonté et ma sollicitude Impériale être a jamais préservés de toute atteinte.

Pour confirmer et manifester de nouveau mes volontés Impériales à ce sujet, de manière qu'aucune infraction n'y soit faite, et que l'on sache que ceux qui agiraient contrairement seront l'objet de ma colère souveraine, j'ai octroyé un ordre Impérial, qui a été porté à la connaissance de tous les fonctionnaires compétents, afin que l'on ne puisse plus s'excuser de la négligence qu'on aurait porté sous ce rapport; et pour plus ample déclaration et notification que l'exécution fidèle et perpétuelle de cet ordre est exigé par ma volonté souveraine, le présent Firman Impérial vient d'être promulgué par ma Sublime Porte.

Vous, le Patriarche susmentionné, quand vous en prendrez connaissance, vous conformerez pour toujours votre conduite aux exigences de cette ordonnance; vous vous abstiendrez de toute contravention, et si quelque chose de contraire à cette ferme résolution vienne à être produite, vous devez vous empresser à la rapporter et la notifier à ma Sublime Porte. Sachez-le bien et portez foi à ce noble signe.

Emané vers la fin de la lune de Chaban 1269.

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No. 35.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 330.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 1, 1853.*

CONSIDERABLE sensation has been occasioned among the Foreign Missions at St. Petersburgh, by the great differences observable in the Russian manifesto, as published in its original state, that is, as addressed to the Russian people, and in the official French translation destined for more general circulation, which appeared in the St. Petersburgh Journal.

The most striking word in the original was "perfidionsness," as applied to the conduct of the Sultan, an epithet which the Government translator appears to have been desired to omit.

I need not observe, that the suppression is calculated to give an erroneous general impression of the force of that appeal which the Emperor's Government has judged it necessary to make to the prejudices, for in this instance I will not say opinions, of the Russian people.

The expected circular has not yet been published.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 36.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 334.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 1, 1853.*

IN the course of a conversation which I held with the Chancellor on the 29th ultimo, he observed that the hopes of a peaceable solution of difficulties which he still entertained, were founded upon the resolution taken by England and France, of not considering the occupation of the Principalities as constituting a *casus belli*, and upon the interpretation which he understood Her Majesty's Government to give to the provisions of the Convention of July 1841.

His Excellency stated to me twice over, and with considerable emphasis, that the position of Russia was this: that her armies were entering the Principalities, and that she then waited for the overtures which might be made to her. "And," I added, "she is of course disposed to receive them favourably."

After some little hesitation, the Chancellor corrected my phrase by saying, "She remains in the hope that any overture which may be made, may be such as can be entertained." We proceeded to speak of the possibility of some middle course being taken, which might satisfy the demands of Russia without wounding the dignity or injuring the independence of Turkey; and as the Chancellor's language upon the subject was very guarded, I observed that what I was driven to conclude was, that the settlement of the question would be found in some arrangement which should reconcile the terms of the non-accepted note of Prince Menchikoff with those of the note of the Porte which the Prince had not felt at liberty to accept. By manner, but not in actual words, Count Nesselrode appeared to assent to this remark.

I begged Count Nesselrode to inform me whether it was true, as it had been stated to me, that the Emperor's Government had applied to that of Austria for its good offices? His Excellency replied, that he hardly knew how to answer the inquiry; that the thing had been done of itself, as it were spontaneously ("Cela s'est fait de soi-même et pour ainsi dire spontanément.")

The inference which I am disposed to draw from the conversation of which I have reported the most essential points are: 1st, That the Emperor has given up finally his original intention of not allowing the alteration of a word, or a "comma," in the note presented by his Ambassador. 2ndly, That although the Russian Government will hardly be brought to propose any modification in the substance or form of its propositions to the Porte, they would not be sorry that some slightly modified conditions should be prepared by a friendly Court; and, 3rdly, That though they feel the disadvantage of the position in which they have placed themselves, they will be more disposed to persevere in a very evil course, than by quitting it, to depart widely from the conditions laid down by Prince Menchikoff.

The Chancellor spoke much of the distracted state of Turkey, and of the great probability that the discontent of the Greeks, that is, of the great majority of the Sultan's subjects, may lead to some revolutionary movement which may bring on a sudden crisis fatal for the Sultan's authority. He expressed his doubts as to this contingency being sufficiently contemplated by Her Majesty's Government.

To these observations I returned no answer; and indeed, I could have made none but such as would have given offence. I could only have remarked, that under the treatment which the Sultan has experienced successively at the hands of both his Imperial neighbours, the wonder was, not that there was a danger of an outbreak of his subjects, but that they were not already engaged in revolution.

In alluding to what is passing at Constantinople, I took an opportunity of remarking that nothing could be more pacific and judicious than

the advice which had been constantly given to the Porte by Lord Stratford, and that his Lordship's conciliatory conduct had opposed the most dignified answer to the calumnies by which he had been assailed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 37.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 336. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 1, 1853.

I LEARN that the Greek Minister has been speaking to several persons here of the disorganized state of Turkey, and of the dreadful outrages which have been committed of late upon Christians by bands of armed Albanians and others.

These statements, brought forward simultaneously and at such a moment of crisis by Greek and Russian authorities, give me some uneasiness, and lead me to suspect that there may be better reasons than those we are acquainted with for these anticipations of a revolutionary movement in Turkey which have been expressed.

The cry of "The Orthodox Greek Faith in danger," which has been raised here, is indeed of itself sufficient to induce the Christian subjects of the Porte to rise in rebellion; but I should be glad to feel convinced that no more direct appeals had been made to their fanaticism and discontent.

Supposing a revolutionary movement to take place in Turkey, it would hardly surprise me if, even now, at the eleventh hour, the Emperor were seen to undertake the protection of the remains of the Sultan's authority. This policy I take to be directed rather against Turkish independence than against the existence of Turkey, and till very lately I believe His Majesty to have been prepared alike to show himself in frowns or in smiles, so that he were but definitively recognized as the invincible opponent or the pretended protector of the Sultan.

In a conversation which I held two or three days ago with the Greek Envoy, I pointed out to him again that the best interests of his country required that peace should be preserved in his neighbourhood.

I begged of him to see things in their true light, and to feel convinced that if Turkey were to be destroyed and dismembered by a violent process, not one acre of territory would fall to the lot of Greece.

Upon this point I found M. Zographo, as usual, very reasonable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 38.

*Sir G. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 338.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 1, 1853.

THE Emperor, in the conversation which I had the honour of holding with His Majesty some months ago, spoke of the discontent which prevailed in Bulgaria, and of the efforts made by his orders to prevent its explosion in any attempt against the Sultan's authority.

With reference to that conversation, His Majesty has desired Count Nesselrode to communicate to me the letter and inclosure of which I have the honour to transmit copies to your Lordship.

I ought to observe that the originals of these papers were placed in



my hands, whilst in the copies which have been given me by the Chancellor the signature of the persons who address their complaints to the Russian Consulate in Bulgaria are omitted, as was understood between his Excellency and myself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 38.

*M. Popoff to Count Nesselrode.*

M. le Comte, *Belgrade, le 5 Juin*, 1853.

LES nouvelles les plus inquiétantes parviennent ici des différents points de la Bulgarie, dont les malheureux habitants, exaspérés par de nouvelles persécutions de la part des Turcs, se trouvent sur le point de faire une levée de boucliers. Plusieurs citoyens notables des districts de Widin, de Pirati, et de Berkoratz, ont adressé à un de leurs confrères des lettres qui présentent un triste tableau des excès horribles que les Mussulmanes ont recommencé à commettre dans ces pays.

Je m'empresse de placer ci-près très humblement sous les yeux de votre Excellence la traduction exacte de l'une de ces lettres qui m'a été communiquée avant hier.

Tout en promettant de faire parvenir au Ministère Impérial les plaintes du peuple Bulgare, j'ai cru devoir conseiller d'éviter toute collision avec les Turcs, et à ne pas se laisser aveugler par le désespoir au point de se jeter dans une lutte inégale qui ne peut que compromettre la cause de leur pays, dans un moment surtout où cette cause est soutenue par le Gouvernement Impérial, et où les Bulgares ont tout à espérer de la haute sollicitude de l'Auguste Protecteur dont ils invoquent le secours.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) L. POPOFF.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 38.

(Traduction.)

SALUT à notre honorable frère! Nous adressons au Seigneur des vœux pour ta santé. Apprends les horribles persécutions que nous souffrons de la part des Turcs. Ils parcourent par bandes composés de 60 hommes nos villages, et y commettent le pillage, le viol, et le massacre qu'on ne peut ni décrire ni raconter. Ils ont tué dans le village de Kamiz un tchobardgi et pillé sa maison; ils ont tué Stanko dans le village de Maxlitza; ils ont tué dans le village de Bratechoratz un homme du nom de Stajan, et violé sa fille; ils ont tué le Kmet du village de Suberajda; ils ont tué à Soignitza deux voyageurs, Georgei et Nicolas. Enfin, tous les massacres, les pillages and les viols, on ne peut ni les décrire ni supporter plus longtemps. Nous te prions, frère, d'aller l'annoncer au Consul Russe. Implore-le comme tu l'entends, and dis que nous sommes décidés à nous soulever, quand même aucun de nous ne devrait rester vivant. Supplie M. le Consul d'écrire au Tzar Nicolas; nous n'avons que Dieu et lui pour nous protéger. Nous te prions de nous informer de tout au plus vite, et nous restons tes malheureux frères, plongés dans la souffrance par les persécutions des Turcs.

(Suivent les signatures.)

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No. 39.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 339.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 1, 1853.*

AT a moment when such general attention is bestowed upon the plan to be devised for reconciling the demands made upon the Porte by Russia with the concessions which she can accept without the loss of independence and dignity, I would venture to submit the following very simple idea to your Lordship's consideration.

First, that the Turkish Government should, in a letter from Reshid Pasha to the Chancellor or in a khatti-cheriff, announce the confirmation of all the privileges and immunities enjoyed either in virtue of treaties or from ancient usage by the Greeks; specific mention being made of the fresh sanction thus given being applicable to the arrangements lately made with regard to the Holy Places.

Second, that this letter or khatti-cheriff should be brought to St. Petersburgh by a special Ambassador from the Sultan, to whom its delivery, accompanied if thought necessary by an official note, should be entrusted.

Third, that upon the receipt of the letter or khatti-cheriff by the Emperor's Government, official copies of the same should be communicated by the Porte to the Representatives of the Great Powers at Constantinople in an official note in which the Sultan's firm intention of respecting the privileges thus afresh and collectively secured to the Greeks, and notified to the Emperor, might be repeated.

I have no means of knowing whether this humble suggestion may be approved of by Her Majesty's Government, whether even, if so approved, it would meet the views of Austria, nor again whether even in this hypothesis the offer would be considered as acceptable by the Emperor. I would only venture to remark that whilst the acceptance by Russia of good and honourable terms would be a point of great importance, even the rejection of such conditions would tend to strengthen a good cause.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 40.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 268.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July 5, 1853.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 145 of the 28th ultimo, inclosing the Project of a Convention prepared by the Prussian Government, to be signed by the Five Powers, for the future regulation of the religious rights and immunities enjoyed by the Christian subjects of the Porte.

As instructed by your Lordship I yesterday conveyed to Baron Manteuffel the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for this communication, and stated that they concurred in its spirit, and will be happy to cooperate with the Prussian Government towards the objects sought to be attained by the Convention; but that Her Majesty's Government apprehend that it would be premature to do so at present.

His Excellency entirely agreed with this opinion, and said that he had merely put his ideas on paper for future consideration; and it evidently is his anxious desire that the communication of this project should be regarded as strictly confidential.



Whatever may come of it, Her Majesty's Government can at all events place it on record as a spontaneous declaration of the views of the Prussian Government on the present crisis.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 41.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 269.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July 5, 1853.*

AT an interview which I had yesterday with Baron Manteuffel, I stated to his Excellency, with reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 138 of the 28th ultimo, replying to one which I had addressed to your Lordship reporting a conversation with the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the attitude assumed by Austria on Turkish affairs, that the great object at the present moment must be to bring the utmost weight of moral influence to bear on Russia, particularly on the part of all the German Powers, who would be the first to suffer from the war for which the Emperor of Russia appears to be preparing.

Baron Manteuffel agreed as to the advantage which a general expression of opinion in this sense might have, but did not seem disposed to press the smaller Powers to do more than they have done spontaneously.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 42.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon:—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 270.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July 5, 1853.*

THE Austrian Minister called on me yesterday, and in the course of a conversation I asked if it were true, as reported, that Count Giulay had been charged to make any special overtures to the Russian Government on the Eastern Question.

Count Thun replied that he had no reason to believe that this was the case; that the Emperor had selected Count Giulay, as one of his most distinguished generals, to attend the reviews at St. Petersburgh; that that officer possessed His Imperial Majesty's entire confidence; and that as the affairs which now so much absorb the attention of the Governments of Europe would surely be discussed during his stay in Russia, it had been thought advisable to communicate to him all the correspondence that had passed on the matter, and that this had been done in order that he might not be ignorant of the views and opinions entertained on the subject at Vienna, and shape his language accordingly; but that his mission, according to the intelligence which he had received on the subject, was military and not political.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 43.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 271. Confidential.)

My Lord *Berlin, July 5, 1853.*

WHEN I saw Baron Manteuffel yesterday I found him a good deal agitated, and I discovered that he had just had an interview with the Russian Minister, who had held strong language to him on the subject of the independent policy which Prussia desired to follow in the Eastern Question, and had made remarks on the erroneous views which his Excellency had taken as to the bearing of the Treaty of 1841 on the present state of this affair. Baron Budberg, after making some observations in support of this statement, complained of the conduct of both Chevalier Bunsen and M. de Wildenbruch, remarking that they had acted as enemies of Russia, and were not to be trusted. Baron Manteuffel replied, that the King could not change his Ministry to please the Emperor, and that he was prepared to defend their conduct.

I understand also that Baron Budberg has been pressing Baron Manteuffel to declare what the future policy of Prussia will be in case more serious events should occur, and has said that a mere neutrality would not satisfy the Emperor, as that would be all to the disadvantage of Russia, and that he has gone as far as to threaten that unless a different line of policy were announced, Prussia might look in vain to Russia for assistance in case of any future difficulties with France.

I have not been able to discover whether Baron Budberg held this language by instructions from his Government or not, but it is clear, and I hold the information from the best authority, that the Russian Minister has been endeavouring to intimidate Baron Manteuffel, and to urge him to change a policy which may be hereafter detrimental to Prussian interests.

Baron Manteuffel is, I am assured, resolved not to swerve from the line which he has taken, and unless some foreign influence is exercised over the King, there is no present reason to apprehend that any change will come over the policy of the Prussian Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 44.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 272.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July 5, 1853.*

I ASKED Baron Manteuffel yesterday his opinion of the letter of Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode of the 7th ultimo, but he was indisposed to speak on the subject and replied that he had not had time to examine it with care, and all I could learn from him was that he would have preferred it to have been drawn up in a manner more likely to promote an arrangement between Russia and the Porte.

We spoke also of the Emperor of Russia's manifesto of the 26th ultimo, but of this again he seemed unwilling to speak, and he was so pressed for time that I was unable to get at any clear expression of his opinions, which perhaps he was the more disinclined to give as he had not seen the King since his return from the country.

I have, &c

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 45.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 272.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 8, 1853.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has informed me that M. Kisseleff had read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys two despatches from Count Nesselrode, in one of which it was stated that he had learnt from Baron Meyendorff that Lord Westmorland had suggested that an Ambassador should be sent by the Porte to settle the differences between Turkey and Russia at St. Petersburgh. The other despatch stated that M. de Bourqueney proposed that the Porte should sign Prince Menchikoff's note without alteration, and receive in exchange a note declaring the interpretation put upon it by the Russian Government.

Count Walewski further told me that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had declared to M. Kisseleff that the French Government knew nothing of such a proposal; that M. de Bourqueney had no authority to make it; and that he had made no mention of having done so: to which M. Kisseleff replied that there might be some misunderstanding as to the origin of the plan, but that as it had been proposed by somebody they might as well discuss it together.

Upon this M. Drouyn de Lhuys appears to have inquired what the nature of the explanatory note would be, and whether it would be submitted beforehand for the approbation of the Porte and its allies. M. Kisseleff replied that such a course would not be consistent with the dignity of the Emperor, but that if the interpretation of Prince Menchikoff's note were left to his generosity, ample proof would be afforded of His Imperial Majesty's solicitude for the independence of Turkey.

Under these circumstances, Count Walewski said M. Drouyn de Lhuys gave M. Kisseleff no encouragement to hope that his project could meet with serious consideration.

I told Count Walewski that I had no reason to believe that the proposal attributed to Lord Westmorland had been made by him to Baron Meyendorff.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 46.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 273. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 8, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency, in your despatch No. 510, marked Confidential, states that M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in speaking of the Oriental question to some of your colleagues, has expressed himself in the following sense: "The position of Russia is such that she must either accept or refuse the right of the Five Powers to interfere, under the Treaty of 1841, for the defence and protection of the integrity and independence of Turkey."

Your Excellency will avail yourself of any fitting opportunity to recommend to M. Drouyn de Lhuys not to insist too strongly upon the Treaty of 1841, the specific object of which was solely to restore the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire of closing the Dardanelles against foreign ships of war in time of peace; and beyond that, no obligation was contracted by the Powers that signed the Treaty. The preamble states the motives which induced the Powers to agree to the re-establishment of the rule in question; but it clearly does not give them a right to interfere for the protection and defence of Turkey: it leaves each State free to act according to the considerations affecting its own policy and

interest; and for this reason, Her Majesty's Government concur with M. Drouyn de Lhuys that an act more obligatory upon the Five Powers for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, and for the settlement of differences which may arise between them and Turkey, has now become a matter of urgent necessity.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 47.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 274.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 8, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 511, marked Confidential, you will inform M. Drouyn de Lhuys that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in the views taken by the French Government of the project attributed to M. de Bourqueney, and the recommendations which M. de Castelbajac will be instructed to make to the Russian Government.

It would be impossible for the Porte to adopt Prince Menchikoff's note without a clear and satisfactory understanding beforehand of the interpretation to be put upon it; and, if Russia were acting with good faith, nothing would be more simple and at the same time more dignified on her part than to enter into an engagement of this kind upon a subject of such vital importance to the Porte, whose independence she still professes the wish to uphold.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 48.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 113.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 9, 1853.*

I RECEIVED yesterday morning by the extra messenger Capel, your Excellency's despatches from No. 117 to No. 127, both inclusive, the last of the 24th of June.

I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the language held by you to the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs, as reported in your despatch No. 122 of the 24th of June.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 49.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 115.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 9, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings, as reported in your despatch No. 117 of the 24th June, with reference to the suggestion offered by the Cabinet of Vienna to the Turkish Government, with the view of affording an opportunity for the mediation of Austria between Russia and the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 50.

*Circular Despatch from Count Nesselrode to the Russian Ministers at Foreign Courts.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, July 9.)*

Monsieur, *St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{10 \text{ Juin}}{22 \text{ Juillet}}$ *1853.*

MA dépêche circulaire du 30 Mai passé, vous a informé de la rupture de nos rapports diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement Ottoman. Elle vous a chargé d'instruire le Cabinet près duquel vous êtes accrédité, des griefs que nous a donnés la Porte, de nos efforts infructueux pour en obtenir satisfaction, et des concessions successives que nous a fait faire notre désir sincère de conserver avec le Gouvernement Turc de bonnes et amicales relations. Vous savez qu'après avoir renoncé tour à tour à l'idée d'une garantie obtenue sous forme de Convention Séned, ou autre Acte synallagmatique quelconque, nous avions réduit nos demandes à la signature d'une simple note, telle que celle dont le texte vous a été transmis. Vous aurez pu voir que cette note, indépendamment des dispositions plus particulières aux saints lieux, ne renferme au fond autre chose, quant à la garantie général réclamée en faveur du culte, qu'une simple confirmation de celle que nous possédons depuis longtemps. Je vous ai fait remarquer, Monsieur, que la signature de cette pièce constituait aux yeux de l'Empereur la seule et vraie réparation qu'il puisse accepter pour l'offense commise envers lui par la violation du firman de l'année 1852, comme aussi des promesses personnelles qu'y avait jointes le Sultan. J'ai ajouté qu'un pareil Acte était d'ailleurs indispensable, puisque l'obtention de nouveaux firmans, susceptibles d'être enfreints, aussi bien que le premier, ne pouvait plus à elle seule nous offrir de gage suffisant pour l'avenir. Enfin, je ne vous ai point dissimulé que si, après huit jours de réflexion, la Porte Ottomane refusait d'obtempérer à notre demande, l'Empereur se verrait dans l'obligation de recourir, pour obtenir satisfaction, à des mesures plus décisives qu'une simple interruption de rapports.

En posant cet ultimatum à la Porte, nous avions plus particulièrement informé les grands Cabinets de nos intentions. Nous avions engagé nommément la France et la Grande Bretagne à ne pas compliquer par leur attitude les difficultés de la situation, à ne pas prendre trop tôt de mesures qui, d'un côté, auraient pour effet d'encourager l'opposition de la Porte, de l'autre, engageraient plus avant qu'ils ne l'étaient déjà dans la question, l'honneur et la dignité de l'Empereur.

J'ai le regret de vous annoncer, aujourd'hui, que cette double tentative a malheureusement été vaine.

La Porte, comme vous le verrez par la lettre ci-jointe de Reshid Pasha, vient de faire à celle que je lui avais adressée une réponse négative, ou au moins évasive.

D'autre part, les deux Puissances maritimes n'ont pas cru devoir déférer aux considérations que nous avions recommandées à leur sérieuse attention. Prénant avant nous l'initiative, elles ont jugé indispensable de dévancer immédiatement par une mesure effective, celles que nous ne leur avions annoncées que comme purement éventuelles, puisque nous en subordonnions la mise à effet aux résolutions finales de la Porte; et qu'au moment même où j'écris, l'exécution n'en a pas encore commencé. Elles ont sur-le-champ envoyé leurs flottes dans les parages de Constantinople. Elles occupent déjà les eaux et ports de la domination Ottomane à portée des Dardanelles. Par cette attitude avancée, les deux Puissances nous ont placés sous le poids d'une démonstration comminatoire, qui, comme nous le leur avions fait pressentir, devait ajouter à la crise de nouvelles complications.

En présence du refus de la Porte, appuyé par la manifestation de la France et de l'Angleterre, il nous devient plus que jamais impossible de modifier les résolutions qu'en avait fait dépendre l'Empereur.

En conséquence, Sa Majesté Impériale vient d'envoyer au corps de nos troupes, stationné en ce moment en Bessarabie, l'ordre de passer la frontière pour occuper les Principautés.

Elles y entrent, non pour faire à la Porte une guerre offensive, que nous éviterons au contraire de tout notre pouvoir aussi longtemps qu'elle ne nous y

forcera point; mais parceque la Porte, en persistant à nous refuser la garantie morale que nous avions droit d'attendre, nous oblige à y substituer provisoirement une garantie matérielle; parceque la position qu'ont prise les deux Puissances dans les ports et eaux de son Empire, en vue même de sa capitale, ne pouvant être envisagée par nous dans les circonstances actuelles que comme une occupation maritime, nous donne en outre une raison de rétablir l'équilibre des situations réciproques moyennant une prise de position militaire. Nous n'avons du reste aucune intention de garder cette position plus longtemps que ne l'exigeront notre honneur ou notre sécurité. Elle sera toute temporaire; elle nous servira uniquement de gage, jusqu'à ce que de meilleurs conseils aient prévalu dans l'esprit des Ministres du Sultan. En occupant les Principautés pour un temps, nous désavouons d'avance toute idée de conquête. Nous ne prétendons obtenir aucun agrandissement de territoire. Sciemment et volontairement nous ne chercherons à exciter aucun soulèvement parmi les populations Chrétiennes de la Turquie. Dès que celle-ci nous aura accordé la satisfaction qui nous est due, et qu'en même temps viendra à cesser la pression qu'exerce sur nous l'attitude des deux Puissances maritimes, nos troupes rentreront à l'instant même dans les limites de la Russie. Quant aux habitants des Principautés, la présence de notre corps d'armée ne leur imposera ni charges ni contributions nouvelles. Les fournitures qu'ils nous feront seront liquidées par nos caisses militaires, en temps opportun et à un taux fixé d'avance avec leur Gouvernement. Les principes et règles de conduite que nous nous sommes prescrits à cet égard, vous les trouverez exposés dans la Proclamation ci-jointe que le Général Prince Gortchakoff, chef du corps d'occupation, a été chargé de publier à son entrée dans les deux provinces.

Nous ne nous dissimulons nullement, Monsieur, combien l'attitude que nous prenons a de portée, et quelles en peuvent devenir ultérieurement les conséquences, si le Gouvernement Turc nous oblige à la faire sortir du cercle étroit et limité dans lequel nous désirons l'enfermer. Mais la position où il nous jette, en poussant les choses à l'extrême, en nous refusant toute satisfaction légitime, en ne répondant par aucune concession quelconque à toutes celles que le Prince Menchikoff avait faites successivement sur la forme comme sur le fond originaire de nos propositions, ne nous laisse plus d'autre parti à prendre. Il y a plus: les principes si péremptoirement posés, malgré la modération du langage dans la lettre responsive de Rechid Pacha, aussi bien que dans sa note du 26 Mai dernier aux Représentants des quatre Puissances à Constantinople, n'iraient à rien moins, s'il fallait les prendre à la lettre, qu'à mettre en question tous nos droits acquis, qu'à frapper de nullité toutes nos transactions antérieures.

En effet, si le Gouvernement Ottoman juge contraire à son indépendance et à ses droits de souveraineté, tout engagement diplomatique quelconque, même sous forme de simple note, dans lequel il s'agirait de stipuler avec un Gouvernement Etranger pour la religion et les églises, que devient l'engagement qu'il a contracté autrefois envers nous sous une forme bien autrement obligatoire, de protéger dans ses Etats notre religion et ses églises?

Pour peu que nous admettions un principe si absolu, il nous faudrait déchirer de nos propres mains le Traité de Kaïnardji, comme tous ceux qui le confirment; et abandonner volontairement le droit qu'il nous ont conféré de veiller à ce que le culte Grec soit efficacement protégé en Turquie.

Est-ce là ce que veut la Porte? A-t-elle intention de se dégager de toutes ses obligations antérieurs, et de faire sortir de la crise actuelle l'abolition à tout jamais de tout un ordre de relations que le temps avait consacré?

L'Europe impartiale comprendra que, si la question se posait en ces termes, elle deviendrait pour la Russie, malgrés les intentions les plus conciliantes, insoluble pacifiquement. Car, il s'agirait pour nous de nos Traités, de notre influence séculaire, de notre crédit moral, de nos sentiments les plus chers, nationaux et religieux.

Qu'on nous permette de le dire: la contestation actuelle et tout le retentissement que la presse lui a donné en dehors des Cabinets, reposent sur un par malentendu ou sur un défaut d'attention suffisante à tous nos antécédents politiques.

On semble ignorer, ou l'on perd de vue, que la Russie jouit virtuellement, par position et par Traité, d'un ancien droit de surveillance à la protection effective de son culte en Orient; et le maintien de cet ancien droit qu'elle ne saurait abandonner, on se le représente comme impliquant la prétention toute



nouvelle d'un protectorat à la fois religieux et politique, dont on s'exagère pour l'avenir la portée et les conséquences.

C'est à ce triste malentendu que tient toute la crise du moment.

La portée et les conséquences de notre prétendu nouveau protectorat politique n'ont point d'existence réelle. Nous ne demandons pour nos coreligionnaires en Orient que le strict *status quo*, que la conservation des privilèges qu'ils possèdent *ab antiquo* sous l'égide de leur Souverain. Nous ne nierons pas qu'il n'en résulte pour la Russie ce qu'on peut justement nommer un patronage religieux. C'est celui que de tout temps nous avons exercé en Orient. Or, si jusqu'ici l'indépendance et la souveraineté de la Turquie ont trouvé moyen de se concilier avec l'exercice de ce patronage, pourquoi l'une et l'autre en souffriraient-elles à l'avenir, du moment que nos prétentions se réduisent à ce qui n'en est au fond que la simple confirmation?

Nous l'avons dit, et nous le répétons: l'Empereur ne veut pas plus aujourd'hui qu'il ne l'a voulu dans le passé renverser l'Empire Ottoman, ou s'aggrandir à ses dépens. Après l'usage si modéré qu'il a fait en 1829 de la victoire d'Andrinople, quand cette victoire et ses conséquences mettaient la Porte à sa merci; après avoir, seul en Europe, sauvé la Turquie en 1833 d'un démembrement inévitable; après avoir, en 1839, pris auprès des autres Puissances l'initiative des propositions qui, exécutées en commun, ont de nouveau empêché le Sultan de voir son trône faire place à un nouvelle Empire Arabe; il devient presque fastidieux de donner les preuves de cette vérité. Au contraire; le principe fondamental de la politique de notre Auguste Maître a toujours été de maintenir aussi longtemps que possible le *status quo* actuel de l'Orient. Il l'a voulu et le veut encore, parceque tel est en définitive l'intérêt bien entendu de la Russie, déjà trop vaste pour avoir besoin d'une extension de territoire; parceque prospère, paisible, inoffensif, placé comme utile intermédiaire entre des Etats puissants, l'Empire Ottoman arrête le choc des rivalités qui, s'il tombait, se heurteraient incontinent pour s'en disputer les ruines; parceque la prévoyance humaine s'épuise vainement à chercher les combinaisons les plus propres à combler le vide que laisserait dans l'équilibre politique la disparition de ce grand corps. Mais si telles sont les vues réelles, avouées, sincères de l'Empereur, pour qu'il puisse y rester fidèle, il faut aussi que la Turquie agisse envers nous de manière à nous offrir la possibilité de coexister avec elle: qu'elle respecte nos Traités particuliers et les conséquences qui en dérivent; que des actes de mauvaise foi, de sourdes persécutions, des vexations perpétuelles, intentées à notre culte, ne nous créent pas une situation qui, intolérable à la longue, nous forcerait d'en confier le remède aux chances aveugles du hasard.

Telles sont, Monsieur, les considérations que vous êtes chargé de faire valoir auprès du Gouvernement , en portant à sa connaissance, par la présente dépêche, les résolutions et les intentions de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 50.

*Reshid Pasha to the Chancellor of the Empire.*

*Constantinople, le 4/6 Juin*, 1853.

JE me suis empressé de mettre sous les yeux de Sa Majesté mon Auguste Maître, la dépêche que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 19 Mai dernier.

Sa Majesté le Sultan a toujours montré en toute occasion les plus grands égards pour Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, qu'il considère comme son allié sincère et comme un voisin bien intentionné. La Sublime Porte, ne mettant nullement en doute les intentions généreuses de l'Empereur, a ressenti un profond chagrin de l'interruption des relations, survenue malheureusement, parcequ'on n'a pas bien compris peut-être l'impossibilité réelle où elle se trouvait à propos de la question soulevée par le Prince Menchikoff de consigner dans un engagement diplomatique les privilèges religieux accordés au rit Grec. Toutefois elle éprouve la consolation de voir que pour sa part elle

n'a nullement contribué à amener un semblable état de chose. En effet le Gouvernement Ottoman a montré, dès le principe, les meilleurs dispositions et toutes les facilités relativement à toutes les questions que le Prince Menchikoff était chargé de régler d'après les ordres de l'Empereur. Et même, dans une question aussi délicate que celle des privilèges religieux de l'Eglise Grecque, s'inspirant encore de ses sentiments pacifiques et ne refusant par les assurances qui pouvaient faire disparaître et réduire à néant tous les doutes qui auraient pu s'élever à cet égard, la Porte espérait surtout de la sagesse reconnue du Prince Menchikoff, que cet Ambassadeur se montrerait satisfait du projet de note qui lui avait été transmis en dernier lieu, et qui contenait toutes les assurances demandées. Quoiqu'il en soit, ce fait regrettable s'est produit.

Il est vrai que son Altesse le Prince Menchikoff a, la seconde fois, abrégé la minute de Sened qu'il avait donnée d'abord, et, en donnant à la fin un projet de note, il a fait quelques changements, soit dans les termes, soit dans le rédaction et le titre de la pièce; mais le sens d'un engagement s'y trouvait toujours. Et, comme cet engagement diplomatique ne peut s'accorder ni avec l'indépendance du Gouvernement Ottoman, ni avec les droits de son autorité souveraine, on ne saurait donner aux motifs d'impossibilité réelle, présentés sur ce point par la Sublime Porte, le nom de refus, et faire de cela une question d'honneur pour Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie.

De plus, si on se plaint de cette impossibilité, en l'attribuant à un sentiment de défiance, la Russie, en ne tenant aucun compte de toutes les assurances offertes de la manière la plus solennelle par la Sublime Porte, et en déclarant qu'il était indispensable de les consigner dans un Acte ayant force d'engagement, ne donne-t-elle pas plutôt une preuve patente de son manque de confiance envers le Gouvernement Ottoman? Et celui-ci n'a-t-il pas, à son tour, le droit de s'en plaindre?

Toutefois il s'en remet, pour répondre sur ces deux points à la haute justice si connue de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, ainsi qu'à la haute raison et aux sentiments éminemment pacifiques de votre Excellence, que chacun d'ailleurs a pu reconnaître et apprécier.

Sa Majesté le Sultan, par un firman Impérial revêtu de son auguste hatti-chérif, vient de confirmer de nouveau les privilèges, droits, et immunités dont les religieux et les églises du rit Grec jouissent *ab antiquo*.

La Sublime Porte n'hésitera jamais à maintenir et à donner les assurances contenues et promises dans le projet de note remis au Prince Menchikoff peu avant son départ. La dépêche reçue de la part de votre Excellence parle de l'intention de faire passer les frontières aux troupes Russes. Cette déclaration est incompatible avec les assurances de paix et de bon vouloir de Sa Majesté l'Empereur. Elle est, en vérité, si contraire à ce que l'on est en droit d'attendre de la part d'une Puissance amie, que la Sublime Porte ne saurait comment l'accepter.

Les préparatifs militaires et les travaux de défense ordonnés par la Porte, ainsi qu'elle l'a déclaré officiellement aux Puissances, ne sont donc nécessités que par les armements considérables de la Russie; ils ne constituent qu'une mesure purement défensive. Le Gouvernement du Sultan, n'ayant aucune intention hostile contre la Russie, exprime le désir que les anciennes relations que Sa Majesté regarde comme si précieuses et dont les avantages sont si nombreux et si manifestes pour les deux Parties, soient rétablies dans leur état primitif.

J'espère que la Cour de Russie appréciera avec un sentiment de confiante considération les intentions sincères et loyales de la Sublime Porte, et tiendra compte de l'impossibilité réelle où elle se trouve de déférer aux désirs qui lui ont été exprimés. Que cette impossibilité soit appréciée comme elle mérite de l'être, et la Sublime Porte, je puis l'assurer à votre Excellence, n'hésitera pas à charger un Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de se rendre à St. Pétersbourg, pour y renouer les négociations et chercher, de concert avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, un accommodement qui, tout en étant agréable à Sa Majesté, serait tel que la Porte pourrait l'accepter, sans porter aucune atteinte, soit aux bases de son indépendance, soit à l'autorité souveraine de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Votre Excellence peut tenir pour certain que, pour ma part, j'appelle ce résultat de tous mes vœux. J'aime à croire que, de son côté, il en est de même.

Je prie, &c.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 50.

*Proclamation.*

Habitants de la Moldavie et de la Valachie!

Sa Majesté l'Empereur mon Auguste Maître m'a ordonné d'occuper votre territoire avec le corps d'armée dont il a daigné me confier le commandement.

Nous n'arrivons au milieu de vous, ni avec des projets de conquête, ni avec l'intention de modifier les institutions qui vous régissent et la situation politique que des Traités solennels vous ont garantie.

L'occupation provisoire des Principautés, que je suis chargé d'effectuer, n'a d'autre but que celui d'une protection immédiate et efficace dans des circonstances imprévues et graves où le Gouvernement Ottoman, méconnaissant les nombreuses preuves d'une sincère alliance que la Cour Impériale n'a cessé de lui donner depuis la conclusion du Traité d'Andrinople, répond à nos propositions les plus justes par des refus, à nos conseils les plus désintéressés par la plus offensante méfiance.

Dans sa longanimité, dans son constant désir de maintenir la paix en Orient comme en Europe, l'Empereur évitera une guerre offensive contre la Turquie aussi longtemps que sa dignité et les intérêts de son Empire le lui permettront.

Le jour où il obtiendra la réparation qui lui est due et les garanties qu'il est en droit de réclamer pour l'avenir, ses troupes rentreront dans les limites de la Russie.

Habitants de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, je remplis également un ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale en vous déclarant que la présence de ses troupes dans votre pays ne vous imposera ni charges ni contributions nouvelles, que les fournitures en vivres seront liquidées par nos caisses militaires en temps opportun et à un taux fixé d'avance, d'accord avec vos Gouvernements.

Envisagez votre avenir sans inquiétude, livrez-vous avec sécurité à vos travaux agricoles et à vos spéculations commerciales, obéissez aux règlements qui vous régissent et aux autorités établies. C'est par le fidèle accomplissement de ces devoirs, que vous acquerrez les meilleurs titres à la généreuse sollicitude et à la puissante protection de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

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No. 51.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 116.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 9, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government having, after mature deliberation, seen reason to advise the Sultan not to exercise his unquestionable right of declaring war against Russia upon the occupation of the Principalities, it was highly satisfactory to them to find that, before the receipt of my despatch, No. 81, of the 18th ultimo, your Excellency had tendered similar advice to His Highness, who had determined to act upon it; but if Russian aggression were to be carried farther, and if any other portion of Turkish territory were to be invaded, active operations on the part of Turkey would seem to be inevitable, and eventually the English and French fleets might be called upon to protect Constantinople.

Before, however, the time for adopting a policy of resistance shall arrive, it is alike our duty and our interest to exert our utmost efforts, in conjunction with Her Majesty's allies, to preserve peace on terms that shall be safe and honourable to the Sultan, and shall satisfy every claim that Russia can with justice put forward.

The Emperor of Russia throughout these painful negotiations has declared, and he has recently, upon more than one occasion, renewed the declaration, that he seeks no increase of power or influence over the Greek subjects of the Porte; and desires only the maintenance of the *status quo* in religious matters, and the fulfilment of existing Treaties. Her Majesty's Government therefore recommend the Turkish Government to take this declaration as the basis of a fresh

agreement, and to embody in one separate Convention the stipulations with respect to religious matters in the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, by which Turkey is now bound to Russia.

I accordingly inclose the Project of a Convention which Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the Sultan, without loss of power, might propose, and the Emperor might, without loss of dignity, accept. Her Majesty's Government consider this form of agreement preferable to that of a note, because, as the Emperor has demanded the adoption of Prince Menchikoff's note, *sans variante*, and the Porte has rejected the demand, it can hardly be expected that any mode of settling the question by a note should be devised; while, on the other hand, a Convention is more precise and less liable to misconstruction than a note, followed, as the latter might be, by an answer giving to it a different meaning than that understood by the party signing it, which must either be admitted by silence, or the whole matter must again be reopened and discussed.

The first Article of the Convention commences by reciting the words of the seventh Article of the Treaty of Kainardji; it then adverts to the recent firmans, as showing how the obligation has been carried out by the Sultan, and concludes by renewing and confirming the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople.

This project has been proposed to the French Government, and has received its cordial assent.

Your Excellency is accordingly instructed to bring this Convention under the consideration of the Porte, and to state that Her Majesty's Government would further recommend that it should be sent to St. Petersburgh by a special Ambassador, who should have power to sign, but not to alter it without reference to the Porte. He should lay before the Emperor the recent firman in favour of the Greek Church, together with the firmans respecting the holy places, and be empowered to give a written assurance as to their fulfilment, taking care, however, that such assurance should in no way infringe upon the rights acquired by the Latin Church, nor militate against a similar guarantee being given to France and to other Powers; and lastly, the Ambassador should by Convention or note assign to the Russians at Jerusalem a hospital, or such other buildings as may be required.

If the Porte should think proper to act upon this advice, and if a proposal so fair and honourable be rejected, Her Majesty's Government must consider that it will be manifest to the world that the claim of religious rights covers ulterior designs on the part of Russia, hostile to the independence of Turkey, and the Sultan may then justly claim the sympathy and support of every Government in Europe.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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Inclosure in No. 51.

*Draft of Convention between Russia and the Porte.*

HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having expressed to His Highness the Sultan his desire, that at this particular juncture no doubt or uncertainty should exist as to the right of the members of the Orthodox Eastern Church fully to participate in the privileges, immunities, and other advantages which, by the Treaty between Russia and the Sublime Porte, concluded at Koutchouk-Kainardji on July $\frac{10}{21}$, 1774, and by the further Treaty between the same Powers, concluded at Adrianople on the $\frac{2}{14}$ September, 1829, were secured to that Church in various parts of the Ottoman dominions; and His Highness the Sultan being anxious to comply with the desire of His Imperial Majesty in this respect; it has seemed good to His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and to His Highness the Sultan, that a special and separate Act should be concluded between them for that purpose, and they have accordingly named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias

and His Highness the Sultan



who, having communicated their respective full powers, found in due and proper form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

ARTICLE I.

The Sublime Porte having in times past promised constantly to protect the Christian religion in all its churches within the Ottoman dominions, and His Highness the Sultan, in fulfilment of that promise, having since his accession to the Throne studied to insure to all classes of his subjects full and entire security for the exercise of their religion, and His Highness having in these latter days more specifically declared his sovereign will that the special privileges and immunities in regard to matters pertaining to their religion granted of old to the Christian clergy, subjects of the Sublime Porte, to their churches, convents, and other properties dependent on those establishments, to their shrines and oratories, should be hereafter and for ever maintained within His Highness' dominions, His Highness renews and confirms by the present instrument in favour of the ecclesiastics and other members of the Orthodox Eastern Church all the promises, engagements, and stipulations, in their favour contained in the Treaties concluded at Koutchouk-Kainardji on July $\frac{10}{21}$, 1774, and at Adrianople on September $\frac{2}{14}$, 1829, between Russia and the Sublime Porte. And His Highness the Sultan further engages that any privileges or immunities in regard to matters pertaining to their religion, which the Sublime Porte may hereafter grant to the clergy of other Christian sects, subjects of the Sublime Porte, within the Ottoman dominions, shall be equally granted to and enjoyed by the clergy of the Orthodox Eastern Church in the said dominions.

ARTICLE II.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged, &c.

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No. 52.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 130.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 9, 1853.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to No. 339 of the 2nd instant, inclusive.

Her Majesty's Government have read with sincere regret the manifesto of the Emperor of Russia inclosed in your despatch No. 318 of the 27th ultimo. Such an exciting appeal to the feelings of the Russian people in behalf of their Church, which is not in danger, and of their religion, which has not been assailed, appears to Her Majesty's Government to be as uncalled for as it is inconsistent with the pacific objects which we are desired to believe are still entertained by the Russian Cabinet.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 53.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 131.)

*Foreign Office, July 9, 1853.*

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to the Greek Minister with reference to the present state of things in Turkey, as reported in in your despatch No. 336 of the 1st instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 54.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 197.)

*Foreign Office, July 9, 1853.*

My Lord,

ON the 7th instant Count Colloredo read me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that Baron Meyendorff had communicated to him several despatches of June 23, from Count Nesselrode, which showed the earnest desire of Russia for a peaceful solution of the question now pending with the Porte. Count Nesselrode affirms that Prince Menchikoff's note contains no other engagement than that which the Porte in its last note was ready to give, and he cannot conceive why modifications should be sought for unless it is to efface every vestige of guarantee for the immunities enjoyed *ab antiquo* by the Greek religion in Turkey. Besides, Russia has only announced the occupation of the Principalities as an eventual measure, whereas the two naval Powers have already put in execution an effective and immediate measure in taking up a position within the ports and maritime dominions of the Porte, and to this naval possession Russia can only oppose a military possession.

By thus compromising the dignity of Russia and giving encouragement to the Porte, the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh has been placed in a position to render all negotiation impossible, whatever modifications might be proposed to the Russian note.

In another despatch Count Nesselrode expresses his satisfaction at the desire manifested by the French and English Representatives at Vienna to endeavour with the Austrian Government to find a satisfactory solution. He alludes particularly to the project of sending an Ambassador from the Porte with the note of Prince Menchikoff, and leaving to the Emperor to give in return to the Sultan the assurance that His Imperial Majesty in no way intended to encroach upon his sovereign rights. Count Nesselrode declares that this entirely meets the views of the Emperor, and that the Russian troops, if they have entered the Principalities, would be immediately withdrawn, if the note signed is sent by an Ambassador to St. Petersburgh, and the foreign fleets quit their present anchorage. The note once delivered, the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh will be ready to explain its meaning (à en préciser le sens), by giving to the Ottoman Government all the assurances best calculated to tranquillize it upon the use and the extent of the guarantees demanded by Russia; these guarantees, Count Nesselrode affirms, being absolutely nothing more than the strict maintenance of the *status quo* founded in custom and Treaties.

Russia asks nothing new, nothing that implies an intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey, nothing that shall go beyond the rights of superintendence (surveillance) over the orthodox creed and its churches resulting from the Treaty of Kainardji. Count Buol then says that whatever may be the value of the arguments adduced by Russia, he cannot disguise from himself the grave and pressing reasons that should



weigh with the Porte for effecting a reconciliation with its powerful neighbour as quickly as possible, provided that the honour and independence of the Sultan are guarded; and he dwells upon all the financial and political evils that a prolongation of the present crisis must entail upon Turkey. He adds that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, although it persists in obtaining Prince Menchikoff's note without alteration, yet offers at the same time to give the Porte all the assurances necessary for dissipating the doubts and calming the apprehensions that had led to her resistance, and Count Buol strongly recommends the Ottoman Government to accept the formal contradiction which Russia is ready to give beforehand to the alarm that the text of the Russian note had created, and to get rid of its present embarrassments, if not by signing Prince Menchikoff's note without alteration, at least by endeavouring to frame one as nearly as possible approaching to it, and of a nature to satisfy the Emperor of Russia within the limits traced by his Cabinet.

It is in this sense, Count Buol says, that Baron Bruck will be directed to advise the Porte, and he earnestly hopes that Her Majesty's Government, whose interests are entirely identical with those of Austria on the question, may instruct Lord Stratford to support the conciliatory efforts that will be made by the Internuncio.

My first remark to Count Colloredo had reference to the astounding statement of Count Nesselrode, that the occupation of the Principalities had been imposed upon Russia in consequence of the naval possession of the maritime dominions of the Porte by the fleets of England and France, which was a fiction so palpable that Count Nesselrode could not seriously expect that in any quarter it should be believed.

With respect to the project attributed to the French Minister at Vienna, I said that it might furnish the means of arriving at a peaceful solution of the difficulty, provided that the objectionable parts of Prince Menchikoff's note were entirely neutralized by the assurances that Count Nesselrode now seemed prepared to give; but that after all that had passed it was impossible to leave the Russian part of the transaction in doubt, and that the precise nature of the assurances promised must be communicated beforehand, and be satisfactory to the Porte.

I said Her Majesty's Government was happy to think that the interest of England and Austria were entirely identical upon the Eastern question, and that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had already supported the recommendations of the Internuncio to the Porte, but that we could give no advice inconsistent with the dignity and independence of the Sultan, which Austria as well as England desired to uphold.

Count Colloredo earnestly requested me to permit his Government to give an assurance at St. Petersburgh, that simultaneously with the evacuation of the Principalities, the British and French fleets would quit the Turkish waters.

I replied, that when all differences were settled between Russia and the Porte, and that the Principalities were evacuated, it might easily be supposed that the Bay of Besica was not a place where it was desirable that the combined fleets should long remain; but that Her Majesty's Government would give no assurance upon the subject, because the presence of the fleets in the Turkish waters was neither a violation of Treaties nor an infraction of international law, and could not therefore be considered in the same light as the occupation of the Principalities, which was a violation of Treaty and of the Law of Nations, and constituted an act of war against Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 55.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 198.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 9, 1853.*

ON the 7th instant, Count Colloredo read to me a despatch from Count Buol, containing the views of the Austrian Government upon the answers addressed by Reshid Pasha to the note of Count Nesselrode.

Count Buol anticipates that this answer will not be well received at St. Petersburgh, because Reshid Pasha although affirming that the Porte is ready to repeat the assurances given in the note communicated to Prince Menchikoff shortly before his departure, yet at the same time declares that the Sultan finds it really impossible to enter upon any diplomatic engagements for that object.

If by that, Count Buol remarks, Reshid Pasha understands a synallagmatic contract or a bilateral Act, his disinclination to agree to it is natural; because, in fact, a Convention imposing upon one of the contracting parties obligations, while the other offers nothing in return, might be interpreted as derogatory to the independence of the Sultan. But Russia does not require a bilateral Act. She will, on the contrary, be satisfied with a note, and if the Porte reserves to itself the right to modify the Russian ultimatum, which it cannot sign under a threat without loss of dignity, its course is intelligible; but if, emboldened by foreign sympathy, it withdraws from that which it has already conceded by the note transmitted to Prince Menchikoff, and if it thinks that, notwithstanding the gravity of the circumstances, it can decline any description of diplomatic engagement, even such an one as should be confined to assurances given in a note, it would, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, commit a grave error which might have the most disastrous consequences.

Count Buol says he has expressed this opinion to the Porte, and hopes that similar instructions will be given to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe by Her Majesty's Government. He will in the meanwhile renew his most urgent demands against the occupation of the Principalities.

He adds, that Count Giulay has received orders to omit no opportunity of stating both to the Emperor and to his Cabinet that the military occupation of the Principalities must gratuitously aggravate the situation, and leave the Porte masters of the immense question of general peace, because from that moment the Sultan may when he pleases suspend the Treaty of 1841, and leave to fate and to unforeseen accidents the peace of Europe and the mighty interests it involves.

Count Colloredo likewise read to me the despatch of Count Buol to Baron Bruck, in which it is stated that the Porte must consider the occupation of the Principalities as a direct consequence of its "insufficient" answer to the Russian Cabinet, and will have to bear all the responsibility of it; and Count Buol instructs Baron Bruck to urge the Turkish Government to take no precipitate step upon the occupation of the Principalities that would displease the Court of Russia, and render all future understanding impossible.

I expressed to Count Colloredo my regret that the Austrian Government, which professed to uphold the dignity of the Sultan, should blame the answer sent to Count Nesselrode as insufficient, and throw upon the Porte the responsibility of the occupation of the Principalities. The Sultan, I said, would have been utterly degraded if, under the threat contained in Count Nesselrode's note, he had agreed to the terms of Prince Menchikoff which a few days previously he had rejected.

I then, as upon a former occasion, expressed to Count Colloredo my hope that the Austrian Government would urge upon the Emperor of Russia the necessity of modifying his demands and adopting a conciliatory course, as the spirit of fanaticism in Turkey was quite equal to that which had been excited in Russia, and it would be impossible for the Porte much longer to remain at peace while a portion of its territory was in the occupation of a Russian army.



I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 56.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 199.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 11, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has this day communicated to me a despatch addressed by Count Buol on the 6th instant, to Baron Lebzeltern, stating that the Imperial manifesto, dated the 26th of June, had unfortunately deprived the Austrian Government of the hope it had hitherto entertained, that the differences between Russia and the Porte might have been amicably settled without the occupation of the Principalities being considered necessary.

Count Buol says that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh will have foreseen, by his despatches of the 30th ultimo, the painful impression that the determination of the Emperor of Russia will have produced on the mind of the Emperor of Austria. By those despatches the Austrian Government had again implored (itérativement conjuré) the Imperial Cabinet well to weigh all the reasons of right and opportunity which were of a nature to make them desist from the occupation; and those representations having failed to modify the course that Russia had traced out for herself, it only remained for the Austrian Government to express its profound regret, which is all the more sincere as the difficulties of the task which the confidence of Russia had assigned to them are increased.

They will nevertheless, in the interest of peace, continue to use the conciliatory efforts at Constantinople, London, and Paris, which from the first they exerted in compliance with the desire of Russia; but their chances of success will be exceedingly weakened if Russia delays in supporting them efficaciously.

The Austrian Government has never concealed from the Russian Cabinet the lamentable effect that the occupation of the Principalities must produce on public opinion in Europe; and interpreted, as such a measure is susceptible of being, as a first act of flagrant hostility, it would entail imminent danger of war; and even if the Sultan, yielding to the advice of the Powers, did not treat it as an act of war, it must aggravate all the difficulties of a pacific arrangement.

The Austrian Government, however, renews its earnest entreaties to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, that the occupation should at least be circumscribed within the narrowest possible limits; and that with respect to its object and duration, precise explanations should be given of a nature to calm the uneasiness to which this act must give rise—explanations which are all the more necessary because the Manifesto of June 26 gives to the question proportions more vast than it hitherto possessed, and places it on a ground where it is impossible for Austria to identify herself with Russia, and which appears to the former infinitely to increase the difficulties as well as the dangers of the situation, because by appealing to the religious sentiments of the Russian people, the risk is incurred of arousing Mussulman fanaticism.

The question of the Holy Places having been settled to the satisfaction of Russia, the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh assured that of Vienna that it had nothing more to desire except a guarantee for the future. Since that time the Sultan, with the intention of complying with the demands of Russia, has solemnly confirmed the privileges of the Greek clergy in his empire; and has called all Europe to witness his immutable will to maintain those privileges for ever; and he is prepared to reiterate the most positive assurances on the subject to the Emperor of Russia. How is it

possible, then, adds Count Buol, to reconcile these facts with the passage of the manifesto, where it is said that the Ottoman Porte has attacked the rights of the Greek Church; that she has ended by threatening them with total destruction; and that every effort to bring the Ottoman Government to better sentiments has been fruitless. But if the rights of the Greek Church had been thus threatened, how comes it that the Patriarch of Constantinople, far from raising any complaint, has solemnly and publicly thanked the Porte for the confirmation of the privileges and immunities of his Church.

Count Buol appeals to the wisdom and impartiality of the Russian Cabinet to say whether these contradictions will not explain the doubt and uneasiness that more than one Government interested in upholding the Ottoman Empire cannot fail to entertain; and he asks whether it would not serve the cause of peace, which all desire to preserve, if Russia would give assurances calculated to satisfy Europe upon her real intentions.

I requested Count Colloredo, and I also request your Lordship, to thank Count Buol for this communication, and to assure him that the frankness with which he has offered sound advice to the Russian Cabinet is most satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, who hope that it may be productive of the desired result, as the Emperor of Russia cannot be altogether indifferent to the counsels of his Allies, nor set at defiance the public opinion of Europe; but should this unfortunately not be the case, and should the Emperor reject the proposals for arrangement that might be made to him, and persist in retaining forcible possession of territory belonging to Turkey, Her Majesty's Government trusted that the Austrian Government would not remain neutral, but would come to the aid of the Sultan, who, having adopted the advice given to him by Austria as well as by England and France, has a right to expect that the Three Powers will cooperate together in his defence.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 57.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 273.)
My Lord, *Berlin, July 7, 1853.*

I SAW Baron Manteuffel this morning, when we had some conversation on the aspect of affairs in the East. His Excellency said he had nothing of a satisfactory nature to communicate to me. He made some observations of a general nature on the Russian manifesto of June 26, which conveyed his marked disapprobation of this document, and then expressed his regret that the entrance of the troops into the Principalities should have followed so rapidly. He next informed me that Baron Budberg had communicated to him the proclamation which was to be issued by Prince Gortchakoff on crossing the Turkish frontier.

This document, he said, was less objectionable than anything that had lately emanated from the Russian Government, and he observed that the terms of it appeared more reasonable: that an allusion which was made in it to the protectorate was fair enough; but he made some ironical remarks on the assurances given to the inhabitants of the Principalities, that they might continue their lawful occupations in full security, and that the laws and general administration of those provinces would be respected. He said further, that the Russian Minister had read to him part of a letter from Count Nesselrode expressing his regret at the declaration of the neutral policy which Prussia intended to follow, but that he hoped Russia might nevertheless count on her impartiality.

On my asking Baron Manteuffel whether he had learnt anything as to the future projects of the Russian Government, his Excellency said that Count Henckel was under the impression that the Emperor had no further



warlike intentions, and conceived that the moment was come when negotiations would be practicable; arguing that it would be impossible for the Emperor after his late declarations to recede from the measures which he had announced; that the refusal of the Porte to sign the projected note rendered the advance of the troops inevitable.

I cannot say that Baron Manteuffel seems inclined to adopt this reasoning, but he nevertheless appeared to think some concessions might be now obtained; that the Emperor's honour had, as it were, been satisfied; and that His Imperial Majesty would no longer insist upon the note without alterations; and that in this respect, at all events, he believed the position is somewhat improved.

His Excellency then told me that the French Minister had communicated to him a draft of note for the settlement of the Russian and Turkish question, which had been prepared by his Government; that it was endeavoured in this paper to combine passages and expressions of Prince Menchikoff's projected note and Reshid Pasha's communication to Count Nesselrode; and that he should be very glad if it could be made acceptable. He seemed to apprehend, however, that the Russian Government would not approve of it, the language in which it was drawn up being very different from the vague expressions usually found in Russian notes.

Before leaving Baron Manteuffel, his Excellency told me he had written again to Baron Wildenbruch at Constantinople, directing him to exert every effort to advance the solution of the difficulties, and to unite cordially for this purpose with Her Majesty's Ambassador to the Porte, with M. de la Cour, and with Baron Bruck.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 58.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 276.)
My Lord, *Berlin, July 8, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL left Berlin for the country yesterday afternoon, and I have not consequently been able to communicate with his Excellency on the subject of your Lordship's despatches of the 5th instant.

I called this morning on M. le Coq, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and found him deeply impressed with the gravity of the present situation of the Eastern question. He said that he had carefully examined the correspondence which had reached the Prussian Government within the last few days, and it was evident no time should be wasted in endeavouring to bring the affair, if still possible, to a peaceful termination. That in his opinion the Emperor Nicholas could only be brought to accept an arrangement in which his original propositions were taken as a basis, and that the proposal which was attributed to Baron de Bourqueney appeared to him the one most likely to succeed; that it had been already submitted to the Imperial Cabinet and favourably received, and he believed that if it were pressed upon the consideration of the Great Powers, some means could not fail to be devised which would terminate the difference much more rapidly than would appear at first sight; that looking at the reports received on Tuesday from St. Petersburgh, he could not bring himself to believe that Russia had any extended warlike projects, or even any immediate scheme of aggrandizement, but would, on the contrary, gladly get out of the troubled waters in which she found herself, if an opening were left to her; and that, on the other hand, if there was delay and hesitation amongst the Cabinets, he feared the danger to Turkish independence would be increased. He added that, according to information which had reached the Russian Foreign Office, there was every reason to believe the Emperor Nicholas would be disposed to give ample assurances that he had no political object in pressing his

demands on Turkey, and that these assurances, once given, would put an end to the occupation of the Principalities, an object which it was essential to obtain at an early moment.

I have thought it right to report the substance of M. le Coq's observations, though they can have no great value as coming from a subordinate officer in the Foreign Department, and I am the more induced to mention his remarks as they were delivered with great earnestness.

It appears to me also that if any arrangement were effected, such as that proposed by Baron Bourqueney, the Russian assurances might perhaps afterwards be made the groundwork of a guarantee to prevent future encroachments on the independence of the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 59.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 11.)

(No. 265.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July* 5, 1853.

I FORWARDED to your Excellency this morning the telegraphic despatch which had been received from Bucarest by M. de Bourqueney, announcing the entry of the Russian troops into Moldavia and Wallachia on the 1st ultimo.

This intelligence, although not unexpected by this Government, is looked upon by them with the greatest possible regret; and I am requested by Count Buol to state this to your Lordship, as also to announce to you his intention immediately to convey this feeling to the Russian Cabinet, together with the expression of the disappointment he has felt at the sudden adoption of this measure while there still existed the hopes of an arrangement at Constantinople.

Count Buol yesterday read to me the various despatches he had received from Count Colloredo, reporting the conversations he had held with your Lordship as well as with Lord Aberdeen upon Turkish affairs, and detailing your opinions with regard to them and your general coincidence with the views of Austria, such as he had been instructed to bring them before you.

Count Buol expressed his entire satisfaction with the language your Lordship had held to Count Colloredo, agreeing, as he does, with the policy you recommended, and with the necessity which would arise in case the invasion of the Principalities took place, of concerting measures among the Powers—parties to the Treaty of 1841, with the view of obtaining from the Russian Cabinet the most distinct declarations as to the objects of that movement and the term which would be fixed for its duration. Count Buol, in his desire to prevent this invasion of the Principalities, wrote again yesterday to Baron Bruck, at Constantinople, to desire him to press upon the Turkish Government the adoption of a form of note which might be acceptable to the Emperor of Russia, while as an act of reciprocity, they should require from him a declaration of his determination to respect the integrity of the Sultan's dominions. Count Buol, who has received from Baron Bruck a very satisfactory report of his communications with Lord Stratford, has instructed that Minister to bring these views before his Lordship, and to request his advice and assistance in stating them to the Turkish Minister.

Count Buol read to me also the despatches he had received from Baron Lebzeltern of the 25th ultimo, according to which he had been unable to see Count Nesselrode for several days; he had, therefore, inclosed in a letter to him the despatches he had been directed to communicate, as well as the autograph letter to the Emperor he was charged with from his own Sovereign, but no reply had been received.



As these documents tended in the strongest manner to dissuade the Emperor from invading the Principalities, Count Buol supposes that Count Nesselrode avoided having any conversation with respect to them at the moment the orders for carrying into effect that measure were about to be issued.

I have seen Count Buol since the foregoing part of this despatch was written, and learn from him that he has received the manifesto of the Emperor of Russia upon the order given for the entry of his troops into the Principalities, in which he declares this measure to be imposed upon him for the maintenance of the religious rights and privileges appertaining to the church of which he is the protector. Count Buol was unable to show me this document as he had sent it to the Emperor, but he looked upon it as likely to create a very dangerous excitement in the Greek population as well in Russia as in Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 60.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 11.)

(No. 342.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 4, 1853.

I HAVE the honour of transmitting to your Lordship the "St. Petersburgh Gazette" of yesterday containing the first circular addressed to the Imperial Missions, Reshid Pasha's letter of the 16th ultimo, and Prince Gortchakoff's proclamation to the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia.

The first of these documents will, I imagine, be read with feelings of very painful astonishment by every person tolerably well acquainted with the circumstances which brought about the diplomatic rupture between Russia and the Porte, and with those by which that rupture have been followed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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Inclosure in No. 60.

*Circular Despatch from Count Nesselrode to the Russian Ministers at Foreign Courts.*

[See No. 50.]

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No. 61.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 132.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 11, 1853.

THE following passage occurs in Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Brunnow of the [illegible], which was communicated to me by Baron Brunnow on the 8th of June:

"Enfin au dernier moment, quand le Prince Menchikoff avait consenti à abandonner même le Sened modifié pour se contenter d'une note; quand Reshid Pasha lui-même, frappé des dangers que le départ de notre Légation pouvait faire courir à la Porte, conjurait l'Ambassadeur Britannique avec instance de ne pas s'opposer à la remise de la note formulée par le Prince Menchikoff, Lord Redcliffe l'en a empêché, en déclarant que la note avait la valeur d'un Traité, et qu'elle était inacceptable."

I have to instruct you, with reference to this passage, to communicate to Count Nesselrode the inclosures in Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's despatch,

of which I herewith transmit to you copies; and in doing so, you will state to Count Nesselrode, that the honour of Her Majesty's Ambassador against whom this charge has been brought, demands the further investigation which Her Majesty's Government hope will be instituted by Count Nesselrode.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 62.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 340. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 3, 1853.*

THE French and Swedish Envoys, General Castelbajac and General Nordin, passed two of the last days of the preceding week at the camp. General Castelbajac had then an opportunity of conversing with His Imperial Majesty upon the affairs of the East, and according to the account which he has given me, appears to have done so with very great plainness of speech. He represented that the position which His Majesty had for many years held was so proud an one, that it was unfortunate that it should be compromised by attempts of which, though in various degrees, all the Governments of Europe disapproved. That right or wrong the preservation of Turkey was held to be an object of European importance. That this and the maintenance of peace were two of the points upon which Europe was the most intent, and that if either were placed in danger, His Majesty must be prepared to find that the gratitude of States was short-lived; that the recollection of the services which His Majesty had rendered to the cause of public order would be speedily forgotten. General Castelbajac further remarked that reports which had reached him from Paris showed that a change of feeling of this sort was already observable in some of the secondary States of Germany, where it was openly stated that the overbearing influence of Russia was becoming burthensome.

According to General Castelbajac's account, these observations were listened to with good humour, but failed in producing the slightest effect. The Emperor said that he should be very sorry were Germany to show herself ungrateful, but that this would not affect his resolutions. No one was more desirous of peace than himself, no one had greater interest in its preservation; but he had made great sacrifices, and could not turn back when in pursuit of an object which he possessed such unquestionable right to secure.

The Principalities having been mentioned, and General Castelbajac having adverted to the heavy charge which a fresh occupation would prove to those provinces hardly yet recovered from the effects of a former one, the Emperor said that this was a mistaken fear; that the whole expense would be borne by himself.

In so far as incredulity is compatible with respect, I receive this assurance with mistrust; I have, however, requested General Castelbajac to be very careful in taking note of the engagement, and further suggested that it will be advisable to have it confirmed by the Chancellor.

The Emperor, on taking leave of the French Envoy, expressed his great satisfaction at having had an opportunity of shaking his hand, even when covered with a wet glove (for a heavy shower had just fallen,) and sent a friendly message to the Emperor Napoleon. He had been informed that the manœuvres which had been performed under the direction of His Imperial Majesty at Satory were real scientific manœuvres. It was very fortunate when a Sovereign showed himself capable of commanding his own forces. His Majesty appears to have been likewise very gracious to two English officers of the Indian army, Captain Rigby and Captain Evans, who had been invited to the manœuvres.

Alluding to the camp at Chobham, His Majesty said that fortunate was that country to be esteemed, in which an army of 10,000 men was all that it was necessary to assemble.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 63.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 341.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 3, 1853.*

IT is right that I should state to your Lordship, that as far as I am able to judge, the Russian Government are well satisfied with the prospect which they possess of being able to occupy the Principalities without having to encounter the immediate hostility of England and France, and will endeavour to prolong both this occupation and the negotiation which will be required for bringing it to an end.

Various considerations suggest this policy: as, 1st. The expediency of giving time for popular feeling to subside in England. 2nd. The chances of circumstances arising which may tend to disturb the community of purpose now existing between ourselves and the French. 3rd. The advantage of keeping a large body of men at free quarters; and 4th. The value of a prolonged occupation as having the effect of accustoming the Danubian Provinces to that state to which it is probably intended that they should ultimately be reduced. I say accustoming, and not reconciling, because, as far as I am able to form an opinion, nothing could be less welcome to the Wallachians or Moldavians than a fresh visit from their Northern neighbours, unless, indeed, it were to have them as settlers and masters.

As I learn from a person to whom these districts are familiarly known, they are hardly yet recovering from the effects of the last Russian irruption. It is believed here, that the troops must have crossed the Pruth on the 1st instant.

The Manifesto which was inclosed in my despatch, No. 318, was read to-day in all the churches.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—The language of a person holding a situation about the Emperor's person, confirms the opinion which I had formed before conversing with him. This person conceives Russia to have a great advantage by having secured an entry into the Principalities, says, that in this position she can now well afford to wait, and is absolutely and sarcastically incredulous as to the charges of the occupation being borne by Russia. "By the Sultan, he says, very possibly, by the Emperor certainly not."

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No. 64.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 345. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 5, 1853.*

I HAD proposed to myself to offer your Lordship some refutation of the misrepresentations which are collected in the Russian circular, a copy of which was inclosed in my despatch No. 342. I have, however, given up that purpose, upon reflecting how useless it is to oppose separate contradictions to the various parts of a document, the whole of which is one laboured violation of truth.

Your Lordship will have read with astonishment that the Governments of England and France have taken the initiative in the struggle which appears to have commenced, and that while the despatch of the Allied Fleets to the Dardanelles is spoken of as a *mesure effective*, all these menaces, and all that assemblage of forces now poured into the Principalities, are described as measures *purement éventuelles*.

Russia, then, as a preliminary step in a cause of outrage, is entitled to take possession of the Danubian Provinces whenever inclination or waywardness may suggest such movements, it being at the same time understood that the

fleets of England and France cannot be permitted to approach the coasts of the country where those acts of violence are to be perpetrated.

At all events one portion of this paper, to which unhappily for his reputation Count Nesselrode has set his name, appears to me to possess considerable value. If any excuse were required for the Sultan's refusal to comply with the demands made upon him by Russia, it is handsomely provided by the Imperial circular.

When the Russian Government can venture to declare seriously that the rights of which they now demand the simple confirmation, were assigned to them by the Treaty of Kainardji, no surprise is admissible at the Sultan's repugnance to allow the signature of the bond which has lately been set before him.

If Russian interpretation can construe any provision of the Treaty of 1774 into the grant of a Protectorate of the Greeks to the Emperor of Russia, then indeed, according to the same free reading, might the stipulations of Prince Menchikoff's Treaty, Sened, or note, be understood as transferring St. Sophia to the use of the faithful of the Russian Greek Church.

That, however, which is the most striking is the discordance between the confidential language and the official acts of the Russian Government. There was scarcely less difference between the moderate pretensions announced by them during the first week of Prince Menchikoff's residence at Constantinople, and the demands which led to his departure, than there has been between the conciliatory disposition professed since the event by Count Nesselrode, and the appeals and declarations which are made by the Manifesto and the Circular.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 65.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 516.)
My Lord, *Paris, July 11, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch, No. 273, in which you desire me to avail myself of any fitting opportunity to recommend M. Drouyn de Lhuys not to insist too strongly upon the Treaty of 1841, as giving the Powers who signed it a right to interfere for the protection and defence of Turkey, I have the honour to observe that in obedience to your Lordship's previous instructions on this point, I have not failed on more than one occasion to point out to the French Minister for Foreign affairs, the true value of the obligation which their Treaty imposes. M. Drouyn de Lhuys is aware that it is the spirit and not the letter of the Treaty which consecrates the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire; but he argues that if Russia will not be bound by the spirit of existing Treaties, the time is arrived when attempt must be made to superinduce a more obligatory contract.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 66.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 520.)
My Lord, *Paris, July 11, 1853.*

M. DE BOURQUENEY denies in the most positive terms being the author of the project for the settlement of the Oriental question which bears his name.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 67.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 522.)
My Lord, *Paris, July 11, 1853.*

BOTH the Emperor and M. Drouyn de Lhuys have been under some alarm from circumstances which have been reported here that Austria had an intention of occupying Bosnia or Servia or both; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys has given M. de Hübner distinctly to understand that such a proceeding would be looked upon by the French Government with great suspicion and jealousy. He has written in a similar sense to M. de Bourqueney, and has authorized him, should he judge it necessary, to ask categorical explanation of Count Buol. M. de Bourqueney, however, has written that he has no apprehension of any such project being now entertained by Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 68.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 523.)
My Lord, *Paris, July 11, 1853.*

M. DE BUOL has expressed himself to M. de Bourqueney in terms of great indignation at the occupation of the Principalities by Russia, and complains that the step should have been taken at a moment when Count Giulay was on his road to St. Petersburgh with an autograph letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph to the Emperor Nicholas, entreating him not to take this step. Count Buol is also annoyed that he should have received the intelligence of the accomplishment of this decisive movement in an indirect manner.

Count Buol read to M. de Bourqueney the draft of an instruction to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh, insisting on the necessity of Russia limiting the number of troops by which the Principalities are to be occupied, and the time during which they were to remain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 69.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 118.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 12, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that the explanations contained in your despatch No. 118 of the 24th June, and its inclosures, with reference to the assertion made in Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Brunnow of the $\frac{10 \text{ May}}{2 \text{ June}}$, that your Excellency had prevented the Porte from accepting Prince Menchikoff's last proposal, are perfectly satisfactory to Her Majesty and to Her Majesty's Government, who gave no credit to the report made by Prince Menchikoff to his Government.

I have directed Sir Hamilton Seymour to communicate to Count Nesselrode the inclosures in your Excellency's despatch, and I have instructed him to state that the honour of Her Majesty's Ambassador against whom the charge has been brought, demands the further investigation which Her Majesty's Government hope will be instituted by Count Nesselrode.

I have likewise transmitted copies of your Excellency's despatch and its inclosures to all Her Majesty's Ministers abroad with instructions to communicate them to the Government to which they are accredited.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 70.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.**

(No. 281.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 12, 1853.*

THE following passage occurs in a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow of the $\frac{20}{1}$ July, which was communicated to me by Baron Brunnow on the 8th of June.

"Enfin, au dernier moment, quand le Prince Menchikoff avait consenti à abandonner même le Sened modifié pour se contenter d'une note; quand Reshid Pasha lui-même, frappé des dangers que le départ de notre Légation pourrait faire courir à la Porte, conjurait l'Ambassadeur Britannique avec instance de ne pas s'opposer à la remise de la note formulée par le Prince Menchikoff, Lord Redcliffe l'en a empêché, en déclarant que la note avait la valeur d'un Traité, et qu'elle était inacceptable."

Having communicated Count Nesselrode's despatch to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, I have received from his Excellency in reply a despatch† of the inclosures in which I herewith transmit to you copies in duplicate; and I have to instruct you to place one copy of these papers in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Court to which you are accredited.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 71.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.*

(No. 158.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 12, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 273 of the 7th instant, reporting what passed between Baron Manteuffel and yourself on the aspect of affairs in the East, I have to instruct your Lordship to inform Baron Manteuffel of the satisfaction which Her Majesty's Government derive from the expression of his opinions as reported in your Lordship's despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 72.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July 14.*)

(No. 128.)
My Lord, *Therapia, June 29, 1853.*

I AVAIL myself of the Austrian post to forward to your Lordship copies of the instructions addressed by the Austrian, French, and Prussian Representatives, and also by myself, to our respective interpreters in execution of what was agreed upon at our interview of the 24th ultimo.

For my own part I must confess that I have participated in this experiment more out of deference to the Cabinet of Austria than in pursuance of my own convictions. I sincerely hope that the present position of Russia, embarrassing as it ought to be, will facilitate the accomplishment of our views more than the public declarations of that Power will allow us to expect. At all events I think it right to catch at every chance of peace which is not attended with sacrifice of

* A despatch in the same terms was sent to all Her Majesty's Ministers abroad.
† See No. 31.



principle or a loss of time seriously prejudicial to a satisfactory solution of the question at issue.

I have some remarks to submit to your Lordship upon a part of the French Ambassador's instructions; but I reserve them for another and early opportunity.

Reshid Pasha, acting under the opinion of the Ottoman Council, is engaged in preparing the proposed fusion of the two ultimatums.

Notwithstanding past assertions, we are still without any official intelligence of the occupation of the Principalities.

I may venture to assure your Lordship that the Porte will in all likelihood carry its forbearance so far as only to protest for the present against that act of hostility, appealing to the Four Powers, and postponing the fair exercise of its right to ask for the advance of the British and French squadrons to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 72.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. Pisani.*

Monsieur, *Therapia, le 25 Juin, 1853.*

VOUS savez que son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Ottoman m'a communiqué officiellement en dernier lieu la lettre que lui avait adressée le Comte Nesselrode en date du $\frac{13}{25}$ Mai, et celle que son Altesse avait écrite en réponse au Chancelier de Russie. La même communication s'est faite aux Représentants d'Autriche, de France, et de Prusse. Son Altesse a fait suivre cette communication d'un autre, c'est à dire, de l'extrait d'une dépêche adressée par M. le Comte Buol à M. le Baron de Bruck, qui lui-même en a fait part aux Représentants de France et de Prusse ainsi qu'à moi.

A la réunion, qui s'en est suivie, des quatre Représentants, nous avons fixé notre attention sur la proposition que renferme cette dernière communication. Il se peut qu'elle soit moins recommandée par les probabilités du succès que par la haute utilité de son but; mais, d'accord avec mes collègues, je vous invite à vous rendre chez Reshid Pasha, et à lui suggérer de faire préparer un projet de communication basé sur l'idée d'une fusion du projet de note renfermant le dernier ultimatum du Prince Menchikoff avec celui qui, ayant été préparé par Reshid Pasha, ne fut remis à l'Ambassadeur de Russie que d'une manière privée. Ce travail aurait pour motif l'espoir de tomber, s'il est possible, sur une réduction qui pourrait être acceptable à la Cour de Russie, sans, pourtant, s'écarter du principe que la Porte a jugé être essentiel au maintien de ses droits souverains.

Dès que le Pasha aurait surmonté les difficultés qui entravent l'exécution de ce travail, et qu'il m'aurait fait l'honneur de m'en communiquer le résultat, je ne manquerais pas d'aviser avec leurs Excellences mes collègues aux moyens les plus convenables de donner suite au projet dont il est question.

Vous laisserez une copie de cette instruction entre les mains de son Altesse, et je suis, Monsieur, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 72.

*M. de Wildenbruch to his Interpreter.*

Monsieur, *Therapia, le 25 Juin, 1853.*

J'AI reçu de la Sublime Porte communication officielle de la lettre adressée en dernier lieu par son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode à son Altesse Reshid Pasha, et de la réponse du Ministre Ottoman à son Excellence le Chancelier de Russie. J'ai également reçu plus tard de la part de son Excellence l'Internonce d'Autriche et de son Altesse Reshid Pasha communication d'un extrait de dépêche adressée par M. le Comte de Buol à M. le Baron de Bruck.

Conformément à la demande que son Altesse Réshid Pâsha a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 22 courant, et dans le but de contribuer à amener la solution pacifique d'une question qui intéresse à un haut degré le monde Européen, certain en même temps de remplir les intentions du Souverain que j'ai l'honneur de représenter, je crois de mon devoir de suggérer à son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Sultan la pensée de préparer un projet d'une communication basée sur l'idée d'une fusion du projet de la note remis par le Prince de Menchikoff avec celui que son Altesse Reshid Pasha a communiqué au Prince Menchikoff au moment de son départ, et j'espère que son Altesse Reshid Pasha trouvera une rédaction qui pourrait être agréable à la Russie, sans s'écarter du principe que la Porte a jugé essentiel au maintien de ses droits souverains.

Vous donnerez communication, &c.

(Signé) L. DE WILDENBRUCH.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 72.

*Baron Bruck to M. de Steindl.*

*Buyukdéré, le 25 Juin*, 1853.

JE vous invite, Monsieur, à vous rendre auprès de Reshid Pasha pour l'informer que je me suis empressé de faire connaître à MM. les Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre et de France, et à M. l'Envoyé de Prusse, l'extrait de la dépêche de M. le Comte de Buol dont j'ai eu l'honneur de lui communiquer le contenu.

Dans une entrevue que j'ai eu avec les trois Représentants susmentionnés, on est tombé d'accord sur l'utilité de suggérer à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan de faire préparer un projet de communication, basé sur l'idée d'une fusion du projet de note de M. le Prince Menchikoff avec celui de son Altesse Reshid Pasha, dans l'espoir de trouver une rédaction qui pourrait être acceptable à la Russie, sans s'écarter du principe que la Porte a jugé être essentiel au maintien de ses droits souverains.

Vous êtes autorisé, Monsieur, à laisser copie de la présente instruction entre les mains de son Altesse Reshid Pasha.

(Signé) DE BRUCK.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 72.

*M. de la Cour to his Interpreter.*

*Therapia, le 27 Juin*, 1853.

Monsieur,

LA Sublime Porte m'a communiqué officiellement la lettre adressée en dernier lieu par le Comte de Nesselrode à son Altesse Reshid Pasha, ainsi que la réponse de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan au Chancelier de Russie. Son Altesse Reshid Pasha, ainsi que l'Internonce d'Autriche, m'ont également donné connaissance de l'extrait d'une dépêche du Comte de Buol au Baron de Bruck.

J'ai examiné attentivement ces pièces de concert avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, le Ministre de Prusse, et l'Internonce d'Autriche. Le résultat de cet examen a été l'opinion que si la Porte, tout en maintenant avec fermeté les principes qui sont le fondement de son droit de souveraineté, cherchait à rapprocher le plus possible le projet de note du Prince Menchikoff de celui préparé par son Altesse Reshid Pasha, le rapprochement pourrait conduire à une rédaction nouvelle et de nature à contenter le Cabinet Russe.

Tel est du moins le but que dans l'opinion que je partage avec les Représentants d'Angleterre, de Prusse, et d'Autriche, la Sublime Porte ne doit encore aujourd'hui négliger aucun moyen d'atteindre.

Je vous invite en conséquence à entretenir son Altesse Reshid Pasha de cette affaire et à lui suggérer la combinaison dont je viens de parler.

En vous chargeant de cette communication pour M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, je me plais à espérer que la grande expérience et les lumières de son Altesse lui feront découvrir le moyen de



reprendre des négociations au succès desquelles le Gouvernement de l'Empereur Napoléon sera heureux de coopérer autant que les autres Cabinets dont la Sublime Porte a été dans le cas de réconnaître les dispositions amicales.

Vous laisserez copie de la présente instruction dans les mains du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) E. DE LA COUR.

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No. 73.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 119.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 14, 1853.

I RECEIVED this morning your Excellency's despatches Nos. 128 and 129, of the 29th of June.

I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the instruction which you addressed to M. Pisani on the 25th ultimo, for communication to the Porte, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 128, respecting the note which you had agreed with the Austrian, French, and Prussian Representatives, to recommend the Turkish Ministers to prepare for transmission to the Russian Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 74.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July* 14.)

(No. 268.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July* 9, 1853.

I HAVE the honour of forwarding herewith to your Lordship two despatches addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consul at Bucarest, and which have reached me this day.

With reference to the report mentioned by Mr. Colquhoun of the probable departure of M. Ozeroff for Constantinople for the purpose of negotiating, I find, on inquiry, that Baron Meyendorff is not cognizant of it.

Count Buol has informed me that in consequence of the occupation of the Principalities, the Austrian Government, having no troops in that direction, have ordered a brigade of infantry to assemble on the Servian frontier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 74.

*Consul Colquhoun to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord, *Bucarest, July* 2, 1853.

I SENT off last night a few lines to your Excellency, to catch the express steamer. The following is the result of such researches as I have been able to make up to 4 o'clock this day.

I have reason to believe that an estafette has arrived to the Hospodar at 11 o'clock, from the Governor of Ibraila, announcing that the troops positively began the passage into Moldavia yesterday; still I have no word to that effect from the Vice-Consul, who has instructions to let me have the earliest intelligence. Being still confined to my bed, I sent to the Austrian agent; he writes me privately:—

"I have some reason to believe that the reported passage of the Pruth is

premature; an Austrian merchant who left Jassy the night before last, informs me that at that moment no orders for marching had been received."

I am anxiously waiting the arrival of my Constantinople letters, due this afternoon. I hear the former Pasha of Saïda is to be sent on a special mission to St. Petersburgh. If this be true, perhaps the occupation of these provinces may yet be staved off.

I presume the Consul at Jassy will duly inform your Excellency of the first movements in his district.

My continued suffering must apologise for this hasty letter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 74.

*Consul Colquhoun to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord, *Bucarest, July 2, 1853, 5 o'clock* P.M.

THE following has reached me after sending off my short letter of this morning.

General Dannenberg's corps positively passes the Pruth at Leovo this day; this corps is destined to occupy Wallachia.

The corps destined for Moldavia crosses at Seuleni to-morrow.

May I request your Excellency to communicate the above to London, as the post leaves in ten minutes.

M. Khaltchinsky has just returned to Bucarest. M. Ozeroff goes to Constantinople, as reported, next week, to negotiate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

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No. 75.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 270.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July 10, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL has communicated to me the despatch of the 6th instant which he has addressed to M. de Lebzeltern, upon the present state of the discussions between the Russian Government and the Porte, a copy of which he has forwarded to Count Colloredo, to be communicated to your Lordship. I need therefore say no more upon its contents than that I am convinced they will be gratifying to your Lordship.

Baron Bourqueney has shown me the despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys which covers the project of a note, composed of parts of Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum and of Reshid Pasha's proposed note to him before the Prince's departure from Constantinople, and which has been transmitted to St. Petersburgh. The despatch states that your Lordship has approved this project of note, and Count Buol has also given his entire adhesion to it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 76.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 278. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July 12, 1853.*

M. DE LE COQ, upon whom I called to-day at the Foreign Department, read to me two despatches which have been addressed to the Representatives of Prussia at Constantinople and at St. Petersburgh, upon the Eastern question.

The instruction to Baron Wildenbruch is an answer to a despatch which he had addressed to his Government, pressing for information to guide him in the difficult circumstances which were likely to arise; and he is directed to express to the Porte the good feeling entertained towards it by the Prussian Government, and their desire to assist in bringing about a pacific solution of the questions at issue between Turkey and Russia. It suggests that the Porte should be induced to sign some document, consistent with her honour, that would be accepted at St. Petersburgh; in return for which it was hoped the Russian Government would not hesitate to give assurances declaring the absence of all intentions of interfering with the independence of Turkey; these assurances to be drawn up in a formal manner, and to be previously concerted amongst the great Powers.

Baron Wildenbruch is directed to communicate freely and to act in concert with his colleagues, but to follow that line which will ensure to Prussia entire independence of action now and hereafter.

A copy of this despatch has been forwarded to Count Henckel at St. Petersburgh, as in answer to one in which he had reported the favourable reception that the so-called Project of Baron Bourqueney had met with, and he is informed that it is intended for his guidance in any discussion that may arise on the subject.

M. de le Coq mentioned that these two despatches would be sent to Chevalier Bunsen for communication to your Lordship, so that it is unnecessary for me to say more of their contents. He added, that he had read them to Baron Budberg, who appeared satisfied with them; and he said further, that that Minister's language has become much more conciliatory; and that to judge from it, it would appear that the Russian Government were desirous that the question should be peaceably arranged, and would even be thankful to any Government that would assist in bringing about so desirable a result.

I asked him what Baron Budberg had said on the question of the Russian answer to the Porte being concerted with the Great Powers. He replied—requesting that I would consider what he said was in the strictest confidence,—that the Russian Minister did not believe his Government would object to this.

I rejoined, that I was glad to hear this, for if Baron Budberg spoke the feelings of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, there was a satisfactory opening for negotiations; but that I was apprehensive he might not be well informed of their real impressions on this point, for M. de Kisseleff had held totally different language to M. Drouyn de Lhuys in a late discussion of this question.

M. de le Coq told me further, that he had seen a copy of one of the last Austrian despatches to St. Petersburgh, and that it was drawn up in a less conciliatory and rather upbraiding tone, and that he thought it not so well calculated to produce the desired effect as the Prussian instruction, which was more in the light of an appeal to the Emperor's generosity.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 77.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 346.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 7, 1853.*

ON the 5th instant the Austrian Generals Giulay and Wimpfen, with a numerous staff, arrived here from Stettin. They had hardly landed when the whole party were summoned to Peterhoff, where they are now established.

The professed object of the visit of these Generals is to be present at the manœuvres and reviews, but I apprehend that it is no secret that General Giulay is charged with some negotiation, the object of which is to bring the Russian views with regard to Turkey more into harmony with those of the rest of Europe.

It would appear that the Austrian Cabinet must have been very imperfectly informed as to the intentions of the Emperor Nicholas; for, as I am assured, great surprise was expressed by the Austrian officers at finding, upon their arrival here, that the occupation of the Principalities must have taken place.

Since writing the above, I learn that Baron Lebzeltern states that it is erroneous to believe that General Giulay is entrusted with a diplomatic mission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 78.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 347. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 7, 1853.*

FORMIDABLE as the resistance will be which Russia will have to encounter in the event of her carrying out her present intentions against the Turks, it appears difficult to understand how (unless indeed for a brief period) she should abandon designs to which such publicity has been given, and which have been prepared at so heavy a cost.

The sum which has been expended upon military and naval preparations (not to speak of secret disbursements) is not known, and probably never will be: it must, however, be enormous, and I cannot doubt that the Imperial Treasury is in a state of considerable exhaustion.

This is shown by the discontinuance of the works on the Warsaw Railway, and the somewhat significant fact of the Emperor having apprized Prince Dolgoruky that he has for the present abandoned the intention of either building or purchasing an hotel as a residence and office for the Minister of War.

The Government appears disposed to conceal their intention with regard to the interruption of the railway works, for I have heard within the last few days of overtures being made to an English house for the purpose of obtaining the delivery of a certain quantity of rails at Dunabourg via Riga. The offer was not accepted, and a natural disposition is manifested among mercantile men here to contract their operations.

The apprehensions entertained by persons interested in the corn trade have been quieted by the last reports received from the great corn districts on the banks of the Wolga. These accounts speak of the healthy aspect of the crops, and state that the fall of the river which had been observable for some weeks was at length ceased. This proves that some of the tributary streams must have been fed by rivers.

It is remarkable that, perhaps in consequence of the general uneasiness felt here—an uneasiness manifested among other symptoms by a considerable advance in freights—corn to be delivered in August or September can be purchased at lower prices than is given at present in the markets.



I hear of three English houses of St. Petersburgh, which, in contemplation of hostilities, have placed their property under the protection of Russian names.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 79.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 348.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 8, 1853.*

AS your Lordship will have learned from a preceding despatch of mine, No. 292, the publication of the diplomatic circulars in the "Saint Petersburgh Journal," is attributed here by official persons to the necessity which existed for some reply being made to the attacks which during the latter weeks has been directed against the Russian Government by the public press of England and France.

Whether this publication has benefited the cause of Russia, and has had the effecting of reconciling European feeling to the late course of diplomacy in Turkey, are questions to which, I imagine, only one answer can be returned.

As regards public feeling in this country, I have considerable hesitation in expressing an opinion, because a foreign resident in St. Petersburgh has in point of fact but slight opportunities of estimating it correctly.

As far, however, as the observation of those better acquainted than myself with the country is to be taken as a guide, I should say that the effect of the circulars, which have been read exclusively by the educated classes, has not been such as was expected.

I hear of many Russians who have not scrupled to declare that these papers do not contain a straightforward exposition of views; that if it is desirable that Turkey should be invaded, it would be better that the attack should be made at once than that an unsatisfactory or unintelligible cause of quarrel should be assigned.

With the uneducated classes the case is widely different; they have no means of forming an opinion for themselves, and when they are told, as they are in the manifesto, that the orthodox religion is in danger from the ruthlessness of the Turks, there are no sacrifices which they would not be ready to make for its defence.

How far it is allowable to appeal to religious feelings upon grounds which are not warranted by facts, is a point which appears not sufficiently to have occupied the attention of the Russian Government. There is a flagrant anachronism in imputing the wish of subverting the Greek religion to the most tolerant Caliph that ever occupied the Ottoman throne, and that at the precise moment when his best efforts are employed for ameliorating the condition of his Christian subjects.

I understand that, at the same time that the manifesto was read in the Russian churches, prayers were put to the Almighty for the success of the Imperial arms against the Turks.

This step again involves one of those inconsistencies of which so many have been observable in the late foreign policy of Russia. At one moment we have been told that most unfortunately for Russia the authority of the Sultan is lost, and his empire upon the point of falling to pieces; while at another those precise measures are taken which are the best calculated to bring about results thus officially deplored.

One day, it is stated, that the Power of Russia is such that a movement—a fillip given by the Imperial Government—is sufficient to overturn Turkey; on the next, prayers are put up in the churches for the support of Heaven in the attempt about to be made against this almost prostrate foe.

By degrees, however, the impartial observer of what is passing here almost leaves off attempting to reconcile inconsistencies and to explain obscure passages. So much of what has been of late to be witnessed is in contradiction as well with the repeated declarations, the habitual policy, and best interests of Russia,

that, like a person copying extracts from an unknown language, he confines himself to the endeavour of reporting faithfully that which he endeavours in vain to comprehend.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 80.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 349. Secret.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 8, 1853.*

I HAVE acquainted Count Nesselrode with the contents of your Lordship's despatch of the 28th ultimo, marked Secret, No. 123.

His Excellency expressed his warm satisfaction at hearing that a communication made in fact to the Queen by the Emperor, was not to be brought to public knowledge.

He commented further upon the difficulty of keeping up a system of confidential communication with a Government ready, upon occasion, to make their communications generally known.

I begged to remind his Excellency that the wish, which he had expressed, had been attended to; but that, as I had before stated to him, according to the practice of Constitutional Governments, foreign communications can only reach the Sovereign through the responsible adviser of the Crown.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 81.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 350.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 8, 1853.*

I HAVE held this morning what appears to be a very important conversation with the Chancellor.

It commenced by my saying that I had a serious question to put to his Excellency. I would ask whether, after the publications which had been lately made by the Russian Government, I, in common with every one else who desired peace, was to continue my endeavours towards finding an amicable solution for the difficulties which were thickening around us.

Cherchez toujours, Count Nesselrode answered; and bear in mind, that the solution is now the easier in consequence of the occupation of the Principalities having been effected.

This might be so, I replied; but to my apprehension, what was difficult before is rendered much more so by a military movement and by official publications.

Count Nesselrode said, that he would repeat that the entry of the Principalities made it easier for the Emperor to make some abatement of his demands, but did not explain this opinion; with regard to the publication of the circulars and manifestos, he desired again to state that such an address to the public was indispensable after the attacks made upon Russia by the press of England and France—attacks which Her Majesty's Government had never sought to mitigate by any observation as to the real views of the Russian Cabinet.

After a pause Count Nesselrode made some observation as to the backwardness of the friends of Russia in not proposing some scheme of arrangement (accommodement).

I replied that it appeared to me, on the contrary, that the wish of finding some middle course was that uppermost in the minds of all reasonable men; and that I myself, unfitted as I was to advise or suggest, had submitted a plan to Her Majesty's Government: as I thought the time was come when, if serious consequences were to be averted, great frankness ought to be employed on all sides, I would state to his Excellency what my plan was, only premising that



since it was made events had progressed, and that I could not take upon myself to state whether my suggestion would meet the approbation either of Her Majesty's Government or of the Cabinets of France and Austria. It was this:—

1. The publication of a hatti-sheriff confirming the privileges enjoyed by the Greeks, whether in virtue of prescription or of the stipulations of treaties, with special mention of the arrangements made by the two late firmans respecting the holy places.

2. The notification of this hatti-sheriff to Russia, either in a letter from the Sultan or from the Grand Vizier, to be brought here by a special diplomatic agent from his Highness.

3. The official communication by the Porte of copies of the hatti-sheriff to the Missions of the Great Powers at Constantinople.

The Chancellor, although by degrees and cautiously, gave me to understand that the terms were such as would be accepted by the Emperor; the only point to be kept in view was, he said, that if objections which he considered unreasonable were to be maintained against the signature of the note by the Porte, some equivalent security must be found against the violation of the terms of the Jerusalem firmans.

How, Count Nesselrode then asked, did I contemplate that this proposition should reach the Emperor?

I replied that I must again remark that I was speaking in my own name and not in that of Her Majesty's Government; but that knowing the conciliatory feelings of that Government I had suggested that the proposal should be made in what would probably be the manner the most acceptable to the Emperor, that is, through the Austrian Cabinet.

The Chancellor remarked that it was of course out of his power to return anything like a definitive opinion to the plan which I had mentioned, but that it appeared to him, *primâ facie*, that something of the nature of what he termed the "système-Seymour" might be found acceptable, and that at all event whatever reached the Emperor at the hands of Austria was welcome and worthy of full consideration.

The conversation then took suddenly a more animated turn: again Count Nesselrode desired to maintain the reasonableness of the terms proposed by Prince Menchikoff.

After some discussion I said that I really thought further argument useless; that in general I had the highest respect for his Excellency's judgment, but that, as I had told him before, upon this subject I had much less, because he was an interested party (en jeu), and that I must therefore be allowed to adopt an opinion which was not that of Her Majesty's Government or of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe exclusively, but was shared by the Cabinets of France, Austria, and Prussia, and specially by their Representatives at Constantinople.

An altercation, which the well-known urbanity and good temper of the Chancellor were after a time exercised to restrain within due bounds, was then provoked by Count Nesselrode remarking that he was fully aware of the endeavours made by the Foreign Missions at Pera to defeat and annihilate the influence of Russia; that, reduced to its most simple expression, this was neither more or less than an attempt constantly made by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to reign paramount at Constantinople; and that in these views never would the Emperor be brought to acquiesce, and never would he advise His Majesty to show such complaisance.

To this I replied, and with a certain warmth, that England had never sought to dispute the influence to which Russia was entitled in Turkey, and which, as we had lately read in a State paper, she possessed in a paramount degree; but that unquestionably if it was sought to render that influence exclusive and dangerous to Turkish independence, the opposition of Her Majesty's Government might very securely be counted upon.

With regard to personal allusions I said; I am not fond of resorting to them, but as your Excellency mentions Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's name, let me pronounce that of Prince Menchikoff. I did not, when he was named, endeavour to prejudice Her Majesty's Government against him; I even refrained afterwards from expressing what I felt as to his conduct: but allow me to tell you that no diplomatist who acts as he did, who displays the want of sincerity which he showed, can fail in putting himself upon bad terms with his colleagues. The Prince proceeds to Constantinople, he knows the friendly disposition

with which he is regarded by Her Majesty's servants, and his first business is to seek out the Turkish Ministers, to make overtures or demands of which England knows nothing, and which he insists shall be kept from her knowledge; and when, in process of time, his objects become a matter of publicity, he turns round and abuses his brother Ambassador because he is found to disapprove, as every one else did, of his proceedings.

Count Nesselrode said that this was a mistake; that Prince Menchikoff had shown the greatest openness towards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; that he had at once and fully explained to his Lordship the nature of his views.

M. le Comte, I said, we are at present at variance as to facts; it is sometimes easy to reconcile opinions, it is impossible to reconcile contradictory statements of facts.

At least, said Count Nesselrode, you must admit that Prince Menchikoff displayed a very conciliatory spirit; this was shown by the successive abatements in his demands upon the Porte.

I am sorry to be unable to make any such admissions, I replied; Prince Menchikoff might have shown moderation in acting as he did, supposing his original demands to have been reasonable; but, as had been seen, they had been held by all impartial persons to be of a very different character.

The conversation then, in consequence of the self-possession and kind courtesy of the Chancellor, was softened down to its ordinary tone, and I took leave of his Excellency telling him that I should acquaint your Lordship with the unauthorized plan of reconciliation which I had had the honour of detailing to him.

I would only beg your Lordship to pardon me if I express the hope that the terms I have sketched out may not be granted to Russia should they not meet with the approbation of the French Cabinet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 82.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 351.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 8, 1853.*

IT is very far from my wish to throw doubts upon the intentions of the Austrian Cabinet; nothing can be fairer than their professions, as reported in Lord Westmorland's despatch No. 241.

At the same time I would state to your Lordship that the language held here by the Austrian Mission appears to me hardly to tally with that employed by Count Buol in his conversations with Her Majesty's Minister.

As far as I can make out, only two despatches have been received by Baron Lebzeltern respecting the aggressive policy of the Russians, and the latter and stronger of the two is represented to me as only expressing the hope either that the occupation of the Principalities would not take place, or, if definitively decided upon, that it would be of short duration.

It is unfortunate that in consequence of the absence of her Minister, Austria should be feebly represented at this moment at St. Petersburgh; as I cannot but fear that expressions not very strong in themselves, became still less energetic when employed by a temporary Chargé d'Affaires accustomed to those forms of deferent regard which for a long time have been observed by the Austrian Chancellerie in their communications with that of Russia.

Happily, however, natural policy, position, and interests are such, that until a partition of Turkey shall be actually agreed upon, it is hardly possible that any amount of friendly feeling on the part of the Austrian Government can be sufficient to permit their acquiescence in the extension of Russian supremacy at the expense of Turkey.

Austria can hardly admit of the mouths of the Danube being in the holding of Russia; and the Head of the House of Hapsburgh cannot be the willing champion of Greek privileges and pretensions at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 83.

*Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 38.)
My Lord, *Paris, July 14, 1853.*

ALTHOUGH your Lordship must be already acquainted with the circular despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the 25th ultimo, in reply to the Russian circular of the 11th of that month, I do myself the honour to transmit it as published to-day in the "Moniteur," accompanied by the said Russian circular and the projected note of Prince Menchikoff.

On reperusing the latter document, it has struck me that it might possibly be rendered less objectionable by the insertion in its first declaratory paragraph respecting the privileges of the Greek Church and clergy, after the words "par la faveur Impériale," of the words "et dont ils jouissent maintenant," or an expression to that effect, which the Russian Government could hardly object to after the strong and explicit assurances recently given in that sense to Sir Hamilton Seymour by Count Nesselrode in a confidential letter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. JERNINGHAM.

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Inclosure in No. 83.

*Circular Despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys.*

[See No. 1.]

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No. 84.

*Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 40.)
My Lord, *Paris, July 14, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informed me to-day that his circular despatch, in reply to that of Count Nesselrode of the 2nd instant, would appear in the "Moniteur," in three or four days.

In speaking on the general question his Excellency expressed himself gloomily, stating that he thought it more likely to end by war than peace, and, at all events, that he considered the only chance of peace to consist in a firm and determined attitude on the part of France and England; that in his opinion, Russia would not have ventured as far as she has, had the French and English fleets been sent in the first instance to where they are now, instead of the one going to Salamis and the other remaining at Malta; that he deprecated most strongly all appearance in France and England of fearing war, since, with a country like Russia, it was precisely the way to render peace impossible; and that he regretted to observe by his German correspondence the existence of a general impression that the material interests of England would suffice to prevent her going to war under almost any circumstances.

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that England had the greatest desire for the preservation of peace, but that I conceived there could be no greater mistake than to suppose she was in favour of peace at any price.

His Excellency said his last accounts from Constantinople were of the 30th ultimo, and that they made no mention of any report about Austria's entry into Bosnia, while they represented the affair of Smyrna as in a process of settlement; though M. Drouyn de Lhuys pronounced Baron de Bruck's insisting upon the dismissal of Aali Pasha as unnecessarily, and, considering his mediating position, ungraciously severe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. JERNINGHAM.

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No. 85.

*Circular Despatch to French Ministers abroad.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, July 16.)*

Monsieur, *Paris, le 15 Juillet*, 1853.

LA nouvelle dépêche de M. le Comte de Nesselrode, que le "Journal de Saint Pétersbourg" publiait le lendemain du jour où elle était expédiée à toutes les Légations de Russie, a produit sur le Gouvernement de l'Empereur une impression que Sa Majesté Impériale m'a ordonné de vous faire connaître sans détour.

Nous ne pouvons que déplorer de voir la Russie, au moment même où les efforts de tous les Cabinets pour amener une solution satisfaisante des difficultés actuelles témoignent si hautement de leur modération, prendre une attitude qui rend le succès de leurs négociations plus incertain, et impose à quelques-uns d'entre eux le devoir de repousser la responsabilité que l'on essayerait vainement de faire peser sur leur politique.

Je ne voudrais pas, Monsieur, revenir sur une discussion épuisée; mais, comme M. le Comte de Nesselrode allégue toujours, à l'appui des prétentions de St. Pétersbourg, l'offense que la Porte aurait commise à son égard en ne tenant pas compte des promesses qu'elle aurait faites à la Légation de Russie à l'époque du premier règlement de la question des Lieux Saints, en 1852, je suis bien forcé de répéter que les firmans rendus par le Sultan, à la suite de la mission de M. le Prince Menchikoff, ont été tout fondement à cet unique grief, et que, s'il est un Gouvernement autorisé à élever des plaintes légitimes, ce n'est pas celui de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas.

En effet, à la date du 10 Mai dernier, M. le Comte de Nesselrode, qui venait de recevoir des dépêches de M. l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Constantinople, se félicitait, avec M. le Général de Castelbajac, d'un résultat qu'il considérait comme une heureuse conclusion de l'affaire des lieux saints; M. Kisseleff, à Paris, me faisait une semblable déclaration, et, partout, les agents du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg tenaient le même langage.

Les demandes formulées postérieurement par M. le Prince Menchikoff, quand l'objet principal de sa mission était atteint, quand on annonçait déjà son retour, ne se rattachaient donc par aucun lien à celles qu'il avait fait accueillir par la Porte; et c'était bien une nouvelle question, une difficulté plus grave qui surgissait à Constantinople, alors que l'Europe, un instant alarmée, était invitée par la Russie elle-même à se rassurer complétement.

Pris, en quelque sorte, au dépourvu par des exigences qu'ils n'avaient pas dû soupçonner, les Représentants de la France, de l'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, et de la Prusse à Constantinople ont loyalement employé leurs efforts pour empêcher une rupture dont les conséquences pouvaient être si fatales. Ils n'ont pas conseillé à la Porte une résistance de nature à l'exposer aux dangers les plus sérieux; et, reconnaissant à l'unanimité que les demandes de la Russie touchaient de trop près à la liberté d'action et à la souveraineté du Sultan pour qu'ils pussent se permettre un avis, ils ont laissé aux seuls Ministres de Sa Hautesse la responsabilité du parti à prendre. Il n'y a donc eu, de leur part, ni pression d'aucun genre, ni ingérence quelconque, et si le Gouvernement Ottoman, livré à lui-même, n'a pas voulu souscrire aux conditions qu'on prétendait lui imposer, il faut assurément qu'il les ait trouvées entièrement incompatibles avec son indépendance et sa dignité.

C'est dans de telles conjonctures, Monsieur, que M. le Prince Menchikoff a quitté Constantinople en rompant toute relation diplomatique entre la Russie et la Porte, et que les Puissances engagées par leurs traditions et leurs intérêts à maintenir l'intégrité de la Turquie ont eu à se tracer une ligne de conduite.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, d'accord avec celui de Sa Majesté Britannique, a pensé que la situation était trop menaçante pour ne pas être surveillée de près, et les escadres de France et d'Angleterre reçurent bientôt l'ordre d'aller mouiller dans la Baie de Besika, où elles arrivèrent au milieu du mois de Juin.

Cette mesure, toute de prévoyance, n'avait aucun caractère hostile à l'égard de la Russie; elle était impérieusement commandée par la gravité des circonstances, et amplement justifiée par les préparatifs de guerre qui, depuis plusieurs mois, se faisaient en Bessarabie et dans la rade de Sebastopol.



Le motif de la rupture entre le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et la Porte avait, pour ainsi dire, disparu; la question qui pouvait se poser à l'improviste à Constantinople, c'était celle de l'existence même de l'Empire Ottoman, et jamais le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale n'admettra que de si vastes intérêts se trouvent en jeu sans revendiquer aussitôt la part d'influence et d'action qui convient à sa puissance et à son rang dans le monde. A la présence d'une armée Russe sur les frontières de terre de la Turquie, il avait le droit et le devoir de répondre par la présence de ses forces navales à Besika, dans une baie librement ouverte à toutes les marines, et située en deçà des limites que les Traités défendent de franchir en temps de paix.

Le Gouvernement de Russie, du reste, devait bientôt se charger d'expliquer lui-même la nécessité du mouvement ordonné aux deux escadres.

Le 31 Mai, en effet, quand il était impossible de connaître à St. Pétersbourg, où la nouvelle n'en parvint que le 17 Juin, les résolutions auxquelles pourraient s'arrêter la France et l'Angleterre, M. le Comte de Nesselrode envoyait à la Porte, sous forme d'une lettre à Reshid Pasha, un dernier ultimatum, à bref délai, et qui contenait, très-clairement exprimée, la menace d'une prochaine occupation des principautés du Danube.

Lorsque cette décision était prise avec une solennité qui ne permettait plus à un Gouvernement jaloux de sa dignité de la modifier, lorsque, par une circulaire datée du 11 Juin, Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas la faisait annoncer à l'Europe, comme pour en rendre l'exécution plus irrévocable, notre escadre était encore à Salamine, et celle de l'Angleterre n'était pas sortie du port de Malte.

Ce simple rapprochement de dates suffit, Monsieur, pour indiquer de quel côté est partie cette initiative que l'on s'efforce aujourd'hui de décliner en en rejetant la responsabilité sur la France et l'Angleterre; il suffit également pour prouver qu'entre la communication faite à Paris et à Londres de la démarche tentée directement par M. le Comte de Nesselrode à Constantinople et le rejet de cet ultimatum, le temps a manqué matériellement aux Gouvernements de Sa Majesté Impériale et de Sa Majesté Britannique pour exercer, dans un sens quelconque, leur influence à Constantinople. Non, Monsieur, je le dis avec toute la puissance de la conviction, le Gouvernement Français, dans ce grave débat, n'a nul reproche à se faire; il repousse du fond de sa conscience, non moins que devant l'Europe, la responsabilité qu'on lui impute, et, fort de sa modération, en appelle sans crainte à son tour au jugement des Cabinets.

Sauf le but si différent des deux démonstrations, il y avait peut être une sorte d'analogie dans les situations respectives quand l'armée Russe se tenait sur la rive gauche du Pruth et que les flottes de France et d'Angleterre jetaient l'ancre à Besika. Cette analogie a disparu depuis le passage de la rivière qui forme les limites de l'Empire Russe et de l'Empire Ottoman. M. le Comte de Nesselrode, d'ailleurs, semble le reconnaître quand il suppose déjà les escadres en vue même de Constantinople, et représente comme une compensation nécessaire à ce qu'il appelle notre occupation maritime la position militaire prise par les troupes Russes sur les bords du Danube.

Les forces Anglaises et Françaises ne portent, par leur présence en dehors des Dardanelles, aucune atteinte aux Traités existants. L'occupation de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, au contraire, constitue une violation manifeste de ces mêmes Traités. Celui d'Adrianople, qui détermine les conditions du Protectorat de la Russie, pose implicitement le cas où il serait permis à cette Puissance d'intervenir dans les Principautés: ce serait si leurs privilèges étaient méconnus par les Turcs.

En 1848, quand ces provinces ont été occupées par les Russes, elles se trouvaient en proie à une agitation révolutionnaire qui menaçait également leur sécurité, celle de la puissance souveraine et celle de la puissance protectrice. La Convention de Balta Liman, enfin, a admis que, si des événements semblables venaient à se renouveler dans une période de sept années, la Russie et la Turquie prendraient en commun les mesures les plus propres à rétablir l'ordre.

Les privilèges de la Moldavie et de la Valachie sont-ils menacés? Des troubles révolutionnaires ont-ils éclaté sur leur territoire? Les faits répondent d'eux-mêmes qu'il n'y a lieu, pour le moment, à l'application ni du Traité d'Adrianople, ni de la Convention de Balta Liman.

De quel droit les troupes Russes ont-elles donc passé le Pruth, si ce n'est

du droit de la guerre, d'une guerre, je le reconnais, dont on ne veut pas prononcer le vrai nom, mais qui dérive d'un principe nouveau, fécond en conséquences désastreuses, que l'on s'étonne de voir pratiquer pour la première fois par une Puissance conservatrice de l'ordre Européen à un degré aussi éminent que la Russie, et qui n'irait à rien moins qu'à l'oppression en pleine paix des États faibles par les États plus forts qui sont leurs voisins?

L'intérêt général du monde s'oppose à l'admission d'un semblable doctrine, et la Porte, en particulier, a le droit incontestable de voir un acte de guerre dans l'envahissement de deux provinces qui, quelle que soit leur organisation spéciale, font partie intégrant de son empire. Elle ne violerait donc, pas plus que les Puissances qui viendraient à son aide, le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, si elle déclarait les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore ouverts aux escadres de France et d'Angleterre. L'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale est formelle à cet égard, et bien que, dans sa pensée, elle n'exclue pas la recherche d'un moyen efficace de conciliation entre la Russie et la Turquie, j'ai invité M. le Général de Castelbajac à faire connaître notre manière de voir à M. le Comte de Nesselrode et à lui communiquer cette dépêche. Je vous autorise, également, à en remettre une copie à M.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

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No. 86.

*Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 45.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 15, 1853.*

IN writing my despatch No. 40, of yesterday's date, I had not time to mention certain details of my conversation on that day with M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

His Excellency observed upon the difficulty of replying adequately to the last Russian Circular on account of its mendacity, since it was rather a delicate matter to convey to a foreign Government that it had not spoken the truth.

He considered Count Nesselrode as acting under compulsion in putting his name to so senseless, truthless, and affronting a document, which he characterized as authorising the employment against Russia, by England and France, of two or three fleets and as many armies, were they so disposed.

His Excellency said, he proposed publishing the Russian Circular and his reply on different days, and he asked my opinion. I replied, that I thought the bane and the antidote had better again go together, to which he agreed.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys dwelt upon a topic on which he has already made remarks to Lord Cowley, namely, the similarity between Russia's attitude at present and when she was proceeding to the partition of Poland, adding, that on that occasion also England had tried to prevent the catastrophe by proposing a form of Convention.

I remarked that the partition of Poland could not have taken place had Austria and Prussia not combined with Russia, and that such a combination was hardly to be expected against Turkey; that, moreover, England and France were determined to defend Turkey, whereas Poland had fallen undefended.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys may perhaps be said to suffer from what has been called Russophobia; and one of his observations was, that, were great care not taken, and a fearless and determined front opposed to Russia, the whole of Europe might sooner or later become "Turkified."

His Excellency insisted upon the necessity of bearing in mind that Russian civilization was not like English or French, and consequently that the confidence to be placed in Russian assurances was of a peculiar kind.

From one of his Excellency's expressions I should gather that he would much like a Treaty between France and England guaranteeing Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. JERNINGHAM.

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No. 87.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 134.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 16, 1853.*

BARON BRUNNOW has communicated to me the circular despatch, dated $\frac{\text{June 1/13}}{\text{April 20/May 2}}$, which Count Nesselrode has addressed to the Russian Missions.

It is difficult to express the astonishment and regret with which Her Majesty's Government have read in this despatch the declaration that the Principalities have been invaded and occupied in consequence of England and France having disregarded the recommendations of the Russian Government, and having sent their fleets to the waters of Turkey.

The passages of the despatch which contain this extraordinary statement are the following:

"En posant cet ultimatum à la Porte, nous avions plus particulièrement informé les grands Cabinets de nos intentions. Nous avions engagé nommément la France et la Grande Bretagne à ne pas compliquer par leur attitude les difficultés de la situation, à ne pas prendre trop tôt de mesures qui, d'un côté, auraient pour effet d'encourager l'opposition de la Porte, de l'autre, engageraient plus avant qu'ils ne l'étaient déjà dans la question l'honneur et la dignité de l'Empereur."

"D'autre part, les deux Puissances maritimes n'ont pas cru devoir déférer aux considérations que nous avions recommandées à leur sérieuse attention. Prenant avant nous l'initiative, elles ont jugé indispensable de dévancer immédiatement par un mesure effective, celles que nous ne leur avions annoncées que comme purement éventuelles, puisque nous en subordonnions la mise à effet aux résolutions finales de la Porte; et qu'au moment même où j'écris, l'exécution n'en a pas encore commencé. Elles ont sur-le-champ envoyé leurs flottes dans les parages de Constantinople Elles occupent déjà les eaux et ports de la domination Ottomane à portée des Dardanelles. Par cette attitude avancée les deux Puissances nous ont placés sous le poids d'une démonstration comminatoire, qui, comme nous le leur avions fait pressentir, devait ajouter à la crise de nouvelles complications.

"En présence du refus de la Porte, appuyé par la manifestation de la France et de l'Angleterre, il nous devient plus que jamais impossible de modifier les résolutions qu'eu avait fait dépendre l'Empereur.

"En conséquence, Sa Majesté Impériale vient d'envoyer au corps de nos troupes stationné en ce moment en Bessarabie l'ordre de passer la frontière pour occuper les Principautés."

With respect to the first passage, I have to observe that Count Nesselrode's despatch of June 1, to Baron Brunnow was not communicated to Her Majesty's Government till June 8, and therefore the order sent a week before to Admiral Dundas, to proceed to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, was not issued in disregard, as Count Nesselrode's circular affirms, of considerations brought to the knowledge of the British Government. But even if the case had been otherwise, and no orders had been issued, it was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to suppose that the threat to occupy the Principalities would be rendered null by the Porte accepting the terms which a few days before it had unhesitatingly rejected; and on the 8th of June, therefore, Her Majesty's Government were compelled to consider the occupation of the Principalities inevitable; and they conclude that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh is not now prepared to admit that the note of Count Nesselrode to Reshid Pasha contained an empty menace, the execution of which was never seriously contemplated. But, in fact, Count Nesselrode's note of May 31, communicating the hostile intentions of Russia, would of itself have been sufficient to justify Her Majesty's Government in taking measures for the protection of Turkey.

I shall now proceed to place on record at what time, and for what reasons, the British fleet was sent to the Turkish waters.

Prince Menchikoff, acting, it must be assumed, on the orders of his Government, stated in his note of the 5th of May, of which a copy was received in London on the 18th of May, that any further delay in answering his proposals respecting the Greek Church, could only be considered by him as

"un manque de procédés envers son Gouvernement, ce qui lui imposerait les plus pénibles obligations."

Again, in his note of the 11th of May, a copy of which was received in London on the 30th of May, Prince Menchikoff says, that in case of an unsatisfactory decision on the part of the Porte—"si les principes qui en forment la base [of the Articles he was negotiating] sont rejetés, si par une opposition systématique la Sublime Porte persiste à lui fermer jusqu'aux voies d'une entente intime et directe, il devra considérer sa mission comme terminée, interrompre les relations avec le Cabinet de Sa Majesté le Sultan, et rejeter sur la responsabilité de ses Ministres toutes les conséquences qui pourraient en résulter." And lastly, in his note of the 15th of May, received in London June 1st, Prince Menchikoff concludes: "Il appartient à la sagacité de votre Altesse de peser les suites incalculables et les grandes calamités qui pourraient en résulter, et qui retomberaient de tout leur poids sur la responsabilité des Ministres de Sa Majesté le Sultan."

This succession of menaces, addressed to a Power whose independence Russia had declared her determination to uphold, and in support of claims so much at variance with the assurances given to Her Majesty's Government, together with the vast military and naval armaments which for months had been preparing on the very confines of Turkey, left no doubt on the mind of Her Majesty's Government of the imminent danger in which the Sultan was about to be placed. They deeply lamented that this danger should arise from acts of the Russian Government, which was a party to the Treaty of 1841; but as Her Majesty's Government adhere now, as firmly as in 1841, to the principles which that Treaty records, and believe that the maintenance of European peace is involved in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, they felt that the time had arrived when, in the interests of peace, they must be prepared to protect the Sultan; and upon learning the abrupt departure of Prince Menchikoff, it was determined that the British fleet, which up to that time had not quitted Malta, should be placed at the disposal of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

On the 1st of June a despatch was forwarded to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, authorizing him, in certain specified contingencies, to send for the fleet, which would then repair to such place as he might point out. On the 2nd of June, instructions were sent to Admiral Dundas to proceed at once to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and there to place himself in communication with Her Majesty's Ambassador.

On the previous day we received a copy of Prince Menchikoff's note of May 18, announcing the termination of his mission, and that the refusal of the guarantee demanded "devra désormais imposer au Gouvernement Impérial la necessité de la chercher dans sa propre puissance."

On the 2nd of June I communicated to Baron Brunnow the measure taken by Her Majesty's Government; it could not have been made known by him at St. Petersburgh before the 7th or 8th, and consequently it could in no way influence the decision taken by the Russian Government; for Count Nesselrode's note to Reshid Pasha, announcing that, "dans quelques semaines ses troupes recevront l'ordre de passer les frontières de l'Empire," was dated the 31st of May; and his despatch to Baron Brunnow, in which he said that if the Porte did not sign Prince Menchikoff's note within a week after the arrival of the note to Reshid Pasha, the Emperor "ordonnera à ses troupes d'occuper les Principautés," was dated the 1st of June.

It is thus clearly established that the British fleet was not sent to the waters of Turkey in disregard of considerations submitted to Her Majesty's Government by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and that on the day before the instructions to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe left London, the decision to occupy the Principalities was taken by the Russian Government; and I say that decision was taken, because the Russian Government could never for one moment seriously have expected the submission of the Porte to the terms, "sans variante," that a regard for its own dignity and security had a few days before compelled it to decline. Yet Count Nesselrode in his circular despatch of July 2, affirms that the presence of the English and French fleets in the Bay of Besica has mainly provoked and fully justifies the occupation of the Principalities; he insists that they are in sight of the capital, from which they are nearly 200 miles distant; and that their maritime occupation of the Turkish



waters and ports can only be balanced by a military position on the part of Russia.

But Her Majesty's Government must in the strongest terms protest against this assertion; and they deny that any resemblance exists between the position of the combined fleets in Besica Bay, and that of the Russian armies in the Principalities. The fleets have the same right to anchor in Besica Bay as in any port of the Mediterranean. Their presence there violates no treaty and no territory; it infringes no international law; it is no menace to Turkish independence, and it assuredly ought to be no cause of offence to Russia: whereas by occupying the Principalities, Russia does violate the territory of the Sultan and the special Treaty which regards that portion of his dominions: it is an infraction of the Law of Nations, and an act of direct hostility against the Sultan which he would be justified in meeting by a declaration of war, and by a requisition to the allied squadrons to come up to Constantinople for his defence; and, lastly, it is an act so dangerous as a precedent, and so violent on the part of a powerful State towards one whose very weakness should be its protection, that throughout Europe it has created feelings of alarm and reprobation. To admit that any similarity exists, or that any comparison can with truth be established, between the position of the English and French fleets outside the Dardanelles, and that of the Russian armies within the Principalities, is manifestly impossible.

It is with deep regret that Her Majesty's Government thus find themselves compelled to record their opinions upon the recent invasion of the Turkish territory; but they consider that the withholding of those opinions would be an abandonment of duty on their part, and might render it difficult for them hereafter to interfere in defence and support of Treaties which constitute the International Law of Europe, and which are the only effectual guarantees of general peace and of the rights of nations.

The sufferings which the occupation of the Principalities must entail upon the inhabitants, will doubtless be much alleviated by the Russian Government taking upon itself the entire charge of that occupation.

As I have so often, and at such length, discussed the demands of Russia upon the Porte, it is hardly necessary for me to remark upon the other portions of Count Nesselrode's circular despatch, which in fact adduces no new fact or argument in support of those demands. I must, however, express the conviction of Her Majesty's Government that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh is altogether mistaken when it affirms that the Porte is indisposed to satisfy the just claims of Russia, or desires to shrink from its existing engagements with Russia. If this were correct, such influence as Her Majesty's Government may possess would be exercised to bring the Porte to a proper sense of its obligations: but they are as unaware of such breach of engagement on the part of the Porte, as they are of those numerous arbitrary acts of the Ottoman Government which, it is said, recently infringed the rights of the Greek Church, and threatened utterly to annihilate the order of things sanctioned by ages, and so dear to the orthodox faith.

Russia claims for her "co-religionnaires" in the East the strict *status quo*, and the maintenance of the privileges they have enjoyed under the protection of their Sovereign; but Count Nesselrode entirely omits to show how that *status quo* has been disturbed, how those privileges have been curtailed, what complaints have been made, what grievances remain without redress. Her Majesty's Government know only of one offence committed by the Turkish Government against Russia, which, by the admission of Prince Menchikoff, was satisfactorily atoned for; while on the other hand the recent firman of the Sultan confirming the privileges and immunities of the Greek Church has been gratefully acknowledged by the Patriarch of Constantinople.

Where then are the causes which Count Nesselrode, appealing to impartial Europe, assumes will justify the position now taken by Russia?

Count Nesselrode further says, that Russia by her position and by her Treaties, virtually enjoys the right of protecting the Greek Church in the East; if such be the case, and if that right, whatever its nature and extent may be, is undisturbed, it is Russia that throws doubt upon its existence or validity by endeavouring to force the Porte into fresh engagements. If ancient rights exist and are observed by Turkey, Russia has no cause of complaint against Turkey.

But if she seeks to extend those rights, then is Turkey justified in closely examining the nature of such fresh demands, and in refusing those from which her independence and dignity would suffer.

Her Majesty's Government receive with sincere satisfaction the renewed assurances that it is the policy of His Imperial Majesty and the interest of Russia to maintain the existing order of things in the East; and as the interests of Turkey impose upon her the necessity of observing her engagements with Russia, Her Majesty's Government trust that Russia will not, by seeking at the present time to exact what the Porte ought not to yield, prolong a crisis that may render inevitable consequences which Europe is so deeply concerned in averting.

You will read this despatch to Count Nesselrode and furnish his Excellency with a copy of it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 88.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 135.)
*Foreign Office, July* 16, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to No. 351, of the 8th instant, inclusive.

I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approves the answer which, as reported in your despatch in No. 349 of the 8th instant, you returned to Count Nesselrode's remarks as to communications from the Russian Government being liable to acquire publicity in this country.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 89.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.**

(No. 287.)
*Foreign Office, July* 18, 1853.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith duplicate copies of a despatch† which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh, with reference to the circular despatch of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to the Representatives of Russia in foreign countries dated the $\frac{30 \text{ June}}{12 \text{ July}}$, and setting forth the grounds on which the Russian Government seeks to justify the entrance of the Russian troops into the Turkish provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia.

Of this circular, as communicated to me by the Russian Minister at this Court, I also inclose a copy for your information.

I have to instruct you to place in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Court to which you are accredited, a copy of my despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* A despatch in the same terms was addressed to all Her Majesty's Ministers abroad.
† No. 87.



No. 90.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July* 18.)

(No. 274.)
My Lord, *Vienna, July* 12, 1853.

WITH reference to the statements contained in my despatch No. 268, as to the movement of a brigade of infantry which had been ordered to assemble on the frontier of Servia, I have now the honour of reporting that this brigade will consist of the three regiments of infantry, Nicholas, Haynau, and Constantine, and that they will be placed under the orders of General Coronini, who is Governor of the Austrian province of Servia.

These troops are destined for any service which may be required upon the frontier, where at present there is no other force assembled which might be available in case of disturbances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 91.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July* 18.)

(No. 275.)
My Lord, *Vienna, July* 12, 1853.

I WAITED upon Count Buol to communicate to him your Lordship's despatches Nos. 189 and 190, the first recapitulating the conversation your Lordship had held with Count Colloredo on the 28th ultimo, with reference to a despatch from Count Buol which he had read to you; the second referring to my despatch to your Lordship, No. 251, which reported what had passed between myself and Count Buol on the Turkish question, and instructing me to convey to that Minister the best thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the clear and satisfactory explanation he had given of his views and the policy of the Austrian Government.

Count Buol received the communication of these documents with the greatest satisfaction, and, with reference to the thanks I was directed to convey to him from Her Majesty's Government, he requested I would express to your Lordship his best acknowledgments for this valuable testimony to the concordance of the views by which the policy of the two Governments was directed upon this important question.

Count Buol had already received from Count Colloredo, as I have reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 265, the substance of your conversation with him on the 28th ultimo, and I have therein stated the remarks he made with regard to it. He now added the sincere regret he felt that the earnest entreaties he had used with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh had not succeeded in preventing the occupation of the Principalities, and your Lordship would find in the despatch he had written to Baron Lebzeltern on the 6th instant, how strongly he had expressed the distress and disappointment of His Majesty the Emperor, at the failure of those endeavours.

With respect to your Lordship's despatch No. 190, Count Buol remarked that he felt himself under obligations to your Lordship for having unreservedly communicated to him the reports which had reached Her Majesty's Government, and which tended to throw doubt upon the assurances which had been given us as to the policy of his Government, and he was delighted that this proceeding had put Her Majesty's Government more fully in possession of the sentiments of the Austrian Cabinet and of the course they intended to pursue; and with reference to that course, and to the recommendation contained in the last paragraph of your Lordship's despatch, Count Buol expressed his hope that your Lordship would find in the despatch to Baron Lebzeltern, above referred to, the entire fulfilment of all the assurances he had given, and the most

unequivocal declarations as to the sentiments entertained by the Imperial Government upon the policy which had been adopted towards Turkey by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 92.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 281.)
My Lord, *Berlin, July 15, 1853.*

BARON MAUTEUFFEL is still absent from Berlin, and no day is yet fixed for his return. I have consequently been unable to communicate with the Prussian Government on the subject of your Lordship's despatches of the 9th and 11th instant to Lord Westmorland, copies of which were inclosed in your Lordship's No. 155, as there is no confidential channel through which I could make their contents known in quarters that might be useful; and I have refrained from conversing on the subject with the Under Secretary of State, because a Ministerial crisis has been impending for some days past.

Your Lordship will find an account of this in my despatch No. 284 of this date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 93.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 282. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, July 15, 1853.*

WHEN I was with M. de le Coq to-day, he told me that he had just received a cyphered despatch from the Prussian agent at Bucharest, stating that Prince Stirbey had informed him that a change of Government had taken place at Constantinople, and that it was presumed that the war party had come into power. I asked him to give me the names of the supposed new Ministry, but he said that he believed there must be some mistake in cyphering the names, for with the exception of Mehemet Ali Pasha none were intelligible. He added that Prince Stirbey had observed to the Prussian agent that he feared war was inevitable.

It is my duty to forward this intelligence your Lordship as it has reached me, but I think it right to observe that M. de le Coq did not seem confident that it was well founded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 94.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 215.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 19, 1853.*

REPORTS have been current in this country, and have led to questions in Parliament respecting the intended occupation of Bosnia and Servia by Austrian forces.

Her Majesty's Government give no credence to the report, but it is right that your Lordship should be informed of it, in order that if the measure should



now or hereafter be entertained by the Austrian Government, your Lordship should use your utmost endeavours to prevent such an aggravation of existing difficulties.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 95.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 289. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 19, 1853.*

ON the 16th instant Count Walewski informed me that the French project of note for settling the differences between Russia and Turkey, which formed the subject of your Excellency's despatch No. 421 of the 28th ultimo, had been shown confidentially by General Castelbajac to Count Nesselrode, who had approved of it, and said he thought it would meet the Emperor's views, but that he would give no answer upon the subject until he had taken the pleasure of His Imperial Majesty.

Later in the day (the 9th instant) Count Nesselrode told General Castelbajac that the Emperor was "satisfait et reconnaissant." He added, however, that before coming to a definitive decision, it would be necessary to write to Vienna, as the Austrian Government were engaged in negotiating a similar arrangement at Constantinople.

Count Walewski likewise informed me that Count Buol, to whom the project was about the same time communicated by M. de Bourqueney, had written to St. Petersburgh warmly to recommend its adoption, as no result more satisfactory could be expected from the negotiation then pending with the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 96.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 291.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 19, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency is instructed to communicate to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the project for settling the differences between Russia and the Porte, which Sir H. Seymour, in his despatch No. 350 reports that he has submitted to Count Nesselrode, and you will likewise inform M. Drouyn de Lhuys that Her Majesty's Government, although approving of the plan, and not doubting that it would be sanctioned by the French Government, yet do not think proper to recommend its adoption by the Porte, as other projects are under consideration, and that an addition to their number would create loss of time, and might possibly lead to confusion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 97.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 136.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 19, 1853.*

I HAVE the satisfaction to inform you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by you to Count Nesselrode, as reported in your despatch No. 350 of the 8th instant.

Her Majesty's Government likewise approve of the plan which you sub-

mitted to Count Nesselrode for settling the differences between Russia and Turkey in a manner which appears to be honourable to both Powers, and they do not doubt that their opinion upon the plan will be shared by the French Government.

It is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government, however, at present to recommend its adoption by the Porte, because two if not three projects are now under consideration, and any addition to the number would cause loss of time, and might possibly lead to confusion.

Her Majesty's Government are also disposed for the reasons stated in the inclosed despatch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to prefer the Convention of which I privately transmitted a copy to you on the 13th instant, with instructions to communicate it to Count Nesselrode.

Should you find that this Convention is more acceptable to the Russian Government than any other project that has been submitted to them, you will receive the announcement of Count Nesselrode to that effect as official, and upon his Excellency giving you a distinct assurance in writing that it will be regarded by His Imperial Majesty as a final and satisfactory settlement of the demands of Russia upon the Porte, you are instructed immediately to send the information by a special messenger to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, with a request that he will advise the Porte to agree to these terms.

You will likewise transmit to his Excellency a copy of this despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 98.

*Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 53.)

*Paris, July 18, 1853.*

My Lord,

WHEN I placed in the hands of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as prescribed in your Lordship's despatch No. 281 to Lord Cowley, the correspondence between Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Reshid Pasha disproving the assertion of Count Nesselrode that Lord Stratford had prevented the Porte's acceptance of the note of Prince Menchikoff, his Excellency was so struck with the completeness of the refutation that he expressed the wish of his being at liberty to give it instant publication.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys then gave me to read a memorandum which has been composed from the correspondence of General Castelbajac, detailing the shifting course of Russia from the commencement of the question, and according to which the first excuse for the Russian armaments was a new species of cholera in Persia, and the last the mission of Count Leiningen.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed his conviction that Prince Menchikoff's negotiation had been carried on in great part directly with the Emperor Nicholas, and without the knowledge of Count Nesselrode, an idea which I told his Excellency had also struck me a considerable time back.

He afterwards put in my hands your Lordship's reply to the last Russian circular, begging me to read it aloud, as an inflammation of the eyes prevented his doing so himself, and he frequently interrupted me to express his approbation.

I took the opportunity of complimenting his Excellency on the ability, strength, and moderation of his own reply, when he expressed the opinion that perhaps Russia had not got the better of the two Governments in point of argument, whatever might be the ultimate result of the existing crisis.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. JERNINGHAM.

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No. 99.

*Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 54. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 18, 1853.*

IN the course of conversation to-day, M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed the strongest regret that the two fleets had not passed the Dardanelles upon the Russians passing the Pruth, and he entered upon a variety of reasons for his opinion, of which the following appeared to me the principal; that if Russia means peace she would not have made war because France and England had done only as much as herself, whilst, if she means war, peace will not be preserved by our stopping at Besika Bay; that if, as he believed would be the case, we should have eventually to order the fleets to advance, Russia would be able to exclaim that we had ruined the negotiation; that as the position of Besika Bay was a weak one, and as that of the Sea of Marmora would have been a strong one, the latter would have allowed England and France to be more conceding to Russia than the former, and that to have at once passed the Dardanelles, immediately upon Russia's giving us the right to do so, could not have failed to produce a great moral effect in our favour throughout Europe, the opposite of which he regretted to perceive had arisen from our attitude at Besika Bay; whilst that bold but rightful step would also have done as much as could be done to control Russia.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys further observed upon the impossibility of the fleets remaining where they are throughout the winter, supposing Russia to show a determination to spin out the occupation of the Principalities.

His Excellency reverted strongly to his belief that the present crisis would have been prevented by the two fleets going to the Dardanelles when that of France went to Salamis.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys aggravated his gloomy view of the general state of things by expressing his conviction that we should soon hear of Greek insurrections in Bulgaria and elsewhere, which he believed Russia to be doing her best to bring about.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. JERNINGHAM.

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No. 100.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 526.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 19, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to apprize your Lordship that I returned to my post last night. I called this afternoon on M. Drouyn de Lhuys, whom I found labouring under an inflammation of the eyes, which has partially incapacitated him from business. I regret to find, that during the few days on which I have been absent from Paris he has not received any intelligence which makes him hope for an early solution of the Eastern question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 101.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 527.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 19, 1853.*

THE messenger who ought to have left Constantinople on the 5th instant not having yet arrived, although M. Drouyn de Lhuys received his despatches of the same date two days ago, I am apprehensive that something must have occurred to delay him on his journey.

It does not appear, however, from the contents of M. de la Cour's despatches, that the missing messenger could have been the bearer of any intelligence of importance. M. de la Cour states, that no progress had been made by the Porte in the compilation of a note, as advised by the four Powers, to replace that insisted upon by Prince Menchikoff; but that steps were taking to urge the Ottoman Government to show a little more alacrity.

Another despatch alludes, with gloomy forebodings, to the insufficiency of the means of the Porte to meet the pecuniary sacrifices which the present crisis in her affairs calls upon her to make; and it mentions, on the other hand, that an excitement, which may end in an outbreak, is to be observed in more than one part of the Turkish dominions among the Christian subjects of the Sultan, an excitement which is not without its echo in the neighbouring kingdom of Greece.

A third despatch recounts the late unfortunate event at Smyrna, and states that the French Consul, at the request of his colleagues of Austria and the United States, had taken the refugee Kosta under his protection until it was finally settled to which of them Kosta is to be given up.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—Since writing the above the messenger is arrived. He only left on the 10th.

C.

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No. 102.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 353.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 12, 1853.

COUNT DUVAL DE BEAULIEU, Secretary of the Belgian Legation at Constantinople, has passed the last four years in Turkey, and has been engaged during the greater part of that time in visiting various parts of the country.

He happens to be at this moment at St. Petersburgh, and, as the opportunity was favourable for having an impartial opinion, I asked him what was to be thought of those accounts of persecutions of Christians by Turks, of which we have lately heard so much through the Servian press.

Count Duval's reply to the inquiry was very explicit.

His extensive journies had satisfied him that no systematic persecution of the Christian subjects of the Porte took place, and that individual cases of oppression and wrong were extremely uncommon; the great majority of the complaints upon this subject were absolutely unfounded.

This is not all; what had struck Count Duval de Beaulieu in the relations of Greeks towards Turks was the insolent bearing of the former, who are very generally disposed to treat the Mahometans as an inferior and intruding race.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 103.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon —(Received July 20.)*

(No. 354.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 12, 1853.

AN inspection or review of the two divisions of the Baltic fleet took place at Cronstadt on the 10th instant, when His Imperial Majesty, who commanded in person, was attended by the Grand Duke Constantine, and the Duke of Oldenburg.

It is believed that on the 14th instant the two divisions will return to port,



probably there to remain; and as to the third division, probably in consequence of a want of men, it has been unable to sail.

The cholera is said to prevail both at Cronstadt and on board the fleet, and one ship on which a particularly large number of cases had occurred, is stated to have received orders instantly to resume its cruize in the Gulf.

Within the last few days a considerable number of pieces of heavy artillery have been mounted upon Fort Risbank.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 104.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 355.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 12, 1853.

ON the night of the 10th instant, I called upon the Chancellor at his villa. His Excellency, who was in conversation with several persons, left his chair to say a few words privately to me; "Votre proposition," he said, "l'avez vous envoyée en Angleterre? faites nous la parvenir, et le plus tôt possible, le moment est favorable—faites nous la parvenir par Vienne." I replied, that I had already written to your Lordship upon the subject, and that with his permission I would make an inquiry of his Excellency;—Was it true, as it had been stated to me, that the Government had intimated to the Porte their willingness to receive a Turkish negotiator?

Count Nesselrode replied that I must be aware that all diplomatic intercourse with Constantinople had ceased; that any communication between the Government and the Porte was carried on through the medium (par l'entremise) of the Austrian Cabinet.

This I consider to have been, if not a direct, at all events an affirmative reply to my inquiry.

My French colleague acquaints me that he has been seeking a solution for the question which at present causes such general embarrassment, and that he may have found it in a note which he proposes to substitute for that presented by Prince Menchikoff.

This "projet de note" he read to me; it is composed of passages taken from the notes of Prince Menchikoff and Reshid Pasha, and offers perhaps a better method of putting an end to an unfortunate complication than the plan which I took the liberty of submitting to your Lordship.

I will not conclude my despatch without remarking upon the singularity of the eagerness now shown by the Russian Cabinet to come to terms with Turkey, or, in other words, to modify its original demands, immediately after the publication of the circular containing the words: "En présence du refus de la Porte appuyé par la manifestation de la France et de la Grande Bretagne, il nous devient plus que jamais impossible de modifier les resolutions qu'en avait fait dépendre l'Empereur."

As I before stated, however, I find myself very constantly obliged to record apparent contradictions, without having the means of reconciling them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 105.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 357. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 13, 1853.*

I HAVE not time to send your Lordship the details of some information which I have just received from a private source; I will, however, state to your Lordship that it is of a nature to satisfy me that the Russian Government are fully sensible of the difficulties into which they have been betrayed, and that they are desirous of extricating themselves from a bad position if they can do so by honourable means.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 106.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 131. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 4, 1853.*

THE affair of the Austrian "suggestion" has made but little progress since I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship.

Reshid Pasha informed me that in bringing it before the Council, together with the instructions addressed by the Four Representatives to their respective interpreters, he declined expressing any opinion of his own, but at the same time declared his readiness to abide by the decision of the majority. That decision being in favour of the experiment, it was submitted to the Sultan, and it still awaits His Majesty's sanction.

I have to state for the further information of your Lordship that when I met my three colleagues to compare our several instructions, the Austrian Internuncio objected to the word "identical" which was found in the minute of our preceding interview. I also perceived that in his instruction he had made no mention whatever of that meeting, or of the suggestion as proceeding from it by our common adoption.

I thought it my duty to request that the omission should be rectified, and M. Bruck, after some demur, complied. The principle involved in the form induced me to press the matter with some earnestness.

With respect to the identical character of the instructions I consented to withdraw the word, in consideration of M. Bruck's wishes.

I take this occasion to mention that, in my judgment, the French Ambassador has gone rather beyond the line agreed upon in expressing an opinion favourable to the idea suggested by Count Buol. In explanation of this remark I beg to refer your Lordship to the copy of his Excellency's instruction in my despatch No. 128 of this year, and also to the minute of our meeting inclosed with my No. 117 of the 24th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—Inclosed is a copy of the minute referred to above.

S. DE R.

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Inclosure in No. 106.

*Amended Copy of Memorandum from the Four Representatives to the Porte.*

AYANT reçu de la Porte communication officielle de la lettre adressée en dernier lieu par M. le Comte de Nesselrode à Reshid Pasha, et la réponse du Ministre Ottoman à son Excellence le Chancelier de Russie, et plus tard ayant



aussi reçu de la part de son Excellence l'Internonce d'Autriche et de Reshid Pasha communication d'un extrait de dépêche adressée par M. le Comte de Buol à M. le Baron de Bruck, nous nous sommes réunis pour en constater le fait, et pour échanger mutuellement nos idées sur ces communications.

Nous nous sommes arrêtés à la proposition :

1. De suggérer au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Sultan de faire préparer un projet de communication basé sur l'idée d'une fusion du projet de note du Prince Menchikoff avec celui de Reshid Pasha, dans l'espoir de trouver une réduction qui pourrait être acceptable à la Russie, sans s'écarter du principe que la Porte a jugé être essentiel au maintien de ses droits souverains.

2. De porter cette suggestion à la connaissance du Ministre Ottoman au moyen d'une instruction adressée aux interprètes respectifs, en nous reservant de la faire accompagner d'une instruction par laquelle nous ferions connaître à la Porte nos conseils relatifs à l'amélioration nécessaire de l'état de ses sujets non Mussulmans.

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No. 107.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 132.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 4, 1853.*

OUR intense anxiety to maintain peace, notwithstanding the progress of circumstances prejudicial to its continuance, though derived from our best feelings, may eventually go far towards frustrating the object, without preventing the occurrence of a war. Not only is it my duty to submit this remark to your Lordship, but I am entitled to do so without fear of being misunderstood, since I may appeal with confidence to my correspondence in proof of the earnest endeavours I have made to avert a calamity now brought to our very doors, by inadmissible demands and deceptive declarations.

While Russia appears to have arrayed all Europe in opinion against her, and may be supposed to hesitate between the alternatives of an embarrassment created by her own pretensions, the Porte, after making every reasonable concession, is engaged in the most exhausting preparations, and exposed to the most perilous contingencies. In these respects the Sultan, unfortunately, has no room for choice. His resistance to an unfair and degrading requisition is universally approved. To that resistance he has hitherto assigned a moral character; and there is no reason to doubt that the occupation of the Principalities by Russia, though in principle constituting a case of war, will only be met, in the first instance, by a solemn protest and appeal to the other great Powers of Christendom. But surely His Majesty is bound in honour, in prudence, and in duty towards his nation and empire, to provide the means of defending both against more active hostilities, and also to prepare for the threatened dilemma of having either to comply with the Russian ultimatum, or to accept an indefinite occupation of the Principalities.

In either of these two cases, it is no exaggeration to state that the Eastern question would be virtually surrendered. I mean by the Eastern question, the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire in its present degree of independence and territorial integrity, attended with the effect of averting that violent disturbance of European interests which could hardly fail to ensue on any signal infraction of the principle. But in thus putting forward the point of political counterpoise, I would not willingly lose sight of other considerations involving the progress of trade and the prospects of social improvement in this quarter, with all their respective bearings on our national industry and international sympathies. It rests with Her Majesty's Government, and not, of course, with me, to determine the value of these interests, compared with the risks and sacrifices of war.

The chief advantage which Turkey may hope to derive from not pushing its right of hostilities to an extreme, in the event of a simple occupation, is, that time will thus be gained for attempting further negotiations, for effecting a more complete concert among the Powers agreeing in opinion with Turkey, and for completing the preparations of defence on this side of the Danube. But, although it is probable that the Turkish forces will make a steadier resistance

than the defective state of their service might lead us to expect, the ultimate issue of the struggle, if the parties be left to themselves, can hardly be doubted. Not that we are forbidden by those who can best appreciate the military resources of Russia, to entertain some misgiving as to their colossal strength, when fairly put to the test by operations in a foreign country; nor are we called upon to undervalue the support which might be given to Turkey by its allies, without going the length of open and unlimited hostilities. But if the ultimate exclusion of Russia, as well from the Greek Protectorate as from the Principalities, be really that important object which has been hitherto presumed, success, I humbly conceive, will never be attained, according to any reasonable calculation, without a previous understanding on the part of England and France to stop at no sacrifice necessary to secure it.

The mere occupation of the Principalities will prove a heavy infliction, not only on those provinces, but on the whole empire, as obliging the Turkish Government to protract the state of tension, expense, and effort, which cannot last long without exhausting its available resources in men and money. Should the Danube be passed by a Russian army—should the Asiatic frontiers of the empire be invaded, an enormous increase of the Porte's embarrassments and sacrifices must be the inevitable consequence. Already the dissatisfaction prevailing in Bulgaria threatens to end in an insurrection of the Christians. A party in Servia is at the same time suspected—I hope erroneously—of looking to the first occasion for making a push towards independence. The whole of European Turkey, from the frontier of Austria to that of Greece, is almost denuded of regular soldiers, and exposed to the protection of Albanian hordes habituated to turbulence and plunder.

Information has reached me from Scutari that the Montenegrins are preparing to make an incursion into Turkey, with the prospect of finding sympathy and cooperation among the Christian tribes in that neighbourhood. A spirit of fanaticism, dangerous alike to the Rayahs and to the authorities—dangerous to neglect and difficult to control, appears to be rising in other parts of the country. The Greeks, though still quiet, have taken up a position, and hold in society a language which indicates views of ambition, unrestrained by principles or by Treaties. Letters from Tabreez assert that the Shah of Persia has reverted to his plan of collecting an army at Sulmaich, and that the change is attributable to Russian counsels.

It is evident that if the hostility of a powerful neighbour be turned in upon Turkey through all or most of these channels, while the Sultan's main army is occupied in opposing the principal attack, the odds will be fearfully to His Majesty's disadvantage; and, without very effective succours from abroad, the Empire will need some miracle to preserve it from a ruinous catastrophe.

I have the honour to inclose under cover of another despatch the various extracts of Consular correspondence on which these apprehensions are principally founded.

It is my impression, upon the whole, that the Sultan's Mussulman subjects are generally animated with a noble spirit of loyalty and devotion, though tainted with feelings of cruelty and fanaticism, while the Government themselves are ready to stake all upon the question at issue, provided they may reckon upon the cordial support and cooperation of England and France.

The resources of the country are also known to be immense, though hitherto but partially explored; and the necessities of a hazardous position are not unlikely to bring them into fuller activity for the benefit of other and more enterprizing nations. But the efficient aid of powerful auxiliaries would seem to be the indispensable condition of a protracted and successful contest.

I have thus, my Lord, attempted to bring into one point of view the leading considerations which cannot with prudence be overlooked at the present important juncture. In no direction is the prospect a cheering one. Negotiation, if not in despair, appears to be at fault; and should a resort to force be unavoidable, the struggle must necessarily be sharp, and the issue uncertain. In any case, nothing can be worse than a hesitating, uncalculated course. It is no doubt a misfortune for Europe to be dragged, when least expecting it, to the verge of an arena from which it is difficult to recoil, and upon which it is almost impossible to enter with any limitation of consequences. But let it be remembered that an evil which is only postponed or evaded, is liable to recur with more inconvenience and danger, at no remote period, and that by



venturing at once to look it in the face, we afford ourselves the best chance of viewing it in its true proportions and employing the most judicious means for its correction.

Henceforward that extensive Empire of which Constantinople is the capital, must in all likelihood either take colour with Russia or be assimilated to Europe. In the latter case British influence and interests may be expected to find a widening field for their development; in the former, they may be tolerated for a time, but they will probably decline by degrees, and be finally excluded.

I can hardly doubt that the notion of Reshid Pasha and his friends, if fully supported from without, is, in failure of negotiation, to settle accounts with Russia once for all, and, in pursuance of his earlier promises and of my urgent and repeated representations, to carry out a system of internal improvement calculated to raise the condition of the Sultan's Christian subjects, and to place the Turkish Empire on a footing of close connexion with the leading, and particularly with the western, Powers of Europe.

The idea is no less brilliant than benevolent; but to realize it would be difficult, though far from impossible, and the Porte's existing sense of danger and need of assistance are powerful aids to success. At all events there is no choice but of difficulties, and human prudence can only choose the least, taking care to have the advantage of choosing in time, and while the circumstances are, as now, more favourable than they can be expected to prove hereafter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 108.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 133.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 4, 1853.

REFERRING to my preceding despatch, I have the honour to inclose herewith a number of extracts from the correspondence lately addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consuls in the Levant. They are transmitted to your Lordship for the purpose of showing the grounds on which my representations concerning the state of this country in certain respects are founded. I am persuaded that your Lordship will find in their contents some additional reasons for recognizing the importance of taking an early decision with respect to such ulterior measures as the failure of every reasonable attempt to effect a settlement of the existing differences by negotiation may render indispensable for carrying out the principle on which Her Majesty's Government has hitherto acted in the affairs of this empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 108.

*Consul Werry to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Aleppo, June* 23, 1853.

TRANQUILLITY continues to be maintained both here and in the Pashalic generally. The Ramazan is observed by the Moslems with orderly and good conduct, and the Christian sects have not experienced any molestation from them. The civil Government has been conducted with more energy than previously, and is supported by the military commander, who has adopted judicious measures by strengthening the posts, and the city is patrolled day and night. These measures, accompanied with the arrestation of some Moslems who were implicated in the last revolution, have greatly relieved the Christians from alarm, and also prevented them circulating exaggerated reports on the evil intentions of the Moslems.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 108.

*Consul Werry to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Aleppo, June* 25, 1853.

THE fanatical feelings of the lower orders of Moslems at Antioch, the whole population of which place is of a bad and intriguing character, has been exhibited against Mr. White, a British subject residing at that place, by gross ill usage and insult, and also against the other Europeans there. On the report made to me by the former, I have represented it, conjointly with Mr. Geofroy, the Acting French Consul here, personally to our Pasha, who has promised to send a Moubasheer to the Mouteselim of Antioch to inquire into these complaints and remedy them, and to bring the offenders complained of by Mr. White here for examination and punishment.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 108.

*Mr. Wyse to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Athens, April* 17, 1853.

THE opinion of most thinking men here is that the whole of these late movements have, as I had suspected, been got up with no intention of overt aggression on the Ottoman territory, but for the purpose of keeping alive in the Greek mind the idea of an intimate connection of this country and her interests with the late measures on the part of Russia.

*Athens, May* 30, 1853.

The Government remains apparently passive, but retains the 2000 troops on the frontier, and occupies the villages now known beyond doubt to belong to Turkey, on the plea no longer of repelling just aggression, but of assuring the tranquillity of the limitroph provinces, &c.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 108.

*Consul-General Fonblanque to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Belgrade, June* 23, 1853.

I HAVE not the least doubt of the Mission of General Mayerhoff to Servia and Bosnia being intended for objects the most inimical to the Porte, and distinctly auxiliary to the approaching Russian operations. That Prince Alexander quitted Belgrade to avoid M. de Ségur and me and give Mayerhoff full scope at Kragujevatz is likewise presumable.

My reliance on the Servian agent at the Porte is very much shaken. There are many signs of pre-arrangement with the Prince of Servia and his Government, and I suspect M. Alexa Jacovitz of having come to an understanding at Vienna, either for an Austrian occupation of Servia, or at the very least for restraining any Servian action that could impede the Russian one.

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Inclosure 5 in No. 108.

*Consul Calvert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Beyrout, June* 10, 1853.

ALTHOUGH the rupture of relations between Russia and the Porte has produced here an immense sensation, and has given rise to various speculations as to the issue, the tranquillity of the Pashalic of Sidon and of the Lebanon happily remains undisturbed. The Mahomedans feel no hesitation in expressing a desire for hostilities, for according to them continual war in Turkey is requisite to keep alive the spirit of Islamism. On the part of the Christian population hope and fear are equally balanced. When the startling intelligence was first



received much alarm was felt by them, but if they now live in a state of apprehension, all who are interested in the preservation of peace entertain a confident hope that the threatened danger will be averted through the joint and friendly offices of the Sultan's faithful Allies.

The opinions expressed by the foreign agents and European residents, to whom the Syrians look for information, have greatly contributed to the preservation of tranquillity.

As it was reported to me that the outlawed Emir Saad-ed-deen had assumed a rebellious attitude in Hasbeya, and that in open defiance of the Turkish authority he was endeavouring to excite the Druses against it, I wrote privately to Said Bey, &c.

The Emir, therefore, stands almost alone and unsupported, and he cannot avoid falling ere long into the power of Government.

*Beyrout, June* 16, 1853.

It is with satisfaction that I am able to state that in every part of the Pashalic of Sidon the utmost tranquillity is preserved, although it is believed that more alarm exists than is ventured to be openly expressed.

The cause of the ill-will displayed may be easily traced to the rumours of all kinds which are circulated in the town about the state of affairs at the capital. The opinion prevails that the anxiety of the Porte to preserve tranquillity within her own dominions is indicative of more imminent danger from without than she is willing to admit. The feeling of apprehension is shared in particular by the Christian population of the towns in this Pashalic in which they are in the minority, and is not confined to Beyrout alone, where the Mahommedan element is only two-sevenths of the whole population.

Nothing scarcely has given rise to more conjectures and alarm than the call for troops from this country. Many persons, English as well as natives, have expressed to me their fears of the result of weakening the military strength of Syria at a juncture which is generally looked upon as critical.

*June* 24.

The fear of the Christian inhabitants of Beyrout lest the Mussulmans should rise against them, betrays much pusillanimity. An idea has gained ground that many of the Mussulmans have secreted fire-arms in their houses and shops; but still as the Christians in the town are vastly in the majority and can always rely upon the assistance of their more daring brethren of the Lebanon in an emergency, they have only themselves to blame when by manifesting so much alarm they encourage the Mussulmans to persevere in their display of ill-will towards them.

In many of the coast towns, such as Sidon, Tripoli, and Latakia, there is perhaps greater reason for apprehending disasters, should, by any eventuality, hostilities ensue in Turkey.

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Inclosure 6 in No. 108.

*Consul Ongley to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Canea in Crete, June* 25, 1853.

THIS island is for the present quiet, but both Turks and Greeks appear apprehensive that it will not continue so. The former were beginning to send their families from the country to the town, but the Pasha sent them out again. The latter are providing themselves with European monies to have in hand in case of an emergency. It does not appear to be the wish of the inhabitants that any outbreak should take place, but they fear they may be forced into one by a few giddy headstrong individuals who may commit some excesses on the Turkish population in the country, which would lead to a retaliation, and a civil war be thus lighted up without either party wishing it. A few arms, and 33 quarter barrels, about 825 lbs. of gunpowder, were seized a few days ago, belonging to

some Greeks who were endeavouring to smuggle them into the interior. I am of opinion that the importation was made simply to supply the natural wants of the island, and not with any intention of arming the Greek population.

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Inclosure 7 in No. 108.

*Consul Wood to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Damascus, June 7, 1853.*

THE unusual excitement which prevails in Damascus in consequence of the apprehensions entertained at the capital of a war with Russia, coupled with the disaffection occasioned by the really deplorable laxity and corruption of the local authorities, has produced a state of things that has added much to the general insecurity.

The most formidable Arab tribes have occupied the country from Merg, four leagues from Damascus, to Kavieteyn, and are ready to avail themselves of any confusion that might occur to pillage and plunder.

But the worst feature under present circumstances is the highly agitated state of the population of this city. All the classes of the Mahometans are most anxious to see the embarrassments of the Porte increase, and herself involved in a disastrous war. They wish to see her humbled in the hope that her officers in Syria will cease to persevere in a system of administration prejudicial to the interests of the effendis and grandees, whose property has been sequestered under various pretexts, and has been so heavily taxed as to have reduced their incomes to one half, and to the artizans and tradesmen who find themselves at the mercy of rapacious tribunals and police officers.

To aggravate a state of things which is already unsatisfactory the locusts have partially destroyed the crops, while the disaffected districts have not been brought under cultivation.

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Inclosure 8 in No. 108.

*Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Erzeroom, June 24, 1853.*

I HAVE inquired of various persons coming from Georgia whether any military preparations were making there. Some have said that troops were being assembled at Ghumri; others, and those the most numerous, that everything was perfectly quiet, but that war was talked of as imminent. Our Pasha says that troops have certainly been collected at Ghumri, but in so quiet a way as scarcely to have attracted public observation. It appears to me that no important movement of troops can have been made; but it is not unlikely that the Russians may fear that, in case of war, a simultaneous attack might be combined between the Daghestanlees and the Turks, and in that idea the garrison of Ghumri may have been strengthened.

I cannot see that Russia would derive any advantage from the present occupation of Erzeroom; to do that, and to maintain a sufficient force to resist the attack of the Caucasian tribes, which would certainly be made were war commenced, would require a larger force than she could conveniently withdraw from those points where the principal struggle must take place; and were she victorious there, she could at any time occupy Erzeroom. I therefore conceive that the object of Russia is probably to maintain her positions in Georgia, without any addition to the forces she has there, which, though sufficient for defence, for offensive operations would scarce suffice. In the last invasion of this part of Turkey, the number of Russian soldiers did not exceed 10,000, though they were accompanied by a vast number of irregular native levies, but then Turkey had no disciplined troops; now there will be here, perhaps, a force of 20,000 disciplined troops, besides irregulars, so that it would be scarce safe for Russia to venture on an invasion with an army of less strength; and I doubt whether she could detach so large a force from Georgia without offering too great an advantage to the Caucasian tribes; so that I do not apprehend that we shall see a Russian army in Erzeroom for the present.



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Inclosure 9 in No. 108.

*Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Erzeroom, June 25, 1853.*

IN every part of the country the Koords are actively engaged in robbing, both on the high roads and in the villages.

It is said that within a few days about seven battalions will have come in from Harpoot; and some time since, seventy pieces of artillery set out on the way hither by a circuitous route, as the direct one was not practicable for guns. The detachments in the various out-stations have been called in, but I trust some troops will be left there, as the country will be at the mercy of the Koords, and incalculable injury to the cultivators will ensue.

The militia has been called out; and altogether the force to be collected here will, it is said, amount to about 40,000 disciplined troops. I hope that with such an imposing force the Porte and the General may not be tempted to make an attack upon Georgia, as, from the want of skill in the Turkish officers, there would not be much hope of success. But if Russia were to meet with reverses in Europe, so as to disable her from succouring Georgia, and if an European force were landed in that country to cooperate with the Turkish force, then indeed a forward movement, combined with an attack on the part of the Caucasian tribes, would not fail to drive the Russians out of Georgia, for they would find few friends among the natives, were they to experience a reverse.

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Inclosure 10 in No. 108.

——— *to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Erzeroom, June 25, 1853.*

THERE is no communication whatever between Ghumri and Batoom, on account of the want of roads through the almost inaccessible country which separates the two places. Any news from the former town would naturally find its way through Kars to Erzeroom; and I believe Mr. Brant is writing to your Excellency on this subject. I do not think it probable or possible for the Russians to march from Ghumri on Batoom. The port could be occupied at any time by Russian vessels of war, or by troops marched by the frontier along the sea-shore. The country around Batoom is untenable, on account of its mountainous and densely-wooded character, so that the port alone could be occupied, and could, I imagine, be easily retaken at any moment.

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Inclosure 11 in No. 108.

*Vice-Consul Damaschino to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Translation.)

(Extract.) *Janina, June 10, 1853.*

AFTER orders had been issued for the departure of the troops, the Pasha thought it requisite to submit to the Council the representations made by the inhabitants concerning the danger which they considered themselves exposed to by the withdrawal of the regular troops. It was decided that the two regiments forming the garrisons of Janina and Arta should remain until further instructions.

Taking into consideration the circumstances of the country, and the character of the Albanians, who would most likely fall back into their old habits, the measure of not leaving the country altogether unprovided with regular troops is a very desirable one.

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Inclosure 12 in No. 108.

*Consul Longworth to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extracts.) *Monastir, May* 19, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed, a translation into Turkish from the Greek language, of an incendiary and anonymous address which was, during the last month or two, as I am informed, circulated in the neighbouring provinces of Thessaly and Salonica. It seems to have failed exciting disturbance of any kind, however it may have contributed to the recent panic.

*Monastir, June* 10, 1853.

Aoni Pasha is of opinion that it is exceedingly imprudent to leave the provinces of Thessaly and Thrace, the inhabitants of which are notoriously disaffected, and ready to join the Hellenes on the first opportunity, thus denuded of all regular defence.

Only 6,500 Albanian irregulars, picked men, are to be levied for Shumla. Considering the numerical force of the bands which Albania can furnish, if necessary, this is a very inconsiderable body indeed; and, coupled with the fact already mentioned, that all the regular troops are to be withdrawn from Thessaly and Thrace, leads me to infer that, in the event of the rising of the Greeks in these provinces, it is intended to employ the Albanians against them. How far a plan of this kind would be consistent with good policy, to say nothing of humanity, I must leave your Excellency to judge; believing, for my part, such a result (whether casual or contemplated) by no means improbable.

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Inclosure 13 in No. 108.

*Consul Longworth to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Monastir, June* 23, 1853.

AS I had the honour to state in my last despatch to your Excellency, some alarm and uneasiness have been experienced by the inhabitants of Monastir at the complete evacuation of the place by the Nizam or regular troops. The Austrian Vice-Consul, M. Westermager, having requested me to join him in representing to Aoni Pasha the danger of leaving the town in this defenceless state, I deemed it advisable (though by no means concurring with him as to the extent of that danger, or of the disorders which he believed had actually taken place), to recommend that a small number of regulars should be detained here, if they could be spared without causing inconvenience and embarrassment with regard to the military combinations now in progress. Aoni Pasha as well as the civil authorities at once acquiesced in the propriety of the suggestion, but said they could not venture to infringe the orders of Omer Pasha, who had positively instructed them to send forward all the regular troops.

The Austrian Vice-Consul, who appeared to labour under considerable excitement, then wished me to enter into a joint protest with him on the subject; but this I informed him I did not feel justified in doing. The fact is that although public security might be promoted by the detention of a few companies of infantry at Monastir, there are in the precarious social condition of European Turkey many other places where a still more urgent necessity might be pleaded for their presence; and yet if all such claims were attended to, serious obstacles would be opposed to the concentration of the Turkish army at Shumla

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Inclosure 14 in No. 108.

*M. Tzucala to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Philippopoli, May* 25, 1853.

AN unpardonable indifference of the Porte to what is passing in Bulgaria, under the specious pretence of being a national Slavonic educational movement, has ruined all classes, both governing and governed. The public is excited by members of the Bulgaro-Slavonic Society acting under Russian influence.

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Inclosure 15 in No. 108.

*Consul Saunders to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extracts.) *Prevesa, April* 13, 1853.

The greater part of the villages along the whole line of boundary in Thessaly and Epirus, as well as the entire districts wherein these villages are situated, are almost exclusively tenanted by Christian subjects of the Porte in a state of extreme destitution.

*June* 2, 1853.

The frontier districts of Thessaly and Epirus appear likely to cause considerable embarrassment to the Government in the event of pending negotiations assuming a less pacific character.

The rural population, oppressed by fiscal exactions, and subjected to intolerable acts of violence and injustice, cannot be expected to entertain any but the most rancorous feelings towards their persecutors.

The inhabitants of the greater part of these villages being moreover exclusively Christians, and seeing no other prospect of relief open to them, are continually thronging the foreign Consulates with the view of seeking some friendly intervention.

After thus depicting to your Lordship the disastrous condition of these frontier districts from various causes, it may be readily conceived that for some time past the emigration of whole families to Greece, which can only be accomplished by stealth, has been practised to a considerable extent; and that parties so circumstanced, together with the whole body of Suliots, Chimariots, and other Epirotes domiciled in Greece will be eager to avail themselves of the first favourable occasion of promoting disturbances in this province.

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Inclosure 16 in No. 108.

*Consul Blunt to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Salonica, June* 23, 1853.

THE inhabitants of Larissa and other towns in that district appear greatly alarmed for the consequences that may ensue from the removal of the regular troops, which does not appear to have been a prudent measure, having little confidence in the irregulars, who, generally speaking, spread alarm wherever they are stationed or move, owing to their well-known propensity to plunder.

On the 21st instant the Acting Governor of Salonica received intelligence of a band of sixty robbers, mostly Christians, which infest the district of Serres.

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Inclosure 17 in No. 108.

*Vice-Consul Bonutti to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Translation.)

(Extracts.) *Scutari, June* 1, 1853.

ALL that remains to protect these districts are three battalions of regular troops and 1200 irregular Topchi, who are quartered on the borders. All the desperate characters have raised their heads again, and acts of rapine and robbery are again very frequent at the expense of the Christians.

Osman Pasha, the Governor of this province, is a Mussulman, and sees with perfect indifference all these excesses. The Christians, who are exposed to the vengeance of their enemies, live in a continual state of alarm. It must, however, be borne in mind that the Christian population of these districts is three times greater than the Turkish, and if they have been hitherto kept down it was merely by the hope of political improvement under the promising administration of Omer Pasha.

*Scutari, June* 8, 1853.

There now remain in these parts only three companies, incomplete, of regular troops, distributed among the various fortresses in this district.

A few days ago a conflict took place between the Montenegrins of Cuci and those of the tribe of Clementi in the Turkish territory. Several of the former tried to get into the village of Selci in Clementi, to carry away the cattle, and succeeded in driving off a few after killing two of the shepherds.

*Scutari, June* 15, 1853.

It is said that in the several Conferences held by the Chieftain Hassan Nica with Prince Daniel at Cettigne, the said Chieftain had promised that the mountainous tribes of this province should be favourable to the cause of Montenegro, and that he would get up an insurrection when a favourable opportunity presented itself. Prince Daniel sent for several of the Chiefs of the Clementi tribe to proceed to Cettigne and confer with him. They refused, however, to go.

P.S.—Intelligence has just been received from Montenegro that great warlike preparations are being made there, and that they are assembling all their forces to attack the Turkish territory. The Pasha is already sending a piece of cannon to Podgoritza. There are no regular troops in this province, nor can any assistance be expected from these mountain tribes. It is thought, on the contrary, that they would operate in favour of Montenegro.

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Inclosure 18 in No. 108.

*Vice-Consul Bonutti to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Translation.)

(Extract.) *Scutari, June* 22, 1853.

IT is much feared that in the event of a conflict with the Montenegro, the Christian mountaineers of this Province would refuse to join the Turks, because, as I have already reported, the influence of the Montenegro has begun to prevail amongst them; so that when the Pasha made his proposals to them concerning the campaign, in the event of provocation being given by the Montenegrins, the Turks themselves began to suspect the truth, because they replied that they would be ready to march whenever the Pasha would summon hither two Chiefs of every Christian tribe of the Mountains as hostages, inasmuch as they dreaded a collusion on their part.

It cannot be denied, on the other hand, that the Montenegrins suffer under constant provocations. A Turk of Podgoritza killed lately a Montenegrin of



Piperi in a spirit of pure fanaticism. Under the present misrule this feeling may lead to fatal consequences.

The Governor of Herzegovina, Mustapha Pasha, is ordered to assume the Pashalic of Scutari should hostilities break out on the part of Russia. Osman Pasha will replace him. This change is perhaps contemplated with reference to the influence which they would naturally exercise over their fellow-countrymen in favour of the Porte, they being both men of great note.

Three battalions of the reserve at Tiranna have deserted, not being able to obtain any pay, and their families are made to suffer for it.

Since the departure of Seraskier misrule prevails. Murder and plunder are of daily occurrence, and the Government enriches itself by mulcting the parties, &c. About ten murders have been committed within the last eight days between Scutari, Alessio, Dulcigno, and Tiranna. The public roads are infested, and no measures are taken.

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Inclosure 19 in No. 108.

*Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Tabreez, June* 5, 1853.

THE Prince Governor of Tabreez told my brother yesterday that he had received letters from Teheran, stating that the King had at one moment abandoned the intention of camping with a large army at Sultanieh during the summer, but that the Russian Minister had prevailed upon (the word used was "compelled") His Majesty to do so.

The Prince understood by his letters that the Russian Minister had urged upon the King the advantage which Persia might, with such a force under arms, derive in the event of a war between Turkey and Russia.

The Prince added that the King will therefore proceed to Sultanieh, and his army consists of 35,000 to 40,000 men.

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Inclosure 20 in No. 108.

*Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Trebizond, June* 28, 1853.

PRIVATE letters from Georgia recently received here mention that the Russians are actively employed strengthening their stations, and erecting new forts on the Circassian and Mingrelian coasts.

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Inclosure 21 in No. 108.

*Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extracts.) *Shumla, June* 6, 1853.

ALL along the road between Varna and Shumla I observed in the several places at which I stopped that the Turks were impressed with great fear, and the Christians with still greater, as they fear both the Russians on account of the devastation which a war would occasion, and the Turks on account of the vengeance which they anticipate they would indulge, in such an event, towards them.

The presence of the regular troops is certainly much to be desired in the view of quelling the rising feeling of animosity on the part of the Turkish population generally, and of suppressing it altogether should any outbreak arise.

*Tarnova, June* 12, 1853.

As far as I have been enabled yet to observe, the military armaments and expected hostilities between Russia and the Porte have produced no other

feeling than that of panic of the usual consequences and disasters which may be anticipated from warfare in general, and more especially so at this period of the year when the peasantry are on the eve of gathering in their harvests; and these considerations certainly influence in a predominant degree the feelings of the Bulgarian Christians, who form the majority of the population of this province. On the other hand, the Turkish inhabitants are evidently greatly alarmed and doubtful as to the fate that may await them in the issue of a war with Russia, which they appear sincerely to desire and hope may be averted. But irrespective of the warlike preparations on the part of Russia, and the defensive measures adopting by the Porte which at this moment engross the attention of all, the natural feelings and sentiments of the Christian population of this immediate district—comprising a population of about 160,000—exhibit a remarkable degree of independence of spirit, if not in action at least in their social relations with the Turkish inhabitants. In Turnova I cannot but remark a freedom of intercourse with the Turkish population, and an assumption of equality on the part of the Bulgarians which has greatly surprised me, so different is this state of things from the abased and humbled condition of the Christians in most other districts of this province. Hence I apprehend that if any acts of insubordination be meditated under such circumstances as those attending the presence of a Russian army on this side of the Danube, it is in this district of Bulgaria, where the people are imbued with a bold spirit and with a lurking disaffection, that the Turkish Government may look for demonstrations of a rebellious nature, rather than in any other parts of this province, where the Bulgarian Christians, subdued and humbled either by the presence of a greater proportion of the Mussulman population, or by a long course of submission to local oppression, are driven to outbreak and remonstrance only by some sudden and notable act of injustice.

*Turnova, June* 16, 1853.

The Turks I have found in some instances (and this impression may be more general than I am as yet prepared to state to your Lordship) are under the persuasion that Russia meditates a religious war upon this country, and that mosques of Christian origin, as Saint Sophia and others similarly associated, are demanded by Russia to be given up to the Greek sect; these and the like impressions naturally inspiring the corresponding feeling of religious fanaticism in defence of their faith.

On the other hand, the Christians have in some cases expressed equally extravagant notions, not only of the extent of the demands of Russia on their behalf, but of the fanatical spirit of vengeance and hatred which such demands must create on the part of the Mussulmans, such impressions and conclusions filling their minds with much anxiety and fear.

*Turnova, June* 17, 1853.

Omer Pasha was of strong opinion that the Russians would on this occasion avoid the line of the coast, and occupy the centre of Bulgaria.

The uncertainty of operations by sea, and the sympathy which the Russians would hope to awaken among the Christian populations of these districts, were the principal considerations upon which this opinion of the General was founded.

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Inclosure 22 in No. 108.

*Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Turnova, June* 28, 1853.

THIS state of things is the more to be deplored under present circumstances, as the feelings of the Christian population are decidedly opposed to any foreign occupation, and both the Pasha and the Bishop of Turnova have repeatedly assured me, that were it not for the recurrence of these wanton and cold-blooded murders, and the consequent total insecurity of life, the Bulgarians would, they feel certain, ask for arms to resist an invasion of the country, especially at this moment, when the crops are ripe, and the fruits of all their toil may be lost by the commencement of hostilities; still, the more pressing evil now becomes the dread which the Turks themselves inspire.



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Inclosure 23 in No. 108.

*Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Turnova, July* 1, 1853.

MR. COLQUHOUN in speaking of Bulgaria, says:

"People here assert that the Bulgarian population is decidedly Russian at heart, and were the armies of the Czar to cross the Danube that they would be received as brothers. The Bulgarians have several wealthy persons over here, and the Russian Consulate has been handling them, and endeavouring to make use of them, but I believe hitherto without success."

With reference to these observations, I can only say, that from every opportunity I have had of observation, it appears to me that the Christian population of this province regards the threatened invasion by the Russians as a most disastrous and untoward event; but they would doubtless make the best of the sympathy which the Russians would lavish on their behalf, to which may may be added the most unfortunate and menacing attitude which the Turks have assumed towards the Christians in certain districts of this Pashalic, and I believe elsewhere in this province.

Reports of these menaces and threats reach me daily from Sistova, and yesterday an Ionian who arrived from that place states, that although he had not terminated his affairs there, he had decided upon leaving immediately, as the danger to which the Christians were exposed had become imminent, even the Moudir of that place having declared that after the Bayram it would go hard with the Christians.

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No. 109.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July* 20.)

(No. 134. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 4, 1853.

THE Internuncio, without making any communication to me, or, as far as I know, to the French and Prussian Representatives, imparted some days ago to Reshid Pasha a separate and secret version of the proposal previously transmitted from Vienna with respect to the Russian Ultimatum.

A statement of what occurred on the occasion of this proposal between Reshid Pasha and the Austrian interpreter is inclosed herewith in the shape of a report addressed by M. Pisani to me.

Your Lordship will observe that it closes with a request from Reshid Pasha that I would advise him as to the manner in which it might be best for him to reply to M. Bruck.

I did not hesitate to do so, and the terms of my advice were these: that he should express his thanks for the continued interest displayed by the Cabinet of Vienna, and declare that the Porte could not with propriety take the new proposal into consideration without communicating it, as the "suggestion" had been communicated, to the four Representatives, and waiting their reply.

I am assured by the Pasha that he has adopted this answer. Baron Bruck has since submitted to him privately a draft, of his own drawing up, for the improvement of Prince Menchikoff's note, and also the draft of a new letter from his Highness to Count Nesselrode. These papers I inclose confidentially herewith for your Lordship's more complete information. Reshid Pasha sent them in secret to me, and I have not thought myself at liberty to mention them to any of my colleagues.

I am unwilling to anticipate your Lordship's judgment of these compo-

sitions, but if urged to express an opinion, I could not approve either the one or the other. The note, though it contains some secondary amendments, concedes the main point at issue, and the letter is placed in its most favourable light when taken as an appendage to the concession.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 109.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Most Secret and Confidential.)

*Therapia, June 30, 1853.*

My Lord,

RESHID PASHA has just communicated to me in the strictest confidence, for your Excellency's information, that Baron de Bruck sent this morning M. de Steindl to read to his Highness the substance of a despatch he had just received by the Vienna post, purporting "that the projet referred to in Count Buol's despatch (an extract of which was lately communicated to the three Representatives by Reshid Pasha and the Internuncio himself), ought to be prepared as soon as possible; that the more it approached to that proposed by Russia, the more it would facilitate an understanding. If the Porte was reluctant to sign the note peremptorily proposed to her by Prince Menchikoff, it would be more convenient and more consistent with her dignity to attain the same object by the way which is now open to her; that it would be better for the Porte if a note, whose expressions came as near as possible to the Russian projet were to be signed by a Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburgh; that should the Porte forward such a projet de note to Vienna, accompanied by a sealed note addressed to Count Nesselrode, the Cabinet of Vienna would transmit it with instructions to their Representative at St. Petersburgh to be delivered to its address, in the event he saw any good disposition on the part of Russia to come to an understanding, otherwise to be returned to Vienna for transmission back to Constantinople. If Russia assents to such an arrangement as now proposed, the question will come to a speedy solution. At any rate the Porte will gain more in the public opinion in Europe, which is already in its favour."

Reshid Pasha desired to be furnished with a translation of the despatch, which was written in German, but M. de Steindl observed that he was not authorized to comply with the request; that he was directed to say that the communication must be considered as very secret and confidential, and that it was intended merely for the information of His Highness. The latter replied that he could not keep it secret from his colleagues, and consequently wished at least to be permitted to take notes of such parts as bore more immediately upon the subject. To this M. de Steindl consented, and translated to him, *verbatim*, the more prominent parts, which Reshid Pasha hastened to take down in Turkish.

M. de Steindl further stated that the Internuncio, with a view to facilitate the *rédaction* of the projet, had drawn up a sketch of the proposed note, as also of the new letter to be addressed to Count Nesselrode, and begged leave to submit the draft to Reshid Pasha. The latter repeated to M. de Steindl what he had stated on a former occasion, that he was pretty certain that all this would lead to nothing; that Russia would accept of no other answer but the one already presented by Prince Menchikoff; at all events he saw no objection to examine the projet of note and letter prepared by Baron de Bruck.

Now Reshid Pasha is very anxious to be made acquainted with your Lordship's opinion as to the answer to be returned to M. de Bruck: his Highness seems to think that the Porte cannot accept any arrangement by a single Power unless it were sanctioned by and common to the four parties to the Treaty of 1841.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 109.

*Project of Note from the Porte to the Russian Government, proposed by Austrian Internuncio.*

SA Majesté le Sultan, voulant donner à son auguste allié et ami l'Empereur de Russie un nouveau témoignage de son amitié la plus sincère, et de son désir intime de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui existent entre les deux Etats, désirant de constater en même temps son entière confiance dans les intentions constamment bienveillantes de Sa Majesté Impériale, et d'y répondre dignement avec franchise et cordialité, a daigné apprécier et prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations faites par son auguste allié l'Empereur de Russie pour le culte orthodoxe d'Orient, que Sa Majesté professe.

Le Soussigné a reçu en conséquence l'ordre de donner par la présente note l'assurance la plus solennelle au Gouvernement Impérial de Russie, sur la sollicitude invariable et les sentiments généreux et tolérans qui animent Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan pour la sécurité et la prospérité du clergé, des églises, et des établissements religieux du culte Chrétien d'Orient.

Afin de rendre ces assurances plus explicites, préciser d'une manière formelle les objets principaux de cette haute sollicitude et prévenir à jamais toute nuance de malentendu et de désaccord à ce sujet entre les deux Gouvernements, le Soussigné est autorisé par Sa Majesté le Sultan à faire les déclarations suivantes:—

1. Le culte orthodoxe d'Orient, son clergé, ses églises, et ses possessions, ainsi que ses établissements religieux, jouiront dans l'avenir sans aucune atteinte, sous l'égide de Sa Majesté le Sultan, des priviléges et immunités qui leur sont assurés *ab antiquo* ou qui leur ont été accordés à différentes reprises par la faveur Impériale, et qui ont été confirmés par le hatti-chérif de Sa Majesté le Sultan, en date des derniers jours de Chaban 1269, adressé au patriarche de l'église orthodoxe d'Orient, et dans un principe de haute équité participeront aussi aux avantages qui viendraient accordés aux autres rits Chrétiens par Convention ou par dispositions particulières.

2. Sa Majesté le Sultan, ayant par son firman souverain du expliqué son firman revêtu du hatti-humayoun du 15 de la lune Rebiul-akhir, 1268 (16 Février, 1852); et ayant ordonné en sus, par un autre firman en date du , la réparation de la coupole du temple de Saint Sépulcre, ces deux firmans seront textuellement exécutés et fidèlement observés, pour maintenir à jamais le *statu quo* actuel des sanctuaires possédés par les Grecs, exclusivement ou en commun avec d'autres cultes.

Il est entendu que cette promesse s'étend également au maintien de tous les droits et immunités dont jouissent *ab antiquo* l'église orthodoxe et son clergé, tant dans la ville de Jérusalem qu'en dehors, sans préjudice aucun pour les autres communautés Chrétiennes.

3. Pour le cas où la Cour de Russie en fait la demande, il sera assigné une localité convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem ou dans ses environs, pour la construction d'une église consacré à la célébration du service divin par les ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pélerins indigents ou malades, lesquelles fondations seront sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

4. Les ordres nécessaires seront donnés pour l'exécution fidèle de ces décisions souveraines, et on s'entendra ultérieurement sur la régularisation des points de détail, qui n'ont pas trouvé place, tant dans les firmans concernant les lieux saints de Jérusalem que dans la présente notification

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Inclosure 3 in No. 109.

*Project of Letter from Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode, proposed by Austrian Internuncio.*

PAR une lettre en date du $\frac{1}{13}$ Juin, j'ai eu l'honneur d'exprimer à votre Excellence les vifs regrets du Sultan mon auguste maître, de ne pouvoir obtempérer sans modification aux désirs de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, exposés dans la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 19 Mai.

L'interruption des relations diplomatiques entre les deux Gouvernements annoncée par votre Excellence pour ce cas, en a été la suite.

Dans l'entretemps je viens d'avoir connaissance de la circulaire en date du 30 Mai, adressée par votre Excellence aux Missions de l'Empereur à l'Etranger, dans le but d'éclaircir les différends survenus entre nos deux Gouvernements et de justifier les demandes de la Russie.

Le Ministère Ottoman serait à même de refuter quelques unes des assertions contenues dans la circulaire du 30 Mai; il y trouve cependant en général une tendance si conciliante, qu'il préfère renoncer à toute réfutation, pour chercher plutôt une voie de s'accorder sur le petit nombre de points encore en litige, et de rétablir de la sorte l'entente cordiale si vivement désirée par les deux Gouvernements.

Dans ce but, le Sultan mon auguste maître a bien voulu charger son Conseil de Ministres de prendre itérativement en mûre considération le projet de note annexé à la circulaire de votre Excellence en date du 30 Mai; et de s'appliquer à mettre en accord, autant que cela serait possible, la réponse du Gouvernement Ottoman avec les désirs de la Russie, et avec le principe reconnu à toute occasion par votre Excellence de la souveraineté et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman.

Cette délibération vient d'avoir lieu, et son résultat satisfaisant, provoqué par le vif désir de tous les Ministres de prouver à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie leurs profonds regrets de l'interruption des relations diplomatiques, a été approuvé par résolution suprême de mon Auguste Souverain.

Suivant les ordres que Sa Majesté le Sultan a bien voulu me donner à cet égard, je m'empresse avec la plus vive satisfaction de vous transmettre ci-près, M. le Comte, le projet d'une note que le Gouvernement Ottoman est prêt à adresser au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, sitôt qu'il aura obtenu l'assurance que ce projet répond entièrement au désir de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie.

Dans ce cas, vivement désiré par le Gouvernement Ottoman, le Sultan mon auguste maître s'empresserait d'envoyer un Ambassadeur Extraordinaire à St. Pétersbourg pour rétablir les relations amicales qui, je l'espère, ne se trouveront jamais plus compromises.

Agréez, &c.

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No. 110.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 139.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 7, 1853.*

I AVAIL myself of this opportunity to forward copies of two instructions addressed by me to the Acting Chief Interpreter of Her Majesty's Embassy respecting the alarms entertained in some parts of the empire by the Sultan's Christian and other tributary subjects, the comparative want of protection in districts from which the regular troops have been necessarily withdrawn, and the number of crimes committed, particularly in the province of Bulgaria, by Turks suspected of indulging a spirit of fanatical hatred towards the Christians. These instructions, as your Lordship will observe, were drawn up for communication to the Turkish Government, and I shall not fail to follow them up, if



necessary, with other steps calculated to enforce the suggestions which they contain.

Apprehensions, not resting, as far as I yet know, on any well averred facts, are entertained in the capital, as well as elsewhere, of an intended rising against the Christians, and I have been urged by some well-informed persons to call up Her Majesty's squadron with a view to their protection. It may before long be found advisable to do so, but I am unwilling to resort to such a measure without a palpable urgency, considering that it might be construed into an act of menace against Russia, and diminish what slender chances still remain of a successful negotiation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 110.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.*

Sir, *Therapia, June 22, 1853.*

YOU will communicate to Reshid Pasha the several extracts of Consular reports from Scutari, Monastir, and Prevesa, annexed to this instruction. You will observe that they relate in part to those acts of disorder, injustice, and corruption, sometimes of a very atrocious kind, which I have frequently brought by your means to the knowledge of the Ottoman Porte. The assurances given to me by the late Grand Vizier, the appointment of a more trustworthy Pasha at Salonica, and the order for Hazzi Hussein Pasha to repair forthwith to Constantinople, had warranted a hope that the grievances so justly and loudly complained of could at length be effectively redressed. But it is with extreme disappointment and pain that I observe the continuance of evils which affect so deeply the welfare of the empire, and which assume a deeper character of importance in the present critical state of the Porte's relations with Russia. You will read this instruction to his Highness; you will communicate fully the contents of the accompanying extracts; and you will press upon his mind the urgency of adopting adequate measures for the repression of crime and the protection of the Sultan's loyal and peaceable subjects without further delay. I am aware that the Porte's attention is principally directed at present to their defensive preparations which cannot with safety be dispensed with; but it cannot be denied that the matters now brought into notice have an immediate bearing on the same great interest, and cannot be neglected with safety more than with justice.

You are at liberty to leave a translation of this instruction with Reshid Pasha, and also copies of the annexed extracts should his Highness appear to require them.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 110.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.*

Sir, *Therapia, July 4, 1853.*

I HAVE frequently had occasion of late, and indeed for some years back, to bring to the knowledge of the Porte such atrocious instances of cruelty, rapine, and murder, as I have found, with extreme concern, in the Consular reports, exhibiting generally the disturbed and misgoverned condition of many parts of Roumelia, and calling loudly for redress from the Imperial Government. The character of these disorderly and brutal outrages may be said with truth to be, in general, that of Mussulman fanaticism, excited by cupidity and hatred against the Sultan's Christian subjects. I will not say that my friendly and earnest representations have been entirely disregarded. On the contrary, I have

sometimes had the satisfaction of being instrumental towards the repression of crime, the alleviation of individual suffering, and the recall of incapable magistrates. But the evil, nevertheless, has not been permanently removed, and the effect of every partial check has been of short duration.

It is evident that the present political circumstances of the empire must tend directly to increase the temptations to crime, and to bring a much wider extent of country within the range of disorderly and outrageous passions. The Mussulmans are excited by the prospect of war. The Rayahs, from their numbers, especially in the European provinces of Turkey, are objects of fear, no less than of hatred and cupidity. The movement of troops; the calling out the Redif; the concentration of regulars on the frontier; the demand of supplies; the scarcity of money; the pressure for payment of arrears; the anticipation of future taxes, concur to spread alarm among the peaceable, and to hold out a clearer prospect of impunity to the violent. The Pashas and subordinate Governors are perplexed; individuals possessing local wealth acquire a licentious influence; and unless some powerful remedies be applied without further delay, it is to be feared that the authority of the Central Government will be completely overpowered in some of the provinces, and that the people, despairing of protection, will augment the disorder by resorting to lawless means of self-preservation.

For the sake of the empire itself, no less than from motives of humanity, I am inexpressibly anxious to engage the Porte's attention, ere it be too late, to this abundant source of evil and danger. I am well aware of the difficulties under which the Government labours, and that it is far more easy to describe any mischief and to trace it to its causes, than to find an efficient remedy. Yet such is the magnitude of the evil, and such the danger of its extension under present circumstances, that the necessity of checking its progress, and restoring some degree of confidence among the tributary classes, is scarcely subordinate to the duty of preparing the means of resistance against an invading foreign army.

In addition to the numerous extracts of my Consular correspondence which I have furnished to the office of Foreign Affairs with reference to this subject, I now inclose, for special consideration, the intelligence which has reached me from an official source in Bulgaria. Reshid Pasha will learn from its contents how crying is the evil—how urgent the peril, even in a province where a very considerable portion of the regular army is being at this moment collected.

The more pressing and obvious wants are these: the correction, by means of explanation and control, of that fanatical and licentious spirit which now inflames the Mussulman population; some special means for the protection of the loyal and peaceably disposed, whether Mussulman or Rayah; an efficient responsibility on the part of the local governors and magistrates towards the Supreme Government; a more regular and judicious exercise of authority in the collection of supplies, and the direction of persons acting in concert with the army; relief for the labouring and the rural classes, by means of extraordinary aids obtained by the Porte from other sources, and applied to the payment of the forces, and other immediate wants of the State.

I abstain from offering any suggestions of a more particular kind, in the belief that the Porte is the best judge of its own resources, and in the hope that it will adopt every remedial measure to be found within the range of those resources.

You will leave a copy of this instruction with Reshid Pasha, after reading and fully explaining its contents to his Highness; and you will request that it may be brought, without delay, before His Majesty the Sultan and the Council of State, to the end that it may be taken into serious consideration; and that the Porte's decision may be communicated to me for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 111.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 141.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 7, 1853.*

WE have at length received official intelligence of the entrance of the Russian army in Bessarabia into the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. The crossing of the Pruth at Sculeni began at 8 o'clock in the forenoon of the 3rd instant.

Inclosed herewith is a copy of Consul Gardner's despatch to me, transmitting a copy of Prince Gortchakoff's Proclamation. As the terms of this document agree with the conditions on which I had recommended the Porte not to withdraw the Hospodars, I have every reason to believe that they will remain in their respective Governments for the present.

There are two passages in the Proclamation to which I beg leave to draw your Lordship's attention; one is that describing the conditions on which the Emperor is stated to abstain from offensive hostilities against Turkey, and the other indicative of the manner in which the pledge of not charging the inhabitants of the Principalities with the expenses of the occupation is to be redeemed. It cannot be necessary for me to trouble your Lordship with any comment upon the interpretation to which, in different ways, each of them is liable.

For your Lordship's more particular information, I inclose herewith in copy a despatch addressed by the Prince of Moldavia to Reshid Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 111.

*Consul Gardner to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Jassy, July 2, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to state to your Excellency that this morning I received a visit from the Minister Basil Ghyka, who had been requested by the Prince to call upon me. He brought the positive intelligence that the two Principalities would be immediately occupied by the forces of Russia, and showed me the different letters which the Prince had received from Prince Gortchakoff and the Russian Consul, the former announcing his arrival, and the Proclamation to be issued by him on entering the Principality (which is probably now under press), and the latter demanding that a deputation should be sent to meet the General. The Proclamation was permitted to be copied, and I have the honour to inclose it, as a document which removes every doubt.

I have felt it a duty to call upon the Hospodar, who has permitted me to send the present despatch under cover of his own to Constantinople by estafette. He gave me the further intelligence, which I repeat verbatim.

The Russian troops which will enter the Principality are the 4th Corps d'Armée, commanded by General Dannenberg, and a part of the 2nd Corps, forming a total 80,000 men. The remainder of the 2nd Corps, under command of its Chief, General Panjattin, will pass the Pruth at Leova, and proceed to Wallachia and Bucharest, while the 5th Corps d'Armée, under General Lüders, will remain as a corps d'observation, ready on the first act of hostility by the Turks to cross the Danube, and from Toultcha march direct onwards to the Balkan, force the defiles, and attack Adrianople. Each corps d'armée is 60,000 strong. These strategic movements I pretend not to judge; I merely repeat what was observed by the Prince. I said to the Prince that my reports to your Excellency had been the repetition of his own assurances to me; that he had received no intelligence whatever of the intention of the Russian Government to occupy militarily these Principalities. His reply was, that until the present moment he had utterly disbelieved it himself, but that, entertaining no longer

any further doubt of such an intention, he had immediately made it known to me.

The Prince subsequently added that he had lately received letters from Constantinople. The Divan complained of their receiving little or no positive information from him, and he could give none, for it was impossible for him to state as a fact what might be disproved by the events of the succeeding day; that his position was most difficult and delicate; that he would have proceeded at once to Constantinople, if the Sultan had required his presence there, but that it was now impossible for him to say what may be required of him or of his Government by the Russian authorities, who promise to respect every right and privilege, but whose future instructions must depend much, nay altogether, on the turn which events may take. In fact, all communication with Turkey might be interrupted.

The Prince is writing to Constantinople, and will dwell more at length on these topics. His Highness professes the utmost deference for the orders of the Porte, but must defer at the same time to others which may be in direct opposition to them.

I shall await with anxiety your Excellency's instructions to regulate my own conduct. My means are very restricted, for everything is absorbed by the expenses of the Consulate and salaries of my employés, and these visits render everything dear. Within the last few years the price of everything has doubled or tripled.

I entreat your Excellency's consideration of my present position.

The present despatch contains a summary of the intelligence from his Highness. The matter I have been forced to compress, from want of time, as I have only had a brief hour to address your Excellency, but feel it as a real favour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) S. GARDNER.

P.S.—The Russian troops will enter Jassy to-morrow (Sunday).

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Inclosure 2 in No. 111.

*Proclamation of Prince Gortchakoff.*

Habitants de la Moldavie et de la Valachie!

SA Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste maître, m'a ordonné d'occuper votre territoire avec le corps d'armée dont il a daigné me confier le commandement.

Nous n'arrivons pas au milieu de vous ni avec des projets de conquête, ni avec l'intention de modifier les institutions qui vous régissent et la situation politique que des Traités solennels vous ont garanties.

L'occupation provisoire des Principautés que je suis chargé d'effectuer n'a d'autre but que celui d'une protection immédiate et efficace dans des circonstances imprévues et graves où le Gouvernement Ottoman, méconnaissant les nombreuses preuves d'une sincère alliance que la Cour Impériale n'a cessé de lui donner depuis la conclusion du Traité d'Andrinople, répond à nos propositions les plus justes par des refus, à nos conseils les plus désintéressés par la plus offensante méfiance.

Dans sa longanimité, dans son constant désir de maintenir la paix en Orient comme en Europe, l'Empereur évitera une guerre offensive contre la Turquie aussi longtemps que sa dignité et les intérêts de son Empire le lui permettront.

Le jour où il obtiendra la réparation qui lui est due et les garanties qu'il est en droit de réclamer pour l'avenir, ses troupes rentreront dans les limites de la Russie.

Habitants de la Moldavie et de la Valachie! je remplis également un ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale en vous déclarant que la présence de ses troupes dans votre pays ne vous imposera ni charges ni contributions nouvelles; que les fournitures en vivres seront liquidées par nos caisses militaires en temps opportun et à un taux fixé d'avance d'accord avec vos Gouvernements.

Envisagez votre avenir sans inquiétude.



Livrez-vous avec sécurité à vos travaux agricoles et à vos spéculations commerciales; obéissez aux règlements qui vous régissent et aux autorités établies.

C'est par le fidèle accomplissement de ces devoirs que vous acquerrez les meilleurs titres à la généreuse sollicitude et à la puissante protection de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 111.

*Prince Ghyka to Reshid Pasha.*

Monseigneur, *Jassi, le 18 Juin*, 1853.

JE m'empresse de porter à la connaissance de votre Altesse les notions suivantes:

Par la poste précédente j'ai eu l'occasion de prévenir le Prince Vogorides que M. Khaltchinski, Consul-Général à Bucarest, étant arrivé à Jassi en était réparti immédiatement pour se rendre en Bessarabie. De rétour, après une absence de quatre jours, M. Khaltchinski avait été chargé de me prévenir de l'entrée probable des troupes Russes dans les Principautés, en ajoutant toutefois que l'ordre n'en était attendu par le Prince Gortchakoff, résidant à Kichenell, que vers le 17 du courant. Aujourd'hui, le 18, vers midi M. Khaltchinski a quitté Jassi pour se rendre à Bucarest. Après son départ je viens de recevoir pour la première fois une communication officielle du Prince Gortchakoff comme Commandant-en-chef, par laquelle son Excellence me notifie que l'armée placée sous son commandement venait de recevoir l'ordre de franchir la frontière le 21 du courant, pour occuper les deux Principautés. En faisant allusion aux motifs de cette détermination, qui sont d'ailleurs exposés dans la proclamation émanée du quartier-général, le Commandant-en-chef s'attache à m'assurer que l'occupation s'opérera sans porter la moindre atteinte aux privilèges accordés aux provinces qui sont confiées à l'administration des Princes, et sans leur imposer aucune nouvelle charge ou corvée.

Il réclame finalement mon concours pour subvenir aux besoins des troupes, et promet que, animées du meilleur esprit de discipline, elles ne donneront aucun sujet de plainte. Cette communication, conçue dans les termes sus-mentionnés, a été accompagnée d'une proclamation destinée à être adressée aux habitants de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, et dont votre Altesse trouvera ci-jointe la copie textuelle. Cette proclamation sera sans doute publiée le jour même de l'entrée des troupes.

Le Commandant-en-chef a chargé en même temps le Consul résidant à Jassi de s'entendre avec le Gouvernement Moldave pour préparer les provisions nécessaires à l'entretien des troupes, qu'il s'engage de payer aux prix courants, et a requis en outre que des Commissaires Moldaves fussent accrédités auprès des Commandants, afin de faciliter l'acquisition des produits dont ils auraient besoin. Cette disposition, qui avait été constamment adoptée dans toutes les occasions précédentes, a été toujours considéré comme indispensable et avantageux pour le pays, en ce qu'elle admettait des intermédiaires indigènes entre les Commandants des troupes et la population. La note du Consulat de Russie, qui réquérait l'adoption de cette mesure, insistait à ce que les trois Commissaires désignés pour être placés auprès du Commandant-en-chef, se rendissent immédiatement à Kicheneff pour être mis à sa disposition. Je n'ai pas cru devoir céder à une pareille démande insitée, et me suis borné à enjoindre aux susdits Commissaires, ainsi qu'aux autres, de se trouver sur la frontière au moment du passage des troupes.

D'après les renseignements, que j'ai pu récueilli, je me fais un devoir d'ajouter à ce que précéde, que le Prince Gortchakoff réunit sous son commandement trois corps d'armée, le 2me sous les ordres du Général Panioutin, le 4me commandé par le Général Dannenberg, et le 5me sous le Général Lüders; le 4me et partie du 5me Corps sont destinés à occuper les deux Principautés. Le Général Lüders continuant d'ailleurs de résider en Bessarabie, le passage s'effectuera par Scouleni et Leova, et le quartier-général sera établi à Bucarest.

Votre Altesse, pésant ma position dans sa sagesse, jugera, j'ose l'espérer, l'impossibilité où je me trouve de me réfuser aux exigences de toute genre qu'implique une occupation militaire.

Aussi à défaut d'instructions sous la circonstance suis-je obligé de borner mon rôle à assurer la tranquillité publique, et à veiller à ce qu'il ne soit porté aucune lésion aux populations, et à ce que les contrats passés entre les commandants des troupes et des particuliers soient fidèlement exécutés.

Daignez, &c.

(Signé) G. GHYKA.

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No. 112.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 144.)

*Therapia, July* 9, 1853.

My Lord,

THE sudden dismissal of the two principal Ministers of State, the Grand Vizier and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, without a knowledge of any circumstances calculated to satisfy the public curiosity, has thrown the whole capital into a state of astonishment and anxiety. As this important change took place at the very moment when intelligence was received of the occupation of Moldavia by a Russian army, it was natural to ascribe it to some intrigue connected with the feeling of the Government towards Russia. The leading members of the diplomatic body had every appearance of being taken by surprise, and the Sultan's Ministers, both those who were dismissed and those who were retained in office, disclaimed all knowledge of the Sultan's motives in taking so questionable a step at the present juncture. The prevailing impression was that the war party had obtained the ascendant, and that measures, not unlikely to precipitate an appeal to force, were to be expected.

For my own part, I determined to seek information at the fountain head, and I accordingly sought and obtained an audience of the Sultan this morning.

His Majesty received me with his usual affability, and I had scarcely stated the object of my visit, when he assured me that the partial change of Ministry, which he had ordered, was exclusively attributable to personal causes. Without entering into particulars, he told me that some of his Ministers had occasioned so much vexation by their personal jealousies that in self-defence he had been obliged to remove them. His idea, under this supposed necessity, was to replace the late Grand Vizier, Mustapha Pasha, by the Commander of the guard, Mehemet Rushdi Pasha, and Reshid Pasha by the late Governor of Smyrna, Aali Pasha.

I took the liberty of submitting to His Majesty whether the critical circumstances in which his Empire was now unfortunately placed, did not impose upon him the duty of making all secondary considerations give way to the principal point; and whether the stability of his administration, and the consequent respect inspired by it, were not objects of greater consequence than obtaining relief from the annoyance of those personal differences which his Imperial authority was fully able, if properly exerted, to control, and perhaps even to remove altogether.

These and other observations, pressed upon His Majesty's attention with becoming respect, failed not, I am happy to say, in producing the desired effect. The two Pashas, Mustapha and Reshid, are restored to their former posts; and the Sultan, by my advice, has urged upon them so strongly the paramount duty of devoting themselves exclusively to the public interests in this time of crisis that the causes of the late untoward changes are, I trust, not likely to be repeated for the present.

I was the more desirous of bringing the Sultan to this resolution because I found that he intended to name Aali Pasha to the direction of the Foreign Office, and I had reason to know that the appointment of that distinguished individual so soon after the late occurrences at Smyrna would give offence, most unseasonably, to the Court of Austria.

I cannot conceal from myself that a certain degree of inconvenience is attached to a reinstatement, following so immediately upon a dismissal, of such high functionaries. But I am convinced that the balance of evil was on the side of perseverance in an untimely and injudicious change, and that the sense of its being necessary to return so promptly to the preceding state of things is well calculated to discourage a repetition of such hazardous experiments.



I am happy to add that, although the coincidence of these occurrences with the festival of Bairam has occasioned a delay in the transaction of public business, my audience afforded me an opportunity of urging the Sultan to persevere for the present in a course of moderate counsels, notwithstanding the aggressions of Russia, and of receiving the most satisfactory assurances in that respect from His Majesty's own lips. Since my return to Therapia I have learnt that orders have been given to submit the protest, which is already drawn up, to the deliberations of the Council, and to prepare a proclamation directed to the maintenance of public tranquillity, by explaining fully the existing differences between Turkey and Russia, as well as the friendly relations subsisting generally between the Porte and the leading Powers of Christendom. It may seem strange that the second part of this explanation should be necessary; but it appears that the presence of the British and French squadrons in the Dardanelles is considered by some ignorant Turks as rather having reference to their own eventual interests than to the protection of Turkey in case of further aggression from Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 113.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 145.)

*Therapia, July* 9, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Austrian "suggestion," adopted, as I mentioned before, by the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, has been laid before the Sultan, and after an unexplained delay of several days, returned to Reshid Pasha with His Majesty's sanction. No subsequent communication has, however, been made to me, or, as far as I know, to my colleagues on the subject, and the idea of a fusion of the two ultimatums must now be either abandoned, as offering no prospect of success, or united with the execution of what is suggested in your Lordship's instruction No. 81 of this year. The latter will probably be found the preferable course, and, at the request of Reshid Pasha, I have endeavoured to adapt to that plan the draft of a protest which His Highness had originally prepared for the case, which has since occurred, of the occupation of the Principalities by a Russian army.

The Ministerial incidents of the last two days have necessarily postponed the completion of that proceeding, but I trust that, the Cabinet being now restored to its former construction, there will be no longer any delay which can by possibility be avoided. The "suggestion," supposing it to have been practicable, which may well be doubted, arrived here too late to prevent the occupation of the Principalities, though M. Bruck, on no alleged grounds, appears to think that the Porte's immediate consent to it might have enabled him to procure a suspension of the Emperor's order from the authorities at Odessa. Unfortunately, it is but too evident that the guarantee demanded by Russia is precisely that which the Porte has refused to grant with the approval of all Europe except Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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## No. 114.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 146.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 9, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information, extracts from the Consular despatches, reporting the movements of troops towards the northern frontier, the condition of the men, and the great embarrassments arising out of the want of sufficient funds.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 114.

*Consul Longworth to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Monastir, June 23, 1853.*

FIVE months' arrears of pay are owing to the whole army, officers and men, which creates much murmuring and discontent. The military chests are apparently empty; and Omer Pasha was compelled to have recourse to the merchants of this place for so small a loan as 60,000 piastres. There was some talk of raising a million by anticipation, on the Temetuat or property tax in this and the adjoining districts; but no steps that I am aware of, have yet been taken for that purpose. It is very questionable indeed if such a sum could be raised at present, as the resources of the people are said to be completely exhausted, and the jails overflow with insolvent tax-payers. 3,000 out of the 7,000 irregulars that were to have been raised in Albania refuse to march unless they are paid three months' hire in advance, and an allowance of 80 instead of 50 piastres a month; among these are 1000 Miridit or Christian Albanians, though in consideration of their privileges and exemption from Haratsh they are bound to serve gratuitously.

Information has within the last few days been received from Osman Pasha of Scutari, that the Montenegrins have again begun to harass and plunder their neighbours, and seem to be preparing for an incursion on a formidable scale, into the Turkish territory; he has accordingly sent large reinforcements of irregulars to Spuez. There is at this moment, I believe, a Russian Consular Agent resident at Cettigne.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 114.

*Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Turnova, June 28, 1853.*

DURING the last few days two regiments of cavalry, five battalions of infantry, and twenty field-pieces have passed through this town, *en route* to Shumla, in all about 5000 men, under Hakim Pasha and Shukur Pasha. These troops form a portion of the force of 15,000 men which his Excellency Omer Pasha had informed me were marching on Shumla from Monastir and that neighbourhood.

As I am informed, last week there were only in Shumla two regiments of cavalry and two battalions of infantry. The 5,000 men who had just passed through Turnova will reach Shumla on the 29th or 30th instant, and the remaining 10,000 men and thirty guns, if they arrive as quickly as expected by Omer Pasha, should be in Shumla by about the 10th of next month.

In the meanwhile it was reported here by an officer arrived from Shumla, that 8000 infantry were expected to arrive in that place from Constantinople through Varna



The troops that have hitherto passed through Turnova, although having performed a long and harassing march, appeared to me to be in effective condition and well appointed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. ST. JOHN NEALE.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 114.

*The Hon. Henry Stanley to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Varna, July 6, 1853.*

SINCE the date of my last despatch, June 14, 1,500 troops arrived from Adrianople for Varna. Up to to-day 23,000 men have arrived here by steamers from Constantinople to join the corps at Shumla or Silistria. In reckoning these troops I have set down the lowest figure when accounts varied.

The batteries have been repaired, the embrasures lined with fascines, and the exterior covered with fresh turf; a battery of five heavy guns is being erected at Galata Burnu, the point forming the south side of the bay of Varna.

There is no news of the Russians having yet moved across the Pruth, although their passage was expected on the 4th or 5th instant.

The feeling not only of the population but also of the high officers and of the Pasha is in favour of war, and it would appear here that if these preparations go on much longer throughout the Bulgarian frontier, the maintenance of peace will be much more difficult.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. STANLEY.

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## No. 115.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 220.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 21, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO yesterday communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that the French project of note for settling the differences between Russia and Turkey had been transmitted to Baron Bruck at Constantinople, with instructions to recommend its immediate adoption by the Porte, if the Austrian project then under consideration had not yet been agreed to; but Count Buol added if the latter project should in the meanwhile have been approved by the Turkish Government, and should arrive at Vienna, it was his intention, for the purpose of saving time, to send it immediately to St. Petersburgh.

I told Count Colloredo that the course which Count Buol proposed to adopt appeared to be judicious, and I again impressed upon him the urgent necessity of avoiding delay.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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## No. 116.

*Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 55. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 18, 1853.*

SINCE the departure of the messenger, I find I have omitted to mention that M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed to me, that many months ago, in writing to Lord John Russell, he predicted the mischievous course pursued by the Emperor Nicholas, feeling confident that the armaments at Sevastopol and in Bessarabia could not but signify injurious designs.

I told his Excellency I must do him the justice to say, that when, in the early part of the year I had occasion to observe to him that Her Majesty's Government placed reliance on the assurances of the Emperor of Russia, he showed a disinclination to concur.

It may perhaps be said that the armaments in question were as much at variance with the language of peace, as was the Emperor's fixed idea of the impending fall of Turkey with his expressed wish for her perpetuity; that, though Russia talked as if she wished the Porte's preservation, she acted as if she desired its downfall; and that the said fixed idea may have had some sort of connection both with the alleged Greek prophecy that the present year would see St. Sophia restored to Christianity, and with the fact that the Prince of Montenegro attacked the Turks immediately on his return from St. Petersburgh.

It may be as well to mention, that having expressed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the opinion that a vital point at present was the adherence of Austria, his Excellency not only agreed with me, but seemed to trust in such support.

When M. Drouyn de Lhuys maintained that the present crisis would not have arisen had England agreed at the outset to a bolder line of conduct, it was of course easy to retort, that neither the crisis nor the question would have arisen had not France made her untoward move about the holy places; but, as your Lordship is aware, no one condemns that step more than M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and the subject therefore appeared to me as beside the matter under consideration.

His Excellency's reason for the above-mentioned opinion seemed to be, that the early junction of the two fleets would have made it impossible for the Emperor Nicholas not to feel convinced from the first that England and France were determined to act in concert, and consequently that, unless bent on war at any price, His Majesty would not have gone as far as he has.

The argument of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that the stronger position of the Sea of Marmora would have rendered it easier for England and France to make concessions to Russia than does the weaker one of Besika Bay, may perhaps find its answer in the reflection that the Power most called on to concede is Russia, and that the stronger we leave her position for a time, the easier is it for her to concede.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. JERNINGHAM.

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No. 117.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 361.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 15, 1853.

IF the late reckless policy of the Russian Cabinet has been of a nature to cause the apprehension of the whole of Europe, it has served not less effectually to cause a perturbation here which will probably require a longer time to calm down.

What the sums are which have been expended in naval and military preparations, and in those practices which on extraordinary occasions are so extensively employed by Russian agents, will probably never be known to the public, but their effect is already shown by the state of the Russian Treasury. Already before one of the acts of hostility have taken place, of which so many would follow the completion of Prince Menchikoff's plans, the exigencies of the State have become such that there is serious question of having recourse to those deposits of gold in the St. Petersburgh fortress which form the basis of the national credit.

As yet the influence of Baron Stieglitz and some other prudent counsellors has been sufficient to prevent these means being resorted to, but the Finance Minister is said to be intent upon making use of what has been considered an almost sacred deposit, and should any increase of public difficulties occur it is easy to foretell that his ideas will prevail.

A slight circumstance which has come to my knowledge proves the straits



of the Imperial Treasury. The corps of Grenadiers, some 45,000 strong, has been brought here for the manœuvres, and the officers find themselves absolutely unable to live as they are expected to do. Their miserable pay enables them to exist when they are in country quarters; they are penniless when they are brought to St. Petersburgh, and are compelled to equip themselves in a manner worthy to bear the inspection of the Emperor.

To render the condition of this unfortunate class the more deplorable the cholera has been particularly fatal to the officers, and for these reasons a gratuity of three months' pay has been promised them. I am willing to hope they will obtain this relief, but it has not yet arrived, the sum required being of an amount which the Finance Minister cannot conveniently dispose of.

This fact, and it is a fact, will enable your Lordship to judge of the probability of the unfortunate inhabitants of the Principalities being repaid the cost of these herds of Russians and Cossacks who have been quartered upon them with a view to prosecuting the cause of the Greek Orthodox faith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Since writing my despatch I have been told that an ineffectual appeal for a loan of 60,000,000 or 70,000,000 silver roubles was made three weeks ago to the Saint Synod by the Government.

The Synod, who are supposed to have made a bad investment by the advances which they made to the Government during the Hungarian campaign, are stated to have replied that the Emperor was master of them and of the funds confided to their care, but that these funds had a distinct and a pious destination.

In this submissive refusal the Emperor, as I hear, at once acquiesced.

G. H. S.

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No. 118.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 363.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 15, 1853.

A VERY important despatch has been, as I understand, received by Baron Lehzeltern.

If I am rightly informed, Count Buol represents, if not with asperity at all events forcibly, that the Austrian Cabinet have been placed in a position of considerable embarrassment by the Russian Government, which, after asking for the good offices of Austria in these unfortunate differences between the Emperor and the Sultan, has during the process of negotiation altered the position of the contending parties by the publication of a manifesto calculated to influence the quarrel.

Count Buol in his despatch further alludes to the causes of complaint which are put forth by the Russian Cabinet against Turkey, and observes that the information of which he is in possession is far from corroborating the statements made as to the gross cases of persecution of Christians which have been spoken of.

Strange indeed would it have been if any such confirmatory evidence could have been obtained, these accusations, upon the very face of them, having been trumped up to serve the purposes of the moment, and to offer an excuse for an unparalleled act of outrage.

I am informed that the Russian Government, who were unreasonable enough to have been already dissatisfied with Baron de Bruck for not having settled the dispute according to their wishes within a few days after his arrival in Pera, are highly displeased with this last despatch of Count Buol's, which has been already communicated by Baron Lehzeltern to the Chancellor.

According to a report which has reached me, Baron de Bruck is intent upon inducing the Porte to sign a note similar to that mentioned in my despatch No. 355, as having been desired by General Castelbajac.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 119.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 364.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 15, 1853.*

A CONVERSATION which I had this morning with the Chancellor was more satisfactory than any which I have held for some time with his Excellency.

Count Nesselrode professed himself much gratified by the assurances which I gave him of the conciliatory disposition by which Her Majesty's Government are still animated, in despite of all that has of late occurred, and expressed his confidence that under this state of things a disturbance of the European peace was not to be feared.

His expression was that he now felt very sanguine as to the future, since, as Her Majesty's Government were intent upon finding some solution of the present difficulty which would be acceptable to the Emperor, he was convinced that these means of escape from danger would be discovered.

His Excellency spoke of various plans which had been devised, and added (I thought incautiously) that of course Russia would select that which pleased her the best; he himself leaned to the plan proposed by M. de Bourqueney; this however was, I observed, little thought of at Paris or in London, indeed, I added, it was now understood that the idea had originated not with M. de Bourqueney but with Baron Meyendorff.

Count Nesselrode then reverted to my own suggestion, and again expressed the wish that this plan should reach St. Petersburgh as soon as possible through the Austrian Cabinet.

I will not conceal from your Lordship that this anxiety impresses me with the belief that the terms which I had devised are of a nature too favourable for Russia, though at the same time I do not hesitate to express my conviction of its being for the general interests of Europe that the Emperor should be well satisfied with the arrangement which may be definitively decided upon.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 120.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 289. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July 19, 1853.*

I HAD an interview this morning with Baron Manteuffel, and we had some general conversation on the news which had arrived here since we last met connected with the affairs of the East. His Excellency told me that he had learnt with satisfaction that several projects of arrangement had been sent to St. Petersburgh, and that he trusted some one of them would be found acceptable; that he himself had thought at one time of preparing one, but that he had afterwards dropped the idea. I then observed that I trusted there would be found at St. Petersburgh a disposition to listen to reason, and that we might confidently look to a pacific solution of the question. He believed this would be the case; but he added, that he had received intelligence of considerable reinforcements having marched into the Principalities; that the army of occupation already amounted to 50,000 men; and that he also heard of the advance of further Russian forces towards the Turkish frontier. I told his Excellency that all this proved more and more the necessity of a close union amongst those



who were opposed to the encroaching policy of Russia, and that I hoped he would write to St. Petersburgh in a stronger sense than he had hitherto done; that Austria had changed her language, and had done so from seeing the little attention that had been bestowed by the Emperor and his Cabinet to various suggestions that had been sent in what might be called a mild and supplicating tone; that it was now more essential than ever that we should unite, and bring our moral weight to bear together on the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh; that we were all agreed as to the injustice of the proceedings of Russia in this question; and that it was only by showing her that there was no second opinion in the matter among the great Powers that we could insure success and a continuation of the blessings of peace.

Baron Manteuffel assured me that it was his intention to write in this sense to St. Petersburgh; but I regret to say that the King has already left Berlin; and his Excellency intends to return again to-day to the country, where he purposes remaining a week, so that it is improbable any fresh instructions of importance on Eastern affairs will issue from the Prussian Foreign Office for some days to come.

I availed myself of the opportunity of this conversation to read to Baron Manteuffel some passages in your Lordship's late despatches to Lord Westmorland Nos. 189, 197, and 199, and drew his Excellency's particular attention to the various observations which your Lordship had made to Count Colloredo on the communication by that Minister of some despatches from Count Buol. He seemed quite to appreciate your Lordship's reasoning as to the value of the Treaty of 1841; the good advice Her Majesty's Ambassador had given to the Porte not to declare war against Russia, in retaliation for her unjustifiable conduct in occupying the Principalities; as well as the justice of your remarks as to the Emperor of Russia's apparent desire to give himself the benefit of a state of peace for preparing further armaments.

I read to him the observations which your Lordship addressed to Count Colloredo, as reported in your No. 197, to the Earl of Westmorland, relating to the question of a simultaneous evacuation of the Principalities and departure of the combined fleets from Besika Bay. He appeared struck with the truth of your Lordship's arguments, and I trust they made an impression on him.

I then drew Baron Manteuffel's special attention to the last part of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Westmorland No. 199, where you express the expectation that if the Emperor of Russia rejected the proposals for arrangement which had been made to him, and persisted in retaining forcible possession of territory belonging to Turkey, the Austrian Government would not remain neutral, but come to the aid of Turkey; and asked him what Prussia would do in such a case? His Excellency's reply was, that the occupation of the Principalities was not of that immediate importance to Prussia which it was to Austria; that certainly neutrality was her policy, but that he could inform me confidentially that the Prussian Government was quietly preparing for eventualities; but he would not say anything which approached to a belief that Prussia would make any new declaration on the subject, or alter that independent policy which she had laid down for herself in the present crisis.

It is evident that his Excellency finds himself in an extremely difficult position at the present moment, between his desire to break through the ascendant power which Russia exercises amongst the Court Party, and his own wish to take an independent, perhaps an opposite, course.

He has been thwarted in the hope which was entertained last week of destroying the baneful influence of a powerful reactionary newspaper, which he would have suppressed if he had been allowed to follow his own wishes on the subject; his position is weakened, and he will not, I fear, be disposed to propose any measures with regard to foreign policy which are likely to bring him at the present moment in collision with the feelings of the Court Party. In a little time the position may again change, but in the meanwhile it is one of extreme weakness, and gives no immediate hope of the adoption of any decided measures.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 121.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 292. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July 19, 1853.*

THE French Minister mentioned to me a few days ago, that he had been instructed to discover whether there was any truth in a rumour that the Prussian Government had entered into an engagement with Russia to act with her in the event of hostilities resulting from the present complications in the East, and he asked me my impressions on the subject. I replied that I believed the Prussian Government were free to act as they pleased; that I had myself made inquiries of the nature he alluded to of Baron Manteuffel, and that his answers were satisfactory.

The Marquis de Moustier has since informed me that having questioned the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Excellency had clearly denied the existence of any engagement of the kind with Russia. The French Minister appeared to consider the answer as conclusive, and deserving to be placed on record.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 122.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 536.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 21, 1853.*

I HAVE placed in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' hands the copy, transmitted to me for that purpose, of your Lordship's despatch No. 134 to Sir Hamilton Seymour. His Excellency, in requesting me to thank your Lordship for this communication, expressed his satisfaction at the manner in which it replied to the Russian circular of the 2nd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 123.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 295.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 22, 1853.*

A FEW days ago Count Walewski informed me that his Government were desirous to concert with Her Majesty's Government as to the measures to be taken, and the instructions that should be sent to the French and English Ambassadors at Constantinople in the event—

1. Of Russia rejecting all measures of conciliation.
2. Of the occupation of the Principalities being prolonged; and
3. Of the presence of the combined fleets being necessary at Constantinople in consequence of serious events.

I told Count Walewski that I could give him no decisive answer without consulting the Cabinet; but I begged to remark that the second contingency appeared to be unnecessary as being included in the first, for the Emperor of Russia, if he refused all offers of conciliation, would certainly continue to occupy the Principalities, and, on the other hand, he must immediately evacuate them if his differences with Turkey were arranged.

I asked Count Walewski what were the "serious events" to which the third hypothesis alluded; and his Excellency said that the despatch of M. Drouyn de



Lhuys was not very clear on that point, but that he understood them to refer not to any attack on the part of Russia, but to internal commotions.

I have since informed Count Walewski that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government it would be unjust towards the Representatives of England and France at Constantinople to throw upon them the responsibility of acting upon hypothetical instructions, and that as much would depend upon the nature of the terms proposed to Russia, and the reasons assigned by her for rejecting them, and that as authentic information upon the subject could only be received at London and Paris, while vague rumours would only reach the Ambassadors, it would be highly imprudent for the Governments of England and France not to keep entirely in their own hands the decision of a question upon which the peace of Europe might depend, particularly as the Ambassadors had ample power under their instructions to protect the Porte against any hostile attack that might be attempted by Russia in the future to effect a peaceful arrangement by negotiation.

In the meanwhile, however, I said that Her Majesty's Government would take into their serious consideration, and would desire to concert with the French Government as to the measures which should be adopted if all the different projects for settling the question should prove unsuccessful, but that at present it appeared to them unnecessary to contemplate the case of suspending the Treaty of 1841, in order that the naval forces of England and France might be employed in the internal affairs of Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 124.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 298.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 22, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency was instructed confidentially to submit to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the Project of Convention which Her Majesty's Government thought might be agreed to by Russia and the Porte for settling the differences between the two countries, and it was not until I heard from your Excellency that this project was fully approved by the French Government, that it was sent to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and to Her Majesty's Ministers at St. Petersburgh and Vienna.

It is right, however, that an official record of this communication should exist, and I accordingly inclose a copy of the project, which you will give to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and repeat to him the assurance that it is not proposed by Her Majesty's Government in rivalry with any other projects that may be under consideration, and that it is quite immaterial to Her Majesty's Government which plan of arrangement is ultimately selected, provided that the principle for which, in conjunction with the Government of France, they have been contending is maintained, and that in offering to the Emperor of Russia terms which without loss of dignity he may accept, no concessions shall be made that would endanger the independence of Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 125.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 129.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 22, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the instructions which you gave to M. Pisani, and of which copies are inclosed in your despatch No. 139 of the 7th instant, for representations to be made to the Porte with the view of securing better treatment for the Sultan's Christian subjects.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 126.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 130.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 22, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the advice which you gave to the Sultan at the interview which you had with his Highness, of which a report is contained in your despatch No. 144 of the 9th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 127.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 149.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 22, 1853.*

I HAVE communicated to Baron Brunnow the substance of my despatch No. 136 of the 19th instant to you, and informed him that I had not alluded in it to the evacuation of the Principalities as a necessary and immediate consequence of an arrangement of differences between Russia and the Porte, because I thought it would be little less than an insult to the Russian Government to suppose, after the public assurances that had been given on the subject, that any portion of the Turkish territory would be occupied by Russian forces for a day longer than was necessary for their evacuation when the question at issue between the two Governments was amicably settled.

Baron Brunnow expressed his entire concurrence in this view, and said he was sure that the motive of Her Majesty's Government for not referring to the Principalities would be duly appreciated at St. Petersburgh, but that neither Her Majesty's Government nor the Porte need have any apprehension on the subject; he added also that the Turkish Government could not be expected to sign any Convention nor to agree to any project of arrangement unless they previously received beforehand a guarantee in the form that would be acceptable to them for the evacuation of the Principalities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 128.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, July 22.)*

M. le Ba n, *St. Pétersbourg, le 4/5 Juillet, 1853.*

DANS le No. 186 de ses dépêches votre Excellence a, entre autres, fait mention de l'arrière pensée que l'on nous attribue de vouloir entraver la navigation du Danube.

Le vif intérêt que le commerce attache au maintien des communications avec les Principautés par ce fleuve doit nous engager à ne pas laisser s'accréditer une pareille imputation. Je crois devoir en conséquence vous inviter, M. le Baron, à faire parvenir au Gouvernement et au commerce Anglais l'assurance formelle que l'entrée de nos troupes dans les Principautés n'ayant nullement le caractère d'un état de guerre, la sûreté et la liberté de la navigation du Danube, loin d'avoir à redouter de notre part des entraves préjudiciables aux transactions commerciales, ne cesseront de faire l'objet de la sollicitude particulière du Gouvernement Impérial. Rien ne saurait d'ailleurs mieux attester les intentions de l'Empereur à cet égard que les ordres transmis au Prince Gortchakoff afin que même* les bâtiments Turcs puissent naviguer librement sur le Danube, aussi longtemps que la crise actuelle n'aura pas dégénéré en une guerre ouverte.

A cette occasion je tiens aussi à vous annoncer, M. le Baron, pour votre information personnelle, que le Prince Gortchakoff va recevoir la recommandation d'aviser aux précautions nécessaires, afin de prévenir de la part des sujets et protégés étrangers dans les Principautés des plaintes du genre de celles qui, lors de la dernière occupation de ces Provinces par nos troupes, avaient donné lieu à des discussions entre nous et le Gouvernement Britannique.

Recevez, &c.
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

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No. 129.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 365. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 16, 1853.*

A WANT of time prevented my offering you the details of the communication to which I alluded in my despatch No. 357 of the 13th instant; and I the more regretted my inability to write to your Lordship at length, as these details possess considerable interest.

I will only premise that they formed the substance of a conversation which had been held by one of the senior employés of the Foreign Office with a person in whom I have full confidence, who has had the kindness to bring this conversation to my knowledge, upon condition that his name shall not appear.

"Our position," said the Russian employé, "is one of extreme difficulty and embarrassment. We are perfectly aware of it, and we are in a hurry to extricate ourselves, so that we can only do so in a creditable manner.

"In general, every step taken in our foreign policy is taken advisedly and after due deliberation. On this occasion the Emperor has been betrayed—that is the word—by the rashness of the Sclavonian party, by Prince Menchikoff, and M. de Séniavine, who were powerfully supported by the Grand Duke Constantine.

"These persons actuated, the two first by their fanatical Russian feelings, the latter still more even by his dislike to his eldest brother and the peaceable policy which he always advocates, circumvented the Emperor, and persuaded him that by good management and sudden movements an advantage could be derived for the Greek Church, which would produce a great effect in Russia, and which was attainable without risk or difficulty.

"The result has been what you see. The preparations for this undertaking have exhausted the Treasury. We have spent about thirty millions of

* In copies sent abroad, the word "même" is to be omitted, at Baron Brunnow's request.

silver roubles since the 1st of January upon our armaments, and we find that we have aroused the jealousy of the whole of Europe. This comes of neglecting the advice of the Chancellor, and of the Russian party getting a temporary ascendancy.

"So the affair now stands. If pressed, the Emperor will fight his way through his difficulties as he can, for he will not bear disgrace; but you may be sure that if honourable means of retreat can be found, His Majesty will gladly avail himself of them."

The person in question proceeded to speak of Prince Menchikoff, and observed that it might be taken as certain that he went to Constantinople with the firm determination of what he termed "de brouiller les affaires."

"Did you hear," he continued, "of a speech which the Prince made in the hearing of several persons, as he was upon the point of embarking at Odessa?—'J'ai bien l'intention,' he said, speaking of the Turks, 'de les mener rondement; je les connais ces gens là, et quand à leur miserable Sultan je me propose bien avant de le quitter de lui faire avaler du pore.'"

I request your Lordship's attention to the picture thus offered of Russian manners in the middle of the nineteenth century.

The policy of the Emperor's whole life is defeated, and the peace of Europe placed in danger, by the intrigues of a couple of fanatics, assisted by the wild ambition and perverse disposition of a youthful Prince; while one of these conspirators, at the very moment of undertaking the most important office with which the confidence of his master could invest him, cannot repress a ribald joke, which would have been unbecoming in his great grandfather, the fortunate pastrycook's boy.

The picture would have been incomplete if this aged jester had not been the person who, immediately afterwards, came forward as the calumniator of one of the most eminent of European diplomatists, by whose firmness his acts had been foiled, and if, in process of time, his own vile intrigues had not been brought (though indirectly) to the knowledge of the English Mission by a confidential servant of the Imperial Foreign Office, in general so distinguished by its mysterious discretion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 130.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July 25.*)

(No. 541.)
My Lord, *Paris, July 24, 1853.*

I HAVE placed in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' hands, as desired by your Lordship's despatch No. 298, an official copy of the Project of Convention which Her Majesty's Government has transmitted to St. Petersburgh and the Porte, in the hope that those two Powers will see in it an honourable means of terminating their present differences.

As this latter step was not taken without previous confidential communication with the French Government, it would be needless for me to add more, did I not think it desirable that some official record should exist, showing that that communication had taken place.

I have therefore the honour to state, that I received the Project in a confidential form on the 7th instant, and communicated it the same day to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, expressing the hope that it would have the approval and support of the French Government.

As soon as M. Drouyn de Lhuys could take the Emperor's orders, he informed me that neither His Majesty nor his Government had any objection to the Convention, but would recommend its adoption both at St. Petersburgh and Constantinople, and anywhere else where your Lordship might send it; but, M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, I was aware that other projects had been brought forward with the desire of effecting a reconciliation between Russia and the Porte, and if either of these projects should be deemed a more satisfactory conclusion of the question by the parties more immediately interested in its



solution, he could not bind himself to advise the adoption of the English Project of Convention in preference.

I replied, on my part, that your Lordship had no wish that he should do so. All that Her Majesty's Government desired, was a speedy termination of the present state of affairs in the East, and they conceived such a termination was to be found in the Convention I had laid before him. But if any other mode of settling them, honourable to the Porte and satisfactory to Russia, was discovered, Her Majesty's Government would be very sorry that their Project should stand in the way of it. They had not put that Project forward in any spirit of rivalry, and would sincerely rejoice if either France or Austria imagined a plan more worthy of acceptance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 131.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July 25.*)

(No. 295.)
My Lord, *Berlin, July 22, 1853.*

I CALLED this morning on M. de le Coq, in the absence of Baron Manteuffel, and he informed me that a further instruction had been addressed to the Prussian Minister at Constantinople. He read me this despatch, the main object of which is to recommend the adoption of the "projet-Bourqueney," and to urge Baron Wildenbruch to use all his influence with the Porte to accept any reasonable propositions that are made for the termination of the negotiations now pending in the Turkish capital.

When M. de le Coq had finished reading this paper, I observed that it contained nothing new, that it showed that no material change had perhaps come over the independent policy of the Prussian Government in this question; but I said the tone of the instructions was designed to engage the Porte to sign a note which she had already refused to do, and to adopt an arrangement less calculated than others which had been brought forward to maintain the dignity and independence of Turkey.

I then told M. de le Coq that a Project of Convention had been sent to St. Petersburgh by Her Majesty's Government for the settlement of the question, but that we did not yet know whether it had been favourably received or not, and I gave him this paper to read. After he had perused it, he observed that it appeared to him to contain everything that Russia could require, and that he should write to Count Henckel at St. Petersburgh by this evening's packet to support the project, and to add the weight of Prussia in recommending its adoption.

I told him he would do well to write in this sense, but that we were disappointed at the falling off that had occurred in the policy of Prussia, and had expected that she would have persevered in viewing the Eastern question in the manner she had done at the commencement. To this M. de le Coq replied, that it was useless for the Prussian Government to press matters in a stronger tone at St. Petersburgh, that her remonstrances would not be listened to, and would not advance the objects we had in view; but that he could assure me that there was no change in her sentiments and desire to do everything in her power to uphold the dignity and integrity of the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 132.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 278.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July 20, 1853.*

I READ to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 199; and he observed with much satisfaction your Lordship's approval of his conduct in the advice he had offered to the Russian Cabinet, and generally of his despatch to Baron Lebzeltern of the 6th instant, which had been communicated to you by Count Colloredo.

Count Buol read to me the reports he had received from Count Colloredo of his interviews with your Lordship, which are in conformity with your despatches Nos. 197 and 198.

I drew Count Buol's especial attention to the last paragraph in the despatch No. 199, in which your Lordship expresses the hope that, in the unfortunate event of the Emperor of Russia's rejecting the proposals for arrangement that might be made to him, the Austrian Government would not remain neutral, but would come to the aid of the Sultan in cooperation with England and France.

Count Buol observed that he had not changed the opinions he had expressed to me, and which I fully reported to your Lordship in my despatches Nos. 241 and 251, and which met with your Lordship's approbation, and that he still considered himself as entirely united with your policy with respect to the Turkish Empire. He would employ every means in his power to maintain its independence and integrity; he would take no engagement with Russia not to oppose her by arms; and he would take none for engaging in hostilities on either side; but if he should be called upon to carry out an armed intervention on the frontier, it would be in support of the authority and independence of the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 133.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 281.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July 20, 1853.*

M. DE BOURQUENEY received last night despatches from the French Ambassador at Constantinople, dated the 10th instant. M. de la Cour gives an account of the Ministerial crisis which took place on the 7th instant, which was brought about by the efforts of Mehemet Ali, to induce the Sultan to adopt a more energetic policy towards Russia, and to resent the occupation of the Principalities.

M. de la Cour represents the Sultan as having been greatly irritated by that measure, and consequently inclined to adopt the suggestions of a more warlike policy. The Sultan sent to the Grand Vizier and to Reshid Pasha, to announce to them that he was under the necessity of replacing them by Mehemet Ali and Ali Pasha, the late Governor of Smyrna.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, under these circumstances, waited upon the Sultan, and brought before him the extreme danger to which he would expose his empire, and succeeded in persuading him to reconsider his decisions.

The two Ministers were reinstated, with some engagement that they should not again be exposed to similar treatment. M. de la Cour highly praises the conduct of Lord Stratford; and Baron Bruck, in a letter to Count Buol, does the same.

M. de la Cour does not consider the position of affairs in Constantinople as satisfactory; he thinks the warlike feeling of the Turks has been roused, and may lead to excesses.



Baron Bruck appears to be less alarmed, and to hope that the consideration of the projects of arrangement brought forward by the four Representatives may be resumed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 134.

*Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 26.)*

(No. 58.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 25, 1853.*

THE accompanying article from to-day's "Constitutionnel," regarding the recent conversation in the House of Commons between Mr. Layard and Lord John Russell on Turkish affairs, may possibly be found of interest.

As your Lordship will perceive, the tone of this article is, that Russia is trying to gain time, and that England and France ought to obviate such policy by bolder action.

In a previous despatch I ventured to characterize the last Russian circular as showing a disinclination for war as well as truth. I would now take the liberty of adding, that although the Emperor Nicholas may be averse to war, he may also be bent on going on as far as he can without war, and consequently on remaining in the Principalities as long as possible, and even upon eventually occupying Bulgaria, should circumstances enable him to allege the excuse either of a Mahomedan outbreak against Greek orthodoxy, or of a Greek outbreak again Mahomedan sovereignty.

I would further venture to suggest the possibility that the ultimatum of Russian views on Turkey may be,—Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria, for Russia, Bosnia and Servia for Austria, and the remainder for the Grand Duke Constantine.

Russia could hardly like that even a Russian successor to the Sultan should be more than a second or third rate Power, a sort of neutral janitor of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; whilst she cannot but feel that England and France would never consent to her possession of those straits, and also that no Power could hold them without such consent.

But the Principalities and Bulgaria would give Russia an immense extent of both banks of the Danube, a strong mountain frontier, and an additional population of six millions.

It may perhaps be said that the Turkish question presents an incompatibility between peace and civilization, since, even should the present crisis end pacifically, there would remain, not only undiminished but increased, the perilous juxtaposition of Mahomedan decay and Christian advancement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. JERNINGHAM.

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No. 135.

*Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 26.)*

(No. 60.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 25, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that he heard yesterday from Vienna by telegraph, and has forwarded the information to Count Walewski in the same manner, that, at a conference between Count Buol and the Representatives of England, France, and Prussia, it had been determined to support what M. Drouyn de Lhuys called his "harlequin" proposition for settling the Turkish question, and that it was to be recommended by Austria simultaneously at Constantinople and St. Petersburgh, with the understanding that the Porte should send it to St. Petersburgh by an Ambassador, upon being assured both of its acceptance and of the evacuation of the Principalities.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed, that although he was still far from sanguine about an arrangement, what had taken place at Vienna was of value both from Austria's having presided at the conference, and from Prussia's having joined in it; the former circumstance appearing to him the more important, because it might, in case of need, be brought to bear upon the future.

His Excellency added, that he had no special predilection for his own proposition over that of Her Majesty's Government, that he was most in favour of the one which could be soonest accepted, and that he hoped your Lordship would not object to give instructions in that sense at St. Petersburgh and Constantinople.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys presumed that the conference at Vienna had proceeded from the Emperor of Russia's expressed intention of consulting Austria upon the French proposal.

His Excellency signified the readiness of the French Government to join with that of Her Majesty in more vigorous measures, should it appear, as he was disposed to apprehend, that Russia was only trying to gain time.

I observed that the recent speech of Lord John Russell, in reply to Mr. Layard, seemed to show both that the patience of Her Majesty's Government was not inexhaustible, and that it would not be succeeded by weakness, to which his Excellency fully agreed, adding general praise of the speech in question.

Having inquired of M. Drouyn de Lhuys what was the present tone of M. Kisseleff, he replied that it was of confidence in a pacific settlement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. JERNINGHAM.

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No. 136.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 27.)*

(No. 147.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 14, 1853. 11½ P. M.

I AVAIL myself of the Austrian post, whose departure is retarded for a few hours, to forward to your Lordship a French translation of the Porte's official protest against the military occupation by Russia of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.

This translation was sent to me by the Porte with a Turkish copy of the original document.

I am prevented by want of time from making any addition to this statement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 136.

*Protest of the Porte against the Occupation of the Principalities by Russia.*

(Traduction.)

LA Sublime Porte vient d'apprendre officiellement que l'armée Russe a passé le Pruth, et qu'elle est entrée dans la Moldavie avec l'intention d'occuper aussi la Valachie. Ce mouvement, opéré sans le concours de la Porte sur une partie integrante de son Empire, a dû lui causer autant de peine que de surprise. Il lui est pénible de voir les habitants de ces provinces loyales et tranquilles exposés à toutes les chances d'une occupation militaire. Il lui est difficile de concilier une telle agression avec les déclarations pacifiques et les assurances amicales que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a tant de fois réitérées. Il lui est encore plus difficile de ne pas s'étonner d'une opération qui porte atteinte aux principes établis dans le Traité de 1841.

La Sublime Porte, en exprimant les sentiments que cet évènement lui fait éprouver, ne peut se dispenser de mettre dans leur vrai jour quelques circonstances auxquelles les Ministres de Sa Majesté Impériale se sont efforcés en



vain de donner une conclusion telle que leur amour de la justice et de la tranquillité leur faisait désirer.

Les négociations qui furent entamées de concert avec le Prince Menchikoff, se bornaient, d'abord, aux points qui souffraient des difficultés relativement à la question des lieux saints, et les différends qui en étaient les objets principaux ne tardèrent pas à recevoir une solution propre à satisfaire toutes les parties intéressées.

Nous avons consenti, en outre, à la construction d'une église et d'un hôpital à Jérusalem pour le service spécial des Russes, en sorte que les concessions demandées en faveur des prêtres et des pélerins de la même nation n'ont pas été refusés non plus.

Après l'heureuse conclusion de la partie des négociations qui avaient trait au seul objet ostensible de la mission extraordinaire du Prince Menchikoff, cet Ambassadeur s'est empressé avec les plus vives instances de faire accepter une autre demande, dont les conséquences, si elle avait été admise par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan, n'auraient pas manqué de porter une grave atteinte aux intérêts de l'Empire et de compromettre les droits souverains qui en sont les ornements et les soutiens.

On a vu par les communications officielles que la Sublime Porte a faites en temps et lieu aux Hautes Puissances, qu'elle n'hésite point à donner des assurances suffisantes capables de dissiper les doutes qui ont amenés les discussions relatives aux droits, aux privilèges spirituels, et à d'autres immunités qui s'y rattachent, et dont les Eglises Grecques et les prêtres Grecs sont en possession de la part de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Loin de songer à retirer une partie quelconque de ces privilèges, ou même à en restreindre la jouissance consacrée par leur utilité, Sa Majesté Impériale se fait une gloire de les confirmer publiquement, et fidèle aux maximes de la justice et de la clémence, de les mettre à l'abri de tout préjudice au moyen d'un Acte solennel revêtu de son hatti-chérif, et qui a été porté à la connaissance de tous les Gouvernements amis. Tel étant le cas, ce serait une chose oiseuse que d'encombrer cette question d'un tas de détails. Il suffit ici de constater que d'un côté la demande de l'Ambassadeur Russe, nonobstant certaines modifications, soit dans les termes soit dans la forme, demeurait à la fin inadmissible à cause de ce qu'il vient d'être expliqué; tandis que de l'autre côté elle devenait sans objet réel par suite des garanties solennelles données spontanément par le Souverain lui-même à la face du monde entier. Ces faits incontestables suffisent pour dégager la Sublime Porte de toute obligation de s'excuser davantage au sujet des privilèges religieux. Il est d'une évidence incontestable que l'indépendance d'un Etat Souverain est nulle, si parmi ses attributions il n'existe pas celle de refuser, sans offense, une demande que les Traités n'autorisent point et dont l'acceptation serait en même temps superflue quant à son objet ostensible et non moins humiliante que nuisible à la haute partie qui s'en excuse.

Néanmoins la Sublime Porte ne se désiste en rien de son désir amical et profondément sincère de remplir avec la plus scrupuleuse exactitude, non seulement tous ses engagements envers la Russie, mais de lui donner en outre toute nouvelle preuve de ses dispositions cordiales qui soit compatible avec les droits sacrés de sa souveraineté et avec l'honneur et les intérêts fondamentaux de son Empire.

Elle est toujours prête à réitérer les assurances promises dans la lettre en date du $\frac{1}{13}$ Juin, écrite en réponse à celle de son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode portant la date du 19 Mai v. s., et elle est encore disposée, pour peu que l'on veuille s'arrêter à un arrangement propre à satisfaire la Cour de Russie sans préjudice aux droits sacrés du Sultan, à envoyer un Ambassadeur à St. Pétersbourg pour chercher, de concert avec le Cabinet Russe, les moyens de parvenir à ce but.

Quant au passage de la lettre de son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode relative à l'invasion éventuelle du territoire Ottoman, la Sublime Porte a déjà déclaré qu'elle ne saurait l'accepter; et, puisque cette lettre, ainsi que la réponse du Ministère Ottoman ont été sur-le-champ communiquées aux Puissances signataires du Traité de 1841, il devient évidemment inutile de se répandre en détails sur une question aussi pénible.

A la suite de ces circonstances et en vertu de ces considérations, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté avait lieu d'espérer que les motifs fondés qu'il n'a cessé d'alléguer pour justifier le refus de son consentement, l'impossibilité dans

laquelle il se trouve de l'accorder, et le désir sincère qu'il a exprimé à plusieurs reprises de voir renouer les rélations cordiales des deux Hautes Parties, seraient enfin appréciés, et que la Cour de Russie reviendrait à des sentiments plus équitables à son égard. La Sublime Porte éprouve d'autant plus de douleur en se voyant déçue dans cet espoir, que les qualités éminentes de l'Empéreur de Russie, sa modération et sa justice connues, ne lui permettent pas de supposer que Sa Majesté serait capable de vouloir fonder ses demandes sur d'autres bases que celles de la raison et du bon droit, et qu'elle a tout récemment donné, soit au Sultan lui-même, soit aux Puissances Européennes, des assurances positives de son désir de respecter la dignité et de maintenir l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman.

Voilà dans quel état de choses la Sublime Porte vient de recevoir l'avis officiel que les troupes Russes ont franchi la frontière.

Si la Cour de Russie persiste à fonder la demande de consacrer par un document obligatoire envers elle les privilèges religieux dont il est question sur le Traité de Kaïnardji, il est à remarquer que la promesse contenue dans la première partie de l'Article VII de ce Traité relativement à la protection de la religion Chrétienne et de ses églises est une généralité, et l'on ne peut guères y voir le degré de force que la Russie lui attribuait, et encore moins une spécialité en faveur de la religion Grecque.

Quoiqu'il en soit, si la Sublime Porte manquait de protéger la religion et les églises Chrétiennes, c'est alors seulement qu'il faudrait lui rappeler sa promesse en citant le susdit Traité, et il n'est pas moins clair que cette nouvelle proposition ne saurait être fondée sur ce Traité, attendu que les privilèges et les immunités de la religion Grecque ont été octroyés par la Sublime Porte sans la demande ni l'intervention de qui que ce soit. C'est effet un point d'honneur pour elle de les maintenir à présent et à l'avenir, et un devoir que lui impose son système plein de sollicitude pour ses sujets.

Les firmans qui viennent d'être promulgués et qui confirment les privilèges et les immunités de toutes les religions, témoignent publiquement les fermes intentions de la Sublime Porte à cet égard, de manière que sans le moindre doute une intervention étrangère n'est pas du tout nécessaire à cet effet. Seulement, puisque la Cour de Russie a conçu, quelqu'en puisse être le motif, des soupçons par rapport à ces privilèges religieux, et que la religion Grecque est celle de l'Auguste Empereur et d'une grande partie de ses sujets, la Sublime Porte, mûe par ces considérations, comme aussi par déférence pour les rélations amicales qui existent encore entre les deux Puissances, ne recule pas devant la résolution de donner à ce sujet des assurances suffisantes. Mais si un Gouvernement contracte sur les droits et les privilèges qu'il a de son propre mouvement accordés aux églises et aux prêtres d'une nation de tant de millions d'âmes soumises à son autorité, des obligations exclusives avec un autre Gouvernement, ce serait partager son autorité avec ce Gouvernement—ce ne serait que méantir sa propre indépendance.

Les Traités conclus entre la Sublime Porte et la Cour de Russie concernant les deux Principautés n'autorisent en aucune manière l'envoi de la part de la Russie de troupes dans ces deux pays, et l'Article y rélatif qui se trouve dans le Séned de Balta Liman est subordonné au cas où des troubles internes y éclateraient ; ce qui n'est nullement le cas dans la circonstance actuelle.

Le fait est que ce procédé agressif de la part de la Russie ne saurait être en principe considéré autrement que comme une déclaration de guerre, donnant à la Sublime Porte le droit incontestable d'employer, en revanche, la force militaire. Mais la Sublime Porte est loin de vouloir pousser ses droits à l'extrême. Forte de la justice qui règle sa politique envers les Puissances, elle préfère les réserver dans l'attente du retour spontané de la Russie à une manière d'agir plus conforme à ses déclarations. C'est dans le but d'écarter tout obstacle à ce retour, qu'elle se borne pour le moment à protester contre l'agression, dont elle a bien le droit de se plaindre. Elle croit offrir par ce moyen au monde entier une nouvelle preuve de la modération du système qu'elle a adopté dès le commencement de cette affaire. Elle s'abstient de tout acte hostile ; mais elle déclare qu'elle ne consent en aucune manière à ce que l'on fasse entrer de temps en temps des troupes dans les provinces de Moldavie et de Valachie, qui sont parties intégrantes de l'Empire Ottoman, en les regardant comme une maison sans maître.

Elle proteste donc formellement et ouvertement contre cet acte, et dans la



conviction que les Puissances signataires du Traité de 1841, ne donneraient pas leur assentiment à une pareille agression, elle leur a fait un exposé des circonstances, et gardé en attendant une attitude armée pour sa défense.

Pour en venir à la conclusion, elle répète que Sa Majesté le Sultan est toujours désireux d'aller au devant de toute réclamation fondée de la Cour de Russie, ce dont il a déjà donné maintes preuves, et prêt à redresser tout grief concernant les affaires religieuses dont ses sujets Grecs pourraient encore avoir à se plaindre ; que réparation a été faite par rapport aux lieux saints ; que cette question a été résolue à la satisfaction de la Russie, et que la Sublime Porte n'hésite pas à offrir des assurances plus explicites afin de confirmer l'arrangement qui a été fait au gré de toutes les parties.

*Constantinople, 4/16 Juillet*, 1853. (S *Cheval*, 1269.)

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No. 137.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 135.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government learned with satisfaction from your Excellency's despatch No. 117 of the 24th of June, that you had concurred with your colleagues of Austria, France, and Prussia, in recommending to the Porte to act upon the suggestion of the Austrian Cabinet, and to endeavour to frame a proposal based upon the draft of note which in the last instance Reshid Pasha was prepared to address to Prince Menchikoff, and also upon the draft of note which Prince Menchikoff required the Porte to sign, in the hope that from the two a note might be compiled which Russia would be willing to accept as a satisfactory termination of her discussions with the Porte.

But Her Majesty's Government have been greatly disappointed at finding by your Excellency's despatch No. 145 of the 9th of July, that above a fortnight had then elapsed not only without any decision having been adopted, but without any explanation having been either given or sought for, of the singular and inopportune delay which had been suffered to take place, although it appears that the Sultan had actually approved of a note being prepared in conformity with the suggestions made by Austria and supported by the Representatives in their memorandum of the 28th of June.

Now it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the Porte ought to have lost no time in framing a note which it could with entire safety sign ; and if such a note had been urged upon the Emperor of Russia by Austria, there is reason to think that it would have answered the purpose, judging from the favourable reception given at St. Petersburgh to a similar proposal made by the French Government.

Your Excellency seems, however, to think that the idea of a fusion of the two ultimatums must be abandoned as offering no prospect of success, but you assign no reason for this opinion.

As, however, the attention of Europe is now directed to the negotiations carrying on in different quarters by different Powers, upon the issue of which may depend the question of peace or war, it is highly important that no doubt or misunderstanding should exist upon the manner in which the negotiations are conducted ; and Her Majesty's Government are therefore desirous to receive from your Excellency further and more precise information upon the proceedings of the Porte in this matter, respecting which, without further and detailed explanation, Her Majesty's Government are unable to form any judgment.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 138

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 136.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 28, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency's important despatch No. 132 of the 4th instant has been laid before the Queen, and has received from Her Majesty's Government the most serious attention.

Your Excellency is aware that Her Majesty's Government have approved of the course pursued by the Sultan, and recommended by your Excellency, in not exercising his unquestionable right of declaring war against Russia upon the occupation of the Principalities; and they also entirely agree with your Excellency that His Highness has acted wisely in preparing himself to repel any further aggression on the part of Russia. But it was in order to save the Sultan from the dilemma contemplated by your Excellency, of having to comply with the Russian ultimatum, or to accept an indefinite occupation of the Principalities, that Her Majesty's Government have ardently desired to effect an arrangement by negotiation.

The urgent necessity of extricating Turkey from her present position by peaceful means is now more strongly than ever impressed upon Her Majesty's Government by the numerous reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in different parts of the Empire, which your Excellency has transmitted, upon the alarming state of the country, and by your Excellency's opinion respecting the dangers which threaten the authority of the Sultan, in Bulgaria and Servia from the disaffection of the people, and in European Turkey from the absence of regular troops; while it appears that the Montenegrins are preparing to make an incursion into Turkey, and that the Shah of Persia, instigated by Russia, is collecting an army at Sultanieh, and your Excellency considers that a spirit of fanaticism, dangerous alike to the Rayahs and to the authorities, is rising in various parts of the country, and that the Greeks have taken up a position which indicates views unrestrained by principles or by treaties. But at the same time the Turkish Government is so little mindful of its interest not to offend Christian Powers at this moment, or so powerless to enforce its own orders, that your Excellency was compelled on the 24th ultimo, and again on 4th instant, to address to the Porte an energetic remonstrance against the rapine, the exactions, and the cruelties, to which its Christian subjects were exposed.

It is evident then that imminent and daily increasing perils menace, not alone the authority of the Sultan, but the very existence of the Turkish Empire; and there is too much reason to fear that the number and the intensity of these perils must be increased by delay in putting an end to the state of things which your Excellency has so powerfully described. But it is from England and France alone that Turkey can look for active sympathy and support; in the event of a struggle all other Powers would be found neutral or would become hostile; and if England and France were now prepared to run the risks of an European war, and to disregard the commercial, the social, and the political disasters it would entail, if they were prepared, in short, as your Excellency says, to stop at no sacrifice for the object they have in view, there is little doubt that they would cripple the resources of Russia, and that on the signature of peace, it is more than probable that the exclusion of that Power from the Greek Protectorate and from the Principalities would be secured. Russia would be effectually repelled, but Turkey in the meanwhile might be irretrievably ruined; and we might then find it impossible to restore her integrity or to maintain her independence.

To protect Turkey against foreign aggression, is the interest of England and France, nor would the task present any insurmountable difficulty; but both might find themselves powerless to guard Turkey against those elements of internal dissolution which now appear to constitute her greatest danger. There is no doubt that Russia, while she pretends to wish for the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, has, in her late measures, calculated on these causes of internal dissolution, and perhaps hastened their operation.



Her Majesty's Government are well aware that the resources of Turkey are great, and that hitherto they have been but partially explored; but they fear that their further development, or the adoption of those reforms which your Excellency has so long and so judiciously recommended, would be improbable during a time that the Sultan was engaged in war with a foreign Power, and his European provinces were reduced to a state bordering on anarchy, and which, even now, compels your Excellency to contemplate, as stated in your despatch No. 130 of the 7th instant, the necessity of calling up the British fleet, not for the purpose of repelling a Russian attack upon Constantinople, but in order to protect the Christians from an intended rising of the Mahomedans against them.

It is not, then, because we have any doubt that the policy of Russia has been unjust and ungenerous, and is indefensible; it is not alone because we think that war is a calamity; but it is because we believe that war would be an additional danger to Turkey, that Her Majesty's Government are determined to preserve peace by every means consistent with the national honour, and the maintenance of that principle for which we have been contending in Turkey: and in this respect their opinions are strengthened by those of your Excellency, upon whose judgment, experience, and accurate information Her Majesty's Government place the fullest reliance.

Your Excellency will have learnt, by my despatch No. 116 of the 9th instant, that Her Majesty's Government, so far from regarding negotiations as exhausted, see cause to hope that the present alarming state of affairs may be terminated in a manner safe and honourable to the Porte, and not unacceptable to Russia; and it is hardly necessary for me to add, that Her Majesty's Government consider the immediate evacuation of the Principalities as the condition of any Act being signed on the part of the Sultan for settling his differences with Russia.

Her Majesty's Government have entirely approved the course pursued by your Excellency in resisting the unjust claims of Russia, and maintaining the principle of Turkish independence; and in the event of any further act of aggression by Russia, or of undue delay on her part in accepting the terms for an amicable arrangement that may be proposed to her, Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of France, will be prepared to take more active measures for the protection of Turkey against a Power of whose hostile designs there will then exist no reasonable doubt.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 139.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 542.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 28, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I returned to my post this morning.

I have seen M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who gave me an account of the late proceedings at Vienna with respect to the French project of note for settling the Oriental question. As M. de Bourqueney states in his telegraphic despatches, for none other have been received, that Lord Westmorland had made use of the same means of communication to apprize your Lordship of the modifications to the French draft proposed by Count Buol, I need not trespass further on your time than to say that M. Drouyn de Lhuys is ready to adopt them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 140.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 548. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 28, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has confidential accounts from Moldavia which report the language of Prince Gortchakoff to be that the Principalities may be considered as finally separated from the Sultan's dominions. The Prince is said to have blamed the Hospodar, when the latter informed him that he had just sent in his tribute to the Porte; and a confidential letter, which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has seen, from Constantinople states, upon this head, that the Russian Government had recommended the Hospodar to declare to the Sultan that he would pay him tribute no longer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 141.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 366.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 20, 1853.*

I HAVE been very desirous of representing to your Lordship what effect has been produced in Russia by the publication of that very inflammatory manifesto, from which it might have been inferred by the ignorant that the Greek religion was in danger in consequence of the violence and fanaticism of the Turkish Government; but I have found myself, as indeed I still am, unable to speak very confidently upon the subject.

Public opinion in Russia has but a languid circulation, and its pulsations almost escape the observation of those strangers who, like myself, have no access to the classes of society in which it is probably most perceptible.

If, however, I am unable to state to your Lordship what is felt here, and to what results warm religious feelings have led, I am able to oppose a contradiction to many of the statements upon the subject which have been put forth by the public press, and even by a journal of such importance as the "Times." It has not been my fortune to witness any indication of religious excitement, nor have I been able to hear of any, although I have been anxious to gain information upon the point, and have made extensive inquiries as to the indications which may have been remarked by others. The one single instance of fanatic excitement of which I have heard, is that of a servant who quitted his master that he might enlist to fight against the infidels.

As for those exhibitions of joy, those illuminations which are stated to have been witnessed at St. Petersburgh when the manifesto was published, nothing was known of them here till the accounts to which I allude were read in the English and French papers.

As regards the upper classes, what may perhaps be made out is a dread of war without a reasonable motive, which will occasion fresh demands for men and equipments, while, by putting an end to commerce, it will deprive the landed proprietors of a large portion of their incomes. What may be discovered among the lower and middle classes, is an indifference which leads to the belief that they doubt the existence of any danger to their religion.

Were that danger real and apparent, I have no doubt that religious zeal would be unequivocally manifested by the richer of the mercantile class in a willingness to contribute to the exigencies of the State; among the poor, in an eagerness to offer their personal services.

As I have alluded to the public press, I may take this opportunity for remarking that the ignorance which it has betrayed upon Russian affairs has been very remarkable of late. Even in an article of the "Times," which is supposed to have been received from a St. Petersburgh correspondent, and which professes to give a list of the present Cabinet, I read (independently of





other inaccuracies) the names of two men, Count Wronschenko and Prince Wolkonsky, whose public services terminated a twelvemonth since by their death.

According to a letter from Moscow which has been placed in my hands, the only effect produced by the manifesto, although accompanied by a political sermon by the chief ecclesiastical authority of the town, has been an increased belief in the imminence of war, and a disposition on the part of persons in trade to contract their mercantile operations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 142.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 372.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 22, 1853.*

BY the arrival of the messenger Drury, I have been put in possession of your Lordship's further despatches down to No. 133 inclusive.

Although not directed to do so by your Lordship, I have not hesitated to read to Count Nesselrode your Lordship's despatch No. 130 of the 9th instant.

The grievous difficulties from which the whole of Europe is at present suffering have proceeded mainly from concealment and underhand dealing, and, as certainly none of the views entertained upon the great question by Her Majesty's Government are such as any one can be ashamed to profess, I was desirous that the Chancellor should know from your Lordship's own language what was the opinion entertained in England of the Russian manifesto.

In the course of the conversation which ensued, Count Nesselrode again endeavoured to establish an analogy between the position occupied by Russia in the Principalities, and that taken up by France and England at Besica Bay. I entreated him not to press a point which, if insisted upon, would lead to serious consequences, as I would not conceal from him that Her Majesty's Government would never lend themselves to recognize that any such similarity existed.

Among other arguments or elucidations which I employed, I made use of this.

"Your position," I said, "M. le Comte, is that of a person who has broken into the house of our friend; ours is that of being found fault with for having taken up our station at the corner of the street in which that act of violence has been committed."

This conversation, which took place on the 20th instant, ended in an amicable manner by Count Nesselrode observing in pleasing terms that he would not conceal from me that the idea of a misunderstanding so serious as to lead to war between Russia and England was one which his sense and feelings rejected; that he had no doubt of the willingness of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw their ships as soon as possible from the Dardanelles, and that nothing would be more agreeable to the Emperor than to receive from the Porte such assurances as would enable His Imperial Majesty to recall his troops from the Principalities.

I ought perhaps to have mentioned, that the Chancellor remarked upon the too great stress which was commonly laid upon the independence of Turkey, while but little attention was bestowed upon her actual existence. The accounts from Turkey of the fanaticism of the Turks, and of the sufferings of the Christians, were, he said, dreadful, and might lead to serious consequences.

I replied that it appeared to me a little extraordinary that Her Majesty's Government and that of Austria, both in general tolerably well informed, should have heard nothing of these persecutions, but if in truth the fanaticism of the Turks had been awakened, it was hardly to be wondered at when they no doubt thought both their religion and their existence in danger; that the

inference to be drawn was the pressing necessity for putting an end to a state of affairs by which Turkish feelings were so powerfully excited.

In this conclusion Count Nesselrode professed his hearty acquiescence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 143.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 374. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 22, 1853.*

JUDGING from a conversation which I held on the 20th instant with the Chancellor, I am inclined to believe that the Russian Government are prepared to lend themselves to some arrangement with Turkey similar to that which was alluded to in my despatches No. 339 and No. 350, but which they would prefer being embodied in a Convention.

In expressing this opinion, however, I am bound to reflect, that while professing a willingness to come to terms and even to hasten negotiations, the Russian Cabinet (if listening to sinister suggestions) may be desirous of gaining time under the appearances of being disposed to negotiate; nor must it be forgotten that late transactions have offered a fresh example of the Emperor's liability to be acted upon by domestic influences.

As often as the influence of the Grand Duke Constantine is allowed to exert itself, so often, I apprehend, will the Emperor be liable to such aberrations from his habitual policy as have been lately witnessed in the gratuitous quarrel sought by Russia of the Porte.

As I once before stated, the Grand Duke Constantine is, probably from calculation, a bigot in religion, his prejudices and aspirations are those of his race, and his dislike to his elder brother would of itself render him little favourable to the cause of peace and tranquillity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 144.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 376.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 22, 1853.*

IN obedience, in willing obedience, to the orders contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 11th instant marked No. 132, I have pointed out to Count Nesselrode the unfounded accusation which had been directed against Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and to which additional force had been given by his Excellency's despatch to Baron Brunnow of the $\frac{29\ May}{10\ June}$.

I likewise communicated to Count Nesselrode the inclosures of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's despatch No. 118, and at the same time observed to him, on the part of your Lordship, that the charge which had been made against Her Majesty's Ambassador rendered it highly necessary that a further investigation (enquête) upon this point should be established.

Count Nesselrode stated, with some warmth, that it was impossible that he could take upon himself to advise the Emperor to accede to such a proposition; when, after remarking to him that he must not be surprised if Her Majesty's Government showed themselves very tenacious as to any point regarding the conduct of the Queen's diplomatic servants, I begged to leave the papers in his Excellency's hands, that he might satisfy himself what ample means existed for



disproving the misrepresentation to which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had been exposed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—As it is evident that I shall obtain from the Russian Government no reparation for the misrepresentations directed against Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, I propose reading the inclosures of his Lordship's despatch to the heads of the various Foreign Missions at St. Petersburgh.

G. H. S.

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No. 145.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 378. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 22, 1853.*

COUNT NESSELRODE, whom I have just left, stated that he had the satisfaction of being able to inform me that a telegraphic message arrived this morning from Vienna brings intelligence of a struggle between the peace and the war party in the Sultan's Cabinet having ended in the triumph of peaceable counsels.

Two circumstances that strike me as remarkable have just been brought to my knowledge by a person in whose statements I can place perfect confidence.

The police of the town are at this moment engaged in spreading through the capital a report of the difficulties at Constantinople being satisfactorily settled, and yet but a few days ago when the Church images were carried about the streets, mingled with the prayers which were offered for the cessation of the cholera, others were put up for the triumph of the Emperor's resistance of the infidels' attacks upon the Orthodox Greek faith. These two facts sufficiently demonstrate that if the Sultan's Ministry is not united, the Councils of the Emperor are agitated by very opposing currents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 146.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

(No. 149.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 16, 1853.*

SOON after the late readjustment of the Turkish Ministry I took occasion to visit the principal members of the Cabinet with the view of impressing upon their minds the extreme importance of acting with unity and steadiness under the present critical circumstances of the Empire. I endeavoured to convince them of the danger which must necessarily accrue not only to the Empire but to themselves also, if they continued to be swayed by private interests and personal jealousies at a time when all their energies ought to be applied exclusively to the service of their Sovereign. I must do them the justice to say that they took my admonitions in good part, though each conceived them to be more applicable to his colleagues than to himself. I found at the same time that, with some trifling shades of difference, they all took the same view of the Russian demands, and, however anxious for the maintenance of peace, were unanimous in their resolution to oppose them to the last. I left them with the impression that there would soon be more to apprehend from their rashness than from their timidity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 147.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 150.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 16, 1853.

THE Porte had prepared its protest against the occupation of the Danubian Principalities before the official intelligence of that aggression had reached Constantinople. But the festival of Bairam, the momentary change of Ministers, and the unavoidable formalities of this Court, occasioned a delay of several days before it was communicated to the foreign Representatives. I have already sent a manuscript copy of it to your Lordship, and I have now the honour to inclose a printed one. It will be found to contain the principal ideas suggested in your Lordship's instruction to me, No. 81 of this year. Reshid Pasha admitted them with much readiness into his draft, to which an explanatory form was given, with the view of making the protest more palatable to Russia. His Highness, at my suggestion, accompanied it with a note to the four Representatives. A copy of this document is inclosed herewith, and on its receipt I lost no time in proposing to my three colleagues a meeting, at which we might take both the note and the protest into consideration.

The proposed interview has since taken place at my house, and I am happy to state that we found no difficulty in determining the course to be pursued by us under the circumstances. A memorandum of what passed at our meeting is inclosed herewith. Your Lordship will observe that we concluded by agreeing to apply for a conference with Reshid Pasha. His Highness has since appointed an early hour to-morrow for receiving us.

In the course of our interview to-day, the Austrian Minister read the draft of a letter which he had prepared for Reshid Pasha to address to Count Nesselrode. I submitted to my colleagues the propriety of leaving his Highness free to draw up his own letters, and my amendment prevailed.

I take this opportunity to mention that the Austrian proposal of a "fusion" of Prince Menchikoff's parting note with that prepared by Reshid Pasha had previously dropped, the Pasha having paused in his composition, apparently because I declined having anything to do with it apart from the other Representatives, and the Internuncio having acquiesced in its relinquishment on account of the delay and consequent change of circumstances.

For my own part, I am persuaded that our best chance of making an impression at St. Petersburgh lies in the plan traced out in your Lordship's instruction No. 81 of this year, though in following it out, in concert with the French Ambassador, I hope not to lose sight of what advantage may be derived from the concurrence of Austria and Prussia, by so far adapting their respective ideas to it as to promote our conciliatory views without compromising that principle on which the Porte has taken its stand.

The other Representatives appear to entertain no doubt of a marked improvement in the disposition of the Russian Government. Though I have no direct information on the subject myself, I am unwilling to suppose that their impressions and those of their respective Courts are without any solid foundation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 147.

*Note from the Porte to the Four Representatives.*

(Traduction.) *Le 8 Cheval*, 1269. (14 *Juillet*, 1853.)

LA Sublime Porte ayant pris le parti de protester contre l'entrée des troupes Russes en Valachie et en Moldavie, croit de son devoir de communiquer son acte de protestation aux Représentants des hautes Puissances qui de concert avec elle et avec la Cour de Russie ont signé le Traité de 1841. Ce dernier acte de la Sublime Porte est basé sur des motifs graves, et elle profite de la circonstance pour réitérer les assurances qu'elle a tant de fois données dans les négociations récentes de ses sentiments pacifiques et vraiment amicaux envers la Russie. Elle s'en remet à leurs Excellences pour faire tel usage de l'acte de protestation explicatif qu'elles jugeront propre à ramener la Russie à des dispositions analogues.

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) MUSTAFA RECHID.



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Inclosure 2 in No. 147.

*Memorandum of Conference of the Four Representatives.*

*Therapia, le 16 Juillet*, 1853.

LES Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de la Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, se sont réunis pour échanger leurs idées relativement à la note officielle que venait de leur adresser son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Ottoman, afin de mettre à leur disposition l'acte de protestation fait par la Sublime Porte contre l'occupation militaire des Principautés Danubiennes par la Russie.

Ils se sont arrêtés à la résolution de proposer à Reshid Pasha de transmettre à son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode copies de la note explicative renfermant la dite protestation et des firmans que sa Hautesse avait promulgués depuis peu dans le but de confirmer à perpétuité les privilèges religieux accordés aux divers cultes des sujets non-Mussulmans en Turquie. Ils sont, en outre, convenus, si la Porte le jugeait à propos, de prendre charge de la lettre que son Altesse voudrait bien écrire pour accomplir ce double objet, en réitérant au Cabinet Russe les assurances amicales qui se trouvent dans la note de protestation, et en exprimant le désir de recevoir au plutôt une réponse de la part de son Excellence le Chancelier de Russie.

Par rapport à l'expédition de cette lettre ils sont restés d'accord que la manière la plus convenable d'y donner cours serait de la faire remettre au Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade Ottomane à Vienne, qui recevrait de son Gouvernement l'ordre de la porter lui-même à sa destination, et au cas où, selon toute apparence, il ne lui serait pas permis de passer la frontière Russe, de prier le Cabinet de Vienne de vouloir bien le faire parvenir à M. le Comte de Nesselrode par le canal de son Représentant à St. Pétersbourg. On déciderait cette alternative à Vienne dans une réunion où les Quatre Puissances seraient représentées de concert avec ceux de la Russie et de la Sublime Porte, si, toutefois, l'un ou l'autre, ou tous les deux, jugeaient à propos d'y assister.

Il a été convenu en sus que les Représentants de l'Angleterre et de la France à Constantinople s'accorderaient pour adresser une lettre identique à leurs collégues respectifs en Russie, et que la lettre ainsi rédigée pour accompagner l'expédition de la lettre de son Altesse Reshid Pasha à son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode servirait de fond et de mesure pour le parti à prendre comme ci-dessus à Vienne, et que dans ce but elle y serait envoyée d'ici sous cachet volant aux Représentants d'Angleterre et de France. M. l'Internonce d'Autriche et M. l'Envoyé de Prusse se sont reservés d'adresser une lettre analogue à leurs Cours, le dernier par l'entremise de son collégue à Vienne, pour hâter la décision sur le parti à prendre, sans d'ailleurs s'écarter de la ligne convenue.

Pour s'assurer du concours de la Porte on est finalement convenu de proposer une conférence à son Altesse Reshid Pasha.

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No. 148.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 151. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 16, 1853.

THE Prussian Minister at this Court has submitted, by order of his Government, a separate proposition to the Porte concerning the pending matter of dispute between Russia and Turkey. In substance it amounts to an exchange

of declarations between the two Parties, the Porte having to send in Prince Menchikoff's note, and the Russian Government replying by a disavowal of any intention to encroach on the sovereign rights of the Sultan.

On learning from Reshid Pasha that the Porte would not consent to the proposal, M. de Wildenbruch took upon himself to modify it; but he does not appear to have pressed his amended plan to any practical conclusion.

For your Lordship's more complete information, I forward herewith in copy, M. de Manteuffel's communicated instruction to Baron de Wildenbruch, and the latter's confidential amendment submitted to Reshid Pasha. It is remarkable that all previous knowledge of M. de Bourqueney's plan of arrangement is distinctly disclaimed by M. de la Cour.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 148.

*M. de Wildenbruch to Reshid Pasha.*

(Privée et Confidentielle.)

M. le Ministre,

EN ayant l'honneur de communiquer à votre Altesse copie de la dépêche dont je lui ai donné lecture dans la journée, je crois devoir y joindre en peu de mots les arguments dont je l'ai soutenue.

Votre Altesse m'a dit qu'il ne pouvait s'agir dans le moment actuel de la signature du projet de note du Prince Menchikoff.

J'observe que la dépêche que M. l'Internonce a eu l'honneur de vous communiquer fait abstraction de ce point; je l'admets donc pour ma part.

Il s'agira donc de quelque chose d'analogue à ce projet de note, d'une nouvelle base à trouver pour le rénouement des négociations.

Le moyen le plus simple de gagner cette base me parait être le suivant:

La Sublime Porte n'a point communiqué à la Cour de Russie les firmans par lesquels le Sultan a confirmé en dernier les libertés, immunités, &c., du culte de ses sujets non-Mussulmans.

Un Ambassadeur Extraordinaire serait chargé de porter à St. Pétersbourg tous ces firmans, et votre Altesse les communiquerait au Cabinet de Russie par une note officielle dans laquelle la Sublime Porte déclarerait qu'elle s'engage au maintien scrupuleux des droits, immunités, et privilèges confirmés par les susdits firmans, et exprimerait en même temps la conviction que Sa Majesté l'Empereur trouverait dans cette déclaration les garanties demandées par lui.

Je me réfère à la dépêche du 5 Juillet pour faire remarquer à votre Altesse que l'accusé de réception du Cabinet Russe, dont la teneur aurait été fixée d'avance et d'un mutuel accord entre les deux Gouvernements, devra préciser et expliquer d'une manière positive les sens des Traités antérieurs et la valeur des expressions qu'ils contiennent relativement à l'état des églises Chrétiennes dans l'Empire Ottoman.

Votre Altesse ne voudra point omettre de vouer son attention au point important de la fixation définitive des limites très peu assurés jusqu'à ce jour, dans laquelle cette intervention en faveur du culte Chrétien a été exercée.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) L. DE WILDENBRUCH.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 148.

*Baron Manteuffel to M. de Wildenbruch.*

Monsieur, *Berlin, ce 5 Juillet*, 1853.

NOUS sommes en possession de vos rapports politiques jusques et compris celui No. 59 du 20 du mois passé. Ces rapports continuent à nous offrir le plus grand intérêt: ils ont été immédiatement sous les yeux du Roi.

Plus la complication Russo-Turque devient menaçante pour la paix, plus le besoin d'en trouver une solution pacifique se fait généralement sentir.

C'est surtout à Vienne, où l'on est à même de recueillir les plus fraiches données de Constantinople et des Principautés Danubiennes, que les Représentants des Grandes Puissances ont pris à tâche de combiner des plans d'amener un arrangement propre à concilier les intérêts des deux parties et à sauvegarder l'indépendance de la Sublime Porte, en maintenant les points dont le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a déclaré ne pouvoir ni vouloir se départir.

Parmi les idées émises dans ce but, celle que le Ministre de France à Vienne, Baron de Bourqueney, a proposée, a fixé particulièrement l'attention du Roi notre auguste maître. Ce Ministre propose:

"Que la Porte signe d'abord la note présentée en projet par le Prince Menchikoff, et qu'elle l'envoye à St. Pétersbourg par un Ambassadeur Extraordinaire, à qui le Cabinet de Russie donnerait dans sa réponse l'assurance que Sa Majesté Impériale n'entendait nullement empiéter sur les droits de souveraineté du Sultan."

En acceptant cette proposition, la Porte obtiendrait le grand avantage que le contenu de la note recevrait par la réponse du Cabinet Impérial une interprétation satisfaisante qui ôtat de cette pièce tout ce qui a paru jusqu'ici à Constantinople contraire à la position du Sultan vis-à-vis de ses sujets et à son rang de Souverain indépendant. Il est entendu que la réponse du Cabinet Impérial de Russie devrait être concertée d'avance, sinon quant à sa rédaction, du moins quant à son contenu essentiel.

L'idée dont je viens de vous entretenir, Monsieur, nous semble avoir un double mérite. D'abord, elle offre à la Porte le moyen de négocier avec la Russie et de préciser le sens de la note à signer par elle, en discutant la réponse. Il est évident que la négociation même et la réponse future du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg constateront formellement ce que ce Cabinet à déjà hautement énoncé lui-même, savoir que toute velléité de s'arroger de nouveaux droits en Turquie a été loin de la pensée de l'Empereur, et qu'il s'est toujours seulement agi de conserver un état de choses que les Traités en vigueur et un usage immémorial ont sanctionné.

L'autre mérite du plan est plus grand et plus décisif encore; il consiste dans la sûreté de son succès à St. Pétersbourg. Nous savons de science certaine que l'Empereur Nicholas a accordé son suffrage au plan ci-dessus mentionné, et que Sa Majesté Impériale est disposée à faire retirer ses troupes de la Moldavie et de la Valachie dans le cas où la Porte agréerait la proposition et y donnerait suite. Cette certitude de succès doit être d'un poids immense pour la décision de la Porte, qui, quelque soit son opinion sur ses moyens de résistance à opposer à la Russie, ne saurait se faire aucune illusion sur la gravité des dangers, je dirai même sur les conséquences infailliblement désastreuses, d'une prolongation de la crise actuelle.

L'intention du Roi, notre auguste maître, est donc que vous, Monsieur, vous prévaliez de votre qualité d'organe d'une Puissance dont les bienveillantes dispositions pour la Porte ne se sont jamais démenties, pour recommander confidentiellement aux Ministres Ottomans l'examen et l'adoption du plan qui doit son origine au Ministre de France à Vienne. Vous exposerez franchement à Reshid Pasha, dont nous apprécions les qualités supérieures, combien il importe à la Porte de sortir de la position où elle se trouve dans ce moment, et de mettre un terme à une complication que les amis de l'Empire Ottoman ont vu surgir avec peine et anxiété. Vous avez du reste jugé si bien, Monsieur, les conjoncture scabreuses où vous êtes appelé à agir, que je vous abandonne avec une entière confiance le choix des arguments que vous ferez valoir auprès des Ministres du Sultan. La confiance que ces Ministres vous accordent, et la position par-

faitement désintéressée de votre Cour dans les questions discutées entre la Turquie et la Russie, vous seront d'un puissant secours pour la tâche dont vous êtes chargé. Le Roi croit ne pas pouvoir mieux répondre à l'appel que la Porte a fait à Sa Majesté d'après votre rapport No. 59 du 20 Juin, que par les conseils que vous lui offrirez conformément à la présente dépêche.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

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No. 149.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

(No. 152. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 16, 1853.*

THE copy inclosed herewith of a report addressed to me yesterday by M. Pisani, may serve to give your Lordship some idea of the difficulties which beset my course of proceeding here.

I particularly solicit your Lordship's attention to the language held, as it would seem, by my French colleague to Reshid Pasha.

I do not at all partake his opinion concerning the inexpediency of hastening the publication of the protest, and as to what he says of a Convention proposed by Her Majesty's Government, I should have had no idea of his meaning were it not for a private letter which I received by the last opportunity from Lord Cowley. His Lordship has given me to understand that the objections of the French Government applied to the form rather than to the substance of a Convention as proposed by your Lordship, and that the idea would in all probability drop without further discussion.

I have taken the hint suggested by this communication, and desisted from pressing the offer of an explanation of the Treaty of Kainardji as part of the propitiating experiment now in preparation for St. Petersburgh. It appears that the French objections to any conventional form are extended by M. de la Cour to that point also.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 149.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 15, 1853.*

HAVING last night waited on Reshid Pasha, he communicated to me very confidentially, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch from the Prussian Cabinet to M. de Wildenbruch, dated July 5th, as well as a private and confidential letter from the latter addressed to Reshid Pasha.

In the course of the day M. de Wildenbruch called on his Highness, and in communicating to him orally the contents of the said despatch, observed that although its purport was at variance with his opinion and against his conscience, yet he had a duty to fulfil, that of endeavouring to carry into execution the orders of his Government.

Reshid Pasha stated in reply that, under the present circumstances, the Porte could not accept any proposal until she is aware how the protest will operate upon the minds of the Four Powers, under whose consideration that paper has been respectively submitted.

In the evening M. de la Cour came to see Reshid Pasha, and talked over the purport of M. Manteuffel's despatch, and appeared to be in favour of the proposal it contains. The answer returned by Reshid Pasha was the same as that given to the Prussian Envoy. Moreover, he communicated to him the despatch of the Prince of Moldavia, as well as its inclosures, and made the remark that, after all this, the Porte could not with propriety take upon itself to change the present state of things without a reference to the Four Powers.



M. de la Cour expressed his regret at the Porte having been so hasty in publishing its protest, which, said he, rendered an arrangement more difficult.

He subsequently informed his Highness very confidentially and secretly, that he knew for certain that the British Government seemed inclined to induce the Porte to sign a Convention with Russia, and that the proposal having been communicated to the French Cabinet, it rejected it as too favourable to Russia. Finally, he said that he had drawn up a project of a note, which he proposed sending to Reshid Pasha next day.

His Highness foresees that the Four Powers will, ultimately, try to induce the Porte to enter into some engagement with Russia, and this thought produces a very sad impression upon his mind. He thinks, should your Excellency concur in the same opinion, of putting off the promulgation of the proclamation to the people, because, added he, were the Porte to be compelled to act otherwise than the declarations contained therein, it will commit itself towards its subjects. This is a very delicate and serious point.

The Sultan, whom Reshid Pasha saw this morning, seems to entertain apprehensions that Europe will not assist him, and begins to doubt the sincerity of the repeated assurances of friendship and goodwill towards the maintenance of the integrity of his Empire and his sovereign rights. Reshid told His Majesty that he need not entertain such fears, and that he was aware that England and France appeared ready to assist him, if occurrences should require it, and that his ministers were decided to undergo any sacrifice for the support of His Majesty's independence and rights.

Reshid Pasha's interview with the Sultan took place before his Highness had seen M. de Wildenbruch and M. de la Cour. The Pasha is very much cast down after what passed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. PISANI.

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No. 150.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

(No. 153.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 17, 1853.*

THE Russians in Moldavia have called upon the Hospodar of that province to suspend his communications with the Ottoman Government, and instead of sending the tribute as usual to Constantinople to keep it in reserve for their eventual disposal. It is naturally expected that the same course will be taken in Wallachia as soon as the Russian forces arrive at Bucharest.

The Porte, as your Lordship may remember, consulted me upon this subject some time ago, and, agreeably to my advice, the Hospodars were not withdrawn in consequence of the mere occupation of their provinces by the Russian army. The case which I had foreseen has now occurred; the Hospodars are forbidden to keep up their communications with the Porte, and the Treaties which regulate their relations with the Sovereign are violated. The Porte under these circumstances is not inclined to hesitate. The Hospodars are to be recalled, and should they fail to comply with the Porte's commands they will be dismissed.

I have conversed on this matter with the French Ambassador, and he agrees with me that our respective Consuls at Jassy and Bucharest cannot with propriety be allowed to remain in function after the Porte shall have announced to us officially its decision and the grounds thereof.

It might, possibly, be right to withdraw the Consuls altogether, but I am unwilling to adopt so extreme a measure while in almost daily expectation of hearing from your Lordship in reply to my despatch on that subject. In the interests of commerce a gradual may, perhaps, be preferable to an abrupt retirement of the Consuls.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 151.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 154. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 17, 1853.

REFERRING to my despatch of this date, No. 153, I bring under your Lordship's notice three papers relating to the subject matter of it, and communicated to me in confidence by Reshid Pasha. There is reason to believe that the Porte is only waiting for advices from Bucharest similar to those already received from Jassy in order to make an official communication on the subject to the four Representatives.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 151.

*Prince Ghika to Reshid Pasha.*

Monseigneur, *Jassy, June* 25, 1853.

J'AI eu l'honneur d'adresser à votre Altesse Sérénissime en date d'hier un exposé des faits qui ont suivi l'occupation des Principautés par les troupes Russes. C'est avec une peine des plus sensibles que je me vois aujourd'hui en devoir de vous soumettre une communication que le Consulat-Général de Russie de Bucharest m'a adressée, et que je viens de recevoir à l'instant même.

La teneur des deux pièces, dont copie est ci-jointe, donnera à votre Altesse une idée éxacte de l'invitation qui m'est faite au nom de l'Empereur de Russie de suspendre mes relations avec la Sublime Porte, ainsi que la transmission du tribut du pays, comme incompatible avec la présence de l'armée Russe. Aussitôt après la réception des pièces susmentionnées, ayant eu une entrevue avec le Prince Gortchakoff, j'ai cru devoir lui faire part de mes observations sur la circonstance, et lui déclarer que je me trouvais en demeure d'en informer la Sublime Porte, à quoi son Excellence ne fit aucune objection.

De mon côté, sentant combien il est au-dessus de mon pouvoir de toucher des questions politiques qui sont du ressort des deux Puissances, je m'empresse d'en référer à votre Altesse, afin qu'elle y avise dans sa haute sagesse de la manière qu'elle jugera convenable.

Daignez, &c.

(Signé) G. GHIKA.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 151.

*M. de Khaltchinsky to Prince Ghika.*

*Bucharest, le* 23 *Juin,* 1853.

J'AI l'honneur de communiquer confidentiellement à votre Altesse la copie ci-jointe d'une dépêche reservée que M. le Chancelier de l'Empire m'a adressée sous la date du 3 Juin. Vous y trouverez, mon Prince, les indications les plus précises sur la conduite que vous aurez à tenir vis-à-vis de la Porte, par suite de l'occupation des Principautés par les troupes Impériales, ainsi que sur les dispositions que vous aurez à prendre pour la suspension du tribut que la Moldavie était jusqu'ici tenue de payer au Gouvernement Ottoman.

En vous invitant à vous conformer aux ordres de Sa Majesté l'Empereur consignés dans cette dépêche, j'ai l'honneur, &c.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 151.

*Count Nesselrode to M. de Khaltchinsky.*

*St. Pétersbourg, le* 3 *Juin,* 1853.

AINSI que je vous l'ai déjà annoncé, l'occupation militaire des Principautés ne doit apporter aucune modification dans l'ordre de choses existant sous le rapport de leur administration civile et du personnel des hauts fonctionnaires, si ce n'est peut-être le changement de quelques employés que les Hospodars eux-mêmes jugeront nécessaire de faire pour mettre autant de régularité que possible dans les différentes branches du service, et plus particulièrement dans celui de l'approvisionnement de nos troupes.

Il y a, cependant, une question sur laquelle nous devons faire connaître d'avance aux deux Princes notre opinion, afin qu'ils puissent se régler en conséquence. Nous voulons parler de leurs relations avec Constantinople et le Ministère Ottoman. Celles-ci doivent nécessairement cesser du jour où nos troupes occupent militairement le pays, et où toute action, toute ingérence de la part de la puissance suzeraine est temporairement suspendue. Une autre conséquence de cette situation sera celle de la suspension du tribut que les provinces sont tenues de payer à la Porte. Ces sommes, que les Vestiaries encaisseront comme par le passé, doivent rester à la disposition du Gouvernement Impérial, qui se réserve d'en faire l'usage qu'il jugera le plus opportun.

Vous voudrez bien, Monsieur, faire part aux Hospodars de ce que je viens de consigner ici d'ordre de l'Empereur.

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No. 152.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 157.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 18, 1853.

BEARING in mind your Lordship's instruction respecting the principles on which Omer Pasha may be directed to carry on his operations touching the Danube, I beg to submit to you the two memorandums inclosed herewith: the one relating to defensive operations on this side of the river, the other indicating how far it may be desirable to leave unmolested such vessels of war as the Russians may employ on the river itself, above its junction with the Pruth. I am indebted for the former of these papers to Major-General Macintosh, who was lately here, and I have communicated it to Reshid Pasha, and through his Highness to the Council.

With respect to what is recommended in the other memorandum, I learn from that Minister that the Council objected to its adoption, probably on some ground of form; but the same suggestions are about to be put into a different shape, with better prospects of being accepted.

Your Lordship will learn from the letter inclosed herewith in copy, and addressed by Prince Gortchakoff to Reshid Pasha, who sent it to me, that the Russians profess the intention of acting with moderation similar to that which I have recommended to the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 152.

*Memorandum relating to Defensive Operations south of the Danube.*

THE line of the Danube is so extended, and the nature of the country in its immediate vicinity so favourable for a large manœuvring army, if opposed to one in the state of training, beyond which the Turks have not advanced, that it seems almost hopeless that they should, unless powerfully aided, meet their opponents successfully in such a locality. It may, therefore, be submitted that

the best plan of procedure would be, only to garrison the fortresses on the Danube, and to strengthen duly the line of the Balkan at as early a period as possible, as the best situation in which an army could receive the assailants. With this view, everything should be done to put Shumla and Varna in as complete a state of preparation to receive their garrisons as possible; and, moreover, the passes leading through the mountains in the rear should be artificially strengthened with field-works looking towards these fortresses. Heavy cannon, such as ship guns, might be placed in these works, which could not be easily used against the troops on this side in the event of any portion of the works falling into temporary possession of the enemy.

It would be impossible to prepare such works at a period when active operations might be going on in the field; and the expense would be greatly diminished by employing the troops which are already in that neighbourhood in their construction, before their dispersion renders this impossible.

There is a range of low mountains, called the Lesser Balkan, behind the great range, and looking towards the sea, the pass through which, near Faki, should also be strengthened, with a view to its occupation. A force landing behind the pass through the Balkan, in rear of Varna, might otherwise turn the main position, and even penetrate from thence into the country.

Should the enemy succeed as before in reaching Adrianople, it is believed that the capital might still be defended by occupying a position which extends from the creeks of Buyuk-Chekmejeh, and Koutchouk-Chekmejeh towards the Black Sea. This position, however, ought also to be artificially strengthened. The peninsula on the European side of the Dardanelles ought to be strengthened against a land attack by works across the narrowest part of the isthmus north-east of Gallipoli, as most of the batteries on that side of the strait could be easily carried from the heights behind them, if left as they now are. It would also be very desirable that the Gulf of Saros, behind that peninsula, should be accurately surveyed, and the soundings near the isthmus correctly laid down, a facility for doing which is, I presume, afforded by the present vicinity of the fleet. I say this in the belief that no such survey at present exists, as in the event of our ships having at any period to act there, and possibly to land troops, it would be found of great utility.

Works are to a certain extent in progress in rear of the batteries on the Bosphorus, which was a precaution much called for.

The other localities adverted to would require a careful examination of skilful officers of engineers, who would afterwards lay down the works and superintend their execution, and I fear that the Turkish military establishment does not afford a sufficient number for such an undertaking; and it is the impression on my mind that the whole staff arrangements in this country are still very deficient.

*Therapia, July* 6, 1853.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 152.

*Instructions to Omer Pasha.*

(Translation.)

THE Russian forces having occupied Moldavia and Wallachia in a military manner, declaring at the same time that they do not thereby intend war against the Sublime Porte, and the Porte itself having taken the resolution of suspending its right of war under a reference to those Powers which signed the Treaty of 1841, you are directed not to enforce the rights of treaty against Russian vessels of war which may go up the Danube beyond its confluence with the Pruth, provided they do not touch at any point on the right bank of the Danube, or take possession of any place there, or land troops on the same side of the river, or push forward under the fortifications of Roustchouk, Silistria, or Widdin, in any of which cases a different view may be taken, unless there should be reason to believe that the vessels in question had been forced by a strong wind or other incidental cause upon the Bulgarian coast.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 152.

*Prince Gortchakoff to Reshid Pasha.*

*Jassy,* $\frac{5 \text{ July}}{7 \text{ July}}$, 1853.

M. le Ministre,

JE remplis les ordres de mon auguste Souverain en faisant parvenir cette lettre à votre Excellence pour l'informer de l'entrée des corps d'armée placé sous mon commandement dans les Principautés de Moldavie et Valachie.

Mieux que personne votre Excellence connait les raisons qui ont nécessité cette mesure. Le Gouvernement Impérial n'y a recours qu'après avoir épuisé tous les moyens de persuasion, toutes les vois diplomatiques, toutes les démarches de conciliation qui lui étaient dictées par son sincère désir de rester dans les meilleurs rapports d'amitié et de bon voisinage avec la Porte Ottomane.

Aujourd'hui encore, en faisant entrer son armée dans ces provinces placées en vertu des Traités sous la suzeraineté du Sultan et la protection de l'Empereur, Sa Majesté ne déclare pas la guerre à la Porte. Elle attendra que la Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan, mieux conseillé, mieux éclairé sur les intentions et les demandes légitimes de la Russie, y fasse droit sur la base des Traités existans.

Il dépend uniquement du Gouvernement Ottoman d'accélérer une entente sincère et reciproquement satisfaisante. Ce moment sera aussi celui où les troupes que je commande rentreront dans les limites qu'elles viennent de franchir.

Les ordres que je remplis en occupant militairement les Principautés me prescrivent de m'abstenir de tout mouvement hostile et agressif contre les troupes et les garrisons Turques stationnées au-delà du Danube.

C'est au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan de juger s'il doit adresser à ses commandants militaires les mêmes ordres, afin d'éviter toute collision regrettable qu'une démonstration offensive de leur part en deçà du Danube amenerait nécessairement entre nos forces respectives.

Je suis, &c.

(Signé) GORTCHAKOFF.

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No. 153.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July* 30.)

(No. 158.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 18, 1853.

RUMOURS, on which I place but little reliance, continue in some measure to prevail here of an intended massacre, in which the Turks would be the executioners and the Christians the principal victims. There is no doubt that considerable excitement exists among the Mussulman population, and it is more likely to increase than to diminish. But the Porte is deeply interested in preventing any kind of disorders here; and hitherto, with the exception of some trifling incidents, the public tranquillity has been admirably preserved.

On the occasion of a visit which I made to the Captain Pasha a few days ago on board his magnificent flag-ship, a three-decker, I passed close in front of the whole crew, amounting to 1100 men, and witnessed the exercise of the guns, without remarking a single glance or gesture of ill-will, and much gratified by the zeal, activity, and skill displayed throughout.

I have nevertheless been careful to provide, as far as I can, against the worst, by requesting Admiral Dundas to station a couple of large steam-vessels in these waters, and by prevailing on the Sultan to issue an explanatory proclamation calculated to remove erroneous impressions from the minds of the people. The execution of this last measure has been delayed, but it is now on the point of being carried into effect, and I hope to good purpose.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 154.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

(No. 159.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 19, 1853.*

THE latest advices from Trebizond and Erzeroom discourage the idea of any immediate intention on the part of Russia to cross the Asiatic frontier of Turkey. Intelligence of a more alarming character was received at the Porte a short time ago from Kars, but it appears to have had no solid foundation.

The extracts inclosed herewith of Consular despatches addressed to me will serve to apprize your Lordship of such movements as the Ottoman troops are making on that side of the Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 154.

*Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Erzeroom, July 6, 1853.*

I CANNOT learn that there has been any movement of troops in Georgia. Prince Woronzow is in the neighbourhood of Ahkiska, for the benefit of some mineral baths it is stated. I have been told that there is a large Mahomedan population in and around Ahkiska, and as some excitement is said to exist among them, the Armenians are rather fearful that there may be some outbreak, and probably the forces of the garrison may be increased to prevent this. I am not enabled to state whether this be a true statement, or whether it may be made to cover, by a plausible pretext, a military movement. From the source where I derived the information, the latter may possibly be the truth.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. BRANT.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 154.

*Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Erzeroom, July 7, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the forces collected here up to the present moment consist of—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 10 battalions of Infantry, probably - - - | | 7,500 strong |
| 2 regiments of Cavalry - - - - - | | 1,500 |
| The 2 battalions here previously, about - - | | 1,200 |
| | | 10,200 |
| Expected, about 4 battalions - - | 3,000 | |
| Some cavalry from Van, probably - | 500 | |
| 70 guns, with their men, probably - | 1,100 | |
| | 4,600 | |
| | | 14,800 |

This will be about the force of the army in regular troops. What will be the strength of the militia I am not correctly informed; it is conjectured 30,000 or 40,000. The troops are encamped close by the city. They are quiet and well behaved, and a good police is maintained in the town.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. BRANT.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 154.

*Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Trebizond, July 10, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you that orders have been received here to form a force of 10,000 irregulars for service in case of need at Choorookseo. Trebizond will furnish 4000, and the remainder are to be enlisted at Tizeh, Surmeneh, and Oph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. A. J. STEVENS.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 154.

*Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Trebizond, July 14, 1853.*

A TURKISH steamer arrived here from Batoom yesterday. The Turkish troops in that vicinity are busy building forts on the coast between Khoppa and Choorookson, to the number of six or eight. On the other hand, not the slightest movement or preparation has yet been made by the Russians on their frontier.

The Turkish steamer "Vassitai Tijarét," on departure to-day, takes 800 Redifs from this place and the district of Rizeh.

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No. 155.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

(No. 161.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 19, 1853.*

I FORWARD herewith, for your Lordship's information, a despatch which I have addressed to-day to Her Majesty's Envoy at St. Petersburgh, and I request your Lordship's early attention to the delicate questions which form the subject matter of its contents.

I have communicated with the French Ambassador, as well on the question of urging the evacuation of the Principalities, as on that of eventually withdrawing the two squadrons to some distance from Besika Bay. He appears to hold the same opinion as myself on both subjects, and will, no doubt, take the commands of his Government thereon.

I am convinced that your Lordship will make no acquaintance with the intentions of Her Majesty's Government without any unnecessary delay, affording the same advantage to Her Majesty's Representatives at Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 155.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir, *Constantinople, July 19, 1853.*

IN the identical letter addressed by M. de la Cour and myself to you and General Castelbajac, mention is made of the very natural expectation entertained here that the evacuation of the Principalities by Russia will accompany the nomination of a Turkish Ambassador to St. Petersburgh, supposing the preliminary agreement respecting religious privileges may be satisfactorily settled. I am

prepared to learn that the Porte makes a formal condition of that measure. Indeed it is not easy to conceive how an independent Government, not yet reduced to despair by the necessities of war or the hazards of insulation, could make up its mind to send out an Embassy to Russia while two of its provinces are forcibly occupied by that Power.

It is principally owing to my sense of the difficulty arising from this cause, that I have concerted to throw out the prospect of a retirement of the squadrons from the immediate neighbourhood of the Dardanelles as a facility for the evacuation of the Principalities.

I send a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Government, with a request that their view of the matter may be transmitted to you with the least avoidable delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 156.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 162.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 20, 1853.

THE proposed conference of the four Representatives with his Highness the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs took place on the 17th instant. The memorandum, inclosed herewith, which, though unsigned, has received, like the preceding one, inclosed with another despatch, the sanction of Reshid Pasha and my three colleagues, will inform your Lordship, without going into details, of what passed between us on the occasion. We have since employed our best exertions in preparing to carry into effect the conciliatory proceeding which we then agreed to adopt.

I have now the honour of forwarding herewith to your Lordship the several despatches which, in addition to the two memorandums, I have drawn up, subject to the assent of my colleages, or upon a general understanding with them. Their contents will serve, I trust, to explain whatever is necessary to enable Her Majesty's Government to form a correct judgment of the course which we have agreed to pursue in the hope of confirming the improved dispositions supposed to exist at St. Petersburgh, and of securing them in favour of a peaceful arrangement on safe and honourable terms.

In common with the French Ambassador I have found it necessary to make some concessions in point of form and expression to the delicate position of our German colleagues, to whose goodwill, within the limits prescribed by that position, I am bound, nevertheless, in justice to bear witness. I trust at the same time that while endeavouring to remove such obstacles as unnecessarily encumber the avenues to peace, we have not neglected to guard the rights of the Sultan and the interests of his Empire.

I feel confident that your Lordship's indulgence will not be wanting wherever I have incurred responsibility for the sake of improving a favourable opportunity, or preventing an increase of the impending evils.

I shall naturally be anxious to learn your Lordship's opinion without loss of time, and I take the liberty of submitting, if the course now taken be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government, that their approval may be conveyed by telegraph to Vienna for further transmission by express to St. Petersburgh.

Reshid Pasha's instruction to the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna is inclosed herewith in translation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 156.

*Memorandum of Conference of the Four Representatives with Reshid Pasha.*

LES quatre Représentants à Constantinople s'étant réunis avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères chez son Altesse à l'heure convenue, ils lui ont fait part de tout ce qu'ils avaient pris la résolution de lui proposer par suite de la communication qu'il leur avait faite au sujet de l'occupation militaire des Principautés Danubiennes par les troupes Russes, conformément au memorandum de la veille.

Le Ministre Ottoman, après avoir exprimé la satisfaction qui lui causait cette réunion, déclarait aux Représentants qu'en réservant l'approbation du Conseil et la sanction de Sa Majesté le Sultan, il se disposait à accepter les conseils qu'ils venaient de lui offrir, qu'il n'hésiterait pas à écrire à son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode dans le sens proposé, et qu'il ne voyait pas d'objection à faire expédier sa lettre de la manière que leurs Excellences les Représentants lui avaient indiquée.

Son Altesse a déclaré en même temps que la Porte ne pourrait aucunement se désister de la résolution qu'elle avait déjà annoncée, c'est-à-dire, de ne jamais prendre envers la Russie un engagement diplomatique relatif aux privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque, et qu'il ne pouvait cacher sa conviction qu'un tel engagement équivaudrait à un arrêt de mort pour l'Empire Ottoman. A cette exception près, la Sublime Porte ne cessait pas d'entretenir toutes les dispositions propres à satisfaire la Russie, et à manifester à tout le monde son désir sincère de renouer les relations les plus amicales avec cette Puissance.

Les Représentants, sur la réponse de son Altesse, se sont bornés à lui faire sentir l'extrême importance de hâter la décision de son Gouvernement, ce que le Pasha a promis de faire avec tout le zèle possible.

Les Représentants se sont ensuite retirés pour donner cours aux propositions posées dans la Conférence.

Il fut entendu que l'offre à renouveller par la Porte d'envoyer une Ambassade Extraordinaire à la Cour de Russie serait reservée pour la dépêche que les Représentants comptaient adresser à leurs Cours, ou à leurs collégues respectifs à Vienne et à St. Pétersbourg, vû que cette offre se trouvait déjà dans la note de protestation, et que la Porte ne devrait pas s'exposer à l'humiliation d'un refus, en la formulant aussi dans la lettre de son Altesse au Chancelier de Russie.

*Thérapia*, 17 *Juillet*, 1853.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 156.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Monsieur, *Constantinople, le* 20 *Juillet*, 1853.

L'OCCUPATION provisoire de la Moldavie et de la Valachie par les armées Russes ayant mis la Porte dans l'obligation de protester contre une mésure qu'elle serait fondée de regarder comme un cas de guerre, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Ottoman m'a communiquée son acte de protestation accompagné d'une note verbale. Une pareille communication a été faite aux Représentants d'Autriche, de France, et de Prusse.

Les copies ci-jointes des deux pièces vous offrent l'occasion de reconnaître combien les sentiments de modération et de paix ont présidé à leur réduction. Vous y verrez, en outre, que le Gouvernement Ottoman, tout en se référant aux Puissances signataires du Traité de 1841, donne à mes collégues ainsi qu'à moi la faculté de faire tel usage de sa protestation que nous jugerions convenable dans l'intérêt de la conciliation, basée sur ces principes dont la Porte n'a pas cru possible de se départir.

Partant de ce point, nous nous sommes réunis sans délai, et le résultat de

nos délibérations a été consigné dans un memorandum dont j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre copie ci-jointe.

La conférence que nous avons pris le parti de proposer à Reshid Pasha n'a pas tardé à avoir lieu chez son Altesse, et la partie essentielle de ce qui s'est passé à cette occasion, telle qu'elle se trouve dans un autre memorandum ci-joint en copie, ne manquera pas de fixer votre attention.

La lettre adressée, d'après notre suggestion, par le Ministre Ottoman à son Excellence le Chancelier de Russie renferme tout ce que nous croyons nécessaire pour constater les sentiments d'amitié et de confiance dont la Porte ne cesse d'être animée envers l'auguste Souverain auprès de qui vous avez l'honneur d'être accrédité, et pour ouvrir au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, malgré la rupture des relations diplomatiques entre les deux empires, et les fâcheuses circonstances qui s'en sont suivies, un moyen à la fois pratique et honorable de mettre fin à un état de choses qui dérange les intérêts les plus importants de part et d'autre, et qui menace de compromettre la tranquillité de toute l'Europe.

L'original de cette lettre, dont copie ci-joint en traduction, doit être transmis d'abord à l'Ambassade Ottomane à Vienne, et de là à son destination finale par l'intermédiaire du Cabinet Autrichien à moins que le Premier Secrétaire de la dite Ambassade ne puisse obtenir un passeport pour le porter lui-même à St. Pétersbourg.

De telle manière que cette alternative serait déterminée par les Représentants à Vienne réunis en conférence, il est à désirer que la remise de la lettre à M. de Nesselrode ne soit effectuée sans votre concours, et l'on aura besoin de tout l'appui que vous seriez à même de lui prêter de concert avec vos collègues, pour faire sur le Cabinet Russe une impression désirée. Malgré que plus d'une circonstance ferait espérer que l'Empereur Nicolas est mieux disposé à un accommodement qu'il ne l'était il y a quelques semaines, la détermination déclarée par la Porte de ne jamais prendre un engagement diplomatique relatif aux privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque, présente toujours de grandes difficultés. Cependant le Cabinet Russe désavoue toute prétention au-delà du maintien des privilèges qui lui ont été assurés dès les premiers temps, et cette circonstance fait espérer que l'Ambassade offerte de nouveau par la Porte pourrait être agréée, et que par votre entremise officieuse et celle de vos collègues, employée avec les ménagements propres à l'occasion, la base d'un accommodement qui en est le but pourrait être arrêtée d'avance. La communication, en forme de note, des firmans solennels qui confirment à perpétuité de la part du Sultan les dits privilèges semble fournir un moyen des plus efficaces de réaliser cet espoir, pour peu que le Gouvernement Impérial fût disposé, comme on l'affirme, à rassurer la Porte surtout par une déclaration formelle, dont la substance serait qu'il n'entend nullement empiéter sur l'indépendance du Sultan et le libre exercice de ses droits souverains. Je me borne à ce seul différend dans la conviction que les autres points contenus dans les dernières déclarations du Comte de Nesselrode seraient facilement arrangés.

En recommandant tous ces propos à votre zèle connu, M. le Chevalier, je n'ai pas besoin d'attirer votre attention sur l'extrême importance de hâter autant que possible l'expédition de la réponse que son Excellence M. de Nesselrode jugerait convenable à faire à la lettre de Reshid Pasha.

Au cas que les apparences feraient prévoir une réponse favorable, l'emploi de vos bons offices pourrait, ce me semble, contribuer à faire sentir à M. le Chancelier tout ce qu'il y aurait d'opportun et de conséquent dans l'évacuation des deux Principautés au moment même où la Porte, rassurée par la réponse de son Excellence, donnerait l'ordre à son Ambassadeur de se rendre à St. Pétersbourg. Il est à prévoir que l'effet immédiat d'une mesure si nécessaire serait de faire cesser toute démonstration d'inquiétude de ce côté-ci, et non-seulement de rassurer les populations Chrétiennes en Turquie, mais d'ôter aux Puissances alliées de la Porte tout motif de veiller plus qu'à l'ordinaire au maintien de son indépendance.

Il est convenu qu'une dépêche identique avec celle-ci sera adressée à votre collègue représentant de France, et que les Cours de Vienne et de Berlin feront parvenir sans délai des instructions analogues à leurs Représentants à St. Pétersbourg. Je me hâte de la soumettre au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine, et fort du soin que j'ai mis à la rendre conforme, soit à la lettre, soit à l'esprit



de mes instructions, j'ose compter, en attendant, sur votre coopération obligéante pour y donner toute la suite dont elle serait capable.

Il va sans dire que l'assentiment clair et formel de la Porte accompagne tout ce que j'ai l'honneur de vous mander ici dans l'intérêt de la paix.

Je vous prie, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 156.

*Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode.*

$\frac{5}{17}$ *Juillet*, 1853.

LES troupes de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ayant occupé les provinces de Valachie et de Molduvie contre l'attente de leur propre Gouvernement, la Sublime Porte s'est trouvée dans la nécessité de protester contre cet acte et croit devoir transmettre à votre Excellence copie de la note qui renferme sa protestation.

Je me plais à espérer que votre Excellence dans son équité voudra bien reconnaître que la Sublime Porte y a évité soigneusement tout ce qui aurait pu rendre les circonstances actuelles plus fâcheuses, tandis qu'elle y réitère les assurances les plus formelles que Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, même à présent, ne désiste en rien de son désir amical et parfaitement sincère non-seulement de remplir tous les engagements envers les Russes, mais en outre de leur donner telle preuve de ses dispositions cordiale qui soit compatible avec les droits sacrés de la souveraineté et avec l'honneur et les intérêts fondamentaux de son Empire.

La Sublime Porte ayant communiqué aux Légations des Grandes Puissances à Constantinople copies des firmans Impériaux, &c., qui confirment les privilèges religieux du sujets des différents cultes dans l'Empire Ottoman, copies de ces firmans sont envoyées aussi à votre Excellence; et comme les anciens privilèges du culte professé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, et par la majeure partie de ses sujets, ont été pleinement confirmés à perpétuité, la Sublime Porte espère que le Gouvernement Russe l'apprendra avec plaisir.

Ayant pleine confiance dans les sentiments pacifiques de votre Excellence, j'aime à croire qu'une réponse analogue de sa part ne tardera guères à combler l'attente que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de lui réitérer.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 156.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Westmorland.*

*Therapia, July* 19, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship, under flying seal, a despatch, accompanied with several inclosures, which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Envoy at St. Petersburgh, in the hope of contributing to the restoration of a good understanding between Russia and Turkey, before their unfortunate differences assume a character of actual hostility. I have drawn it up in the French language, as being more convenient for purposes of communication with the Austrian, French, and Prussian Representatives, with whom I am acting on this occasion. M. de la Cour joins with me in adopting the same letter. Baron de Bruck and M. de Wildenbruch write in similar terms to their respective Courts.

For my guidance in this joint proceeding I have no special instructions entirely covering the case; but the magnitude of the object, and its urgency, coming in aid of the letter and spirit of those which have reached me, leave no room to doubt the propriety of my course; and I venture, therefore, to reckon with confidence upon your Lordship's cooperation as well as on that of Sir Hamilton Seymour.

The modes of reconciliation previously and separately suggested by the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin have dropped, through their inaptness to meet the conflicting exigencies of the case. The present experiment is based on the assertion of some marked improvement in the disposition of Russia, and it

carries the advantage not only of being in accord with the principles declared in 1841, but of tending directly to remove, in one way or another, that baneful uncertainty which, in my humble judgment, cannot be prolonged without imminent danger to all the great interests at stake.

You will observe that our point of departure is the Porte's communication of its protest against the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia by Russia. It would really seem, both in reason and justice, that the Porte's adoption of that milder course, accompanied with friendly explanations and still more friendly communications, ought to confirm the Russian Cabinet in any pre-existing improvement of its feelings towards Turkey.

It is obvious that the main difficulty subsists in framing a basis of arrangement respecting the religious privileges, which would satisfy Russia without betraying the Porte: and it may be added, on the faith of the Porte's repeated declarations, that if the Emperor continues to insist on a guarantee, involving diplomatic or exclusive engagements, no plan of voluntary accommodation can possibly succeed. As for Prince Menchikoff's note, the Divan will not hear of it.

Allow me in other respects to refer you to the identical despatch, which I hope is sufficiently explicit in its terms.

I shall be anxious to know the result of your conference on the subject of its contents, and I have no doubt that you will convey all necessary information to Sir H. Seymour together with my despatch. Here we are all of opinion that expedition is of the utmost consequence; and I need not add that, as the Four Powers, in so far as depends on us, are now united on treaty ground, it is extremely desirable, if I may be allowed an opinion, to keep them there, without overstepping the real intent of this present proceeding as sanctioned and shared by the Porte.

I conclude by forwarding to you herewith a translation of Reshid Pasha's instruction to the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna. I have just received from His Highness a Turkish copy of the original sent for communication to the four Representatives.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 5 in No. 156.

*Reshid Pasha to the Turkish Minister at Vienna.*

(Traduction.)

*Juillet*, 1853.

VOTRE Excellence aura déjà appris par les dépêches détaillées qui lui ont été adressées, que les troupes Russes ayant passé le Pruth et franchi la frontière en violation des Traités existants, la Sublime Porte, d'après l'usage des Gouvernements, a protesté publiquement et formellement contre ce procédé. Par suite donc d'une conférence tenue avec les Représentants des Quatre Puissances, des délibérations qui ont eu lieu dans le Conseil suprême, et des ordres de Sa Majesté Impériale émanés à cet égard, une copie de la dépêche que j'ai adressé en cette occasion aussi au Comte de Nesselrode, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Russie, est transmise à votre Excellence.

Il a été décidé dans cette conférence et au Conseil que la dépêche en question serait confiée à un des Secrétaires de la Légation Impériale à Vienne le plus apte à ce service, afin qu'elle fût portée à St. Pétersbourg; mais si quelque difficulté à l'exécution de ce plan était opposée par le Ministre de Russie, M. de Meyendorff, la dépêche en question serait transmise à St. Pétersbourg par l'intermédiaire de son Excellence M. le Comte de Buol, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. Cette démarche ne devra pas être considérée comme une mesure isolée de la part de l'Autriche, celle-ci se trouvant dans la même position que tout les Représentants des autres Gouvernements concourant à son adoption.

Vous êtes donc chargé, au reçu de la dépêche dont il s'agit, de vous réunir sans retard avec leurs Excellences le Comte de Buol et les Représentants



d'Angleterre, de France, et de Prusse, afin de conférer avec eux sur cet objet, et de porter à exécution celui des deux projets qui sera adopté, en m'informant au plutôt du résultat définitif.

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No. 157.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 164.)

*Therapia, July* 20, 1853.

My Lord,

AT the suggestion of Captain Slade, confirmed by other naval opinions, I advised the Porte to send a small cruizing squadron, composed of a frigate, a corvette, a brig, and a steamer, some fifty miles into the Black Sea, in consequence of a large Russian frigate and steamer having been seen within ten or fifteen miles of the Bosphorus under circumstances which required some degree of attention.

The Porte lost no time in complying with my advice, and I believe that the vessels in question are still engaged in their cruize.

I am informed that a Turkish brig, having previously fallen in with a Russian man-of-war, saluted in the customary manner, and that the salute was not returned.

The Porte has recently fitted out another line-of-battle ship and a frigate, for service at the entrance of the Bosphorus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 158.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 307.)

*Foreign Office, July* 29, 1853.

My Lord,

ON the 25th instant, I received from Lord Westmorland a telegraphic despatch of which I inclose a copy to your Lordship.*

I lost no time in communicating upon the subject with Count Walewski, and his Excellency informed me that a similar despatch had been addressed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys by the Baron de Bourqueney, who stated that the modifications of the French note proposed by Count Buol were insignificant.

I told Count Walewski that the course suggested by Count Buol appeared to me unobjectionable, but that Her Majesty's Government could not engage to sanction any change in the note they had agreed to without previously knowing what alteration was intended, and that great caution upon this matter was necessary, as Baron Bruck, who doubtless acted upon his instructions, appeared to be more desirous to conclude an arrangement that should be satisfactory to Russia than honourable to the Porte. Count Walewski said that his Government intended to make a similar reservation in their answer to the Austrian proposal, and I afterwards sent to him a copy of my reply to Lord Westmorland, of which I also inclose a copy to your Lordship.*

I yesterday received by telegraph from Lord Westmorland a despatch containing the proposed modifications, and having again communicated with Count Walewski, I learned from him that similar information had been received by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who was prepared to approve of the alterations.

I inclose copies of Lord Westmorland's despatch and of my answer,* which your Excellency will communicate to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, informing him at the same time that the instruction that Lord Westmorland is directed to convey Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has for its object to prevent confusion in the event of any other arrangement having been adopted by the Porte before the arrival of this fresh project from Vienna.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* See Inclosures 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, in No. 175.

No. 159.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)*

(No. 302.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July 29, 1853.*

I SAW Baron Manteuffel this evening, and we had some conversation on the subject of a conference which appears to be established at Vienna between the Representatives of the Four Powers, for the purpose of drawing up a note; based on that proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, for the settlement of the quarrel between Russia and Turkey. His Excellency told me that Baron Canitz had been empowered on the part of Prussia to assist at this conference, and that he hoped it would secure a satisfactory result; but that as yet he was not in possession of any intelligence beyond the mere fact of the proposed meeting.

We then spoke of the several events which had occurred connected with the Eastern affairs since we last met. He said that he had read with much interest your Lordship's answer to the second Russian circular (No. 134 to Sir Hamilton Seymour), and that he highly approved of your Lordship's draft of Convention, which he considered to have the advantage over the other projects, that it was explicit, and defined the position of Russia in the question under dispute more clearly than they did. But he added that he did not wish to pronounce a preference in favour of any one, for that he ardently desired to see the affair concluded in a manner which would insure the independence and integrity of Turkey.

He said that he had received the Porte's protest of the 14th July, and that the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires had been with him to urge him to answer it; that he thought it would be best to confine his answer to a simple acknowledgment of its arrival.

I then told his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government regretted to find Prussia seemed no longer disposed to take as anxious a part in favour of Turkey as she appeared disposed to do at the outset of this question, and that her falling off in this respect had improved the position of Russia, and had left to Austria a more important share in the negotiations which Prussia might have enjoyed with her.

His Excellency replied that in reality her position was not changed, and that the Government was animated with the same sentiments as ever; but that he had reason to complain of the want of confidence shown to him by the Austrian Cabinet, which had latterly made scarcely any communications to him. The tone and manner in which Baron Manteuffel spoke, indicated a want of confidence in the intentions of Austria, and a jealousy of the part she has now undertaken; but he assured me that the Representatives of Prussia at the Great Courts were all directed to use their best influence in terminating this business, and that the opinions of the Government were unchanged, though circumstances had made them appear so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 160.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)*

(No. 286.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July 25, 1853.*

I YESTERDAY received a message from Count Buol requesting me to call upon him, which I did accordingly, when he explained that the despatches which he had received from Constantinople not having corresponded to the hope he had entertained that some project, such as had been proposed to the Porte by the Austrian Internuncio, and accepted by the Representatives of England, France, and Prussia, would have been adopted by that Government, and would have been transmitted to him to be forwarded to St. Petersburgh, he had come to the determination, with the sanction of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, of calling upon M. de Bourqueney, Baron Canitz, and myself, to consult together, with the view of arriving at the adoption of some proposal which could be submitted to the Porte with the sanction of all our Governments.



Count Buol explained that his object in making this proposal was, that if the note we might approve of was adopted by the Porte, it should be transmitted to St. Petersburgh with the same recommendation as to its acceptance as had been addressed to Turkey.

The other Ministers, as well as myself, having agreed to this proposal, as one which we would submit to our respective Governments, Count Buol stated that the note which had been proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys appeared to him to be the best foundation upon which we could proceed in the formation of the new one. I mentioned the Convention which your Lordship had drawn up, and which I had learnt from you had been approved by Baron Brunnow as well calculated to obtain the object we had in view; but as the note of M. Drouyn de Lhuys had already been transmitted to Constantinople, and had been approved by your Lordship, it was considered by the other Ministers as more likely to be accepted by the Government of the Sultan, by whom such strong objections had already been stated to any transaction in the form of a Convention.

The general opinion having, therefore, been pronounced in favour of the projected form of a note, I agreed to submit the proposal to your Lordship, and, as there would be no means of communicating with Constantinople until Friday next, by which time a courier from St. Petersburgh was expected, it was agreed that Count Buol should draw up the note and submit it for our consideration, by which time it was expected that the answers from our respective Governments would be arrived.

The answer from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, agreeing to this proposal, has already been received from M. de Bourqueney, with the injunction only that the alterations in the original note, before they are adopted, are to be reported for the sanction of the French Government, and Count Buol has consequently proceeded in drawing up the note.

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor spoke to me of the anxiety he felt that the project proposed by Count Buol should be adopted; and he expressed his regret that Baron Meyendorff, who had been invited to attend the conference, had not considered himself authorized to do so. His Majesty stated that he felt great anxiety for the settlement of these lamentable complications, and that he had used every exertion to prevent them, and would, now that they had arisen, continue those exertions to put an end to them.

*July 26th.*—Since the above was written, I received, after 12 o'clock last night, your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of yesterday's date. I transmitted a copy of it early this morning to Count Buol, with a request that he would send me the modifications he proposed in the note to be adopted, that I might immediately transmit them by telegraph to your Lordship, and I am still waiting for his reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 161.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)*

(No. 289.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July 26, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 215, I have to state that I have received no information with respect to the intended occupation of Bosnia and Servia by Austrian troops, which would induce me to give any more credence to the report than is given to it by Her Majesty's Government; but in case the adoption of that measure should now or hereafter be entertained, I will act in accordance with your Lordship's instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 162.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)*

(No. 292.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July 27, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL called M. de Bourqueney, Baron Canitz, and myself, to a second conference this day, when he communicated to us a project of a note he had drawn up in accordance with the understanding come to at the last conference on the 24th instant, and reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 286.

The modifications he had made in the original note of M. Drouyn de Lhuys were discussed, and several alterations proposed and adopted, and the note, according to the copy which I have the honour of inclosing, was finally agreed to, to be submitted to our respective Governments.

Your Lordship will have received all the essential modifications inserted in this note by the telegraphic messages I transmitted to you this day, and if they meet with the approbation of the different Governments, it is Count Buol's intention to forward the note to Baron Bruck by the steamer which leaves Vienna on Friday the 29th, and will arrive in six or seven days at Constantinople.

Count Buol will instruct the Internuncio to recommend the adoption of this note by the Turkish Government in the strongest manner, as having been agreed to by the Four Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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Inclosure in No. 162.

*Note proposed to be sent to Constantinople by the Representatives of the Four Powers.*

| *The paragraphs of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' Note, as they stand in the original.* | *Count Buol's Note (founded upon that of M. Drouyn de Lhuys), as agreed to by the Ministers of England, France, and Prussia, at Vienna, on the 27th instant.* |
|---|---|
| LE départ de M. le Prince de Menchikoff dans des circonstances qui auraient pu jeter des doutes heureusement mal-fondés sur le caractère amical et confiant des relations que Sa Majesté le Sultan a à cœur d'entretenir et de resserrer avec son auguste allié et voisin, Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, a profondément peiné la Sublime Porte.——Elle s'est donc occupé soigneusement de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces d'un si regrettable mal-entendu, et un irade suprême . . . | SA Majesté le Sultan n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont malheureusement été altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, a pris soigneusement à tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ce différend. |
| *Elle* | Un irade suprême en date du lui ayant fait connaître la décision impériale, *la Sublime Porte* se félicite de pouvoir la communiquer à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode. |
| à M. l'Ambassadeur de Russie ou à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode. | Si, à toute époque, les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les con- |



| *The paragraphs of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' Note.* | *Count Buol's Note.* |
|---|---|
| | sacrer de nouveau par des actes solennels qui attestaient de leur ancienne et constante bienveillance à l'égard de leurs sujets Chrétiens. |
| *la plus sincère* et de son désir intime de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui existent entre les deux Etats, n'a écouté . . . . | Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul Medjid, aujourd'hui régnant, animé des mêmes dispositions et voulant donner à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un témoignage personnel de son amitié *la plus sincère*, n'a écouté que sa confiance infinie dans les qualités éminentes de son auguste ami et allié, et a daigné prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations dont son Excellence M. le Prince Menchikoff *s'était* rendu l'organe auprès de la Sublime Porte. |
| *s'est* | Le Soussigné *a*, en conséquence, reçu l'ordre de déclarer par la présente que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté *le Sultan*, fidèle à la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traités de Kutschuk-Kainardji et d'Andrinople relatives à la protection du culte Chrétien, regarde comme étant de son *honneur* de faire observer à tout jamais et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit présentement, soit dans l'avenir, la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui ont été accordés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté à l'Eglise Orthodoxe d'Orient et qui sont maintenues et confirmés par elle, et, en outre, à faire participer, dans un esprit de haute équité, le rit Grec aux avantages concédés aux autres rits Chrétiens, par Convention ou disposition particulière. Au reste, comme le firman Impérial qui vient d'être donné au Patriarchat et au clergé Grecs, et qui contient la confirmation de leurs privilèges spirituels, devra être regardé comme une nouvelle preuve de ces nobles sentiments, et comme, en outre, la proclamation de ce firman qui donne toute sécurité devra faire disparaître à jamais toute crainte à l'égard du rit qui est la religion de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, je suis heureux d'être chargé du devoir de faire la présente notification. Quant à la garantie qu'à l'avenir il ne sera rien changé aux lieux de visitation de Jérusalem, elle résulte du firman revêtu du hatti-humaïun, le 15 de la lune de Rébi-ul-Akhir 1268 (Février 1852) expliqué et corroboré par les firmans des . . . . et l'intention formelle de Sa Majesté le Sultan est de faire exécuter, sans aucune altération, ses décisions souveraines. La Sublime Porte, en outre, promet officiellement qu'il ne sera |

| *The paragraphs of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' Note.* | *Count Buol's Note.* |
|---|---|
| *sans* que les Gouvernements de France et de Russie en soient préalablement informés. *La même* . . . . | apporté aucune modification à l'état des choses qui vient d'être *réglé sans* une entente préalable avec les Gouvernements de Russie et de France, et sans préjudice aucune pour les différentes communautés Chrétiens. (*La même* notification sera faite à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français.) |
| (in dubio) | Pour le cas où la Cour Impériale de Russie en ferait la demande, il serait assigné une localité convenable dans la ville de Jerusalem ou dans les environs pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pélerins indigents ou malades de la même nation. |
| | La Sublime Porte s'engage, dès à présent, à souscrire à cet égard un Acte solennel qui placerait ces fondations pieuses sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine. |
| | Le Soussigné, &c. |

No. 163.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 246.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 4, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government approve of your proceedings as reported in your despatches Nos. 286 and 292.

Shortly after the rupture between Russia and the Porte, the Austrian Government were made aware by my communications to Count Colloredo and to your Lordship, that a conference was desired by Her Majesty's Government as the fittest mode of bringing the designs of Russia upon Turkey under the deliberation and control of the Great Powers of Europe, and Her Majesty's Government therefore learned with much satisfaction that your Lordship, together with your French and Prussian colleagues, had been invited by Count Buol to concert with him upon a plan of settlement that should be acceptable alike to the Emperor of Russia and to the Sultan.

As the mediation of Austria has been accepted by Russia, Her Majesty's Government regret that the Russian Minister should not have considered himself authorized to attend the conference, to which he seems to have also been invited by Count Buol; but Her Majesty's Government hope that this does not indicate a disinclination on the part of Russia to accept the reasonable terms that will be submitted to her, and with respect to which it is natural to suppose that Count Buol has been in communication with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

Upon this point, however, Her Majesty's Government are desirous to receive precise information, as it is of the utmost importance that all unnecessary delay should be avoided, both with reference to the increasing excitement which prevails in Turkey, and to the advanced state of the season, which will not permit of the combined fleets remaining much longer in the open Bay of Besika; and I need hardly add that they will not move further from Constantinople so long as the Principalities are occupied by Russian troops.

As soon as it becomes known to the Austrian Government that the note has been accepted by the Porte and by Russia, Her Majesty's Government are extremely desirous that the Russian Government should be advised to commence the evacuation of the Principalities upon the arrival of the Turkish Ambassador at Odessa on his way to St. Petersburgh; for to require the Sultan to send a mission to the Power whose troops hold possession of a portion of his territory, would be a humiliation to which an independent Sovereign might with reason decline to expose himself.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.



No. 164.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 2.)

(No. 551.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 29, 1853.

THE short time allowed me for the perusal of Lord Stratford's despatches of the 20th, which I had the honour to forward to your Lordship this morning, prevented my seeing M. Drouyn de Lhuys before the departure of Lord Stratford's messenger, and informing your Lordship, by that occasion, of the impression made upon the French Government by the new turn which the Eastern Question had taken at Constantinople.

I have since seen the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had been with the Emperor at St. Cloud, for the purpose of communicating to His Majesty the despatches from M. de la Cour, which the "Caradoc" had likewise conveyed to Marseilles. M. Drouyn de Lhuys was good enough to read them to me.

As far as my recollection serves, after the rapid perusal which I was forced to make of Lord Stratford's communications, there is no essential difference between his Excellency's accounts of the late transactions between Reshid Pasha and the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, at Constantinople, and those transmitted to the French Government by M. de la Cour. In some points the latter were more circumstantial, in others less so, but in essentials the two agree.

After reading M. de la Cour's despatches to me, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that the first thing he had done, before even taking the Emperor's orders, was to enjoin M. de Bourqueney, by telegraph, not to act upon M. de la Cour's letter until further orders, it being his intention to consult with the British Government before taking any decision in this new phase of the Question.

I must, however, add that the intelligence from Constantinople has not made a favourable impression either upon the Emperor or upon his Minister for Foreign Affairs, though both render full justice to the pacific spirit which animated the Representatives of the Great Powers at Constantinople, in entering upon the course which the despatches of Lord Stratford and M. de la Cour describe. But they are apprehensive that this new project may interfere with the discussions already commenced, if not brought to a conclusion, by the Representatives of the same Powers at Vienna, and they do not think the Constantinople project so likely to please the Emperor of Russia as that elaborated in the Austrian capital.

There were also points of detail, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, to which he had strong objections. He doubted the success of an endeavour to resume negotiations with Russia by the transmission of the protest of the Porte, and he confessed that he should not like to send instructions to M. Castelbajac to give any support to a letter inclosing that document, because he saw in it admissions which he considered it would have been more advisable that the Porte should not have made. On this point he had reason to think that your Lordship agreed with him. Neither could he admit the analogy which would be drawn between the Russian occupation of the Principalities and the presence of the British and French fleets in Besika Bay, if the withdrawal of the former was to be in any way connected with the departure of the latter. He argued that neither Government could subscribe to such a condition after the declarations

on the subject made by Her Majesty's Ministers in Parliament, and by the French Government in the note which had been published. He then alluded to the renewed declaration of the determination of the Turkish Government not to enter into any diplomatic engagement which should give Russia a right of interference in the internal affairs of Turkey. He had always doubted the prudence of the first declaration to this effect; for, however much we might shut our eyes to it, a diplomatic note is a diplomatic engagement. Finally, he said that it was possible that the note recommended by the Four Powers to be presented by Reshid Pasha in lieu of that demanded by Prince Menchikoff might be excellent—he must reserve his judgment until he had seen it; but, at all events, he should recommend that Austria should take charge of it, and that the preliminary step of sending Reshid Pasha's letter and the Turkish protest should be omitted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 165.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 552.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 29, 1853.*

AMONG the papers on the Eastern question which have lately been transmitted to me by your Lordship, is a despatch from Lord Westmorland of the 10th instant (No. 270), in which his Lordship states that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had informed M. de Bourqueney that the French project of note for settling the differences between Russia and the Porte, to which reference was first made in my despatches Nos. 480 and 484, had been approved by Her Majesty's Government.

As there is some slight discrepancy between M. Drouyn de Lhuys' statement and the words which I have used in your Lordship's name when speaking of this project, it may be as well to state that he never heard from me that your Lordship approved the note. I told him that you admired the cleverness with which it was drawn up, but that you were convinced, since Russia had declared that she would accept of no other note but that contained in Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum, that the French project would not satisfy the Emperor.

I have, however, on more than one occasion assured the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that the project of Convention put forward by Her Majesty's Government was not conceived in any spirit of rivalry towards the French or any other project of arrangement, and that if the French project was preferred, Her Majesty's Government would be quite ready to adopt it.

Your Lordship is already aware that when the French project was put forward, M. Drouyn de Lhuys had no expectation that it would succeed. In fact he only sent it to St. Petersburgh with the laudable design of proving that the French Government, to which such warlike propensities were attributed, had seriously occupied themselves in endeavouring to find a solution of the Eastern differences.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 166.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 561.)

My Lord, *Paris, August 1, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship will have been informed by Count Walewski that the French Government approves and recommends the adoption of the modifications which your Lordship was desirous to see introduced into the Project of Note which the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna had agreed upon,



might be accepted by both Russia and Turkey as an honourable solution of their present differences.

Your Lordship will also have been made aware from Vienna that the same Representatives had considered it more prudent, in order to avoid all appearance of a combination against Russia, not to press the acceptance of this note on the Russian Cabinet by any representations addressed to their colleagues at St. Petersburgh, but to leave it to their respective Governments to take such steps as each might judge advisable.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me this morning, that in consequence of this determination he was about to send instructions to General Castelbajac to state that the French Government approved the Project which had been elaborated at Vienna, and which was to be transmitted to Constantinople this day for the sanction of the Turkish Government, and that they desired to know whether it would or would not be accepted by the Emperor of Russia, adding that if Count Nesselrode's answer should be either unfavourable or evasive, General Castelbajac was at once to state that the French Government would have to take into their consideration (s'aviserait) what ulterior proceedings might become necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 167.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 563. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, August 1, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has given me confidentially the details of a despatch, dated the 25th ultimo, which he has received from the French Minister at St. Petersburgh.

General Castelbajac had been desired to question Count Nesselrode closely as to the views and intentions of Russia, and a conversation of some vivacity appears to have ensued. M. de Nesselrode stated that the Cabinet of Vienna had given the Russian Government to understand that the Porte was inclined to act upon the "projet-Bourqueney," and that if this did not succeed, the Austrian Government would be prepared with another plan. No decision, therefore, could be taken at St. Petersburgh, until the intentions of the Ottoman Government were known.

General Castelbajac observes that there was much ill humour at St. Petersburgh against the French, the Emperor of Russia choosing to think that there was an inclination on the part of the French Government to exclude him from all influence, not only in the East but in the West; and the General thinks that the mediation of Austria in the Eastern question is put rather ostentatiously forward by Count Nesselrode to mark the preference given to an Austrian over a French arrangement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 168.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 311.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.*

ON the 30th ultimo Count Walewski informed me that he had received instructions to propose to Her Majesty's Government that in the event of Russia not accepting within a very short time, or not showing herself well disposed to accept, the measures of conciliation submitted to her, the fleets of France and England should without delay receive orders to enter the Dardanelles upon the first demand of the Porte.

I told Count Walewski that I adhered to the opinion I had several times expressed to him upon this subject, and that I could see no advantage in hypothetical agreements which would never supersede subsequent discussion and deliberation between our respective Governments, nor materially influence their decision upon events as they arose.

Count Walewski assured me that he was far from wishing for any formal engagement or even understanding, but simply for an exchange of opinion between the two Governments as to the course that in certain eventualities it might be desirable to pursue.

I then said that I would read to his Excellency the concluding paragraph of a despatch I had written to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and which had received the approval of more than one of my colleagues. The paragraph is as follows:

"In the event of any further act of aggression by Russia, or of undue delay on her part in accepting the terms for an amicable arrangement that may be proposed to her, Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of France, will be prepared to take more active measures for the protection of Turkey against a Power of whose hostile designs there will then exist no reasonable doubt."

Count Walewski expressed his satisfaction, and I requested his Excellency clearly to understand that the term of delay to be granted to Russia and the future mode of operation were still left quite free and open for discussion between the French and English Governments. To this Count Walewski entirely assented.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 169.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 381.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1853.*

THE French Minister has read to me two excellent despatches, dated the 15th instant, from which he has received from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and in which the assertions, for I will not call them arguments, of the second Russian circular are successfully refuted.

Although only one of these papers was intended for communication to the Russian Government, General Castelbajac has not scrupled to read both to the Chancellor, and to explain to him as clearly as I had endeavoured to do, that no comparison can be admitted as to the position of the allied fleets in Besika Bay and that taken up by the Imperial forces in the Principalities.

It appeared from one of the despatches that the French Government were disposed to give their full support to the Projet de Convention between Russia and the Porte, of which a copy was supplied to General de Castelbajac.

It may be right that I should observe to your Lordship that my French colleague, although the most peaceable and conciliatory of men, has considerably altered his opinions and language since the appearance of the second circular issued by Count Nesselrode.

He immediately represented to his Government that the advance of the fleets to Constantinople would be a measure which ought to be at once taken, and which would only correspond to the invasion of the Principalities; and although still intent upon amicable arrangements, he does not cease to represent the urgency for not allowing unnecessary time to be lost in negotiations.

General Castelbajac appears indeed to have stated to the Chancellor, as he has done to his own Government, that, in his opinion, war, when it may yet be conducted with facility, will be preferable to such protracted uncertainty as paralyses all commerce, and which may end in a rupture at a time of the year when the Baltic will be closed, and when the Black Sea will be scarcely navigable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 170.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 385. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1853.*

THE Chancellor spoke to me yesterday, of his own accord, of the Projet de Convention between Russia and Turkey, proposed by the English and French Governments.

He did not conceal from me that the objections which he entertained to the plan were slight; but observed, that he could give no positive answer until he had received some despatches, which in the course of a day or two must reach him from Vienna.

The objections, such as they were, to be made to the Projet de Convention, were three: that the preamble, he thought, might be abridged; that special mention might be made of the late firmans, relating to the holy places; and that some phrase might be employed which could connect (rattacher) the Sultan's engagements to the Treaty of Kainardji, and to the promises lately made by His Highness to the Greek Church.

I replied, that, without having authority to speak in your Lordship's name, I was convinced that your Lordship looked to the essence of the proposed Convention, and not to particular phrases; that all that was desired was that the affair should be terminated in a manner suited to the interests and consistent with the dignity both of the Emperor and the Sultan.

The conversation proceeded for some time in an amicable strain, and concluded by Count Nesselrode observing, that I might be convinced that the Russian Government was as desirous as that of Her Majesty could be that a peaceable and satisfactory solution of the difficulties should be arrived at.

It was agreed between Count Nesselrode and myself that I should call upon him again on the 29th instant, by which time he considers it certain that he shall be in possession of the despatches expected from Baron Meyendorff.

I hear from several quarters that the language of the Court at Peterhoff is, that all danger of a war is past, and that a settlement of the Oriental question is close at hand.

This and other indications induce me to believe that some arrangement more acceptable to the Russian Government than that devised at London and Paris must have been brought forward, with a certain prospect of success, by the Austrian Mission at Constantinople.

M. Balabine, who was the last of the Russian Mission to quit Pera, has returned to St. Petersburgh.

The language of this gentleman is less conciliatory than that of his superiors—a circumstance to be accounted for, probably, by his having been for a certain time under the orders of Prince Menchikoff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 171.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 386.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1853.*

IN obedience to your Lordship's directions, I furnished the Chancellor yesterday with a copy of your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant, No. 134, which at the same time I begged leave to read to his Excellency.

Count Nesselrode listened with great attention to the despatch, but made no reply or observation beyond this, that when I came to the words "between the position of the English and French fleets outside of the Dardanelles," he remarked that this could not but be considered by the Emperor as a threatening attitude.

To this assumption, I, on my side, could of course not accede. Count

Nesselrode then inquired if the despatch were to be considered as addressed to him? To which I replied, that it certainly was not; but that, being addressed to me, it was intended, as was seen by the concluding paragraph, for special communication to his Excellency.

The Chancellor then said that he should probably be obliged to address some observations in reply to Baron de Brunnow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 172.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.*

(No. 173.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.*

I HEREWITH transmit to your Lordship, for your information, copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting that the Prussian Minister at that Court had, by order of his Government, submitted a separate proposition to the Porte concerning the matter in dispute between Russia and Turkey; and I have to instruct your Lordship to express to Baron Manteuffel the surprise of Her Majesty's Government that the Prussian Government should have instructed Baron Wildenbruch to propose confidentially to Reshid Pasha the project erroneously attributed to M. de Bourqueney, without any previous communication to Her Majesty's Government or to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. Such a mode of proceeding, it is to be feared, is calculated to embarrass the Porte, and to mar, instead of promoting, the arrangement that the Four Powers desire to effect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 173.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 138.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 153 of the 17th of July, that Her Majesty's Government approve the course which you have decided upon adopting in regard to Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Bucharest, and Consul at Jassy, upon the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia being directed by the Russian authorities to suspend their relations with the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 174.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 139.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the advice which you have given to the Porte, as stated in your despatch No. 158 of the 18th of July, that with a view of allaying excitement, the Sultan should issue a proclamation calculated to remove erroneous impressions from the minds of the people.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 175.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 141.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having advised the Porte, as stated in your despatch No. 164 of the 20th of July, to send into the Black Sea a small squadron of observation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 176.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 144.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.*

I TRANSMITTED to your Excellency in my private letter of the 18th ultimo, a copy of the draft of note which had been submitted to Her Majesty's Government towards the end of June by the French Government, as being in their opinion calculated, if addressed by the Porte to Russia, to lead to a solution of the present differences between those Powers.

I learnt from Lord Westmorland, on the 23rd ultimo, that Count Buol conceived that a note might be framed for the acceptance of the Porte based on the French draft; and your Excellency will find in my despatch to Lord Cowley, and in the telegraphic despatches which have since passed between Lord Westmorland and myself, of which copies are now transmitted to you, the details of the course which has since been taken in regard to the Austrian proposal.

I now transmit to your Excellency a copy of the note in the terms to which Her Majesty's Government have assented, and in which they understand it will have been forwarded from Vienna to Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 176.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley, July 29, 1853.*

[See No. 158.]

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Inclosure 2 in No. 176.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 24, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL sent to call me to-day, as well as M. Bourqueney and M. Canitz, and told us that from the last accounts from Constantinople (14th) the negotiations begun there had seemingly made no progress. He wishes to make a note based on that of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and to have it forwarded to the Porte for its acceptance with the approval of our respective Courts. Please let me know if I will be authorized or not by you to give such approval.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 176.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 230.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 26, 1853.

WE approve of the mode of proceeding, but can give no positive sanction or support to the proposed note until we know in what manner it differs from the French note to which we have already agreed. Send me by telegraph the modifications of that note that are desired by the Austrian Minister.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 176.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienne, le* 27 *Juillet*, 1853.

VOICI les deux changements proposés par le Comte Buol sur le dispositif de la note de M. Drouyn de Lhuys: un à la suite de—"le soussigné a reçu l'ordre de déclarer par la présente que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan;" ajoutez —"fidèle à la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traités de Kainardji et Andrinople relatives à la protection du culte Chrétien, regarde," &c. Dans le paragraphe relatif aux lieux saints, remplace les mots "sans que les Gouvernements de France" jusqu'à "l'Ambassadeur de France" inclusivement, par "sans entente préalable avec les Gouvernements de France et de Russie, et sans préjudice aucun pour les différents communautés Chrétiennes." Quelques modifications de préambules devenues nécessaires par le changement de la situation, et jugées acceptables par nous tous, vous seront envoyés plus tard. Une réponse au plus vite est demandé.

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Inclosure 5 in No. 176.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienne, le* 27 *Juillet*, 1853.

VOICI les modifications du préambule: remplacez "Depuis le départ du Prince Menchikoff" jusqu'à "un irade suprême," par "Sa Majesté le Sultan n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, a pris soigneusement à tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ces différends."

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Inclosure 6 in No. 176.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 234.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1853.

WE agree to the modifications proposed. Inform Lord Stratford that Her Majesty's Government desire that this Project should be adopted by the Porte, if no other arrangement has been already made.

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Inclosure 7 in No. 176.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienne, le* 29 *Juillet*, 1853.

LE Comte Buol nous a réunis aujourd'hui pour nous communiquer les dépêches de Constantinople du 20 Juillet. Après avoir pris les ordres de l'Empereur il nous a déclaré que la lettre de Reshid Pasha était de nature à aigrir les débats plus qu'à les concilier, qu'il déclinait la responsabilité d'envoyer; que la marche adoptée ici ces jours derniers par lui, et approuvée par les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris, lui paraît la seule convenable, la seule efficace: en conséquence, le Cabinet Autrichien traite comme non avenue l'expédition de Constantinople du 20, et il se dispose à envoyer à Constantinople sous 48 heures un agent chargé de proposer définitivement à la Porte l'adoption du projet de note avec les modifications qui ont déjà reçu l'approbation du Cabinet Français, et sur lesquelles j'attend encore votre décision. Faites moi savoir quelles instructions je dois transmettre à Lord Stratford.

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Inclosure 8 in No. 176.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1853.

SUSPENDEZ l'envoi des dépêches de Constantinople adressées à Pétersbourg jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

Dans les modifications de la note Française suggérées par le Comte Buol, nous proposons après le mot "Sultan" d'ajouter "restera fidèle," &c.; et après "culte Chrétien" d'ajouter "et que Sa Majesté regarde," &c.

Ces changements sont désirables afin d'assurer l'acceptation de la Porte, cependant nous n'en faisons pas un *sine qua non* absolu. Informez le Comte Buol et vos collégues.

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Inclosure 9 in No. 176.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienne, le* 31 *Juillet*, 4 P.M.

JE viens d'une conférence où les changements que vous proposez par la dépêche télégraphique que j'ai reçue ce matin, ont été immédiatement adoptés par le Comte Buol et par mes collégues. Le Comte Buol nous a lu le projet de note modifié, qui sera envoyé demain par un Colonel chargé d'instructions formelles au Baron de Bruck d'appuyer fortement auprès de la Porte cette proposition; il portera une lettre autographique de l'Empereur au Sultan. J'enverrai vos ordres à Lord Stratford par la même voie. Un courrier Turc m'apporte aujourd'hui des communications de Lord Stratford du 23, qui sont le complément de l'expédition du 20. J'en suspends l'envoi, comme les autres, jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

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Inclosure 10 in No. 176.

*Draft of Note proposed by the French Government to be addressed by the Porte to Russia, as altered at Vienna and London.*

SA Majesté le Sultan n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, a pris conséquemment à tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ces différends; et un irade suprême en date de lui ayant fait connaître la décision Impériale, elle se félicite de pouvoir la communiquer à

son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Russie (ou à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode).

Si, à toute époque, les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les consacrer de nouveau par des actes solennels qui attestaient leur ancienne et constante bienveillance à l'égard de leurs sujets Chrétiens.

Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul Medjid, aujourd'hui régnant, animé des mêmes dispositions, et voulant donner à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un témoignage personnel de son amitié la plus sincère et de son désir intime de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui existent entre les deux Etats, n'a écouté que sa confiance infinie dans les qualités éminentes de son auguste ami et allié, et a daigné prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations dont son Excellence M. le Prince Menchikoff s'est rendu l'organe auprès d'elle.

Le Soussigné a reçu, en conséquence, l'ordre de déclarer par la présente que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan restera fidèle à la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traités de Kainardji et Andrinople relatives à la protection du culte Chrétien, et que Sa Majesté regarde qu'il est de son honneur de faire observer à tout jamais, et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit présentement soit dans l'avenir, la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui ont été accordés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté à l'Eglise Orthodoxe d'Orient, et qui sont maintenus et confirmés par elle; et, en outre, à faire participer, dans un esprit de haute équité, le rit Grec aux avantages concédés aux autres rits Chrétiens, par convention ou disposition particulière.

Au reste, comme le firman Impérial qui vient d'être donné au patriarche et au clergé Grecs, et qui contient la confirmation de leurs privilèges spirituels, devra être regardé comme une nouvelle preuve de ces nobles sentiments, et comme, en outre, la proclamation de ce firman qui donne toute sécurité devra faire disparaître à jamais toute crainte à l'égard du rit qui est la religion de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, je suis heureux d'être chargé du devoir de faire la présente notification.

Quant à la garantie qu'à l'avenir il ne sera rien changé aux lieux de visitation de Jérusalem, elle résulte du firman revêtu du hatti-humayoun du 15 de la lune de Rebiul-Akhir, 1268 (Février 1852) expliqué et corroboré par les firmans de ; et l'intention formelle de Sa Majesté le Sultan est de faire exécuter sans aucune altération ses décisions souveraines.

La Sublime Porte en outre promet officiellement qu'il ne sera apporté aucune modification à l'état des choses sans entente préalable avec les Gouvernements de France et de Russie, et sans préjudice aucun pour les différentes communautés Chrétiennes.

Pour le cas où le Cour Impériale de Russie en ferait demande, il sera assigné une localité convenable dans la ville de Jerusalem, ou dans les environs, pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pèlerins indigents ou malades de la même nation.

La Sublime Porte s'engage, dès à présent, à souscrire à cet égard un Acte solennel qui placerait ces fondations pieuses sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

Le Soussigné, &c.

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No. 177.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 141.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.*

I HAVE the satisfaction to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your proceedings as reported in your despatch No. 162 of the 20th ultimo, and the efforts you have made for the re-establishment of friendly relations between Russia and the Porte.

By my despatch No. 144 of this day's date, your Excellency will learn that the



despatches addressed by you and by M. de la Cour to Sir Hamilton Seymour and to General de Castelbajac, as well as the letter of Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode, have been detained at Vienna; and Her Majesty's Government have approved of this proceeding, because the mediation of Austria having been accepted by Russia, and the former having reason to believe that the French note, with some slight modifications, already agreed to by the Four Powers, would be acceptable to the Emperor of Russia, it appeared inexpedient to run the risk of embarrassment or confusion at St. Petersburgh by a new form of arrangement which might also, if such should be the object of Russia, have furnished fresh pretext for delay.

Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, in preference to all other plans, adhered to this project of note as the means best calculated to effect a speedy and satisfactory solution of the differences. They consider that it fully guards the principle for which throughout we have been contending, and that it may therefore with perfect safety be signed by the Porte; and they further hope that your Excellency, before the receipt of this despatch, will have found no difficulty in procuring the assent of the Turkish Government to a project which the Allies of the Sultan unanimously concur in recommending for his adoption.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 178.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 152.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 3, 1853.*

I OBSERVE that the letter of the Hospodar of Moldavia to Reshid Pasha, announcing that he had been directed by the Russian Consul-General at Bucharest, under date June 23, to break off his relations with the Porte, of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch of July 17, is dated June 25; and even supposing that date to be of the old style, there would still be an interval of ten days between the date of the Hospodar's letter and that of your Excellency's despatch. I observe also that the letter of Count Nesselrode, upon which the Russian Consul-General acted in making this communication, is dated June 3.

The Russian Consul-General seems, from Mr. Colquhoun's despatch to your Excellency of July 19, of which he has transmitted to me a copy, to have deferred a communication to the same effect to the Hospodar of Wallachia until July 18; an interval of thirteen days at least having thus elapsed between his communications to the two Hospodars, even supposing the date of the letter to the Hospodar of Moldavia to have been of the old style, and therefore of July 5 according to the new style.

I should wish to learn from your Excellency on what day the communication was made to the Hospodar of Moldavia, and on what day notice of its having been made reached the Porte, and was made known to your Excellency by the Porte; and if any unnecessary delay was shown by the Turkish Ministers in imparting to you this intelligence, it will be desirable that you should ascertain the cause of such delay.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 179.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 163.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 3, 1853.

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having read to Count Nesselrode my despatch No. 130, of the 9th of July, respecting the Russian manifesto, and of your language in the conversation with his Excellency which ensued, as reported in your despatch No. 372 of the 22nd of July.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 180.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 164.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 3, 1853.

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve of your proceedings, as reported in your despatch No. 376 of the 22nd of July, with reference to the calumnious charges brought by the Russian Government against Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's conduct in the late discussions at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 181.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 165.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 3, 1853.

I THINK it right to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government were induced to approve of the draft of note inclosed in my despatch No. 154 of yesterday, which the Porte has been recommended from Vienna to address directly to the Russian Government, by the expectation that such a note will be accepted by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh as a satisfactory solution of its differences with the Porte.

But Her Majesty's Government are anxious to be informed, at the earliest possible period, whether their anticipations are likely to be realized.

You will therefore endeavour clearly to ascertain from Count Nesselrode the intentions of the Russian Government on that point; and you will report to me, without delay, the result of your communications with his Excellency.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 182.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 3.)

(No. 165.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 20, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Sultan's proclamation, which has been expected for some days, is at length in my possession, and I hasten to forward a translation of it for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I have no time to read it myself, or to ascertain whether any material alterations have been made in the draft already forwarded to England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 182.

*Proclamation.*

(Translation.) *Constantinople, July* 13, 1853.

IT has been already stated in the Turkish official "Gazette" that Russia, having broken off official relations with the Sublime Porte on certain matters on which they could not come to an understanding, withdrew her mission from Constantinople; and that, in consequence of the extensive preparations made by that Power by sea and by land, the Sublime Porte had made some military arrangements and defensive preparations, wholly for precaution and her own protection.

The real cause of the existing dispute with Russia is the desire of that Power to obtain a binding and exclusive engagement from the Porte concerning the religious privileges of the Greek churches and priesthood, which the Porte cannot in justice be expected to give.

Now these religious privileges, granted in the reign of his deceased Majesty Mehemed Khan, of glorious memory, and confirmed during the reigns of his illustrious successors, have been maintained ever since. In imitation of this noble example of his Royal predecessors, His present Majesty has likewise ratified and corroborated them. It never even entered into the imagination of any one to violate the ancient privileges granted *a proprio motu* by the Imperial Throne.

It has been repeatedly declared, in a friendly and sincere manner, that the Porte did not refuse to give assurances sufficient to remove the doubts on which the Russian Government establishes this dispute, in the same manner as the Porte can give assurances to the whole world in a matter so firmly settled; and that whereas, if one Government should enter into an engagement, having the colour or force of Treaty, with another, concerning the religious privileges of a nation consisting of so many millions of its subjects, the independence and sovereign rights of the Power thus bound would be impaired, such an engagement could not be consented to.

While no necessity existed for persisting to such an extent in this matter, the Government of Russia would not desist from its pretensions, and, indeed, the passage of the Russian troops across the Pruth to take temporary possession of and hold the Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, has been a subject of painful surprise to the Sublime Porte. This violation of the frontier is an infraction of existing Treaties, and has been immediately protested against, according to international law, that is, the Sublime Porte has officially and publicly notified to the Great Powers that she cannot accept such a violation of Treaty.

Since divers States, connected by the Treaties which they have contracted, constitute the links of mutual security with respect to territorial possessions and sovereign independence; since agreement and cooperation are the means now generally employed when serious disputes like the present arise; since, moreover, Russia has proclaimed that her real object was not to make war upon the Porte, but to hold possession of Wallachia and Moldavia as a guarantee until

such times as her claims are satisfied; and since all the Great Powers, without exception, have displayed sentiments more or less favourable towards Turkey, while two of them, England and France, being Powers on which, from their quality of maritime States, the Porte relies with special confidence, have given a practical manifestation of their friendship and goodwill, the Porte is engaged in communicating according to custom with the above States; and meanwhile, as she cannot possibly accept a proposition so detrimental to her independence and sovereign rights, she has adopted the unanimous resolution of assuming in her own defence an armed attitude, as well upon the Danube as upon her Asiatic frontier.

Such, then, is the real cause of the dispute with Russia, and the present aspect of the question. The Sublime Porte has at the same time been duly careful to adopt all necessary measures, and to make for her defence every requisite disposition of troops and ammunition.

The duty, therefore, of all the Porte's subjects, according to their several conditions, will be to continue in the tranquil prosecution of their respective concerns, agriculture, and commerce, and to hold themselves ready to execute any orders which may be issued to them by the Imperial Government.

As it has been clearly established in previous statements that, however the pretensions of Russia may relate to the religious privileges of the Greeks, neither the Greek people nor their Chiefs have any knowledge or participation therein; and the Sublime Porte is convinced that they are in every respect satisfied and grateful towards their Sovereign, and that they are concerned more than any other at such pretensions being put forward, it is on these accounts by no means fitting that any resentment should be felt towards them in this respect; and as the Greeks are equally faithful subjects of our gracious Master with the Armenians, the Catholics, the Protestants, and the Jews, it behoves all the Sultan's subjects, without exception, to be on good terms with each other, not acting hostilely, nor using abusive language, nor committing any action contrary to the Supreme will, but attending to their own concerns.

The above dispositions and decision, as well as the admonitions as above stated, are the result of the deliberation of a general Council, comprising the Sheikh-el-Islam, the learned Chiefs of the law, the Seraskier, and all those in military office, and the other Ministers and public servants, and held in the presence of the Grand Vizier; and an Imperial firman having also been issued on this subject, any one disapproving of this decision, and acting in contravention to these decisive admonitions, will be held a disobedient subject, and severely punished.

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No. 183.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 3.)

(No. 167.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 23, 1853.

AT the last meeting of the Four Representatives, held at my house on the 20th instant, I submitted for consideration a draft of a note, or part of a note, which might, if accepted by the Porte, be proposed to the Russian Cabinet as the final arrangement of the question of religious privileges, which a Turkish Extraordinary Ambassador would, if received at St. Petersburgh, be authorized to conclude.

This suggestion was favourably received by my colleagues, and, when subsequently communicated to Reshid Pasha, by his Highness also, who laid it before the Council and submitted it to the Sultan. Approved by both, after some alteration of no real importance, I have now the honour to bring it officially under your Lordship's notice. It is inclosed herewith in its amended shape; and I hope to obtain the consent of the other Representatives, as well as of the Turkish Minister, for sending it jointly to Vienna and St. Petersburgh by way of supplement to the identic despatch already forwarded, in copy, with my previous correspondence to your Lordship, and as offering to Russia, in a full though simple form, the utmost amount of satisfaction which the Porte can with safety give on the main point of difference.

The importance of not losing time will, I trust, excuse me for transmitting



it at once to Her Majesty's Ministers at Vienna and Petersburgh, with an urgent recommendation to use it without delay in carrying out the concerted plan of reconciliation now on its way to those capitals. If it be true, as confidentially stated in some official correspondence, that the Emperor of Russia is ready to declare his respect for the sovereign rights of the Sultan in return for a declaration securing the privileges of his Church in Turkey, he can hardly object to a mode of arrangement which meets his demand without requiring any counter-declaration on his part; especially when it is considered that the offer will, in all likelihood, be brought before His Imperial Majesty with the concurrence and support of his allies in the Treaty of 1841, and that the Porte consents to make it while two of her provinces are occupied by Russian troops, and to confirm it by means of a special embassy to Petersburgh, notwithstanding the rupture by Russia of her diplomatic relations with that Power.

A process, so humiliating to any independent empire, may be supported for the sake of peace and in consideration of past errors; but it is evidently most desirable to shorten it by all available means, and to make it, in case of failure, the passage to a more determined and progressive state of things. I submit that a powerful Government, insulated by the opinion of Europe, cannot be allowed to triumph in its wrong, without inflicting a heavy blow on that international morality which best controls the spirit of aggression, and insures the continuance of peace. The worst form of triumph, I conceive, would in the present instance be that which, by prolonging indefinitely a state of harassing encroachment on the one side, of exhausting efforts on the other, of disturbance and excitement on both, would finally leave to the weaker and injured party no resource but that of ruinous conflict or degrading submission. With no pretensions to foresight, I cannot conceal my apprehension that if the last reasonable prospect of bringing Russia to terms by negotiation were allowed to close in despair, the responsibility would rest with those who are deterred from the performance of duty by the sacrifices it necessarily involves.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 183.

*Project of Note.*

AWARE of the deep interest taken by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia and by the vast majority of his people in all that concerns the religion which they profess, and fully appreciating the motives of that interest, I had much pleasure in making known to your Excellency the firmans which the Sultan, my gracious Sovereign, promulgated at the end of Shaban in this year; and for the removal of all doubts, I now assure you on behalf of the Sublime Porte that it is the sincere intention of His Imperial Majesty, reserving the sacred rights of sovereignty towards his own subjects, to secure to the Greek, or Orthodox Church, by means of those firmans duly enforced, the enjoyment of the privileges thereby confirmed, and also of such other privileges and immunities as may hereafter be granted by His Majesty to any other sect whatever of his Christian subjects.

The Sublime Porte entertains no doubt that the assurance grounded on the above-mentioned firmans, which have inspired confidence everywhere, will give satisfaction to Russia also.

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No. 184.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 3.)

(No. 168.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 23, 1853.

I RECEIVED this morning from Reshid Pasha an official invitation to attend a conference at his house. On repairing thither at the appointed hour, I found the French Ambassador, the Internuncio, and the Prussian Minister, already assembled with his Highness. The Ottoman Minister lost no time in

acquainting us with the object of our meeting. He began by communicating, in a somewhat amended form, the project of an official note which I had proposed to my colleagues, and subsequently to his Highness, two or three days before. The French translation which accompanied the Turkish original is inclosed herewith. Your Lordship may observe that it differs slightly in two or three expressions from the English version which I forwarded with a preceding despatch, and which would not be unlikely to prove the more acceptable of the two to Count Nesselrode. If the difference were deemed to be of any importance at St. Petersburgh, I conceive that there would be little difficulty in reviving the dropped expressions when the note should be finally prepared for transmission to the Russian Government.

Reshid Pasha then proceeded to make us a formal declaration in the name of his Government, and the terms of the declaration having been consigned to paper in his presence, I beg to refer your Lordship for their exact purport to the memorandum inclosed herewith. It is certain that the Sultan and his Council have taken their line definitively, that they now consider themselves as making the last permissible effort for peace, and that their minds are made up for the consequences of a failure. Your Lordship will not fail to notice the last paragraph of the Porte's declaration. It stands in marked contrast with the incitement to a religious war paraded in the Emperor of Russia's manifesto.

The whole declaration was received by my colleagues without the slightest show of objection. The decision and firmness which it exhibits, accompanied as they are with fresh materials and renewed endeavours for an accommodation, appear to me, if I may hazard an opinion, both well-timed and creditable to the Porte. I hope they will be so viewed by Her Majesty's Government.

To complete your Lordship's information, I forward herewith copies of my additional letters to Sir George Seymour and Lord Westmorland. I must again apologise for writing to the former in French. I found it convenient for communicating with M. de la Cour, and securing a nearer approach to identity in our despatches on this occasion to St. Petersburgh.

I repeat my former request, that your Lordship will be kindly pleased to apprise Lord Westmorland and Sir H. Seymour by telegraph of the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the proposed course of proceeding.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 184.

*Project of Convention.*

*Balta Liman, le 19 Juillet*, 1853.

CONNAISSANT le profond intérêt que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ainsi que la grande majorité de son peuple prennent à tout ce qui concerne la religion qu'ils professent, et appréciant entièrement les motifs de cet intérêt, j'ai eu beaucoup de plaisir en faisant connaître à votre Excellence les firmans que mon auguste Souverain a promulgués vers la fin de Chahan de l'année courante. Et pour faire écarter tout le doute, je viens vous assurer de la part de la Sublime Porte que se réservant les droits sacrées de souveraineté envers ses propres sujets, il est de l'intention sincère de Sa Majesté Impériale d'assurer à l'Église Grecque à perpétuité la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui y sont confirmés, et de lui accorder aussi tels autres privilèges et immunités qu'il plairait à Sa Majesté d'accorder désormais à tout autre culte quelconque de ses sujets Chrétiens.

Enfin, je n'ai pas le moindre doute que les assurances basées sur les firmans précités, qui ont inspiré de la confiance partout, ne donnent aussi de la satisfaction à la Russie.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 184.

*Memorandum of Conference between Reshid Pasha and the Four Representatives.*

*Balta Liman, le 23 Juillet*, 1853.

LES Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, s'étant réunis en conférence chez le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Ottoman sur l'invitation de son Altesse, Reshid Pasha a pris la parole comme il suit:

"Je suis chargé par Sa Majesté le Sultan de communiquer à vos Excellences cette pièce avec sa traduction en langue Française, qui est un projet de note qui, dicté par de vrais sentiments de conciliation, parait au Gouvernement Impérial de nature à répondre au désir de la Russie, par rapport à la question des privilèges religieux.

"Je déclare officiellement que la Porte est décidée de ne point aller au-delà des termes d'une note strictement conformes à ce projet; tout autre arrangement lui paraissant une atteinte aux droits sacrés de sa souveraineté et de son indépendance.

"Il est bien entendu qu'aussitôt que la Cour de Russie aura fait connaître l'acceptation de ce projet, la Porte n'hésitera pas d'envoyer un Ambassadeur à St. Pétersbourg chargé de la remise de la susdite note.

"En retour de ces assurances formelles, la Sublime Porte attend que la Cour de Russie ne tardera pas à donner des ordres pour l'évacuation des Principautés Danubiennes.

"Enfin, je déclare, au nom de Sa Majesté le Sultan, que si, malgré tous ces efforts pour arriver à un arrangement pacifique et honorable, il serait obligé de pourvoir par d'autres moyens à la défense de son empire et à l'intégrité de ses droits. La guerre qui en résulterait malheureusement, ne serait à ses yeux qu'une lutte ayant pour objet d'assurer son indépendance."

Son Altesse a terminé sa communication en priant les Représentants de vouloir bien se charger de faire parvenir la déclaration qui précède, ainsi que le projet de note, à leurs collégues à Vienne et à St. Pétersbourg, de manière à compléter l'expédition précédente qui se rattache à la même affaire, et à provoquer dans le plus court délai possible une réponse du Cabinet Russe, laquelle devrait être envoyée au plutôt à Constantinople.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 184.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

M. le Chevalier, *Constantinople, le 23 Juillet*, 1853.

ME rapportant à la dépêche identique du 20 courant je m'empresse de vous envoyer ci-joint un projet de note que son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Ottoman vient de remettre aux quatre Représentants, comme ayant été arrêté en conseil et devant être présenté au Cabinet de Russie de la part de la Porte par l'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire qui serait envoyé à St. Pétersbourg aussitôt que son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode ferait connaître l'intention de sa Cour d'accepter les termes de la dite note.

J'ai l'honneur aussi de vous envoyer ci-joint en copie le memorandum d'une conférence qui vient d'avoir lieu aujourd'hui chez Reshid Pasha sur l'invitation adressée par son Altesse aux quatre Représentants. La déclaration que nous a faite le Ministre Ottoman, comme vous y verrez, au nom de Sa Majesté le Sultan et de son Gouvernement, mérite d'engager toute votre attention. Elle n'a rencontré aucune objection de notre part. Elle doit nécessairement augmenter notre désir de contribuer à l'heureux succès de la proposition qui est maintenant recommandée à vos bons offices et à ceux de vos collégues à St. Pétersbourg. Cette idée a réuni tous les suffrages ici, et j'aime à croire que vos efforts pour la faire agréer par son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode auront le résultat que la Porte en attend.

Je profite d'un bateau-à-vapeur, expédié directement à Marseilles par l'Ambassadeur de France, pour faire passer un moment plutôt à Londres la note et la

déclaration susdites, en priant le Comte de Clarendon de vouloir bien vous communiquer l'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté par le télégraphe electrique.

M. de la Cour écrit à son Excellence le Général de Castelbajac dans le sens de cette lettre, et j'ai tout lieu de croire que les Ministres d'Autriche et de Prusse ne restent pas en arrière.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 184.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord, *Constantinople, July* 23, 1853.

BY way of sequel to my despatch of the 20th instant, I now forward to you, under flying seal, a despatch, with two inclosures, which I have addressed in French, for the sake of more convenient communication with my colleagues, to Her Majesty's Envoy at the Court of St. Petersburgh. I need not solicit your attention to the important contents of this correspondence; and I rely upon your Lordship's well-known zeal in the cause of peace for their prompt transmission to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

It may fairly be presumed that the Porte's intended note will afford facilities for accommodation, not only by the assurances which it contains, but the relinquishment of any pretension to a counter-declaration from Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 185.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 169.)

My Lord. *Therapia, July* 23, 1853.

INCLOSED herewith, in copy, is a letter of recall addressed to the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia: and also a note to the Representatives of the Four Powers explaining the motives of that measure. These papers have passed the Council, but they have not yet received the formality of the Sultan's sanction, without which they cannot, of course, be dispatched to their respective destinations. I have, therefore, to request that your Lordship will consider the present communication of them as strictly confidential.

In pursuance of what I submitted to your Lordship some time ago, I shall direct Her Majesty's Consuls in the Principalities neither to hoist their flags, nor to exercise their official functions after the Hospodars shall have received their letters of recall. The French Ambassador partakes of my view of the case, and assures me that he intends to act in the same manner.

The Consuls themselves will be directed to remain privately at their respective posts, till further instructions can be sent to them from here, or superior orders transmitted to them from your Lordship's office.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 185.

*Note addressed to the Four Representatives.*

(Traduction.)

JE transmets à votre Excellence copie d'une lettre qui vient d'arriver de la part du Prince de Moldavie, ainsi que les papiers y inclus. Ces pièces disent que la Cour de Russie a ordonné que les Princes de Valachie et de Moldavie



eussent à rompre leurs relations avec Constantinople, et à suspendre le payement du tribut établi qui doit être payé à la Sublime Porte.

Or, tandis qu'en même temps qu'elle a fait entrer des troupes dans les deux Principautés, la Russie a déclaré à la face du monde entier qu'elle n'avait pas l'intention de modifier les institutions qui régissent ces pays, et la situation politique que des Traités solennels leurs ont garantie, à présent elle commence par une chose qui regarde immédiatement la puissance propriétaire, c'est-à-dire, par la base fondamentale du système du pays, ce qui a fait à la Sublime Porte une sensation et lui a causé un étonnement qui sont indubitablement participés par votre Excellence ainsi que par votre Gouvernement.

La Sublime Porte, se fiant à la déclaration formelle de la Cour de Russie, pensait laisser les Princes dans leurs postes respectifs, lorsque cette dernière communication a démontré l'impossibilité que, dans l'état actuel des choses, l'autorité légitime continue ses fonctions dans les susdites provinces; et c'est pourquoi la Sublime Porte a résolu d'ordonner aux deux Princes de sortir provisoirement des Principautés dans lesquelles ils se trouvent, et on le leur a fait savoir officiellement.

La Sublime Porte vous prie de communiquer à votre illustre Gouvernement ce nouveau sujet de mécontentement aussi, en guise de supplément à la précédente protestation: et je m'empresse de vous renouveller les assurances, &c.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 185.

*Vizierial Letters to the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia.*

(Traduction.)

LA Russie, tout en faisant entrer ses troupes dans les Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie, a déclaré aussi qu'elle n'avait pas l'intention de modifier les institutions qui régissent ces provinces et la situation politique que des Traités solennels leurs ont garantie. La Sublime Porte, se fiant à cette déclaration pensait conserver votre Altesse et son Altesse le Prince de Valachie dans vos postes respectifs. Nous apprenons par la lettre qui vient d'arriver de la part de votre Altesse que la Cour de Russie a ordonné que vous, ainsi que le Prince de Valachie, ayez à rompre vos relations avec Constantinople, et à suspendre le tribut établi, qui doit être payé à la Sublime Porte, ce qui lui a causé beaucoup de surprise.

Comme la Cour de Russie a entamé le système de ces provinces par l'endroit qui regarde immédiatement la puissance propriétaire, c'est-à-dire, par ses bases fondamentales, la Sublime Porte voit clairement que, dans cet état de choses, l'exercice de l'autorité légitime dans les Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie est chose impossible. Par conséquent, la Sublime Porte a, ainsi que ses droits administratifs l'exigent, décidé que votre Altesse ainsi que son Altesse le Prince de Valachie quittent les Principautés provisoirement, et cette résolution a été communiquée officiellement aux grandes Puissances aussi. Il faut donc conformément aux ordres émanés du Trône Impérial à cet égard, que vous quittiez de suite la province. Et s'il arrive que vous agissiez d'une manière contraire à ces ordres souverains, la Sublime Porte de son côté sera libre de prendre telles mesures qu'elle jugera conformes à ses propres affaires et à ses intérêts. Je m'empresse de vous renouveller les assurances de mes sentiments pleins d'estime.

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No. 186.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 170.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 23, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the Porte's intended answer to Prince Gortchakoff's letter, of which your Lordship is already apprised. As it has not yet received the Sultan's sanction, I must beg that

your Lordship will consider the present communication of it as strictly confidential.

The accompanying report from M. Pisani will show your Lordship for what reason the Porte adheres to its resolution of not allowing Russian vessels of war to navigate the Danube above the confluence of that river with the Pruth. The letter to Prince Gortchakoff declares the Treaty-right which is pleaded by the Ottoman Government in justification of the decision which they are prepared to declare.

I learn from Galatz that four additional gun-boats had arrived there in tow of a Russian steamer, and that twenty more were said to be following.

I am led to believe that the number of Russian troops hitherto introduced into the Principalities does not exceed 60,000 men. The artillery is said to amount to 200 pieces of cannon, and the quantity of waggons engaged in the transport of provisions and ammunition is described as exciting much surprise.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 186.

*Proposed Note from Reshid Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff.*

JE m'empresse d'accuser réception de la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser de Jassy, en date du [illegible].

Cette lettre parle des motifs qui ont amené l'occupation militaire de la Valachie et de la Moldavie. La Sublime Porte s'étant vue dans l'obligation de protester contre cette invasion, et de publier sa protestation, dans laquelle on trouve sans réserve ses réponses, ainsi que l'expression de ses sentiments envers la Cour Impériale de Russie, il me paraît donc que toute explication à cet égard serait inutile ici.

En examinant la protestation susmentionnée, votre Excellence y verra que la Sublime Porte étant en communication avec les Puissances signataires du Traité de 1841, a résolu de garder, pour sa propre défense, une attitude armée jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit informée comment cette question aura été envisagée par ces mêmes Puissances.

La teneur des instructions données aux commandants des troupes de la Porte est qu'ils doivent s'abstenir de tout acte d'hostilité de ce côté-ci contre la partie adverse, tant qu'il n'y aura aucune espèce d'invasion de la rive gauche à la rive droite du Danube.

Mais votre Excellence n'ignore pas que par Traité il est défendu aux bâtiments de guerre Russes de remonter plus haut que l'endroit où le Pruth se jette dans le Danube. Si donc vos bâtiments de guerre remontaient au-delà de l'endroit susmentionné, il est évident qu'un tel acte constituerait une violation des confins souverains aussi; et comme la Sublime Porte possède des places fortes plus haut que le confluent de ces deux fleuves, il en résulte qu'elle ne pourra pas permettre que des bâtiments de guerres Russes dépassent ce point. Elle a pris, au contraire, la décision de les en empêcher. Je ne doute pas que votre Excellence ne soit assez juste pour avouer que, le cas échéant, la responsabilité ne tomberait pas sur la Sublime Porte.

Je saisis, &c.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 186.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 22, 1853.

IN returning the draft of a letter to be addressed to Prince Gortchakoff by Reshid Pasha, I have the honour to state that the alteration proposed by your Excellency has not been accepted by the Council.

The reason alleged for not adopting the amendment was, that, having asked the advice of military people, they expressed an opinion that, were the Russian ships of war to be allowed to go beyond the confluence of the Pruth, such a permission would give Russia the immense advantage of making preparations beforehand, and crossing the Danube with more facility in case of a contemplated invasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.



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No. 187.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon,—(Received August* 3.)

(No. 294.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July* 29, 1853.

COUNT BUOL called a conference this day of the French and Prussian Ministers and myself, and brought under our consideration the communications he had received from Baron Bruck, and those also that the Turkish Ambassador had been instructed to make to him, and which had been transmitted from Constantinople on the 20th instant. Count Buol stated that, having taken the Emperor's orders upon these various communications, he could not agree to the proposals made to him. He must decline to transmit the note of Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode to St. Petersburgh, or to recommend it, or the documents with which it was accompanied; nor could he advise the Ambassador to forward it, or to prepare to forward it, in the manner which had been recommended by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople. He felt that these communications were not of a nature to encourage any hope that they would be well received by the Russian Cabinet, and therefore he entirely objected to them. He then stated that the Emperor had determined to adhere to the recommendation to the Porte of the project of note which Count Buol had drawn up, and which had been assented to by the Three Powers, and which he would transmit by special Envoy, who would probably be the bearer of an autograph letter from himself to the Sultan, calling upon him to adopt it as the only means he thought likely of coming to a satisfactory arrangement.

Count Buol said that if the Porte agreed to this recommendation, the Emperor would make every exertion to obtain the consent of the Emperor of Russia to receive the note, which should be transmitted by an Ambassador from the Porte.

Count Buol did not contemplate sending this communication till the day after to-morrow, so that the members of the Conference would have time to receive the decision of their Governments with regard to his present proposal; and he strongly recommended that we should lose no time in applying for their directions, and for the orders which they would desire to have transmitted to their respective Ministers at Constantinople.

This declaration on the part of Count Buol rendered any discussion of the arrangement proposed by the Porte and by the Representatives at Constantinople impossible; each of us, however, communicated the objects proposed by our respective Ministers, and I particularly brought before the Conference the assurance I had received in a private letter from Lord Stratford that a further conciliatory proposal to be inserted in the note to be presented by the Ambassador, upon his arrival at St. Petersburgh, was likely to be adopted by the Porte, and would be transmitted in two days from the date of the last despatches.

Count Buol declared that, after having received the Emperor's orders, he could not alter the measure which he had been ordered to carry out; he did not conceive that any addition made to the mode of addressing the Emperor, by sending a protest against his proceedings, could render the communication more likely to be accepted by him; he also conceived that this proposal, which was at present only to inquire whether an Ambassador would be received at St. Petersburgh to enter into negotiation as to an arrangement, was of a nature to occasion so much delay at a moment when an early settlement was of the greatest consequence, that, upon that ground alone, he could be no party to it. He believed also that the proposal of the eventual retirement of the fleets from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, in return for the immediate evacuation of the Principalities, was not likely (in face of the declarations lately made) to be accepted by

the Governments of England and France. Count Buol stated that he most earnestly hoped our Governments would agree to and support the decision of the Emperor, which had been come to upon the sole conviction of its being the best chance (indeed, he believed the only one) of coming to an early solution of a complication which might by every day's delay be rendered more difficult of arrangement, and more dangerous to the peace of Europe.

Count Buol will communicate this project to St. Petersburgh at the same time as it is despatched to Constantinople, and will in the strongest terms urge the Emperor of Russia to accept it. He hopes to have an answer from St. Petersburgh by the time he receives that from Constantinople, and, if it is favourable, the Porte may immediately take the necessary measures for the appointment of an Ambassador.

We all urged upon Count Buol the extreme importance of an immediate evacuation of the Principalities as soon as any arrangement should be come to, and he declared to us that he should press upon the Russian Cabinet distinctly his hope that, whenever the Ambassador should be appointed to carry the note from Constantinople, the evacuation of the Principalities should commence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Soon after the termination of the Conference, M. de Bourqueney received a telegraphic message from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, a copy of which is inclosed, by which he is directed to suspend the transmission of the proposals from Constantinople, and to apprise me of this order, as M. Drouyn de Lhuys would consult with regard to them with the English Government.

W.

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Inclosure in No. 187.

*Telegraphic Despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Bourqueney.*

*Paris, le 29 Juillet*, 12½.

A M. de Bourqueney :

SUSPENDEZ jusqu'à nouvel ordre l'envoi à St. Pétersbourg des communications adressées par votre intermédiare à M. de Castelbajac par M. de la Cour. Informez-en Lord Westmorland. Je vais m'entendre avec le Gouvernement Anglais.

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No. 188.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 568.) *Paris, August* 4, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the conduct of the Russian Agents in the Principalities, it may be as well to state that the French Consuls in Moldavia and Wallachia were instructed some time back to suspend their Consular functions should any thing occur to disturb the regular Government of the Hospodars, and their actions consequently do not depend on any instructions which they may receive from M. de la Cour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 189.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 570.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 4, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has profited by the passage of Mr. Tucker, returning by the "Caradoc," to write to M. de la Cour, explaining why the French Government preferred the note which had been agreed to at Vienna, to that sent by Reshid Pasha from Constantinople, and instructing him to use all his influence with the Porte to obtain its assent to the project recommended by the Four Powers.

I have had an opportunity of conversing with the Turkish Ambassador, and I was glad to find that his Excellency has written in the same sense to his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 190.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 571.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 4, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has addressed a despatch to General Castelbajac, with reference to the conduct of the Russian Agents in the Principalities, of precisely the same tenour as your Lordship's No. 157 to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 191.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 390.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 29, 1853.

ALTHOUGH I feel a certain reluctance to reverting to a point upon which I have several times dwelt in my correspondence, I trust that your Lordship will excuse me if I beg leave once more to allude to the ominous opinion pronounced by Count Nesselrode on the 9th ultimo.

It was, as your Lordship will remember, to this effect,—that an abatement of the terms of composition originally laid down by the Emperor would be considered by the Turks as a triumph, and would lead on their part to such insolence as would insure an uncertain peace being followed by war before half a year should have gone by.

It is easy for those to prophecy correctly who possess the means of causing their predictions to be fulfilled, and Count Nesselrode's declaration appears to point to the necessity of such explanations between the Allied Cabinets as shall prevent an arrangement of difficulties between Russia and Turkey from being a mere truce, to be broken upon the slightest cause of offence being given by the weaker to the stronger Power.

The substance of this despatch has been noticed to my colleagues of France and Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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## No. 192.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 394.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 30, 1853.*

I BEG to express to your Lordship the very grateful sense which I entertain of the approbation conveyed to me by your Lordship's despatch No. 136 of my endeavours to carry into effect the objects of Her Majesty's Government at a moment of deep interest like the present.

Your Lordship, will, I hope, not attribute to any feeling of vanity my resolution to read a great part of this despatch to Count Nesselrode. I have done so at a visit which I have paid to his Excellency this day, not only because I was desirous that he should know that my conduct had been approved of by your Lordship, but that he might see that I had full warranty for pressing the acceptance of the Projet de Convention of which a copy had previously been communicated to him.

I began the conversation by requesting that his Excellency would attribute to its real motives the observation which I had to make to him; that nothing could be further from my intention than to utter what might be construed into a threat, but that I begged to remind him that the fine season was fast passing by, and that if negotiations should fail in their desired effect, or should become protracted, it might well happen that the fleets would be compelled to seek a more secure anchorage in the Sea of Marmora; that this removal appeared, in the communications to which I alluded, inevitable, as it could never be expected that the fleets could be withdrawn from Turkey leaving affairs there in the unsettled state which had led to their despatch to Besika Bay.

The Chancellor made a fresh attempt to prove to me how needless was the opposition which Prince Menchikoff's note had met with, and how readily its signature would settle all difficulties. This question, however, I declined to entertain, observing—"Non est hic locus"—a discussion of this sort is worse than useless upon a point in which the dignity and the interests of so many parties are concerned.

Count Nesselrode then read me a short despatch which he had just written to Baron Brunnow, in which he had stated the principal objections which he entertained to your Lordship's Projet de Convention, these being the length of the preamble and the omission of mention of the Jerusalem firmans and grant of an hospital. I entreated of his Excellency not to put forward principal objections, but to state all he had to mention, as it was becoming more and more important to guard against the loss of time. Count Nesselrode assented to this, and stated that Baron Brunnow's instructions would be so full as to obviate the necessity of reference to St. Petersburgh.

The sum of the conversation which ensued was, that the delay which had occurred with regard to the plan of arrangement which Baron Brück was pursuing was to be attributed in part to the Ramazan, in part to the late Ministerial crisis at Constantinople, and that very probably in a few days news might be received of this plan having been successful; that should it fail, Count Nesselrode should be prepared to fall back upon the Projet de Convention slightly altered.

His Excellency did not conceal from me that, as being more distinct, a Convention would suit the views of Russia better than a note.

The Chancellor then desired me to call the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government to the state of Turkey; it was, he said, highly critical; while questions as to Turkish independence were being discussed, the very existence of the empire is at stake—the dangers being those which arise from the confirmed habits of intemperance so unfortunately observed in the Sultan, from the disposition manifested by the fanatical Turkish party to rebel and to place upon the throne a Sultan whose opinions are more congenial to their own, and from the discontent of the Christian population which, in despite of the efforts which he could assure me conscientiously were employed by the Emperor to repress such feelings, were likely to show themselves in rebellion.

I replied that I felt certain that I knew the answer that would be returned



to such a representation; that these sources of danger to which his Excellency alluded, offered, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, so many cogent reasons for bringing the misunderstanding between Russia and the Porte to the speediest conclusion.

As I left Count Nesselrode's room I said, that it appeared then that as yet no communication could be made to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Count Nesselrode of course assented; but added, that I should do well to detain the messenger here, as, in the event of Baron Brück's attempt failing, it was probable that his (the messenger's) services might be required for the purpose of communication with Constantinople.

Upon leaving Count Nesselrode I drove to the French mission, and related the whole of what had passed between the Chancellor and myself to General Castelbajac.

As usual, this proof of confidence was warmly responded to by my French colleague, who immediately said that in the event of a reference to Constantinople becoming necessary, he should be prepared to write to M. de la Cour requesting him to give his best support to the overtures which would be made by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Porte.

The French Minister went further, and stated that in the event of this reference becoming necessary through the failure of Baron Brück's plan, he should be quite ready to join me in the responsibility of adopting the alterations in the Projet de Convention alluded to by Count Nesselrode, so as to avoid the loss of time which would be incurred by a reference to London and Paris.

Like myself, General Castelbajac however doubts whether, when the moment shall arrive, the Russian Cabinet will agree positively to accepting the Projet de Convention, without consulting the Austrian Ministry.

I have to reproach myself with having through forgetfulness omitted to question the Chancellor as to the correctness of the report, according to which the payment of the tribute owing by the Hospodars of the Principalities has been prevented by the military authorities of Russia. I am, however, assured positively that such is the fact, and that the justification of an act which appears to be in contradiction with promises, is attempted on the part of those in authority by the excuse that it would be childish to place in the Sultan's hands the means of carrying on war with Russia.

I beg to conclude my despatch with two observations relating to persons.

It is highly agreeable to me to perceive that the conduct of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople is becoming so well known and so much appreciated by all unprejudiced persons, as to offer the best refutation of the calumnies with which he had been so improperly assailed, and I find constant satisfaction in the relations which exist between my French colleague and myself.

It is highly desirable, at a crisis like the present, that the greatest confidence should prevail between the French and English Missions in Russia, and unquestionably General Castelbajac does all in his power to promote this common object.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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## No. 193.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 295.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July 31, 1853.*

SINCE I had the honour of addressing to your Lordship my despatch No. 294 of the 27th instant, I received, on Friday the 29th, your Lordship's telegraphic message of Thursday, stating "that you agreed to the modifications proposed, and that I was to announce to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe that Her Majesty's Government desires that the project should be adopted by the Porte unless some other arrangement had already been made." And on this day I have received your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of yesterday's date, which instructs me to suspend "the transmission of the despatches from Constantinople addressed to St. Petersburgh, until further orders;" and adds, "In the modifi-

cations of the French note suggested by Count Buol, we propose, after the word 'Sultan,' to add, 'restera fidèle, &c.;' and after 'culte Chrétien,' to add, 'et que Sa Majesté regarde, &c.' These changes are desirable for the purpose of ensuring the acceptation by the Porte; nevertheless we do not make of it an absolute '*sine qud non*.' Inform Count Buol and your colleagues."

I transmitted both these telegraphic messages to Count Buol, and this morning he called a conference, at which he explained his great satisfaction at the approbation your Lordship had given to the modifications proposed by him in the French note, and at the decision you had come to, to suspend the transmission to St. Petersburgh of the propositions which had come from Constantinople. Count Buol then stated that he at once adopted the changes your Lordship proposed in the note he had drawn up, and this was approved by the other members of the Conference.

Count Buol then adverted to the despatches he had received from Constantinople, of the 23rd instant, and stated that the Turkish Ambassador had communicated to him those which he had received, and which, he supposed, were of the same purport as those transmitted to Baron Bourqueney, M. de Canitz, and myself. This having been found to be the case, Count Buol stated that he considered these communications as in no way altering the character of the proposals from Constantinople which had been discussed at the last conference; there was no change in them, with the exception of the official form given to the note hereafter to be presented to the Russian Government by an Ambassador from the Porte if his mission was accepted, and which had already been privately made known and considered at that conference; and with respect to the declaration made by Reshid Pasha to the Representatives at Constantinople, he did not consider it as applicable to his own proposals, which protected the honour and the best interests of the Porte as effectually as the measure Reshid Pasha had adopted. Count Buol therefore looked upon the propositions as unaltered, and he adhered to the decision he had taken with regard to them.

He then read to us the modifications which had been made in the draft of his note, and consented to by the three Governments to which they had been submitted; and also the despatch by which he instructs Baron Bruck to bring that note before the Turkish Government as the one proposed to be addressed to Count Nesselrode and signed by Reshid Pasha. He submitted this despatch for the approval of the members of the Conference, which we all unanimously gave. Count Buol then stated that these documents would be forwarded to Constantinople to-morrow evening by a Colonel, who would also be the bearer of an autograph letter to the Sultan from the Emperor, in which His Majesty would, in the strongest manner, recommend to the Sultan the adoption of the proposals now submitted to him, as being the best calculated to terminate the differences unhappily existing between his Government and that of Russia, with the maintenance of his honour, his dignity, and independence. Count Buol called upon each of the members of the Conference to engage our respective colleagues in Constantinople, in conformity with the instructions we had received from our Governments, to give their support to his proposition, assuring us that to their powerful influence and exertions he looked with the firm expectation that they would succeed in convincing the Turkish Government that it was made in the most friendly spirit, and with the conviction that it offered the best —perhaps the only—chance of terminating with honour, and with the least delay, the unfortunate complications which menaced the prosperity of their own Empire and the peace of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 194.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August 5.*)

(No. 307. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 3, 1853.*

ALI EFFENDI, the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, called on me this morning and communicated to me the copy of a memorandum signed by Reshid Pasha dated Halia Limam, the 23rd ultimo, which had been delivered by His Highness



to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, together with the draft of a note which the Turkish Government propose to address to the Russian Government as a means of settling the differences between them.

In reply to Ali Effendi's inquiries as to my opinion of these documents, and also of the note which Reshid Pasha had addressed to Count Nesselrode on the 20th ultimo, when transmitting to the Russian Chancellor a copy of the Porte's protest against the occupation of the Danubian Principalities; I said that they appeared to be drawn up in moderate language, but that I could say nothing as to the prospect of the note being accepted at St. Petersburgh, and that as I was uninformed of the opinions of my Government respecting this project, my private opinions could be of no value.

Ali Effendi then spoke of the cruel position in which Turkey was placed, saying, that England and France had approved of her resistance to the demands of Russia, and that now when Russia had taken possession of portions of her territory, they had prevented her from adopting active measures against her. I replied that whilst the object of England and France had been to support Turkey, these Powers had also deeply at heart the prevention of open hostilities, which explained the position of our fleets at Besika Bay, ready to sail at a moment's notice, but that we still hoped the differences would be settled by negotiation.

Ali Effendi became then a good deal animated, and threw out hints that if the British and French Governments had not appeared in earnest at the commencement of the crisis, the Porte would not have offered such determined resistance to the demands of Russia, and that now in the moment of danger, when they had made every reasonable concession short of sacrificing their independence, England and France were hanging back.

I endeavoured to demonstrate that this was not the case; that it was not only our duty as friends, but our interest as allies, to support Turkey, and that she might count on us, and on our desire to assist in the maintenance of her independence.

The conversation dropped at this point for a few moments, and Ali Effendi resumed it, saying, "If you do not give us some other support than that which we have received from you up to this time, and see us safe through our present difficulties, you will lose your influence at the Porte; for it is clear that we must henceforth submit to everything Russia chooses to dictate; Russian influence will predominate, and we shall find it better to rest on her friendship, hollow as it may be, than to rely on that of two distant Powers who showed a willingness to come forward in our support, but who, after encouraging us to resist, retreated before the complications which a war with Russia might produce. Such," said Ali Effendi, "is the present feeling at Constantinople, and I conjure you to let it be known to your Government before it is too late."

I replied that his alarms were exaggerated; that they were no doubt dictated by the dangers which threatened his country, but that he would always find England to be the true friend of Turkey.

Having addressed a few questions to him as to whether he had seen much of the Logothete Aristarchi who is now here, and whom he had brought to my house some days ago, he replied that he had held several conversations with him. Well, then, I said, this explains much of your present impressions. The Logothete has, no doubt, been poisoning your mind with all sorts of histories, which he has been told by Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister; and I strongly recommend you to be on your guard as to every word which the Logothete utters: that his reputation at Constantinople, I believed, was not of the best, and that, though he had come here ostensibly for the purpose of placing his sons at some establishment of education, he was perpetually at the Russian Legation, and had also been much, as I understand, with Baron Meyendorff during the fortnight he passed at Vienna, and that he was, most probably, occupied at the present moment in intriguing in favour of Russia.

Ali Effendi replied, that the Logothete had certainly told him that Baron Budberg had shown him some documents, the tendency of which was to raise the character of Russia in this question, to prove her power, and the inutility of the Porte's counting upon any material assistance from the Western Powers. He appears to have attempted to show that we were deterred from more active interference than anchoring our fleets at Besika Bay by the hostile attitude of Russia, and to have endeavoured to prove that all resistance was useless, and

could only hasten the downfall of Turkey; and that if she wished to exist, she must look to Russia as her best friend.

I repeated to Ali Effendi, before he left me, that he must be on his guard as to the Logothete Aristarchi, and not place too much reliance on anything he told him, for it was evident that he was acting in opposition to the interests of Turkey.

I think it right to make this report of my interview with the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, as a proof of the ability with which the agents of Russia turn to account every opportunity of advancing their interests, and the facility with which they find ready engines for their work.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 195.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 297.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 3, 1853.*

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions contained in your despatch No. 232, I have expressed to Count Buol the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at his renewed assurances of the policy of Austria in the unfortunate event of the differences between Russia and the Porte not being amicably arranged, and I have been requested by Count Buol to return your Lordship his thanks for this satisfactory communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 196.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 299.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 3, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of forwarding, together with their inclosures, two despatches from Mr. Consul-General Fonblanque, Nos. 38 and 39, addressed to your Lordship, and transmitted under flying seal to me.

I brought the subject of these despatches under the consideration of Count Buol, who expressed his extreme surprise that the circumstances which had taken place at Belgrade, and the communications which had been directed to be made to the Prince of Servia and to the Pasha of Belgrade, should have been so misunderstood, and that the Prince should have partaken of this error to such an extent, as to have protested against a supposed violation of his rights.

Count Buol repeated to me the order which had been transmitted to the Austrian Consul-General, which was to explain to the Prince and to the Pasha, that the Emperor had determined upon sending a brigade of infantry to the neighbourhood of Peterwardein and towards the frontier of Servia, in no connexion whatever with the movement of Russian troops in the Principalities, but for the sole purpose of giving security to that part of his empire, which might in case of war, if it should unfortunately take place, be menaced by any outbreak or disturbances; and he was also to state that, if in the provinces under their authority any insurrection should take place, they might count upon the assistance of this force to aid in its suppression.

Count Buol stated that in the first instance the Prince returned his thanks for this communication, but that afterwards he was induced to take exception to it, and he had protested in the manner described by Mr. Fonblanque.

Count Buol said that he had now replied to that document, complaining of the spirit of distrust in which it had been drawn up, and explaining the motives in which the original communication had been made.

Count Buol has given the same explanation of these circumstances to



M. de Bourqueney, which he has transmitted to his Government, representing it as perfectly satisfactory.

I have had a conversation with General Meyerhoffer, who was sent to Servia and Bosnia by the Emperor to report upon the state of those countries, which were reported as being likely to revolt in case of hostilities taking place upon their frontiers; but the General assured me that there was no truth whatever in these statements; that he went through both countries, with which he was perfectly acquainted, and had reported to the Emperor that there was no chance whatever of any movement on the part of the population against their Governments. He was perfectly satisfied that if any partial disturbance should take place, the military force existing in both countries was perfectly sufficient to suppress it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 197.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 302.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 3, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of forwarding herewith a copy of the despatch addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, on the 1st of August, transmitting to him, for his information and guidance, the two telegraphic despatches I had received from your Lordship dated respectively Thursday the 28th, and Saturday the 30th of July; the first of which, having reference to Count Buol's proposed note, directed me to inform Lord Stratford that Her Majesty's Government desired that that project should be adopted by the Porte, and the second instructing me to suspend the transmission of the despatches from Constantinople addressed to St. Petersburgh until further orders, and directing me to obtain the alterations in Count Buol's note proposed by your Lordship.

I also forwarded as inclosures to Lord Stratford copies of my despatches Nos. 294 and 295, in which I detailed what had passed at the two conferences held at Count Buol's and attended by the French Minister, the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires, and myself.

I also addressed a private letter to Lord Stratford in which I reported all the circumstances which had attended the drawing up of Count Buol's note, and informed him of its approval by the three Cabinets, as well as of the instructions forwarded by them to their respective Representatives at this Court to suspend the transmission to St. Petersburgh of the despatches received from Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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Inclosure in No. 197.

*The Earl of Westmorland to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Vienna, August 1, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing, for your Lordship's information and guidance, copies of the two telegraphic despatches I have received from Her Majesty's Government, the one dated Thursday, the 28th, the other dated Saturday, the 30th, both of which have reference to the negotiations pending for the settlement of the differences between the Governments of Russia and the Porte.

I inclose likewise copies of my two despatches, numbered respectively 294 and 295, which I have addressed to Lord Clarendon, on the same subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND

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No. 198.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 310.)

*Berlin, August* 5, 1853.

My Lord,

AT an interview which I had this morning with Baron Manteuffel, I told his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government had learnt with surprise that a separate proposition for the settlement of the matters in dispute between Russia and the Porte had been submitted to the Turkish Government by the Prussian Minister at Constantinople; without any previous communication of this intention being made either to Her Majesty's Government or Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople; and for his Excellency's more complete information, I read to him your Lordship's despatch No. 173 of the 2nd instant.

Baron Manteuffel replied that he had already received a despatch on this subject from Chevalier Bunsen, and that he was unable to explain how this could have happened; giving me to understand that Baron Wildenbruch had not yet made any report of this proceeding, and that one of his despatches, which probably contained an account of this affair, was missing. His Excellency expressed regret at the occurrence, attributing it to a misinterpretation of his instructions, which were never intended to have been made use of in the way described; and on my telling him that it appeared to me Baron Wildenbruch's conduct should be censured, he said that he could not say more until he received his own report of his communication with Reshid Pasha, and that he would then speak to me further.

I rejoined that the facts must be as your Lordship had stated them, because they rested on written documents which had been delivered to the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 199.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 311. Confidential.)

*Berlin, August* 5, 1853.

My Lord,

HAVING received a private letter some days ago from Her Majesty's Minister at Dresden, informing me that Baron de Beust had stated to him that the Prussian Government had given assurances at St. Petersburgh that, in the event of a Turkish war, they would side with Russia, I deemed it right to mention the circumstance to Baron Manteuffel, who expressed the greatest astonishment at such false intelligence being promulgated by the Saxon Minister for Foreign Affairs. I then observed to his Excellency, that as it was probable that Baron de Beust had used the like language to other members of the Diplomatic Body at Dresden, it would be well if he were to direct the Prussian Representative's attention to the subject; and I have the honour to inform your Lordship that his Excellency has adopted my suggestion, and instructed Baron Lehndorff to inquire of Baron de Beust the source of the false intelligence which he had received, and to give it the most unqualified contradiction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 200.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 312.)

*Berlin, August* 5, 1853.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL has informed me that he should forward to-night to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh, a copy of the note which had been agreed upon at a conference of the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, for the settlement of the dispute between Russia and Turkey, and that he trusted it would be found acceptable by the Russian Government. He added, that he quite approved of all the proceedings that had taken place at Vienna; but I regretted to observe that he was not as sanguine as I could have wished in his expectation that it would be adopted.

Count Henckel is directed to do all in his power to urge the acceptance of this note, and thus to bring this unfortunate quarrel to an end.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 201.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received May* 8.)

(No. 576.)

*Paris, August* 7, 1853.

My Lord,

IF the advices received by the French Government from the Principalities are to be trusted, not only is the Russian army of occupation in a bad state of equipment, but the spirit which pervades it is not in favour of the proceedings of the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 202.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 577.)

*Paris, August* 7, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DE HUBNER has made an official communication to M. Drouyn de Lhuys respecting the proceedings which have lately taken place at Vienna relative to the Eastern question.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me that there was a passage in Count Buol's despatch communicated to him by M. de Hübner, on which he had thought it necessary to make an observation. Count Buol, in expressing a hope that the late negotiations at Vienna might lead to the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russians, appears to have added, "The presence of the British and French fleets at Besika being thenceforth useless, they would retire," &c.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys protested against any similarity being established between the two acts, or any engagement implied that the fleets would retire.

M. de Hübner replied that he did not understand Count Buol to say that the two acts should be simultaneous, but that the departure of the fleets would be the natural consequence of the evacuation of the Principalities.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys rejoined that reason and common sense would tell that the fleets would not remain at Besika for ever, but he again asserted their right to be there without giving any other Power a pretext for making observations or asking questions, unless, indeed, it were the Porte herself.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 203.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 579.)

*Paris, August 8, 1853.*

My Lord,

THE Constantinople post of the 25th ultimo has reached Paris this morning, but Lord Stratford's messenger is not yet arrived. M. Drouyn de Lhuys informs me that he has received three despatches from M. de la Cour, one relating to the position of the Turkish army in the Balkan, which in the opinion of the French officers in the Turkish service is too extended; the second stating that, although the decision had been taken by the Sultan to recall the Hospodars from the Principalities, the order was not gone to them, but that instructions had been sent to fire on any Russian vessels which might ascend the Danube higher than its confluence with the Pruth; and the third giving some details of the position of affairs at Constantinople. In this last despatch M. de la Cour reasserts the great difficulty which the Representatives of the Four Powers had experienced in inducing the Porte to accept the note to Count Nesselrode, which was eventually stopped at Vienna, and he says that the war party is in the ascendant, and that the language of Reshid Pasha himself is less pacific.

That Minister does not hesitate to declare that it is preferable for the Turks to perish in the struggle than to endure the uncertainty and expenses of their present position.

M. de la Cour appears to apprehend that Reshid Pasha may not be able to retain his place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 204.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 581.)

*Paris, August 8, 1853.*

My Lord,

M. DE BOURQUENEY mentions in a despatch to M. Drouyn de Lhuys dated the 3rd instant, that he had informed Count Buol that the French Consuls at Jassy and Bucharest were furnished with instructions to strike their flags should the Government of the Hospodars be suspended, and he inquired what line it was intended to pursue in regard to the Austrian Consuls.

Count Buol replied that the position of the Austrian Consuls in the Principalities was essentially different from that of the English and French Consuls, the latter having a diplomatic character which the former had not. The Austrian Consuls had only to superintend the commercial affairs of Austrian subjects, and their presence in the Principalities was a necessity.

Count Buol added that he did not believe that the Hospodars would obey the orders of the Porte to quit their seat of Government; but he did not the less blame the proceedings of Russia in regard to them and their relations with the Sultan, which he characterised as being at variance with the promises made by Russia on entering the Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 205.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 253.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 9, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 302 of the 3rd instant, reporting your communication to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople of the telegraphic despatches which I addressed to you on the 28th and 30th ultimo, and of your despatches to me Nos. 294 and 295, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve the course pursued by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 206.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.*

(No. 185.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 9, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 307 of the 3rd instant, reporting the substance of a conversation on the Turkish Question which you have held with the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language held by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 207.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.*

(No. 186.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 9, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 310 of the 5th instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the subject of the separate proposition for the settlement of the matters in dispute between Russia and the Porte, which had been submitted to the Turkish Government by the Prussian Minister at Constantinople, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language held by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 208.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.*

(No. 187.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 9, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 311 of the 5th instant, reporting your communication to Baron Manteuffel of the language used by the Saxon Minister for Foreign Affairs with reference to the policy of Prussia on the Eastern Question, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve the course pursued by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 209.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 171.)

*Therapia, July 25, 1853.*

My Lord,

A GENERAL Council was held yesterday at the Porte, including, together with the Ministers and members of the ordinary Council, many distinguished and experienced persons no longer in office. The course adopted by the Porte, as already communicated to your Lordship in my despatches of the 20th and 23rd instant, and the Sultan's proclamation, of which a draft has already been forwarded to England with my previous correspondence, were unanimously approved. It was decided at the same time that the proclamation should receive an amendment suggested by me, to the effect that the Mussulman subjects of the Porte should be distinctly enjoined in common with the rest to live in harmony with their countrymen of other creeds.

The Turkish Ministers propose to enter seriously to-morrow on the consideration of such measures as may be advisable for them to adopt in order to maintain good order and to afford effectual protection to the Rayahs during the unavoidable withdrawal of the regular troops.

I have submitted to Reshid Pasha a few suggestions, which may possibly assist in giving a practical result to their deliberations. I was glad to find that his Highness, of his own accord, had directed my previous communications on this important subject to be collected, with a view to bringing them more pointedly under the notice of his colleagues. It is, no doubt, to be regretted that they have remained so long without more than a partial attempt at redress, but the pressure of still more urgent business and the uncertainty of the Porte's position might fairly excuse even a more protracted delay. I trust that the next succeeding step will be towards the introduction of those improvements in justice and administration which I have so often recommended to the Sultan and his Ministers, and which are daily becoming more essential to the safety and future welfare of this Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 210.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 174.)

*Therapia, July 25, 1853.*

My Lord,

IN concert with the French Ambassador I propose to confine the abeyance of our consular flags in the Danubian Principalities to Bucharest and Jassy, where the Hospodars reside, and not to extend the measure to Galatz, where our trade might be seriously inconvenienced by the suspension of Mr. Cunningham's functions. The Porte's order for the retirement of the two Princes will be forwarded to-morrow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 211.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 175.)

*Therapia, July 25, 1853.*

My Lord,

A DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Samsoon, dated the 20th instant, informs me that two Russian frigates and a steamer had appeared within sight of Sinope, from the northward, cruizing about.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 212.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 159.)

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1853.*

My Lord,

I RECEIVED this morning your Excellency's despatches from No. 171 to No. 175, both inclusive, the last of the 25th of July. They will be laid before the Queen.

I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction from your Excellency's despatch No. 171, that the Porte is about to take measures for the maintenance of good order and for the protection of the Christians at the present moment.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 213.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 160.)

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1853.*

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint you in reply to your despatch No. 174 of the 25th of July, that Her Majesty's Government approve of your intention to allow Mr. Cunningham to continue to exercise his consular duties at Galatz, notwithstanding the suspension of their duties at Bucharest and Jassy by Mr. Colquhoun and Mr. Gardner.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 214.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. 395. Confidential.)

*St. Petersburgh, August 1, 1853.*

My Lord,

ALL speculation is at this moment turned upon this point—Is the Russian Government in earnest in its professed desire of concluding its differences with Turkey amicably, and in a manner which shall give the arrangement a lasting character?

Were there no other evidence than that of the language held at Peterhoff and at the Foreign Department, the question is one which admits of but one reply: Russia is as desirous as any of the European States can be that an anomalous condition of affairs should be terminated, and that her forces should be recalled to their natural quarters. As regards myself, this conciliatory

language, when held to me, produces, I must say, for the moment a great effect; it is so consonant to my own feelings—so much in unison with what may be considered the truest interests of Russia, that it appears at first hardly possible but that words of peace should represent peaceable intentions.

When, however, the hour of reflection arrives, various doubts suggest themselves to the mind, and of these I shall take but one.

The inquirer, I say, asks himself with what object the fortifications at Cronstadt, &c., are pushed forward with such remarkable activity? It cannot be that Russia fears the encroachments of Europe, for she alone is seen to encroach; it cannot be that she mistrusts the sincerity of other Powers, for all the good faith has been on the other side, and the duplicity on hers; neither can it be that European interests lead to warlike undertakings, for Europe has shown, under great provocation, the strongest indisposition to war. With what view, then, having peace at her command, can Russia be so anxiously intent upon fortifying the approach to St. Petersburgh?

The answer I apprehend to be this,—that, conscious of intentions which are likely to provoke the hostility of Governments the most bent upon peace, Russia is compelled to look to the points at which she herself is vulnerable; and that, being prepared to provoke attacks, she is particularly intent upon parrying those which may be directed against the close neighbourhood of the capital—against her great naval arsenal; attacks which, if successful, would strike a powerful blow to that ascendancy which has depended in great degree upon the supposed inviolability of the Russian Empire.

I am far from ascribing warlike intentions to all those persons by whose opinion the Emperor is likely to be swayed; but as recent transactions have shown that the advocates of an anti-European policy have of late been allowed an influence which they had never before possessed, I cannot but fear that they are still listened to.

The point in which I apprehend the advanced to be agreed with the moderate party is, that of desiring that hostilities should not commence at present; a winter's occupation of the Principalities would be no inconvenience, if, haply, it does not prove to be a clear gain to Russia; whilst a few weeks passed in the present state of tension and exhaustion would be sufficient entirely to exhaust the resources of Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 215.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. 400.)

*St. Petersburgh, August 2, 1853.*

My Lord,

THE conversation which I held yesterday with the Chancellor struck me as being less satisfactory than usual.

His Excellency was without recent intelligence from Constantinople or Vienna, but made sure that despatches from both places must reach here as to-day.

He was disposed to account for the silence observed with regard to M. de Bruck's negotiation by the probability of some serious event (possibly the triumph of the war party) having occurred at Constantinople.

I remarked that Her Majesty's Government were as much intent as ever upon arriving at a pacific arrangement, but that, as it was requisite that Her Majesty's Embassy, whilst pressing the Turkish Government to sign the note or Convention, or whatever other Act was to be concluded at Constantinople, should be able to give the Turks assurances as to this Act being the immediate prelude to the evacuation of the Principalities, I would request his Excellency to enable me to do so.

Count Nesselrode replied, that the Emperor's desire to leave the Principalities was well known, but that his intentions upon the point in question had not been signified.

Upon my repeating the inquiry in other words, Count Nesselrode entreated



of me not to write upon a subject which might lead to complications. The English Government, he would again say, were not sufficiently occupied with the dangers with which Turkey was threatened. The neighbourhood of a Russian force might prove a great benefit to Turkey. Her Majesty's Government, he would say, did not press enough upon the Porte in stimulating it to give satisfaction to the Emperor, and pressed too much upon the Russian Government.

It was unfortunate, Count Nesselrode once again observed, that the "Menchikoff note" had not at once been signed; its importance had been unduly exaggerated; an artificial opinion against it had been created; but the Emperor's position was one from which His Majesty could not recede: His Majesty must obtain satisfaction, either in the shape in which it had been demanded, or in some other of equal value.

To this I replied that I had no desire to resort to recriminations, but that I must revert to my former objection: was it proper that Russian policy should have brought matters to such a pass, that either there should be a prospect of war, or that the Governments the most interested in Turkey should be compelled to give their assent to a measure which they thought dangerous to her independence? Prince Menchikoff's note having been finally laid aside, it was, I thought, very necessary to adopt some other means of settling the question as speedily as possible; and I would remark that if it should prove that the scheme attempted by M. de Bruck had failed, it would be very desirable that the consent of the Russian Government should be given at once to the Projet de Convention prepared in England.

Count Nesselrode could say nothing upon that subject until he should receive the despatches which he was expecting from Vienna, beyond this, that it would not be in his power to agree to the Projet de Convention unless amended; he would inquire whether I had authority to assent to any changes, if not, would I assume the responsibility of doing so?

I replied, that I had not the authority; but that, without taking any engagement with regard to alterations the nature of which I was not fully acquainted with, I could only say that, as to responsibility, I knew no other rule than that of the advancement of the public service.

After adverting to the slow progress of negotiation, I observed that it might be of great importance if, when the principles of an arrangement between Russia and Turkey were admitted, His Imperial Majesty would vouchsafe to send a Plenipotentiary to Odessa, where he could settle matters with the Turkish negotiator.

But, said Count Nesselrode, this is going back; the Turks have already signified their willingness to send an Ambassador to St. Petersburgh.

They are, I replied, as ready to do so as before; but the means suggested would expedite matters, and save much valuable time.

The idea, Count Nesselrode replied, was quite a new one. He could not take upon himself to say how it would be regarded by the Emperor.

In fine, M. le Comte, I remarked, I will say openly that I am a little disheartened. At first I took a cheerful view of affairs; I thought the negotiation would run smoothly; now I observe that it advances very slowly, if it advances at all, and I begin to think ill of affairs.

No, Count Nesselrode replied, there is no room for gloomy anticipations; I still expect a peaceful solution of difficulties if all goes on well at Constantinople; if untoward events (des événements) should occur in Turkey, then indeed we may apprehend complications.

All that I have thus reported to your Lordship appears to me vague and unsatisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 216.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 11.)*

(No. 401.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 4, 1853.*

A CONVERSATION which I have held with a person who is well acquainted with the proceedings of the Prussian Mission tends completely to confirm Lord Bloomfield's opinions, both as to the object of the Prussian Cabinet being to preserve its independence of action in the Turkish Question, and as to the desire felt at present at Berlin to prevent the return of General Rochow until he can do so without incurring that risk of Russian disapprobation which would attend any attempt on his part to throw blame upon the conduct of this Government.

I would suggest that another feeling may possibly exist on the part of His Prussian Majesty's advisers, and that they may not be sorry to recommend themselves to the Russian Court, at the expense of their rivals, by the contrast which their inactivity in a good cause presents to the zeal which has been shown lately by the Austrian Cabinet.

When the Prussian Government alleges that their favourable representations at St. Petersburgh would be more likely to produce evil than good consequences, they assert that which cannot be admitted.

The late policy of Russia has been of a nature to displease the whole of Europe, and the best chance of procuring its amendment would have been that it should have been met by a general cry of disapprobation.

Those, however, who are in the wrong require but little encouragement to persevere in error, and a backwardness on the part of any of the Great Powers to withhold their expression of regret and blame for what has passed would, I am convinced, be considered as indicating their approbation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 217.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 11.)*

(No. 403. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 5, 1853.*

VARIOUS indications are observable here, which if properly considered might suggest to the Government that the course upon which they have lately entered is attended with danger, against which their million of bayonets would not protect them.

When the Emperor visited Cronstadt a month ago, he was painfully struck by the absence of foreign shipping; the same observation is to be made now, and the consequence is that freights have advanced in a remarkable manner—coals, for instance, which are usually brought from England at a charge of 6*s.* per ton, are now imported at a cost of 1*l.* 2*s.*, the result being that very serious inconvenience is felt by the manufacturers, and that some of these, if the evil is to continue, will be obliged to suspend operations.

If such be the effects of a panic, which has never assumed very serious proportions, it may not be difficult to calculate what would be the consequences, I do not say of an attack, but of a simple blockade of the Gulf. Commerce would be annihilated, credit destroyed, and the Government cut off from its principal resource; even now I apprehend that the want of funds is severely felt, for at Cronstadt there appears to be an inability to go on with the works which had been commenced for widening the docks, urgent as was the necessity for these works, and earnest as is the attention now bestowed upon naval affairs.

Among the consequences of a war, there is one which should seem to have escaped the notice of the Government; they have a number of steamers, and as long as peace is preserved with England and France they possess the means of sending them to sea. The facility, however, ends with peace, for besides that



these vessels would be captured if they ventured out, their means of navigation are entirely dependent upon foreign supply.

These are among the considerations which lead me to imagine that Russia has yet to learn to what she might expose herself by a collision with Western Europe, and which induce me to believe that, long and heavy as may be her sword, her cuirass would upon trial be found defective.

At the same time, that the growth of Russia in power of all sorts has been unparalleled by any country unless it be by the United States cannot be questioned; and that, unless checked, it will at no distant period weigh most onerously upon the whole of Europe, appears to me no less certain.

We have had hitherto the security of a Sovereign whose respect for Treaties and whose moderation prevented the misuse of vast resources and unlimited authority: recent events, however, show that the security has fallen in value, and that Western Europe must henceforward rely more upon the power of resisting Northern encroachment than upon the disposition of the North to refrain from encroaching.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 218.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 11.)*

(No. 404.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 5, 1853.*

IT is my agreeable duty to acquaint your Lordship, that upon waiting upon the Chancellor this morning he stated that he had the satisfaction of informing me, that the Emperor had signified his acceptance (acceptation pure et simple) of the Projet de Note which had been received from Vienna, and a copy of which was dispatched on the 24th ultimo from Vienna to Constantinople.

The satisfaction at this result, at this probable termination of an arduous affair, which the Chancellor expressed, was very visible in his countenance.

Intelligence of the Emperor's decision will be sent off to-morrow to Baron Brunnow, and has been already conveyed by telegraph to Vienna.

Count Nesselrode said a few words regarding the fresh proof offered by the Emperor of his love of peace; and for himself would only observe, that it must be in my recollection that he had taken a more cheerful view of affairs from the time that intelligence had been received of the occupation of the Principalities.

On my side I was eager not to establish the claim of having taken a right view of the Turkish question by recalling past transactions, and I refrained accordingly from reminding his Excellency that the form of declaration now assented to by the Emperor was very much what I had suggested to His Imperial Majesty in a conversation which immediately followed the news of Prince Menchikoff's being withdrawn from Constantinople.

Before leaving the Chancellor, being desirous of acting upon the orders conveyed in your Lordship's despatch No. 149, I remarked that I must beg to call his attention once more to the occupation of the Principalities, and to express on behalf of Her Majesty's Government the hope that the occupation would cease as soon as the note should be signed.

Count Nesselrode thought it would be premature to give a direct answer to my question; and would inquire if it were suspected that the Russian army intended to remain in the Principalities permanently?

My question, I replied, did not imply that suspicion; but I felt obliged to make an inquiry which was justified by intelligence which had reached Her Majesty's Government, of roads and bridges which were in a course of construction, and of contracts for several months which had been made.

The Chancellor rejoined that he evidently could not speak positively until he should know whether the Turkish Government were prepared to sign the note which had been sent them; that in the meantime he could only state, that the Emperor was desirous that the occupation of the Principalities should not be prolonged by one day beyond the term which was absolutely necessary.

I had been anxious that my French colleague, who called upon the

Chancellor a little before me, should have made inquiries of the same nature; but this he declined doing, and he was indeed eager that I should forego my avowed intention. General Castelbajac was disposed to consider the immediate evacuation of the Principalities after the signature of the note as a matter of course, and thought that to raise any doubt upon the point, besides being unnecessary, might be considered to imply a distrust in the good faith of the Russian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 219.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 11.)

(No. 317.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 7*, 1853.

THINKING it important that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople should be made acquainted with the intelligence received by Baron Meyendorff relative to the Emperor of Russia's acceptance of Count Buol's proposed note, I have forwarded to Mr. Consul-General Fonblanque a telegraphic despatch of which I have the honour of inclosing a copy, with a request that he would forward by Tartar to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the information which it conveys.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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Inclosure in No. 219.

*The Earl of Westmorland to Consul-General Fonblanque.*

*Vienne, 7 Août*, 1853.

(Telegraphic.)

FAITES passer immédiatement par Tatar à Lord Stratford la dépêche suivante:

"Le Baron Meyendorff m'a communiqué une dépêche télégraphique, datée de St. Pétersbourg du 3 Août, qui porte que l'Empereur accepte la note proposée par le Comte Buol, et si la Porte l'accepte sans changement l'Ambassadeur Turque sera reçu à St. Pétersbourg. Lord Stratford est prié de faire savoir cette nouvelle à M. de Wildenbruch.

"Lord Clarendon écrit le 2 pour confirmer la suspension de l'envoi de Constantinople du 20 et 22 Juillet, et recommande fortement le projet du Comte Buol.

"Les dépêches de Lord Stratford jusqu'au No. 180, datées le 28, sont arrivées."

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No. 220.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 12.)

(No. 587. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, August* 11, 1853.

DURING an interview which I had with M. Drouyn de Lhuys this afternoon, his Excellency expressed an intention of writing to-morrow to M. Castelbajac, stating the satisfaction of the French Government on learning the conciliatory disposition manifested by the Emperor of Russia in regard to Turkey, and declaring that the French Government, relying on the Emperor's good faith, regarded the differences which existed between Russia and Turkey as settled. But inasmuch as the French Government trusted to the Emperor of Russia's loyalty to order the immediate evacuation of the Principalities, so His Imperial Majesty should trust to the loyalty of France for the departure of the French fleet from Besika Bay.



I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that I considered the latter part of the despatch to be imprudent, and that I thought it would be better to omit it. After some discussion, in which the French Minister stated that he had only intended the phrase to which I objected as a guidance for General Castelbajac in case the departure of the fleets was urged upon him, he said that he would alter the last paragraph thus: that the General was to ask no question respecting the evacuation of the Principalities, but that the French Government, being desirous of obliterating the last traces of these unfortunate differences, would be glad to hear without loss of time whenever orders were sent for that evacuation.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he should send this despatch by post, and that the Russian Government might draw its own conclusions from the desire which would thus be expressed in it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 221.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 12.)

(No. 588.)
My Lord, *Paris, August* 11, 1852.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received despatches from Constantinople of the 30th ultimo. A great fermentation continued to exist in the Divan, and in the Mussulman population generally.

The orders desiring the Hospodars of the Principalities to retire from their seats of Government had been sent, but no answer had been made. The Prince of Servia had sent messages expressive of his loyalty to the Porte, and offered a supply of arms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 222.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 316.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 12, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction from your Excellency's despatch No. 577, that the language of the French Government is so entirely in unison with their own as to not allowing any comparison to be made between the position occupied by the combined fleets in Besica Bay and that of the Russian army in the Principalities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 223.

*Baron Brunnow to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 12.)*

Mon cher Lord Clarendon, *Chesham Place, le 12 Août*, 1853.

JE viens de recevoir une dépêche de M. le Comte de Nesselrode du $\frac{23 \text{ Juillet}}{4 \text{ Août}}$, qui m'annonce l'adhésion donnée par l'Empereur au projet de note rédigé à Vienne.

Cette intention est énoncée dans une dépêche adressée au Baron de Meyendorff, dont le Comte Nesselrode me charge de vous donner lecture.

Permettez moi, mon cher Lord Clarendon, de m'acquitter de ce devoir en plaçant sous vos yeux les pièces ci-jointes, avec prière de vouloir bien me les restituer après en avoir pris connaissance.

Mille hommages, &c.
(Signé) BRUNNOW.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 223.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.*

M. le Baron, *St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{11 \text{ Juillet}}{23 \text{ Juillet}}$*, 1853.

VOTRE Excellence aura déjà sans doute eu connaissance de la note rédigée par le Cabinet Autrichien avec la participation des Représentants d'Angleterre, de France, et de Prusse à Vienne. Je m'empresse de lui en envoyer ci-joint une copie, et de la prévenir que Sa Majesté l'Empereur a daigné consentir à recevoir un Ambassadeur Turc si cette pièce est acceptée par la Porte Ottomane. Pour vous mettre au fait, M. le Baron, de la manière dont nous avons cru devoir exprimer au Cabinet Autrichien l'adhésion de notre Auguste Maître à cette combinaison, j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint la copie d'une dépêche que j'adresse aujourd'hui au Baron de Meyendorff, et dont je vous prierai de donner lecture à Lord Clarendon.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 223.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff.*

*St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{11 \text{ Juillet}}{23 \text{ Juillet}}$*, 1853.

LE projet de l'ultimatum que vous nous avez communiqué par votre dépêche du $\frac{1}{13}$ de ce mois, et que le Cabinet de Vienne se proposait de transmettre à Constantinople, après en avoir concerté les clauses et la rédaction avec les Représentants des trois autres Puissances, a fixé toute notre attention.

Si ce projet ne répond pas pleinement aux demandes déjà si modérées que le Prince Menchikoff avait formulées dans la note dont nous avions réclamé la signature, il a la mérite à nos yeux d'un arrangement dont l'initiative a été prise



par une Cour amie, et qui, délibéré en commun entre les Représentants des trois autres Puissances intervenues dans la question, a été unanimement reconnu comme devant être accepté par la Porte Ottomane et transmis à St. Pétersbourg par une Ambassade *ad hoc*.

Vous connaissez, M. le Baron, le désir très sincère de la part de notre Auguste Maître de faire cesser, en autant que cela peut dépendre de lui, les anxiétés que l'on éprouve en Europe, avec quelque exagération peut-être, à l'occasion de notre différend actuel avec la Turquie. Sa Majesté vous charge, en conséquence, M. le Baron, de déclarer au Ministère de l'Empereur François-Joseph, ainsi qu'à vos collégues de France, d'Angleterre et de Prusse, que, pour notre part, nous acceptons tel quel le dernier Projet de Note formulé à Vienne, et qu'un Ambassadeur du Sultan, porteur de ce document, serait reçu à St. Pétersbourg sans aucune difficulté et avec tous les égards d'usage.

Je crois superflu de faire observer ici à votre Excellence qu'en accueillant, comme nous le faisons par esprit de conciliation, l'expédient concerté à Vienne de la note dont il s'agit, et l'envoi d'une Ambassade Turque, nous entendons bien ne plus avoir à examiner ou à discuter de nouvelles modifications et de nouveaux projets élaborés à Constantinople sous les inspirations belliqueuses qui paraissent dominer à cette heure le Sultan et la plupart de ses Ministres, et que, dans le cas où le Gouvernement Ottoman rejetterait encore ce dernier projet d'arrangement, nous ne nous considererions plus comme liés par le consentement que nous y donnons aujourd'hui.

Si l'Europe a besoin, comme on ne cesse de nous le dire, de voir se terminer la crise qui menace l'Orient, c'est à Constantinople que doivent s'adresser à l'avenir les bienveillants et pacifiques efforts des grandes Puissances, que nous secondons de notre côté par tous les sacrifices compatibles avec la dignité de la Russie et la justice de la cause dont elle a dû prendre en mains la défense.

Vous voudrez bien, M. le Baron, donner lecture et copie de la présente à M. le Comte de Buol, et en faire connaître également le contenu à vos principaux collégues du corps diplomatique.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

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No. 224.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 406.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 9*, 1853.

SOME of my diplomatic colleagues have observed, as I have done, that the language of official persons in speaking of Eastern affairs is constantly that too little attention has been bestowed upon the Russian mission at Constantinople; that Russian influence had been allowed to fall off, and that it had become therefore necessary that this influence should be revived by some extraordinary exertion.

Of all the excuses which can be offered for the late transactions of the Russian Cabinet in Turkish affairs, this appears to be the most illogical, as it is in other words a declaration of the Sultan being called upon to pay the price of a fault which is not his, and is the fault of the party by whom reparation is sought.

I should probably not have noticed this attempt at excusing a mischievous volley by an unreasonable argument, but for the circumstances of my having heard it insisted upon by a person whom I do not feel at liberty to name, but who is likely to hold no other language than that which is in use at court.

I observe among my colleagues and other persons the best qualified to form a correct opinion, a mistrust as to the immediate termination of the late quarrel in consequence of the Emperor's acceptance of the Projet de Note drawn up at Vienna.

Some of these persons imagine that the Sultan's accession to the proposed terms may be difficult to obtain. Others anticipate revolutionary movements, caused either by the turbulence of the Christian population or the fanaticism of the Turks; while the Minister of Greece, whose opinion (when not prejudiced) is one of the most valuable, is possessed with the apprehension of the Sultan's throne, and even life, being in danger from the machinations of his brother.

M. Zographo likewise speaks of the disorderly proceedings which invariably and unavoidably attend both the gathering and the disbanding of Turkish armaments, and apprehends that from one or other of these causes disturbances may result, the extent of which it is difficult to calculate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 225.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 408.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 9, 1853.*

THE French Minister who attended the exercises at the Camp of Krasno-Sélöe on the 6th instant, was very graciously received by the Emperor, who spoke to him of the satisfaction which he felt at having been able to promote the cause of peace by giving his consent to the plan of arrangement which had been proposed at Vienna.

His Majesty, however, added, that although he had consented to the plan, he felt by no means certain that the same course would be taken by the Porte.

According to the account which General Castelbajac gave me, His Imperial Majesty appears to be possessed with the idea of the Sultan's authority being greatly shaken, of Turkish affairs being in a state of great disorder, and of some crisis being at hand by which the Ottoman Empire may be placed in the greatest danger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—The exercises of Krasno-Sélöe will end about the 26th instant, with one or two grand reviews, and, as is generally thought, about the 2nd September the Emperor will set off for Warsaw and Kieff.

G. H. S.

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No. 226.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 176.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 27, 1853.*

THE Porte's orders for the retirement under present circumstances of the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia from their respective Governments were forwarded by the Galatz steam-packet of yesterday to Bucharest and Jassy.

Inclosed herewith in copy are the Porte's letters to the two Princes, and those also which I have addressed to Mr. Colquhoun, Mr. Gardner, and Mr. Cunningham. Your Lordship will learn from this correspondence that I have pursued, in concert with the French Ambassador, the same course which I had previously announced to your Lordship.



I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 226.

*Reshid Pasha to the Prince of Moldavia.*

Mon Prince, *Le 14/26 Juillet, 1853.*

LA Russie, tout en faisant entrer ses troupes dans les Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie, a déclaré aussi qu'elle n'avait pas l'intention de modifier les institutions qui régissent ces provinces et la situation politique que des Traités solennels leurs ont garantie, et la Sublime Porte, se fiant à cette déclaration, pensait conserver votre Altesse et son Altesse le Prince de Valachie dans vos postes respectifs.

Cependant, nous apprenons par la lettre qui vient d'arriver de la part de votre Altesse que la Cour de Russie a ordonné que vous, ainsi que le Prince de Valachie, eussiez à rompre vos relations avec Constantinople, et à suspendre le tribut établi, qui doit être payé à la Sublime Porte; ce qui lui a causé beaucoup de surprise.

Comme la Cour de Russie a entamé le système de ces provinces par l'endroit qui regarde immédiatement la puissance propriétaire, c'est-à-dire, par ses bases fondamentales, la Sublime Porte voit clairement que dans cet état de choses l'exercice de l'autorité légitime dans les Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie est impossible.

Par conséquence, la Sublime Porte, ainsi que ses droits sacrés et incontestables l'exigent, a décidé que votre Altesse, ainsi que son Altesse le Prince de Valachie, vous quittiez les Principautés provisoirement, et cette résolution a été aussi communiquée officiellement aux Grandes Puissances.

Il faut donc que vous, conformément aux ordres émanés du Trône Impérial à cet égard, vous quittiez de suite la province, et s'il arrive que vous agissiez d'une manière contraire à ces ordres souverains, la Sublime Porte, libre de son côté, prendra telles mesures qu'elle jugera conformes à ses propres affaires et à ses intérêts. Je m'empresse de vous renouveller, &c.

(Signé) RESHID.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 226.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul-General Colquhoun.*

Sir, *Therapia, July 26, 1853.*

I INCLOSE to you herewith a sealed packet addressed by the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Hospodar of Wallachia. You will learn the nature of the orders transmitted to his Highness from the copy of Reshid Pasha's letter inclosed herewith for your personal information. You will lose no time in waiting privately on Prince Stirbey, and you will deliver the packet to him with your own hands, requesting that he will appoint an early hour for your return in order to know whether he has any communication to make to you.

If he should invite you to stay, you will of course do so; but neither in the one case nor in the other are you at liberty to declare your knowledge of the contents of the packet, until he opens himself to you, or by his continued silence obliges you to inquire what course he means to take.

One of two things will happen. Prince Stirbey will either obey the orders of the Porte, or he will remain at Bucharest contumaciously.

In either of the two cases you will suspend your Consular functions, and cease hoisting your flag.

You will be careful to inform the Chief-Acting Wallachian authority that

you remain as a private person at Bucharest for further instructions; and that you expect to be free to communicate with Her Majesty's Government and Embassy here, employing your good offices on behalf of any of Her Majesty's subjects who may require them.

Should this be refused, you will leave Bucharest at your earliest convenience, after protesting against the necessity imposed upon you, and you will retire to Galatz for further instructions.

I have to desire, in conclusion, that you will act in these matters on a perfect understanding with your colleague the French Consul, to whom instructions of a similar purport are transmitted by the present occasion, and that you will perform the duties enjoined to you without any unnecessary display, or want of consideration for the existing authorities.

The Porte's commands to Prince Ghika are forwarded through the French Embassy, and my instruction to Mr. Gardner is of the same purport as this.

You will direct the Vice-Consuls and Consular Agents at the outports to continue for the present in the exercise of their Consular functions, notwithstanding your retirement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 226.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Gardner.*

Sir, *Therapia, July 26, 1853.*

IN consequence of what you will learn from the papers inclosed herewith for your confidential and personal information, the Porte has determined to recall provisionally the two Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia. Orders to that effect are conveyed by the present opportunity to Jassy. The French Ambassador has undertaken to forward them to their destination. Those of similar purport addressed to Prince Stirbey are entrusted to me, and I now inclose you a copy of my despatch to Mr. Colquhoun, which you will consider as equally addressed to yourself, with the exception of those parts which relate to the delivery of the Porte's letter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 226.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Consul Cunningham.*

Sir, *Therapia, July 26, 1853.*

YOU will lose no time in forwarding to Bucharest by an express the accompanying packet, addressed to Mr. Colquhoun, and you will be careful to select some person of confidence for the purpose.

The packet for Mr. Gardner is to be consigned by you to the French Vice-Consul, who, whether he be at Galatz or at Ibraila, has orders from his Ambassador to send an express to Jassy.

You will receive instructions to continue in the exercise of your Consular functions, notwithstanding circumstances which oblige Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy to suspend theirs.

You will forward by your express any packet which the French Vice-Consul, on learning your intention to send one, may wish to have conveyed to Bucharest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 227.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 165.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 15, 1853.*

I RECEIVED this morning your Excellency's despatches from No. 176 to No. 180 of the 28th instant inclusive, with the exception of No. 177. They will be laid before the Queen.

I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the instructions which, as reported in your despatch No. 176, of the 27th ultimo, you have given to Her Majesty's Consular authorities in the Principalities, on the occasion of the recall of the Hospodars by the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 228.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 319. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 12, 1853.*

GENERAL ROCHOW, the Russian Envoy at St. Petersburgh, who has been on leave of absence for several months past on account of his health, returns to his post to-morrow.

In reply to an inquiry which I have just made of Baron Manteuffel as to whether General Rochow was charged with any special instructions respecting the Eastern Question, his Excellency said that in order that that Minister should be completely informed on the subject, he has been occupied reading the correspondence connected with it, which was to serve as his guide in communicating with the Russian Government; that he had no new directions to give him, but that he was not to conceal that a disapprobation of the late measures of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh continued to be felt by the Prussian Government, though they now hoped the difficulties would be speedily brought to an end.

I inquired further whether General Rochow would urge the evacuation of the Principalities, and was given to understand that the desire of the Prussian Government was that this should take place as early as possible, and that General Rochow would do his best to advance this object, but that he (the General) apprehended that it would be wiser to leave the question to the Emperor's decision rather than to urge it, for that he firmly believed that His Imperial Majesty had no intention of his troops remaining there unnecessarily, but that he would not give way to pressure.

Baron Manteuffel seemed to agree as to the prudence of following this course, but was by no means inclined to admit the justice of the principles which it involved, and said something of the personal confidence with which the Emperor of Russia had inspired General Rochow, hinting that this might perhaps be carried too far, but that still the General was a very useful servant of the Crown, and that he was put to a good deal of embarrassment by the desire which he had frequently expressed of retiring from his present diplomatic post, and which he had again urged on his consideration.

It may be right that I should add to this despatch, that in consequence of the Emperor of Russia having expressed disappointment at not seeing any Prussian officers of rank at the review this summer, the King ordered General Lindheim, who commands at Breslau, and who is already personally known to His Imperial Majesty, to proceed to St. Petersburgh, and the General has already left Berlin for this purpose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 220.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 321.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 12, 1853.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 310 of the 5th instant, upon the subject of the separate propositions for the settlement of the matters in dispute between Russia and the Porte, made some time ago by the Prussian Minister at Constantinople, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I reverted to this affair to-day in the course of a conversation which I have had with Baron Manteuffel, when his Excellency stated that Baron Wildenbruch's despatch had not yet reached him, but that he had written to Chevalier Bunsen on the subject, who would make a communication to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 230.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 310.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August 9, 1853.*

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch No. 246, approving my proceedings as reported in my despatches Nos. 286 and 292.

I communicated the substance of this despatch to Count Buol, informing him of the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government had learnt that he had invited me, together with my French and Prussian colleagues, to concert with him upon a plan of settlement that should be alike acceptable to the Emperor of Russia and to the Sultan, and I particularly pointed out to him that a conference of this nature had from the commencement of the differences between Russia and the Porte been suggested by your Lordship as most desirable.

With respect to the absence of Baron Meyendorff from the meeting of the other Ministers to which he was invited, Count Buol stated that it was occasioned solely by his want of instructions to enter into any negotiation, but Baron Meyendorff had supplied him such suggestions as he thought might serve to advance the objects which all the members of the Conference had so much at heart.

Count Buol was happy to believe that the news from St. Petersburgh of the 3rd instant would relieve your Lordship from the apprehensions you might have entertained as to the acceptance of his project by the Emperor of Russia, and he hoped that there would no longer be any difficulty upon that subject if the project was equally accepted at Constantinople; he also stated that he would use his best efforts to obtain such an arrangement as would prevent any obstacle from arising to the prompt evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian forces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 231.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 181.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 16, 1853.*

I HAVE to instruct you to read to Count Nesselrode the inclosed copy of a despatch from Mr. Colquhoun, giving an account of the movements of Russian troops towards the Danube, with indications of an intention to cross that river. You will ask Count Nesselrode for an explanation of the movements reported



by Mr. Colquhoun, and you will express the regret of Her Majesty's Government at the constant discrepancy which exists between the acts and the assurances of the Russian Government, of which Mr. Colquhoun's despatch furnishes an additional proof.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 232.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 16.)*

(No. 599.)

My Lord, *Paris, August 15, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received some interesting details respecting the Russian army from Bucarest, dated the 4th instant. M. Ponjade, the French Consul, states that after an appearance of uncertainty as to their movements, the Russian troops have moved close up to the Danube, upon which, as high as Galatz and Ibraila, they have gun-boats. He states the number of Russian troops between Ismail and Gemnitza to be 115,938, the details of which he gives; besides, reinforcements are said to be advancing in all directions. Everything indicated the certainty on the part of the Russians of a campaign, and the prevalent idea in the Principalities is that the Russians are only endeavouring to gain time, and will eventually march further. M. Ponjade adds that those who remember the last Russian occupation say that the present troops are in a far better state, both of discipline and equipment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 233.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 16.)*

(No. 600. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, August 15, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship will probably have received from Baron Brunnow and from Count Colloredo communications of a nature similar to those made to M. Drouyn de Lhuys by M. Kisseleff and M. de Hübner.

I do not know their respective dates, but the purport of the former is to say that the Emperor Nicholas accepts the note elaborated at Vienna with the desire of doing away with the exaggerated notions which prevail of his warlike intentions, while the object of the other appears to be to obtain some positive declaration respecting the departure of the fleets from Besika.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys assures me that his language to M. de Hübner has been entirely consonant with that which I had the honour to report in my No. 587, he was about to address to General Castelbajac, an intention which he has since carried into execution.

M. de Hübner further informed M. Drouyn de Lhuys confidentially that his Government had received no assurances whatever from St. Petersburgh respecting the evacuation of the Principalities, and that instructions had been sent by Count Buol to Baron Lebzeltern to elicit some declaration from the Russian Government as to their intentions on this point, and to make them understand that it would be useless to hope to obtain any promise from the English and French Governments respecting the movements of their fleets; that he (Count Buol) felt certain that the fleets would return whenever orders were sent from St. Petersburgh for the troops to recross the Pruth.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 234.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 416. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 11, 1853.

ONE of the first ladies of the Court happening to dine at my house the day before yesterday, observed to me "que les diplomates avaient beau se battre les flancs, qu'il n'en était moins sûr qu'avant six mois de tems la guerre éclaterait."

She went on to explain why—the considerations being founded upon the Sultan's loss of authority, upon the financial condition of the country, its internal difficulties, &c.

The observations of an elderly lady who probably does not even read the "St. Petersburgh Gazette," would be little worthy of attention if it were not that persons about the Court, and indeed all those who know what is passing there, never speak of political matters but in the language employed by their superiors.

Upon this occasion the person I allude to was simply repeating an opinion which had been expressed six weeks ago by the Chancellor, to whom in all probability it had been dictated by the Emperor.

At present, as it appears, a favourite topic at the Russian Court is the unbounded range of territory of which England is possessing herself in India.

The subject was alluded to yesterday by one of the Emperor's friends and confidants, who expressed to me somewhat sarcastically his apprehensions that the English troops would suffer much from marsh fevers; I replied that I believed that they were of a less pernicious nature than those which prevailed in the Principalities.

Baron Mollerno, the Dutch Envoy, who in consequence of the presence of the Dowager Queen of the Netherlands, has been passing the last two months at Peterhoff, acquaints me that he has heard the Emperor express several times his indignation at the mistrust of Russia which is manifested by foreign Governments. "Ce qui me rend furieux," His Majesty said, "c'est de voir qu'on ne se fie pas à ma parole!"

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 235.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 418.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 11, 1853.

THE arrival of the messenger Webster, who reached St. Petersburgh on the 9th instant, has placed me in possession of your Lordship's despatches down to No. 167 inclusive.

With reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 156 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour of observing, that Baron Prokesch was quite warranted in stating to Sir Alexander Malet that the Austrian Government had a previous knowledge of the projected Russian Embassy to Constantinople, and partial though incomplete knowledge of its objects.

This statement is perfectly correct, and it is equally true that the embassy would have set off some weeks sooner but for the infirm state of Prince Menchikoff's health.

It is probable that a correct history of the late dark transactions of the Russian Cabinet will never be written; but I have no hesitation in saying, that any account which may attribute the policy of the Imperial Cabinet to one determining cause will be erroneous.

If I do not err, the Russians viewed at first with satisfaction a step on the part of the Austrian Government which was likely to lead to a common action against Turkey; I cannot, however, I think, be mistaken in stating, that this feeling was succeeded by that of jealousy at learning the complete success of Count Leiningen's mission; and I am confident as to the fact of the Russians having been greatly mortified at finding that apprehensions, which were not excited by Count Leiningen's diplomatic efforts, were aroused immediately and universally by the proceedings of Prince Menchikoff.



This annoyance, and the surprise at finding themselves generally mistrusted, which is observable on the part of the Russians, strikes me as one of the most remarkable features of the whole transaction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 236.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 419. Secret.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 11, 1853.

IT appears that General Castelbajac, upon his visit to the camp last week, was received with even more favour and distinction than I had been aware of, and that the Emperor conversed more with him than with any of his military guests, not excepting General Gluay.

In talking over with me again his conversation with the Emperor, the Marquis Castelbajac remarked that he had at first intended to have withheld from me a part of His Imperial Majesty's observations, but that he felt bound upon reflection to dismiss this reserve, and to acquaint me that His Majesty, after speaking of the distracted state of Turkey and the total loss of all authority by the Sultan, had concluded by stating that it was clear that the Western Powers were not aware of the danger which constantly threatened; but that for his part he regarded it to be so imminent that, as soon as the present difficulties were surmounted, he should consider it of great importance that the Allied Powers should occupy themselves with an eventuality (eventualité) which must be near at hand.

It is very apparent to me that General Castelbajac did not reply to the Emperor's observation (or it may be overture) as an English diplomatist would have done, and that, instead of insisting upon the expediency of propping up a sinking empire he dwelt rather upon the expediency of no fresh arrangement with regard to Turkey being made till the Allied Powers should be consulted.

I need hardly state to your Lordship, that General Castelbajac's communication was made to me in the strictest confidence.

I will not conclude my despatch without reporting to your Lordship that in speaking of the prospect of an arrangement with Turkey, the Emperor added: "Ainsi, donc, General, je ne doute aucunement que nous n'arrivions à une bonne entente pourvu que les autres soient d'aussi bonne foi que nous!"

As in this country there prevails the habit of giving a *mot d'ordre*, which, once employed by the Emperor or his Ministers, is repeated by the persons belonging to the Court; this same phrase has been made use of to me two or three times by my Russian acquaintances.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 237.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 420. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 11, 1853.

I WOULD take the liberty of offering the following short observations, which are suggested by the perusal of your Lordship's despatch to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe marked No. 136.

It is certain that the Russians believe in the power which they possess of overrunning Turkey and putting an end to the Sultan's rule in Europe when they think fit; and as regards myself I do not hesitate to express my conviction that their confidence is well founded. Whether England and France would not

be able to compel Russia to drop her prey, and whether she would not have to pay dearly for her flagitious attack, that is another question, and one which might probably be answered affirmatively.

Meanwhile, however, there can, I think, be no doubt that any remains of authority which the Sultan may possess over his European provinces would be destroyed, and that the Ottoman Empire would remain a ruin which all the power of the most powerful States would be incapable of reconstructing.

The conduct of the Russian Government in the late transactions has been such that it is impossible the most confiding should place any reliance in their professions and promises; putting these, however, aside as valueless, I would venture to observe to your Lordship that I have no doubt of Russia being sufficiently sensible of her own weak points to be very much disinclined to engage in war against England and France, united as they are at present.

For that reason I believe that the Emperor has no actual intention of extending his encroachments upon Turkey; and, beyond that, I believe that he will be induced to withdraw his troops from the Principalities.

His Majesty may not have obtained all that he had in view, but according to his views he has carried out the great objects, of obliterating the effect of French and Austrian interference in Turkish affairs, of reigning paramount in the apprehensions of his southern neighbours, and of having given a fresh and perhaps a fatal shock to the independence of that country whose existence, according to the set phrase of Russian diplomacy, is of greater value to Russia than to any of the other States of Europe.

At a time when the inhabitants of Constantinople may be supposed to be under great apprehensions from the anticipation of a Russian invasion, it has been, I must confess, with no slight satisfaction that I have ascertained that the inhabitants of St. Petersburgh were not unmoved at the contingency of the combined fleets of England and France making their appearance before the walls of Cronstadt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 238.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 425.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 12, 1853.

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch of the 3rd instant, No. 165, it is only necessary that I should state that your inquiry with regard to the Emperor's acceptance of the Projet de Note prepared at Vienna, was answered by anticipation by the despatch No. 491, which I had the honour of addressing to your Lordship on the 5th instant.

With respect to your Lordship's despatch No. 157 of the 2nd instant, I beg to state that I waited yesterday upon Count Nesselrode, to whom I reported the substance of your observations upon the conduct of the Russian authorities in preventing the payment of the tribute due by the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Porte.

No act, I remarked, of the Russian Government had given so much offence in Turkey as well as in England and France, the sensation produced having been all the stronger from the allies of Russia being at the time occupied in bringing about an amicable arrangement of difficulties which might be acceptable to the Emperor.

The Chancellor observed that he was aware that my visit announced clouds, but that he was willing to believe that these clouds were upon the point of being dispersed.

"You reproach us," he said, "with our conduct in the Principalities, and you suspect that our object is to gain time and so prolong our occupation of them. Upon the first point I will observe that nothing can be more circumspect than our conduct has been; we have made no changes in the administration of the country, we pay for everything, and shall leave the Principalities in a



better state than that in which we found them. As for the tribute money, we could not allow it to be handed over to the Sultan—you would not have done so yourselves; it is inconsistent with the very character of a military occupation that the occupying Power should allow supplies of money to be sent to the enemy."

I here interrupted the Chancellor to observe that the Sultan was not the enemy of Russia, that the two countries were not at war: his Excellency admitted the correction, and substituted the word "adversary" for "enemy."

I begged to inquire whether it was at least understood that the tribute-money was reserved for the later use of the Sultan? To this question the Chancellor could return no definitive answer; the Emperor's pleasure not having been signified, no determination had taken place.

Then, I said, for God's sake, decide the question at once, and decide it according to what is on all sides expected of you.

The Chancellor resumed: "Now," he said, "about the delays which we are supposed to be desirous of interposing. The note which is intended to settle affairs reaches us on a Tuesday; on the following day our acceptance of it, without the slightest alteration, is sent off by telegraph as far as Warsaw, and from thence by a feld-jäger to Vienna, where it arrives on Saturday; we subscribe, without hesitation, to the slight changes made in the note at London and Paris, and the acknowledgment of our acquiescence reaches us again on the following Tuesday—a rapidity of communication of which there has been hitherto no example. This does not look like a desire to protract affairs. Now," Count Nesselrode said, "let me proceed further: you wish to see us out of the Principalities; I beg of you not to speak to us upon that subject; we are persuaded that you are anxious to be able to withdraw your ships from Besika. I entreat of you to believe that on our side we are just as desirous of leaving the Principalities; these things are better not spoken of—they will come naturally and of themselves."

I again took an opportunity of expressing the sincere hope that the non-conclusion of affairs would not place the fleets under the necessity of entering the Dardanelles before the approach of autumnal weather.

Count Nesselrode expressed his conviction that long before that time the decision of the Porte (respecting which, however, he would remark that he felt considerable misgivings) must be known; that the Emperor proposed setting off for Warsaw in the first days of September; and that before His Majesty's departure all doubts, he was satisfied, must be removed.

Reverting to the subject of the evacuation of the Principalities, I observed that it was highly important that the Emperor's intention of withdrawing his troops should be made known to the Turks, as a means of obtaining their adhesion to the proposed arrangement.

Count Nesselrode replied, that no such declaration was necessary—that the thing spoke for itself; indeed, that the Emperor's intentions upon this point had been made known in his manifesto.

I feel called upon to admit that some considerable time has elapsed since any conversation in which I have been engaged with the Chancellor has left so favourable an impression upon my mind as that of which I have thus submitted the principal details to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 239.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 182. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 29, 1853.

THE extract, which I inclose herewith, of M. Pisani's daily report to me, has interest enough to induce me to call your Lordship's attention to its contents. The language held by Reshid Pasha to M. Pisani is the more remarkable, as it did not originate in any message or inquiry for me.

It has come to my knowledge in a confidential manner, that the day before yesterday M. de la Cour, while paying a visit to the late Seraskier, now Commander of the Guards, Mehemet Rushdi Pasha, said, in reply to a question from the latter, that France was quite ready to send troops in aid of the Porte, but that it would be difficult to disembark them from the Black Sea, and impossible to march them through Germany. It appears, moreover, that the French Ambassador subsequently sent word to Reshid Pasha that he had written to his Government on that subject.

Other ideas, grounded on the eventuality of war, are also entertained by M. de la Cour. Amongst them are the military occupation of the Dardanelles jointly by England and France, and the independence of the Danubian Principalities. Whether they proceed from himself or from his Government, I cannot presume to say. It would seem, however, pretty clear that schemes of so much importance ought not, under present circumstances, to be lightly or prematurely thrown out. If the motives for entertaining them are sufficient, it is but reasonable to expect that they should not be broached here, except upon an understanding with Her Majesty's Government.

The Turkish Ministers are evidently gaining confidence in their means of resisting Russia. It has been reported to me, as the opinion of a Prussian officer lately returned from Bulgaria overland, that the passes of the Balkan are now so well fortified as to defy the attack of any invading army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 239.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

M. DE STEINDL informed Reshid Pasha that the despatches Baron Bruck received by yesterday's post say that all the Four Powers are very anxious to maintain peace; that England had prepared a Projet of Convention, which was sent to St. Petersburgh for the Emperor's consideration, and that France had also prepared a projet of note which she likewise transmitted to the Russian Cabinet.

Reshid Pasha in reply to M. de Steindl, said that the Cabinets were taking a useless trouble, as the Porte had already given its ultimatum, and that it was resolved not to add a single word to the last projet communicated in the Conference to the Representatives of the Four Powers.

Afterwards M. de Steindl complained of the hasty step taken by the Porte in withdrawing the Hospodars, and that M. de Bruck thought that the Porte would have done well to have consulted him before taking a step which is likely to give provocation to Russia.

Reshid Pasha replied that the acts of Russia may abundantly suffice to vindicate the line taken by the Porte.

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No. 240.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 183.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 31, 1853.

INCLOSED herewith is a printed copy in Turkish of the Sultan's expected Proclamation, as published under the sanction of the Government. I add an English translation, including the amendments.

The signatures of all those who assisted at the great Council a week ago are subscribed to the original.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 240.

*Proclamation.*

(Translation.) *Constantinople, July* 13, 1853.

IT has been already stated in the Turkish official "Gazette," that Russia, having broken off official relations with the Sublime Porte on certain matters on which they could not come an understanding, withdrew her mission from Constantinople; and that, in consequence of the extensive preparations made by that Power by sea and by land, the Sublime Porte had made some military arrangements and defensive preparations, wholly for precaution and her own protection.

The real cause of the existing dispute with Russia, is the desire of that Power to obtain a binding and exclusive engagement from the Porte concerning the religious privileges of the Greek churches and priesthood, which the Porte cannot in justice be expected to give.

Now these religious privileges, granted in the reign of His deceased Majesty Mehemed Khan, of glorious memory, and confirmed during the reigns of his illustrious successors, have been maintained ever since. In imitation of this noble example of his Royal predecessors, His present Majesty has likewise ratified and corroborated them. It never entered even into the imagination of any one to violate the ancient privileges granted *a proprio motu* by the Imperial Throne.

It has been repeatedly declared, in a friendly and sincere manner, that the Porte did not refuse to give assurances sufficient to remove the doubts on which the Russian Government establishes this dispute, in the same manner as the Porte can give assurances to the whole world in a matter so firmly settled; and that whereas, if one Government should enter into an engagement having the colour or force of Treaty with another concerning the religious privileges of a nation consisting of so many millions of its subjects, the independence and sovereign rights of the Power thus bound would be impaired, such an engagement could not be consented to.

While no necessity existed for persisting to such an extent in this matter, the Government of Russia would not desist from its pretensions; and indeed the passage of the Russian troops across the Pruth, to take temporary possession of and hold the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, has been a subject of painful surprise to the Sublime Porte. This violation of the frontier is an infraction of existing Treaties, and has been immediately protested against, according to international law;—that is, the Sublime Porte has officially and publicly notified to the great Powers that she cannot accept such a violation of Treaty.

Since divers States, connected by the Treaties which they have contracted, constitute the links of mutual security with respect to territorial possessions and sovereign independence; since agreement and cooperation are the means now generally employed when serious disputes like the present arise; since, moreover, Russia has proclaimed that her real object was not to make war on the Porte, but to hold possession of Moldavia and Wallachia as a guarantee until such time as her claims are satisfied; and since all the great Powers, without exception, have displayed sentiments more or less favourable towards Turkey, while two of them—England and France—being Powers on which, from their quality of maritime States, the Porte relies with special confidence, have given a practical manifestation of their friendship and goodwill, the Porte is engaged in communicating, according to custom, with the above States; and meanwhile, as she cannot possibly accept a proposition so detrimental to her independence and sovereign rights, she has adopted the unanimous resolution of assuming, in her own defence, an armed attitude, as well upon the Danube as upon her Asiatic frontier.

Such, then, is the real cause of the dispute with Russia, and the present aspect of the question. The Sublime Porte has at the same time been duly careful to adopt all necessary measures, and to make for her defence every requisite disposition of troops and ammunition of war. The duty, therefore, of all the Porte's subjects, according to their several conditions, will be to continue in the tranquil prosecution of their respective concerns, agriculture, and commerce, and to hold themselves ready to execute any orders which may be issued to them by the Imperial Government.

As it has been clearly established in previous statements that, however the pretensions of Russia may relate to the religious privileges of the Greeks, neither the Greek people nor their Chiefs have any knowledge or participation therein; and the Sublime Porte is convinced that they are in every respect satisfied and grateful towards their Sovereign; and that they are concerned more than any other at such pretensions being put forward; it is, on these accounts, by no means fitting that any resentment should be felt towards them in this respect; and as the Greeks are equally faithful subjects of our Gracious Master with the Armenians, the Catholics, the Protestants, and the Jews, it behoves all the Sultan's subjects, without exception, to be on good terms with one another, not acting hostilely nor using abusive language; in short, the Mussulmans, as well as the other subjects of the Porte, shall live on good terms with each other, none among them whatsoever committing any action contrary to the supreme will, but attending to their own concerns.

The above dispositions and decision, as well as the admonitions as above stated, are the result of the deliberation of a General Council, comprising the Sheik ul Islam, the learned chiefs of the law, the Seraskier, and all those in military office, and the other Ministers and public servants, and held in the presence of the Grand Vizier; and an Imperial firman having also been issued on this subject, any one disapproving of this decision, and acting in contravention to these decisive admonitions, will be held a disobedient subject, and severely punished.

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No. 241.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 184.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 31, 1853.

AN express arrived yesterday at the Porte from Belgrade with despatches from the Turkish Pasha, and also from the Servian Government, announcing an offer made by Austria to occupy the country with her troops, and a conviction on the part of the Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs, founded, as he said, on certain knowledge, that the Austrian forces would not wait for the Porte's consent to march into the Principality.

Mr. Fonblanque writes to me in the same sense under date of the 24th.

I have not yet had time to communicate with the Turkish Ministers on this subject; but I am informed that they will not hear of an occupation of Servia, and that the Servian Agent at the Porte expects a rising of his countrymen against the Austrians, should the latter cross the frontier.

Supposing the latter to be as stated, I fear we must conclude that, if Austria be not playing booty with Russia, her Government has at least abandoned the hope of getting the Russians out of Wallachia and Moldavia by means of negotiation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 242.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 186.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 31, 1853.

HAVING had occasion to revert to my correspondence with Sir Hamilton Seymour I observe in my letter of the 19th ultimo, sent home in copy, a passage which may be better for a word of explanation. It relates to the eventual retirement of the squadrons anchored in Besika Bay. Although, as I wrote with an express reference to Her Majesty's Government, no practical consequence attaches to it, I wish nevertheless to make my meaning clearer.

To bargain for the withdrawal of the squadrons as a preliminary to the evacuation of the Principalities, would be one thing: to call to mind, as a favouring circumstance, that the settlement of the pending question, accompanied with the retirement of the Russian forces, would naturally be followed by the departure of the squadrons, is another. It was the latter idea which I had in my thoughts: the dispersion of the spectators when the play is over: the disappearance of the seconds, when their principals are satisfied.

If ever the honour of a nation were to be risked, it would hardly be on an occasion where injustice and duplicity have called it into action.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 243.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 188.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 4, 1853.

THE affairs of Servia have suddenly assumed a character of unusual interest. It was to be expected that Austria would observe the population of that country with a watchful and jealous eye; nor have indications of something more than vigilance been wanting, if the accounts of her military movements along the frontier, and the suspicions attached to Meyenhoffer's mission and Milosch's letter be not altogether misplaced.

I merely allude to these circumstances in the persuasion that Mr. Fonblanque has given to your Lordship the same information respecting them which he has addressed to me. The increase as well as the movement of Austrian troops on portions of the whole frontier line from the Adriatic to the Carpathian Mountains had drawn the attention of others also, and naturally of the Porte itself. No one, however, appears to have been quite prepared for the intelligence which arrived by express from Belgrade on the evening of the 30th ultimo, purporting that the Austrian Consul there had announced the intention of his Government to occupy Servia by a military force whenever any appearance of disorder in that province should require the execution of such a measure.

Mr. Fonblanque's statement was fully confirmed by letters which arrived here at the same time from the Pasha of Belgrade, the Servian authorities, and the French Consul. Extracts from Mr. Fonblanque's reports to me are inclosed herewith, not so much for your Lordship's information, as he has, no doubt, written directly to London on the subject, but as the ground on which my reply to the Porte's communication was to be founded.

The salient points of the case, beside the threat of occupation, were the absence of any disorders in Servia, and the protest, or remonstrance, of the Servian authorities.

These circumstances had determined Reshid Pasha to support the Servians in their resistance to a forced occupation, even before he sent his first message to me announcing the facts. It is almost unnecessary to inform your Lordship that I approved of his decision. The principle, of itself, is highly objectionable, and could not be applied without prejudice to the Porte's independence. There would also be danger of its causing much bloodshed, as the Servians, however rashly, would in all likelihood resist the invasion, which could hardly occur without giving Russia, the protecting Power, a right to interfere too.

On the other hand, it was obviously desirable that the Porte in opposing a dangerous pretension should act with prudence; taking care to give no unnecessary umbrage to Austria, and to secure the attachment of the Servians, without putting too much power into their hands.

Under these impressions I waited on Reshid Pasha, who had requested to see me, and the result of our conversation was, that the Porte should lose no time in seeking an explanation with the Austrian Cabinet, not only by means of the Internuncio, but also through the channel of its own Ambassador at Vienna; and that confidence should be expressed in the intentions of Austria, the inconvenience and hazard of accepting the proposed occupation pointed out, and the present tranquillity of Servia appealed to in proof that the measure would be wholly superfluous. It was further agreed that the Porte should,

nevertheless, declare its readiness to meet the views of Austria by taking precautions against any eventual disturbance; that orders should therefore be issued for collecting a Turkish army near the frontier of Servia, and increasing the small military force, together with the native police, in Prince Alexander's service; and that the Sultan should appoint a Commissioner of rank with power to regulate these several operations and provide for such contingencies as might be expected to arise.

It was subsequently suggested by the Council, that a reinforcement should also be sent to the garrison of Belgrade.

This course of proceeding was communicated to Baron de Bruck the day before yesterday, at a conference which took place between his Excellency and Reshid Pasha at the house of the latter, and on his Highness' invitation.

It appears from what Reshid Pasha stated to M. Pisani that the Internuncio was satisfied with it, and that being requested to explain the communication made at Belgrade by the Austrian Consul-General, he said that it was incumbent on his Government to prepare for every emergency, and that in offering to contribute to the repression of any disturbances which might break out in Servia, it contemplated the extent to which disorder might be carried if not immediately quelled.

I have thought it best not to seek any direct intercourse with Baron de Bruck on this delicate subject. In concert with the French Ambassador I had taken occasion, before the arrival of the last intelligence from Belgrade, to afford him an opportunity of explaining the military movements ordered by his Government along the frontier, and his answer was not so explicit as to encourage any further attempts without the advantage of a right to push the inquiry home. I have preferred writing to Lord Westmorland; and a copy of my letter to him is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's more complete information. The original is forwarded to Vienna by the post of to-day.

I cannot conclude without an appeal to your indulgence, my Lord, when the course of proceeding which I have recommended comes under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. Several objects, not easy to be reconciled with each other, were to be simultaneously provided for, and it is rare but some hazard must be incurred, when that is the case. Under present circumstances every occurrence is complicated by the position in which Russia has placed herself towards this empire. The Servians are not without longings for independence, and the chance of a war must naturally tend to excite their hopes. Invaded, if such were the case, by Austria, and ill-supported by Turkey, they might turn once more towards the protecting Power and make a very serious addition to the dangers which already menace the very existence of this empire.

In my occasional interviews with the Servian Agent I have always advised him to lean upon the Porte, as holding out a better hope for the future prospects of Servia than any to be derived from a closer connexion with Austria or with Russia. Such counsels can, nevertheless, avail but little if the Porte, as time advances and the motives of independence increase, continues to maintain without relaxation that system of jealousy and mistrust which appears more or less in all her dealings with the Christians. The Sultan stands in need of assistance from every side, and in order to obtain it he must incur those risks which are inseparable from weakness. If Servia is to resist an Austrian occupation, it must be entrusted with the means of resistance, and the best security against an abuse of those means is surely to be found in the confidence with which they are granted. The approach of a Turkish army, however explained, would otherwise be a source of apprehension and a motive with the Servians for hastening to sever the tie which still connects them with Turkey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 243.

*Consul-General Foublanque to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Belgrade, July 24, 1853.*

IN my No. 38 to the Secretary of State I mentioned that, on the 22nd instant, the Austrian Consul-General formally, though verbally, notified to Bessim Pasha that if disorders should occur in Servia, two Austrian brigades would be ready to enter the Principality on an application to him, either from the reigning Prince, or from the Turkish Governor of Belgrade.

This morning M. Simitch, the Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs, called on the Pasha to state his subsequently acquired and quite certain information, that the Austrians would occupy the country when they saw fit, without waiting for any application from hence. I doubt whether they will allow time for an answer to be received from Constantinople on Bessim Pasha's reference.

The Imperial forces assembled close by are quite strong enough for the contemplated invasion of Servia, but I should mention that their greatest concentrations are in the directions north of Orsova, whence, I suppose, they will second, over the lower districts of Servia, some Russian movement to take the Turkish army in flank and in the rear.

I venture to think your Lordship will agree that the purpose now indicated by Austria with regard to Servia is even a less excusable aggression than the Russian one in Moldavia and Wallachia.

Under an aspect of affairs so threatening, and surrounded by circumstances justifying suspicion of disloyalty, I rejoice to acquaint your Excellency that the Servian Government has prepared a protest against any violation of the soil by Austrian troops. It will be sent to Colonel von Radisavlievitch to-morrow morning, and, at the same time, a Tatar will be dispatched to Constantinople.

It seems quite evident that Prince Michael's letter was a device for exciting the troubles of which Austria intended to profit in so insidious a manner.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 243.

*Consul-General Foublanque to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Belgrade, July 26, 1853.*

I AM now enabled to inclose the Servian Minister's letter to the Austrian Consul-General. It does not bear out the description, originally given, of a protest, but the latter part contains a sufficiently firm remonstrance against Austrian occupation without a request from the Prince. Still it is as much as the strained influence of M. de Ségur and myself could evoke.

The recapitulated Austrian plea of "traces of the Hungarian emigration still existing in Servia," is either fanciful or fictive. No vestige of the kind remains; but, on the contrary, the most dangerous feeling of the Servian masses is that rancorous one against the Turks, who evinced such sympathy with the Magyars as to be identified in opinion with the political refugees of three years since.

A strong popular feeling is evinced in Belgrade against the Austrians, and there are accounts of rather large bodies of peasants having assembled near Negotin to oppose the expected landing at Milanovatz. Such bands will never stand against regular troops; a single discharge of grape-shot would disperse two thousand of them.

The Servian Government will at once send the treasure and special archives to Kragujevatz.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 243.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Confidential.)

*Therapia, August* 4, 1853.

My Lord,

YOU have probably learnt from Mr. Fonblanque that the Austrian Consul-General at Belgrade has offered military assistance to the Servian Government, with a view to the suppression of any disorders which may arise under present circumstances in Servia, accompanied with an intimation that the proposed auxiliary force might eventually enter that Principality, whether the occupation was or was not agreeable to the national authorities.

I take it for granted that Mr. Fonblanque has also informed your Lordship of the respectful remonstrance addressed by M. Simitch to Baron Radisavlievitch, in reply to his rather startling communication.

I have now to put you in possession of the manner in which the intelligence has been received by the Turkish Ministers, and of the measures which it would seem that they are inclined to adopt in consequence.

The impression made upon them was, to all appearance, a painful one, in which the feelings of surprise and mistrust predominated. I have endeavoured to soften their apprehensions in so far as the idea of an understanding between Austria and Russia is concerned; but I could not, on any sound principle, blame the immediate resolution which they adopted to support the Servian authorities in their resistance to an unsolicited occupation.

The course which they have it in mind to pursue is at the same time well qualified to meet any legitimate expectations of the Court of Vienna. It is in substance, as I understand, to form an army of their own on the frontier of Servia; to allow the Prince of Servia to increase his own small military force and police; to augment the garrison of Belgrade; and to appoint a high Commissioner empowered by the Sultan to communicate with the national authorities, and to watch over the contingencies as they arise.

I know not whether these intentions are conveyed to Vienna by the post of to-day, or indeed whether they are yet definitively settled. But I presume that no time will be lost in apprising the Austrian Cabinet of the view taken by the Porte of its late communication to the Servian Government; and I am certain that Baron de Bruck is already in possession of its sentiments in that respect.

I have done what depends upon me to encourage the Porte in giving the most considerate and amicable form to its declaration, which I venture to hope will be received with satisfaction at Vienna.

Your Lordship will bear in mind that there are no disorders at present in Servia, and that the Austrian troops may be better employed in maintaining order within their own frontier, than in carrying alarm into a country unwilling to receive them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 244.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August* 18.)

(No. 189.)

*Therapia, August* 4, 1853.

My Lord,

MR. FONBLANQUE, in one of his late despatches to me, stated, as a prevailing rumour, that Count Leiningen was supposed to have received, when here, from the Porte an assurance that Servia might be occupied, under certain circumstances, by Austrian troops.

I have made inquiry here concerning this report, and am assured by Reshid Pasha that there is not a word of truth in it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 245.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August* 18.)

(No. 193. Confidential.)

*Therapia, August* 4, 1853.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith is the copy of a letter sent from the Porte to Omer Pasha, with instructions to his Excellency to transmit it under his signature to Prince Gortchakoff.

Your Lordship will observe that the Porte is determined not to submit quietly to any attempt on the part of the Russians to increase their armed force on the waters of the Danube above the confluence of the Pruth with that river.

I dissuaded the Council from announcing, by means of the same letter, its intention to occupy and fortify a small island on the Wallachian side of the river and opposite to the fortress of Widdin, to the defence of which, in case of war, it is thought that the possession of that island by the Turks would be essential. This intention is not abandoned altogether, but only suspended until more certain information can be obtained. I am not without apprehension that an attempt to carry it into effect might cause a premature collision between the forces of the respective Governments.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 245.

*Omer Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff.*

AS your Excellency is already aware from the answer addressed to you by the Porte, the passage of Russian ships of war up the Danube beyond the confluence of the Pruth with that river, is forbidden by Treaty; and I have therefore received instructions to prevent any vessels passing that point. In the event of any Russian vessels of war wishing, henceforward, to pass the point in question, they will be reminded, in the first place, in a friendly manner, of the Treaty restriction, and, should they not comply, your Excellency will understand how impossible it is for me to permit such a thing.

Previously to the receipt of these instructions, ships of war and pontoons (or gun-boats) had passed the point in question and gone to the neighbourhood of Galatz. It is to be hoped from your Excellency's sound sense and judgment, that however this may be, the vessels and pontoons which have passed that point will go back. They shall be permitted to do so unmolested; but if they should attempt to go upwards beyond Galatz, I shall be under the necessity of preventing them also.

In conformity with the pacific feelings which continue to animate the Porte, and of her special consideration towards the Government of Russia, I have considered it my duty to make this communication to you beforehand, and I avail myself, &c.

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No. 246.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August* 18.)

(No. 195.)

*Therapia, August* 4, 1853.

My Lord,

THE satisfaction which you have done me the honour to express in your instruction No. 116 of this year, at the course taken by the Porte with respect to Russia's occupation of the Principalities, will naturally increase in proportion as your Lordship finds reason to believe that the objects for which that course was advised are likely to be attained. I presume, under correction, that the objects in question were to postpone hostilities, to open another chance for

negotiation, to give time for defensive preparations here, and for public opinion to mature elsewhere. Appearances warrant a belief that in none of these respects were our anticipations in error. It would seem, moreover, that forbearance on this side has had some effect in softening irritation on the other, while it is certain that the Porte has been thereby spared the mortification of a defeat, without suffering the annoyance of any administrative derangement.

Your Lordship has probably been for some days in possession of the conciliatory, though final, proposals founded on the Porte's explanatory protest, and forwarded from here on the 20th and 23rd ultimo to London, Paris, and Vienna. Of other experiments originating in an earnest desire to avoid the calamities of war, some, as your Lordship knows, have proved abortive, and some remain for consideration without the advantage of being accepted in the outset by either of the contending parties. Foremost among the latter is your Lordship's draft of a Convention, which reached me, with its covering despatch, on the 31st ultimo.

Under other circumstances, without reference to my own impressions, I should have lost no time in laying it before the Sultan's Government, and even as it was, I might have sheltered my responsibility by doing so; but strict obedience to the letter of my instructions would have furnished a poor compensation for the uselessness, and perhaps the harm, eventually resulting from the step.

Your Lordship had forwarded the Convention to me in ignorance of the plan of arrangement adopted here by the Four Representatives accepted definitively by the Porte, and transmitted to Vienna, for conveyance to Count Nesselrode in the manner most likely to prove agreeable to the Court of Russia. I could not take upon myself, nor would it have been reasonable for me, as I conceive, to propose the Convention as a substitute for that plan, which was in fact beyond our reach, especially after I had ascertained, by affording Reshid Pasha an opportunity of reading the Convention, that he was decidedly averse to it himself, and anticipated a similar degree of objection on the part of his colleagues. The form of a Treaty, founded expressly on that of Kainardji, involving an engagement in terms to Russia, and liable to be understood by that Power as extending over the Sultan's firman, could hardly fail of seeming dangerous in his sight.

Aware that your Lordship has no predilection for one kind of arrangement more than for another, provided the parties be satisfied on just and honourable grounds, I have not hesitated to act according to what appeared to me the true situation and requirements of the case. Should the plan adopted here, and long ere this received in London and Vienna, be found incapable of execution, the Convention may be subsequently brought forward with less disadvantage, if such be the course resolved upon, than if it were now officially presented to the Porte, and officially declined, as I have every reason to believe it would be.

With respect to the Conventional form as preferable, in the actual circumstances of Russia, to that of a note, I would venture to remind your Lordship that the Russian Cabinet showed no disinclination to accept the note submitted to it, as a project, by General Castelbajac, though the terms of that note must have been thought sufficiently safe to guard the Sultan's rights from any encroachment or dangerous innovation.

I cannot bring this despatch to a conclusion without recording a circumstance reported to me two days ago by M. Pisani. His words are these: "In talking on the Russian question, Reshid Pasha declared to Baron de Bruck officially that the Porte is decided neither to accept any new proposal, nor to add a single word to the last Projet de Note. We are ready to die," said he, "rather than sacrifice our independence and sovereign rights to Russia."

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.



No. 247.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)*

(No. 196.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 6, 1853.*

THE Servian Agent at the Porte having called here yesterday, I learnt from his conversation that he viewed with some feelings of mistrust the measures about to be taken by the Porte with respect to his country. His apprehensions appeared to be chiefly directed to the effects of a supposed concert between the Turkish and Austrian Governments to the disadvantage of Servia, declaring his conviction that, if such apprehensions were realized, an insurrection of the Servian peasantry might take place, and afford the Austrians an opportunity of accomplishing their worst purposes.

Though I succeeded in calming his excitement to a certain degree, by explaining to him the real position of affairs, and impressing upon him the advantage as well as duty of inducing his Government to hold firm to the Porte in loyalty and reasonable confidence, I felt the necessity of putting Reshid Pasha upon his guard, and advising him to carry into effect the proposed measures with a due regard to the character of the Servians and the state of parties in their country.

With this view I sent Mr. Alison to his Highness a few hours ago, and the points which I desired him to press upon the Pasha, were the following: first, to enter into no concerted agreement with Austria, but simply to remonstrate against an unsolicited occupation of Servia, and announce the precautionary measures intended by the Porte; secondly, to address a letter of approval and encouragement to the Prince of Servia, enabling him at the same time to explain to his Government and to the public the views of the Porte and its confidence in their loyalty; thirdly, to post the army of observation at a certain distance from the frontier of Servia, and not to divide it into more than two separate brigades at most; fourthly, to select a Commissioner already known to the Servians, and not to increase the garrison of Belgrade beyond an additional battalion.

To all these propositions Reshid Pasha most readily assented.

I have since received visits from the Internuncio, and also from the Servian agent.

The former, being the first to enter upon the subject, assured me that the sole aim of his Government was to let any parties in Servia who might be disposed to cherish revolutionary projects, know that the Austrian forces were at their post. He added, in reply to an inquiry from me, that he was satisfied with the Porte.

The latter told me that he had seen Reshid Pasha subsequently to Mr. Alison's visit, and that his conversation with his Highness had revived his confidence in the intentions of the Porte towards Servia. He, nevertheless, retained some portion of his previous anxiety, and endeavoured to persuade me that the tranquillity of Servia would be best maintained in the present state of parties there by a postponement of the intention to send an additional battalion and a Commissioner to Belgrade, until he could learn from his Government in what manner those measures would probably be construed on the spot.

On the whole, I trust that the necessary measures will be carried into effect with a proper degree of prudence, and consequently without danger of disturbance.

At the same time, I do not quite understand why the Austrian Government should be so eager to adopt precautions with a view to the chance of war, when it speaks with so much confidence of the peaceable disposition of Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 248.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 197.)

*Therapia, August* 6, 1853.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith is an extract of a report addressed to me on the 4th instant by M. Stephen Pisani. It states the terms of Baron de Bruck's explanation to Reshid Pasha of the motives which have influenced the conduct of his Government towards Servia.

M. Nicolayevitch, the Servian agent, assures me that there is no truth in the suspicion expressed therein, and that the views of the Servians do not extend beyond certain improvements in their present political or rather administrative position, expressed in a paper which he placed confidentially in my hands not long ago, and a copy of which I have now the honour to submit herewith to your Lordship.

With respect to the French Consul at Belgrade, I can easily conceive that he lays himself open to suspicion by an excess of zeal and activity; but it does not appear from the language of M. Nicolayevitch that he is much in the confidence or favour of Prince Alexander's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 248.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

BARON DE BRUCK communicated to Reshid Pasha, through his dragoman, a despatch he had received from his Government, stating that the object of the Austrian Cabinet in wishing to occupy Servia in a military manner is, that an idea is entertained that the Servians are contemplating the establishment of a separate Sclavonic kingdom, and that they are paving the way underhand, in order to arrive at their aim; and it would also appear that an understanding exists between them and the Bosnians, and even the Montenegrins.

The Austrian Government had an explanation with Prince Milosch, who seems to plead ignorance of all these; but, meanwhile, he is not allowed to correspond with any one, and is under the surveillance of the police.

The Austrians bitterly complain of the conduct of the French Consul at Belgrade, who, they say, is supporting the Servians in their intrigues.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 248.

*Paper communicated to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe by M. de Nicolayevitch.*

Projet de Charte à octroyer par la Sublime Porte à ses sujets non-Musulmans, ou vœux nationaux des populations Slaves de l'Empire Ottoman.

*Des Droits Religieux.*

ARTICLE I.

LES différentes classes des sujets de l'Empire Ottoman désignées par le nom générique de Rayas, et appartenant sous le rapport de la religion à ces six catégories distinctes, à savoir: au culte Catholique Oriental du rit Grec, au culte Catholique Oriental du rit Slavon (1), au culte Catholique Romain, au culte Protestant, au culte Arménien, et au culte Israélite, seront tous réintégrés, maintenus et protégés dans la jouissance pleine et entière de leurs droits, immunités, et privilèges religieux, tant spirituels que temporels, qui leur ont été *ab antiquo* octroyés et accordés par la Sublime Porte.



ARTICLE II.

En conséquence, l'Eglise, la Hiérarchie et le Patriarcat du rit Slavon, qui a existé *ab antiquo* dans l'Empire Ottoman (2), et notamment depuis le règne des Sultans Orkhan et Murad I, jusqu'à l'année 1765 de l'ère Chrétienne, comme indépendant de droit et de fait de la Hiérarchie et du Patriarcat Grec de Constantinople, qui, à l'époque précitée, n'a été qu'arbitrairement supprimé et soumis à l'autorité de ce dernier Patriarcat, contre une redevance annuelle de 1,358 piastres, sera de nouveau rétabli, reconnu et protégé par la Sublime Porte, avec toutes ses anciennes dépendances, diocèses et paroisses, et avec tous les droits, privilèges et immunités dont jouissent toutes les autres communautés religieuses de l'Empire, et notamment les quatre sièges patriarcaux Grecs de Constantinople, d'Antioche, de Jérusalem, et d'Alexandrie.

ARTICLE III.

Toutefois les Chefs religieux de cette Eglise, au lieu de résider à Ipek comme par le passé, fixeront leur résidence dans la capitale de l'Empire, sans préjudice pour la faculté qu'ils auront de conserver le titre d'Archevêque de leur ancien diocèse et de s'y faire représenter par des vicaires de leur création.

ARTICLE IV.

Les rapports entre cette Eglise et l'Eglise Grecque de Constantinople pourront être rétablis sur le même pied comme ils ont été réglés par un Concordat sygnallagmatique intervenu entre ces deux Eglises en l'année 1376 de Jésus Christ sous la Patriarche Grec Constantinopolitain Théophane et le Patriarche Slavon d'Ipek Sabba IV, ou être réglés de toute autre manière résultant du consentement et accord mutuels.

*Des Droits et Privilèges Municipaux.*

ARTICLE V.

Chacune des six communautés sus-désignées aura la faculté d'administrer elle-même les affaires et les intérêts de son culte, l'instruction publique de ses membres, la justice arbitrale, les affaires et les intérêts des communes et toutes les branches du service public concernant ses membres respectifs qu'il plairait spécialement à la Sublime Porte de lui commettre.

ARTICLE VI.

A cet effet la Sublime Porte autorise la formation dans chacune de ces communautés d'un corps administratif municipal, comme organe de représentation nationale auprès du Gouvernement, et qui sera constitué et organisé de la manière ci-après:

ARTICLE VII.

A côté de chaque Chef religieux de communauté sera instituée une Chancellerie aulique sous la direction d'un seul chef laïque, qui sera reconnu et confirmé par la Sublime Porte en qualité de représentant officiel (Caponkolaya) de sa communauté respective, et en dirigera l'administration supérieure dans le cercle des attributions spécifiées dans l'Article V.

ARTICLE VIII.

Les Chancelleries existantes de la Principauté de Servie, de la Principauté de Samos, et ainsi nommée "Latin Cancellariaei," ou la Chancellerie Latine et leurs chefs, seront investis de ces nouvelles attributions pour les trois communautés Slave, Grecque, et Catholique Romaine, qui, ainsi que les chefs des Chancelleries auliques à instituer auprès des autres trois communions, releveront tous, comme par le passé, du Ministère Impérial des Affaires Etrangères.

ARTICLE IX.

Outre ces organes centraux d'administration municipale pour chaque communion, il y aura dans chaque commune rurale ou urbaine un juge de paix et un maire; le premier pour rendre justice entre co-religionnaires, et le second pour exécuter les sentences de ces juges, pour administrer les affaires et les intérêts de la commune, ou pour servir d'organe à l'exécution de toutes mesures et ordres supérieurs qui leur seront commandés, soit par les Gouverneurs et fonctionnaires Impériaux de province, soit par le chef de la Chancellerie aulique de sa communauté respective, en tant que cela concernerait les affaires d'intérêts spéciaux de cette même communauté, ou la transmission des ordonnances authentiques de la Sublime Porte.

ARTICLE X.

L'organisation de ces jurisdictions de paix et de ces magistratures municipales pourra être réglementée en détail et coordonnée dans un système hiérarchique par les Chancelleries auliques respectives, sauf l'approbation et la sanction du Gouvernement Impérial.

ARTICLE XI.

Pour effacer un signe réputé le plus humiliant pour la condition de ses sujets non-Musulmans dans l'Empire, Sa Majesté le Sultan, dans sa générosité magnanime et dans sa haute et égale justice pour toutes les classes de ses sujets, décrète la suppression pour toujours de l'impôt appelé Haratch ou capitation, qui n'a été supporté jusqu'ici que par les populations non-Musulmanes seules. Cependant les différentes communautés de ces populations sont autorisées à le transformer en une cotisation à percevoir pour leur propre compte et pour subvenir aux frais et traitements de leur clergé, du personnel de leur administration municipale, de l'entretien de leurs églises, monasteries, écoles, imprimeries, hôpitaux, et autres établissements d'utilité publique.

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*Remarques.*

1. Les termes de "culte" et de "rit" sont employés ici dans des sens considérablement distincts. Le mot "culte" désigne la communion, confession, ou religion essentiellement distincte des autres par ses dogmes mêmes, tandis que le mot "rit" ne désigne que les différences dans les formes extérieures et rituelles entre les églises d'un seul et même culte; comme sont, par exemple, les liturgies dans les langues différentes, certaines variantes dans les cérémonies religieuses, dans le costume du clergé, et quelquefois aussi dans le culte que l'on rend aux saints, &c. Tel est précisement le cas entre l'Eglise du rit Slavon et cette du rit Grec. Les Slaves ont dans leur église non-seulement une liturgie en langue propre et plusieurs pratiques religieuses qui leur sont particulières, mais un grand nombre de saints nationaux que le clergé du rit Grec, loin de vouloir admettre dans son calendrier et sa liturgie, répudie au contraire comme choses profanes, et ne se garde pas toujours de tourner même en dérision. C'est là aussi le fond de l'injustice criante que la Sublime Porte a commise à leur égard, il n'y a pas



encore que quatre-vingt-huit ans, en supprimant l'église, la hiérarchie et la patriarcat de leur rit, et en les vendant ignominieusement comme ouailles, et pour une somme de 1,358 piastres de tribut annuel, au clergé Grec, contre tout droit de conscience et de religion, qu'elle a pourtant respecté à l'égard de toutes les autres confessions, et même des Juifs et des Payens. Ce n'est donc qu'en réparant cette injustice aussi promptement que possible qu'elle peut rendre quelque paix et consolation à ses sujets Chrétiens du culte Oriental dont on se préoccupe tant en ce moment et qui ne sont en masse que des Slaves; car dans toute la Turquie d'Europe où la population Chrétienne prédomine il n'y a, à l'exception des Moldo-Valaques, et d'un million tout au plus des nés-Hellènes, que des Slaves (Bulgares, Serves, Bosniaques, Herzegoviniens, Monténégrins) et des Albanais, qui ont précédemment relevé du Patriarche d'Ipek et appartenu au même rite.

2. Voir sur l'Histoire de l'Eglise Slave en Turquie l'ouvrage de M. Ami Boué, "Turquie d'Europe," tome iii, page 434, Clergé et Religion Grecs.

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No. 249.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)*

(No. 199.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 6, 1853.*

THE Russian overland post no longer comes on to Constantinople.

A secret correspondent informs me, I know not on what authority, that the order to stop it in the Principalities was sent express from St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 250.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 170.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 18, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the course pursued by you in regard to the draft of Convention inclosed in my despatch No. 116 of the 9th of July, under the circumstances stated in your despatch No. 195 of the 4th of this month, that draft having been sent to Constantinople without knowledge on the part of Her Majesty's Government of the proposals forwarded from Constantinople to Vienna.

Her Majesty's Government have no predilection for one form of arrangement over another, provided that the independence of the Porte is secured; and it is hardly necessary to observe, that if Her Majesty's Government had not felt convinced that that object was fully attained by the Convention, it would not have been proposed for the acceptance of the Turkish Government; and the spirit in which it appears to have been received by Reshid Pasha is therefore far from satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 251.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 171.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 18, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the advice which, as reported in your despatch No. 199 of the 6th instant, your Excellency has given to the Porte in regard to Servia.

Her Majesty's Government have received from the Austrian Government assurances that they have no intention to interfere in the internal affairs of Servia, and that their object is to protect the Austrian territory from the extension of any insurrectionary movement that might take place in Servia against the authority of the Sultan.

The Russian Government have sent M. Fonton, Secretary of Embassy at Vienna, to Servia, to declare that any movement against the Prince or against the Suzerain Power would be viewed with the utmost displeasure by Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 252.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.*

(No. 195.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 18, 1853.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Lordship, for your own information, copies of despatches from Baron Manteuffel to the Chevalier Bunsen, which have been communicated to me by the latter, inclosing copies of the instructions addressed by the Prussian Government to their Representatives at Constantinople and St. Petersburgh, on the Eastern Question; and I have to instruct your Lordship to state to Baron Manteuffel that, after the assurances so repeatedly given by Baron Manteuffel, Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that the course pursued by Russia towards Turkey has met with the reprobation of the Prussian Government; but Her Majesty's Government regret that such opinions should not have been more openly expressed, and they cannot consider that the common object of the Cabinets of Europe is promoted by silence at a moment when it was desirable to bring the greatest weight of unanimous opinion to bear upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. Nor can Her Majesty's Government understand how Baron Manteuffel, in one part of his despatch to the Chevalier Bunsen, should take credit for his silence, and in another for having joined with the three Powers in adopting the language that is to produce a salutary effect at St. Petersburgh.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 252.

*Baron Manteuffel to Chevalier Bunsen.*

Monsieur, *Berlin, ce* 31 *Juillet*, 183.

JE ne puis mieux vous mettre au courant des phases récentes de la Question d'Orient, et du concours que le Cabinet du Roi a cru devoir prêter à sa solution prompte et pacifique, qu'en vous transmettant ci-joint copie de deux dépêches (et de leurs annexes) que j'ai adressées, l'une le 19 à M. de Wildenbruch à Constantinople, l'autre le 27 au Comte de Henckel à St. Pétersbourg. Votre Excellence est libre de donner, si elle le juge convenable, confidentiellement lecture de ces pièces à Lord Clarendon. Nous avons pris à tache écarter de cette épineuse complication tout ce qu'elle renferme d'irritant et de propre à nourrir une controverse envéninée. Nos impressions pour ne pouvoir passé dans nos dépêches n'en ont peut-être pas été moins vives. Par un silence à ce sujet, nous croyons avoir bien mérité de la cause commune des Cabinets de l'Europe. Tout récemment des entrevues confidentielles ont eu lieu entre le Comte Buol, les Ministres d'Angleterre et de France, et le Baron de Canitz. Animé du désir d'obvier aux indécisions de la Porte, on est tombé préalablement d'accord sur un projet de note dont on lui recommanderait la signature. Notre assentiment n'a pu manquer à cette démarche comme à tout ce qui a pour but de hâter un arrangement satisfaisant. Nous avons lieu de croire que les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris auront également approuvé le projet de note, avec laquelle leurs Représentants à Vienne s'étaient déclarés d'accord.



Nous aimons donc à espérer que le langage unanime des Puissances ne restera pas sans effet soit à Constantinople soit à St. Pétersbourg, et que leurs efforts réunis parviendront bientôt à mettre fin à la déplorable tension qui, au grand détriment des plus graves intérêts, tient en suspens le développement moral et matériel du corps social en Europe.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 252.

*Baron Manteuffel to Baron Wildenbruch.*

(Confidentiel.)
Monsieur, *Berlin, ce* 19 *Juillet*, 1853.

VOS rapports politiques nous sont exactement entrés jusqu'au No. 65 du 7 du courant mois.

Ce dernier rapport s'est croisé en route avec ma dépêche du 5, par laquelle j'ai eu l'honneur de vous inviter, Monsieur, à appuyer auprès de la Porte le projet d'arrangement attribué à M. de Bourqueney. Vous aurez appris en attendant que le Cabinet Français, sans reconnaître expressément le projet en question comme l'œuvre de son Représentant à Vienne, a adopté l'idée générale qui en faisait la base, savoir d'engager la Porte à transmettre à St. Pétersbourg par un Ambassadeur une note renfermant des promesses analogues aux engagements exigés par la Russie, et de s'entendre avec le Cabinet Impérial sur la réponse que celui-ci ferait à sa note. En vous invitant à recommander au Gouvernement Ottoman le projet-Bourqueney, ma dépêche précitée vous a implicitement autorisé à vous associer à toute proposition destinée à amener un arrangement au moyen d'un échange de notes quand même la note de la Porte ne serait pas textuellement celle que M. le Comte de Nesselrode avait jointe en projet à sa lettre à Reshid Pasha.

A nos yeux, cette voie est toujours celle qu'il faut suivre avec persévérance pour arriver à la solution de la complication actuelle. Aussi voyons nous avec satisfaction que tous les Cabinets reconnaissent que dans l'état actuel du différend il importe beaucoup moins de discuter les termes de la note ou de la déclaration par laquelle la Porte doit reprendre la négotiation, que de fournir au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg par cette note ou par cette déclaration un moyen de répéter d'une manière formelle et diplomatique les assurances qu'il est prêt à donner de son respect pour l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. Nous avons tout lieu de penser que le Cabinet Impérial de Russie, après avoir constaté sa ferme résolution de maintenir les droits qu'il s'attribue à l'égard de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque en Turquie, n'insistera plus sur la rédaction de la note Turque qu'il avait communiquée lui-même à Constantinople, et qu'il en acceptera une qui répond au sens de ce projet et en reproduit les idées sans en conserver tous les termes.

Votre rapport du 7 Juillet nous fait espérer que la Porte s'est occupé sérieusement de la rédaction d'une telle pièce. Nous ne méconnaissons pas les difficultés qu'elle doit vaincre pour sortir de sa position. L'ancien esprit guerrier des Turcs s'est reveillé, les croyances et les antipathies religieuses ont été mises en jeu, et l'orgueil national se sent froissé. Mais les difficultés intérieurs que vous avez si bien signalées dans vos rapports ne seront pas invincibles; nous aimons du moins à le croire, puisque les Turcs aiment sincèrement leur Souverain et qu'ils respectent ses décisions comme des décrets inspirés de Dieu. Il nous paraît que l'issue de la crise ministérielle du 8 et 9 Juillet vient à l'appui de nos espérances pour la paix. A la vérité nous ne pouvons avoir sur cette crise que des données télégraphiques et par conséquent incomplètes. Toujours est-il sûr que Reshid Pasha a été réintégré dans les fonctions de Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Quant aux Cabinets Européens, je suis charmé de pouvoir énoncer ma ferme conviction que tous sont animés à rechercher des voies de conciliation.

Pour obvier aux difficultés que l'adoption pure et simple de la note transmise de St. Pétersbourg à Reshid aurait pu rencontrer, le Cabinet Français a fondu ensemble cette note et celle que Reshid Pasha avait offert de remettre au Prince

Menchikoff, et la nouvelle rédaction composée des deux projets antérieurs a été envoyée à St. Pétersbourg comme à Constantinople: vous en trouverez ci-joint une copie. Bien que nous ne soyons pas encore informés si et comment le Cabinet de Russie s'est prononcé sur la pièce même, nous n'avons aucune raison de supposer qu'il l'ait rejetée. M. l'Internonce d'Autriche vous aura dit que sa Cour recommande également ce projet à la Porte à moins que Reshid Pasha n'en ait déjà rédigé un autre qui soit de nature à amener un arrangement du différend.

L'Envoyé Britannique à St. Pétersbourg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, a soumis au Cabinet Impérial un autre plan d'arrangement dont vous verrez les détails par le rapport du Comte de Henckel du 12 de ce mois. Comme ce plan, dont nous ne contestons au reste pas le mérite, doit faire rendre le long detours par Londres et Vienne pour arriver de nouveau à St. Pétersbourg, nous supposons qu'il sera dévancé par l'un des autres projets élaborés et discutés à Vienne et à Constantinople.

Ce que j'ai l'honneur de vous dire ci-dessus, Monsieur, vous fera partager notre persuasion que tout concourt pour faire résoudre pacifiquement la complication qui s'est si inopinément élevée en Orient. En unissant vos efforts à ceux de vos collégues pour hâter l'arrangement du différend, vous voudrez bien faire valoir auprès de la Porte deux reflexions qui se présentent naturellement à l'esprit de tout observateur calme et impartiel. D'abord, le Gouvernement Ottoman doit se rassurer sur les intentions de la Russie. Quelles que soient les impressions que ce Gouvernement a reçues de la mission du Prince Menchikoff et de la manière dont cet Ambassadeur a conduit la négociation, il ne peut douter maintenant que le Cabinet de Russie ne soit disposé à accueillir des propositions qui lui permettent de rétablir ses anciennes relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage avec la Porte, sans se mettre en contradiction avec lui-même. Nous sommes même convaincus que cet arrangement est facile à conclure et qu'il amenera sans retard la retraite des troupes Russes des Principautés du Danube où nous les avons vu entrer à regret. Serait-il prudent pour la Porte de prolonger la crise actuelle qui en elle-même déjà pèse sur l'Empire Ottoman, et en consume les forces sans qu'une guerre puisse lui offrir la moindre compensation?

Ensuite la Porte doit avoir plus que jamais acquis la certitude que dans le cas, que nous aimons à croire peu probable, où son indépendance et l'intégrité de son territoire seraient réellement méconnues, toutes les Puissances en ressentiraient le contrecoup et se croiraient appelées à détourner d'elle les dangers dont elle serait menacée.

Ces réflexions nous semblent de nature à venir à l'appui des conseils que le Roi vous a chargé de donner à la Porte, et je me flatte que l'esprit juste et éclairé de Reshid Pasha reconnaitra que la crise actuelle peut et doit être conduite promptement par des voies pacifiques à son terme, sans que la dignité ni les intérêts de l'Empire Ottoman en souffre aucune atteinte.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 252.

*Baron Manteuffel to Count de Henckel.*

(Confidentiel.)

*Berlin, ce 27 Juillet*, 1853.

M. le Comte,

IL parait que la complication Orientale touche à son terme. Tous les Cabinets ont reconnu l'immensité des conséquences qu'une guerre entre la Russie et la Porte entraînerait infailliblement, et tous ont pris à tâche de concourir à l'aplanissement du malheureux différend qui menaçait d'ebranler le système politique de l'Europe.

Vous connaissez, M. le Comte, les instructions dont, d'ordre du Roi, j'ai muni son Ministre à Constantinople le 5 de ce mois pour appuyer auprès de la Porte le projet attribué au Baron de Bourqueney. Ce projet et l'accueil qu'il avait trouvé à St. Pétersbourg, avaient indiqué la voie par laquelle on était sûr



d'atteindre le but. Aussi, depuis que ce projet a été mis en avant, des propositions de tout genre ont été élaborées et discutées.

D'abord le Cabinet Français a composé de la note prescrite par le Prince Menchikoff à la Porte, et de celle que Reshid Pasha avait rédigée et que l'Ambassadeur Russe avait refusée, une troisième pièce qui a été soumise à l'acceptation des deux parties.

Ensuite Sir H. Seymour a fait la proposition dont vous faites mention dans votre rapport du 12 Juillet.

Tout récemment, nous avons eu connaissance d'un projet de Convention formulé par le Cabinet Britannique, par laquelle la Porte reconnaîtrait virtuellement tous les droits que la Russie revendique pour l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque en Turquie, en vertu d'un usage immémorial et des Traités de Kudjuk-Kainardji et Andrinople.

Ce projet a été également communiqué à St. Pétersbourg et à Constantinople.

Indépendamment de ces projets et de ces propositions, Reshid Pasha s'occupe lui-même de la rédaction d'une nouvelle note par laquelle il espère satisfaire la Russie. Mais ce Ministre craint que ses collégues au Divan ne lui refusent leur assentiment, et que sa note ne soit rejetée au Conseil. Quoiqu'il en soit, la Porte finira par adopter l'un ou l'autre des projets que les Puissances, sur l'appui desquelles elle aime à compter, lui auront sérieusement recommandés.

Nous savons déjà positivement que le Cabinet Britannique approuve le projet de note rédigé à Paris, et qu'il a autorisé Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, comme Sir H. Seymour, à se prononcer pour son adoption. L'Autriche déclare également qu'elle appuiera ce projet, à moins que Reshid Pasha n'en ait déjà arrêté une autre note qui soit de nature à amener l'aplanissement du différend.

Dans cet état de choses nous n'avons pas balancé à munir M. de Wildenbruch de l'instruction du 19 du courant dont vous trouverez ci-joint la copie. Fidèles à notre principe de contribuer de toute manière à l'œuvre de conciliation, nous avons invité l'Envoyé du Roi à Constantinople à se prononcer en faveur de tout projet qui, en sauvegardant l'intégrité et l'indépendance de la Porte, auxquelles personne ne veut porter atteinte, offre des chances de succès.

Mais ce succès nous semblera parfaitement assuré aussitôt que le Cabinet Impérial de Russie se sera prononcé lui-même pour tel ou tel projet d'arrangement.

M. le Baron de Budberg a bien voulu nous faire confidentiellement part d'une dépêche de M. le Comte Nesselrode du $\frac{1}{13}$ Juillet, v.s., à laquelle se trouve jointe la réponse que le Cabinet Impérial a faite à la proposition Française par une dépêche à M. de Kisseleff également datée du 4 de ce mois. Veuillez remercier, M. le Comte, M. le Chancelier de l'Empire de cette intéressante communication. Nous avons été charmés d'y reconnaître les dispositions conciliantes du Cabinet de Russie, qui apprécie le mérite des propositions Françaises et l'esprit qui les a dictées. Cependant M. le Comte de Nesselrode décline de discuter la rédaction suggerée par le Cabinet Français, ou du moins de se prononcer d'une manière définitive sur sa teneur avant d'être informé par l'Autriche de l'effet des instructions dont l'Internonce, Baron de Bruck, a été muni pour engager la Porte à offrir à la Russie la satisfaction qu'elle lui a demandée. Nous aimons à croire que les données que le Cabinet Impérial attend au préalable, avant de se prononcer, ne tarderont pas à lui parvenir, et qu'elles seront accueillies avec faveur et bienveillance. Cependant il se pourrait bien que la position peu assurée de Reshid Pasha et l'influence qu'en dernier lieu les adversaires de ce Ministre ont exercée à Constantinople amenassent de nouvelles indécisions de la Porte, et par conséquent de nouvelles lenteurs de la négociation qui tient en suspens les intérêts les plus essentiels de tous les Etats. Pour obvier à ces lenteurs qui n'offrent des chances qu'aux ennemis de l'ordre social, et qui deviennent de jour en jour plus à charge du commerce et de l'industrie de la Prusse, pour rendre la situation politique claire et nette, rien ne serait à nos yeux plus efficace, plus péremptoire qu'une explication positive du Cabinet Impérial sur le choix qu'il fait entre les divers projets d'arrangement.

Le moment nous paraît venu où la Russie peut se prononcer à ce sujet sans déroger à aucune de ses déclarations antérieures. Elle a constaté par l'occupation militaire des Principautés du Danube à la face de l'Europe entière, sa ferme volonté de soutenir sa cause. Quelque soit le jugement que portent

les Cabinets sur cette occupation, tous ont conseillé à la Porte de ne pas y voir un cas de guerre. Ces faits constituent sans aucun doute une immense satisfaction que la Russie a obtenue. Tout ce que la Porte peut dire dans un acte diplomatique quelconque, n'ajoutera que peu ou rien à ce que les faits ont déjà proclamé. Bien que les projets d'arrangement formulés soient nombreux, ils ne diffèrent entre eux que par la forme; tous ont été inspirés par le désir de contenter la Russie et d'offrir à la Porte la possibilité de sortir de sa position dangéreuse vis-à-vis de son puissant voisin sans perdre tout-à-fait le degré d'autorité indispensable pour continuer à gouverner à l'intérieur.

Veuillez, M. le Comte, faire valoir ces considérations auprès de M. le Chancelier de l'Empire. Nous nous flattons que le Cabinet Impérial rend justice aux efforts sincères que nous avons faits, et que nous ne cesserons de faire, pour amener et accélérer la solution pacifique de la complication Orientale; et qu'en nous signalant celui des projets d'arrangement pour lequel il aura opté, il nous fournira de nouveaux moyens de servir la cause de la paix et de la conciliation.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

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No. 253.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 612.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 18, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received despatches from M. de la Cour up to the 5th instant. They agree in substance, as to general news, with those I had the honour to forward to your Lordship yesterday from Lord Stratford.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 254.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 613.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 18, 1853.

M. DE HUBNER has made a communication to M. Drouyn de Lhuys respecting the attitude taken by the Austrian Government in regard to Servia. Count Buol mentions M. Fonton's mission to Belgrade on the part of Russia, and says that the Austrian Consul-General will have directions to support that gentleman in his endeavours to improve the administration in Servia under the present Prince, and to free that country from the revolutionary element which pervades it; and Count Buol hopes for the assistance of France for the same purpose. He declared at the same time that there was no truth in the imputations made against Austria of protecting the Obrénowitch family, and of wishing to disturb the present reigning Prince; and that if Austrian troops enter Servia, it will be to defend and protect the Porte against internal outbreak.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied to M. Hübner that his general views agreed with those of Count Buol, that it was right to support the present reigning Prince; that if reforms in the administration of government were necessary, they should be counselled; and that France was equally with Austria opposed to revolution: but, when the assistance of France was asked, he must inquire what Count Buol meant by revolution. Men and acts must be named before he could give an answer; for, in fact, what Austria called revolution others might think improvement.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys availed himself again of this opportunity to declare that there could not be a greater mistake than to suppose that the French Government was an enemy to liberal institutions.



In the conversation to which I have referred above, M. de Hübner informed M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the Austrian Government, although admitting the right of the Porte to recall the Hospodars, regretted nevertheless that that step had been taken.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 255.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 319.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August* 16, 1853.

I HAVE received a confidential letter from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, a copy of which I herewith inclose, giving an account of the measures adopted by the Government of the Sultan upon the receipt of the intelligence from Belgrade that the Austrian Consul-General had declared to the Servian Government, that the Austrian force assembled upon their frontier might eventually enter the Principality, whether the occupation was or was not agreeable to the national authorities. As this intelligence is of the same nature as that which had been reported to me by M. de Fonblanque, and transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch No. 299, with the explanations which I had received from Count Buol upon the subject, I have forwarded an extract of that despatch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in order that he may be aware of what had taken place upon that subject.

I have taken the same opportunity of stating to Lord Stratford that M. de Bourqueney has read a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in which his satisfaction is expressed at the explanations given by Count Buol upon the instructions of the Austrian Government as to any assistance which might be afforded to Servia, if required; and in which that Minister expresses his disapprobation of the conduct of the French Consul at Belgrade, who seems to have advised the Prince to address his protest to the Austrian Government, which is looked upon as uncalled for.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Count Buol has received from the Austrian Internuncio the detail of the measures proposed to be adopted by the Porte with respect to Servia, and which are detailed in Lord Stratford's letter to me. He would approve the intention of that Government to send a Commissioner to Belgrade; but he could not recommend the assembly of a Turkish force upon the frontier, as he conceives it might occasion some excitement amongst the various parties existing in that country at a moment when the great object would be to avoid it.

By the last communications which Count Buol has received from the Austrian Consul-General in Belgrade it appears, that both the Prince and the Pasha have expressed themselves as now satisfied with the friendly intentions of the Austrian Government, to whom they will look for support in case of any revolutionary outbreak.

W.

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Inclosure in No. 255.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Confidential.)

My dear Lord, *Therapia, August* 4, 1853.

YOU have probably learnt from Mr. Fonblanque that the Austrian Consul-General at Belgrade has offered military assistance to the Servian Government, with a view to the suppression of any disorders which may arise under present circumstances in Servia, accompanied with an intimation that the proposed auxiliary force might eventually enter the Principality, whether the occupation was or was not agreeable to the national authorities.

I take it for granted that Mr. Fonblanque has also informed your Lordship of the respectful remonstrances addressed by M. Simitch to Baron Radislavievitch, in reply to his rather startling communication.

I have now to put you in possession of the manner in which the intelligence has been received by the Turkish Ministers, and of the measures which it would seem that they are inclined to adopt in consequence.

The impression made upon them was to all appearance a painful one, in which the feelings of surprise and mistrust predominated.

I have endeavoured to soften their apprehensions in so far as the idea of an understanding between Austria and Russia is concerned; but I could not, on any sound principle, blame the immediate resolution which they adopted to support the Servian authorities in their resistance to an unsolicited occupation.

The course which they have in mind to pursue is, at the same time, well qualified to meet any legitimate expectations of the Court of Vienna. It is, in substance, as I understand, to form an army of their own on the frontier of Servia, to allow the Prince of Servia to increase his own small military force and police, to augment the garrison of Belgrade, and to appoint a high commissioner, empowered by the Sultan, to communicate with the local authorities, and to watch over contingencies as they arise.

I know not whether these intentions are conveyed to Vienna by the post of to-day, or, indeed, whether they are yet definitely settled. But I presume that no time will be lost in apprising the Austrian Cabinet of the view taken by the Porte of its late communication with the Servian Government, and I am certain that Baron de Bruck is already in possession of its sentiments in that respect.

I have done what depends upon me to encourage the Porte in giving the most considerate and amicable form to its declaration, which I venture to hope will be received with satisfaction at Vienna.

Your Lordship will bear in mind that there are no disorders at present in Servia, and that the Austrian troops may be better employed in maintaining order within their own frontier than in carrying alarm into a country unwilling to receive them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 255.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 185.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1853.

THE following passage occurs in Count Nesselrode's circular despatch of the $\frac{30 \text{ June}}{12 \text{ July}}$: "Sciemment et volontairement nous ne chercherons à exciter aucun soulèvement parmi les populations Chrétiennes de la Turquie."

With reference to that assurance, I transcribe a passage in the despatch from Her Majesty's Consul in Bulgaria, of which I inclose a copy:

"The agents of Russia have been most active in widely spreading the circulars and manifestoes which have issued of late from St. Petersburgh. Within the last few days, the circular of the Russian Government, which represents the causes of the impending hostilities to be of a religious character, has been translated in various languages, and spread far and wide throughout this province, through the very channel of the Turkish post-office."

I have to instruct you to call Count Nesselrode's attention to this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 257.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August* 22.)

(No. 201.)
My Lord, *Therapia, August* 6, 1853.

I HAVE to request that the word "formelles" may be struck out of the fifth paragraph of Reshid Pasha's declaration forwarded to your Lordship with my despatch No. 168 of this year, and the word "formulées" inserted in its place.

His Highness having represented to me that an error had been made in the translation, I complied with his request to cancel it, and my example was followed by M. de la Cour and M. de Wildenbruch. The Internuncio made difficulties which were not removed until Reshid Pasha consented to make his request in writing.

Baron de Bruck has since admitted the proposed rectification, and for your Lordship's ampler information I forward herewith a copy of Reshid Pasha's explanatory letter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 257.

*Reshid Pasha to Baron Bruck.*

M. le Baron, *Balta Liman, le* 31 *Juillet*, 1853.

AINSI que j'ai eu l'honneur de faire savoir à plusieurs reprises à votre Excellence, le mot "formelles" a été inséré par meprise dans le memorandum de la conférence qui a eu lieu entre les quatre Représentants et moi, à mon "Yali" le 23 Juillet.

Ce n'est qu'en lisant la traduction en Turc de cette pièce que j'ai vu qu'on avait mis le mot "formelles" au lieu de "formulées." Je croyais que c'était une faute commise par la traduction, et ayant voulu vérifier le fait, en lisant l'original j'ai vu que l'erreur n'était pas à ce dernier, mais que le mot existait dans le texte.

Comme j'ai la conscience de ne m'être pas servi du mot "formelles," mais de celui de "formulées," qui ont en quelque sorte de la ressemblance dans la prononciation, je me suis de suite adressé à leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre et de France, qui ont reconnu l'erreur, et sans la moindre difficulté ont acquiéscé à ma demande, en remplaçant le mot "d'assurances formelles" par celui "d'assurances formulées." Son Excellence le Baron de Wildenbruch a suivi leur exemple.

Je viens donc vous prier, M. le Baron, d'avoir la bonté de corriger la copie qui se trouve chez vous, et de vouloir bien signer celle que j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-jointe.

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) RECHID.

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No. 258.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 268.)

*Foreign Office, August* 23, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 319 of the 16th instant, inclosing a copy of a letter which you had received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject of the reported Austrian intervention in Servia, and reporting the substance of your reply to Lord Stratford, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve the course pursued by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 259.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August* 24.)

(No. 426. Confidential.)

*St Petersburgh, August* 15, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the conversation which I held with Count Nesselrode on the 11th instant, I have the honour of transmitting the copy of a confidential letter which I addressed to his Excellency on the 14th instant.

Besides being desirous of renewing my suggestion as to the withdrawal of the Imperial troops from the Principalities commencing as soon as a Turkish Plenipotentiary should arrive on Russian ground, it occurred to me that as Count Nesselrode appeared desirous to establish that negotiations were likely to fail through the fanaticism and obstinacy of the Turks, it must be my object to point out beforehand from what causes these excited feelings have proceeded.

This I have attempted to do briefly, and in a manner not calculated to give offence, by the inclosed letter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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Inclosure in No. 259.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.*

(Confidential.)

*St. Petersburgh, August* 14, 1853.

Dear Count Nesselrode,

IT is often in the close neighbourhood of port that the chances of shipwreck become the greatest; this must be my excuse if my anxiety respecting the success of an arrangement calculated to insure peace increases as the conclusion of our negotiation draws near.

If I have carried away a correct impression of our last conversation, you are not free from anxiety, from the notion of the Turkish Government being little disposed to accede to the measures now pressed upon them on the part of the allies.

It is indeed but too obvious that late transactions, diplomatic and military, must have had the tendency of awaking to a degree that spirit of fanaticism which had previously slept, and that it will require all the friendly exertions of the foreign Representatives at Constantinople to calm down feelings which have been worked upon by apprehensions, religious and political, by which the Turks are at last possessed.

Again, then, I would venture to remark to your Excellency, that nothing will so much conduce to the success of the pacific attempts of your allies—nothing will so much tend to dissipating the unfounded but very considerable



apprehensions of the Turks—as any act on your part which will prove that the overtures which the Sultan is recommended to make, will be met in a friendly spirit by the Emperor.

It is certain that it must be under a sense of pain that the Porte are prepared to send an Ambassador to St. Petersburgh at a time when a portion of the Turkish empire is occupied by a Russian army, as certainly it could misbecome neither the magnanimity nor the power of the Emperor to determine that the withdrawal of the Imperial forces should at all events commence as soon as the Turkish negotiator arrives on Russian ground.

The point is one to which my Government attach very great importance, and attention to it would not only be very acceptable to your allies, but would be very reassuring to that Government whose weakness you have been among the first to deplore.

The immense importance of the questions at issue will, I am sure, excuse me for addressing you this fresh representation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 260.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August* 24.)

(No. 427. Confidential.)

*St. Petersburgh, August* 16, 1853.

My Lord,

ACCORDING to an opinion very commonly received, the most skilful and successful diplomacy of Europe is that of Russia.

Were the fact so, it would not be surprising, the Imperial Government possessing in the funds at its command, in the unity of its action, in the passive obedience of its agents and subjects, facilities which exist in Russia alone; but beyond this I venture to regard the opinion as an erroneous one.

If it had been the Emperor's purpose (which even now I do not believe) to have taken forcible possession of the Principalities, the great point should have been to have brought about a state of things which would have given a colour to if it had not justified this act of violence.

No such intelligible ground of quarrel was established; no such show of reason was made, and it may be almost said that the motives assigned on the Emperor's behalf have been so futile that it is doubtful whether in his interests an unexplained breach of national rights would not have been preferable to one for which such miserable pretexts have been offered.

Again, a diplomacy conducted with even ordinary skill would not, in pursuit of an object, have lost sight of others to which an almost equal importance is attached whenever the neglect has been most apparent throughout the course of the present transactions with Turkey.

It was the policy of the Russian Cabinet to cause the Emperor of the French to be looked upon as the intended violator of Treaties, and to exclude him from the Council of Sovereigns; the effect of Russian diplomacy has been to enable him to dispel the suspicion, and to assign him a place, and a very prominent one, in that Council.

It was their policy to prevent any close alliance between the Governments or the people of England and France, and themselves have brought about that intimacy.

It was their policy to maintain Austria in a state of submissive tutelage, and they offered her the most eligible occasion for emancipating herself, and for manifesting what is here termed "her ingratitude."

It was their policy to preserve their hold upon the rest of Germany, and the rest of Germany witnesses with indignation an enterprise which has all the appearance of an act of hostility against the commerce of every State of the Confederation.

Above all it was, or it ought to have been, their policy that the Head of the State should retain that proud position which his supposed disinterestedness and respect for Treaties had obtained for him, and which is now lost beyond the power of recovery.

If in all this any great skilfulness has been displayed, then must those who hitherto have been esteemed the most successful masters of diplomacy have been undeserving of their reputation.

But it may be said, that Russia having had a bad cause to defend, has at least shown great ingenuity in the defence which her diplomatists have set up for her.

Really, my Lord, those who make this assertion can hardly have read the State Papers which the Imperial Chancellerie have put forth; for assuredly it would have been better that the Blondoffs and Labenskis should have kept silence than that, by rushing into print, they should have exposed themselves to the refutation of every tolerably conducted newspaper. The Foreign Department of St. Petersburgh has been seen to be unequally matched against the Paris "Charivari."

It has indeed been remarked, that the great difficulty of late in arguing with a Russian agent, was not that of putting Russia in the wrong, but of not putting her to such a degree in the wrong as would render a return to more correct ways difficult, from the excess of her departure from a straight course.

As regards the Russians, I must allow that those with whom my habits and duties bring me into intercourse approve of all that the Emperor has done, and approve, I may add, in the same official phrases.

With respect to the strangers whom I see, and I refer more especially to the Members of the Diplomatic Body, having been one and all of them upon my arrival here loud in their admiration of the Emperor, who was then spoken of as the Protector of European society, they are now (with a solitary exception) unanimous in disapproving his conduct, and in considering it as subversive of those principles by which society is held together.

One of my colleagues has not hesitated to state to me, that having been long resident here, it had formerly been his pride to be placed at the Russian Court, while now all that he desired was to withdraw himself from a post for which he felt unfitted—no longer comprehending what is going on around him, or the motives which have led to these strange movements.

I venture, then, to assert, that if Russian diplomacy is to be judged of by the doings, sayings, and writings, which have lately occupied my attention, no opinion can be more erroneous than that which would assign to it the character of pre-eminent dexterity.

Some little talent was shown in the assurances with which a settled purpose was denied at the commencement of Prince Menchikoff's mission, but there began and there ended the only skilful exertion of Russian diplomacy as exerted in an European field, which has come under my observation.

In candour it must, however, be admitted, that there is no sound diplomacy where there is no knowledge of facts, that is, where truth is not allowed to prevail; whereas a Russian functionary only writes or says that which it is acceptable to his master to learn.

Much of the mischief which has lately occurred has been occasioned, first, by the remarkably incorrect estimate taken by the Emperor of the rights secured to him by Treaty; and in the second place, by that want of courage which prevented his servants from venturing to point out the error.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 261.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 191.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 25, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the letter which you have addressed to Count Nesselrode respecting the evacuation of the Principalities, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 426 of the 16th of this month.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 262.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 26.)*

(No. 633. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, August 24, 1853.*

HAVING incidentally obtained information that the Emperor of Russia, in a conversation which he had lately held with General Castelbajac on the Eastern question, had expressed himself to the effect, that although the present storm might pass over Turkey, His Majesty considered the dissolution of that Empire to be imminent, and that it was time to take into consideration what should in that case be done, and that His Majesty had expressed a desire to know the opinions of the French Government upon this subject, I have inquired of M. Drouyn de Lhuys what instructions he proposed sending in reply to General Castelbajac.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys was hardly willing to admit that the Emperor of Russia's language would bear so wide a construction as I had put upon it; but he said without hesitation, that "if any question arose as to the application to be made of what were now the component parts of the Turkish Empire, General Castelbajac would not be entrusted with the negotiations, nor would they be pursued at St. Petersburgh. It was to London that in such a case the French Government would naturally turn."

"But it was with a view of preventing this crisis that he had lately addressed confidential communications to the French Representatives in London, Vienna, and Berlin, desiring them, as if from themselves, to sound those Cabinets as to the advisableness, in order to save the Porte from the rude blows under which she had now all but succumbed, of entering into some mutual engagement by which they should pledge themselves in the first place to abstain from taking the law into their own hands on every occasion on which they might quarrel with Turkey; and by which they should declare, in the second place, that in case of a sudden dissolution of the Turkish Empire from intestine causes, they would not profit by that dissolution for their own aggrandisement. The answers which he had received from the three Courts, though vague, were not unfavourable to his scheme, and encouraged him to try whether some impression of a like nature might not be made on the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. The despatch of General Castelbajac, on which I had questioned him, would give him a favourable opportunity of making this trial; for he might fairly ask the Emperor Nicholas to join in preventing what His Majesty deprecated as likely to arise; and he could do it without offence, because he should blame the proceedings of France in regard to the holy places, and in her expedition to Tripoli; and he should animadvert on the conduct of Austria in regard to Count Leiningen's mission in language as strong as my he should apply to the still more hostile acts of Russia.

"As to the policy of France in the East," continued M. de Lhuys, "I have always maintained that she is more concerned than any other country in the continuation of the *status quo*. She is the only one of the Great Powers that could gain nothing by the fall of Turkey, and her object must be to take care that the balance of power is not destroyed by acquisitions which others might make. England is in much the same position as France, though England might find a compensation in Egypt for the aggrandisement of the Northern Powers elsewhere. France could find a compensation nowhere in the East; consequently, her position is the most disinterested, and no overtures for her supposed advantages could have any effect upon her. But this very peculiarity of position renders it one in which the Emperor may distinguish himself. Nothing passes in the East which does not attract attention; and therefore, while I regret the circumstances themselves, I am not sorry that the Emperor should have had the opportunity of proving himself the decided ally of England, the protector of Turkey, and the adversary of the encroaching policy of Russia, and all this without any prospective advantage to himself; and if the French fleet had been sacrificed in proving it, I still assert that the Emperor and France would have been gainers, because public opinion would have done justice to the disinterested motives which dictated their conduct."

Such, my Lord, is the substance of what fell from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in replying to the question which, I stated in the beginning of this despatch, I put to him. His remarks were not made without some observations on my part, particularly when he touched on the eternal French theme of our designs on Egypt, and when I conceived that they pushed a little too far the disinterested policy of France. I spare your Lordship the perusal of them, as my object is to give Her Majesty's Government an insight into French views, and not a refutation of supposed English intentions. Taken as a whole, I conceive the policy laid down by M. Drouyn de Lhuys as that which ought to be pursued by France in the East, to be creditable to him both as a patriot and a statesman. Whether it will be followed out when the hour of difficulty arrives, is another question. I could only encourage him to persevere by the assurance that, in all affairs regarding the Levant, France would find that our first wish would be to come to an understanding with her.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 263.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 333.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1853.

ON the 20th instant Count Walewski informed me that he had been instructed by his Government to propose that orders should be dispatched forthwith to the British and French Ambassadors, to send for the fleets to Constantinople on October the 1st, if the Principalities were not evacuated before that time.

I told his Excellency that I did not understand what advantage was expected from sending such orders so long before the time they could be acted upon; and that, as the chief difficulties with Russia appeared then to be overcome, it would be desirable to wait for the answer that might daily be expected from Constantinople. If the Porte accepted the note, and Russia still refused to evacuate the Principalities, it might be necessary for the fleets to enter the Dardanelles long before the 1st of October; but if, on the other hand, the note was rejected by the Turkish Government, a different course of action might be thought expedient by the Governments of France and England. Count Walewski appeared to admit that his proposal was open to these objections, and did not press the subject further.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 264.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August* 27.)

(No. 337. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August* 24, 1853.

I CALLED this evening on Baron Manteuffel after the arrival of the despatches from St. Petersburgh, and had a hurried conversation with his Excellency. He said that he had received from General Rochow reports of an audience which he had had of the Emperor, and of an interview with Count Nesselrode, and he regretted to say that the tone of them was not satisfactory. That the Emperor had reproached General Rochow with the conduct of the Prussian Government, stating that if their language to the Maritime Powers had been different, the resistance of England and France to his just claims on Turkey would have been less decided, and the difficulties with which the question was now surrounded would have been greatly diminished; but His Imperial Majesty said that, notwithstanding all that had taken place, he had no intention of retaining possession of the Principalities, and that if the Turks agreed to the Vienna arrangement, his troops would leave them in five days.



This, Baron Manteuffel observes, was the substance of the Emperor's conversation with General Rochow; but he said with regard to the Principalities that the accounts which have reached him direct from thence were by no means calculated to confirm any such intention, and gave no reason to suppose that an early evacuation was to be expected. His Excellency then said that the only important point in General Rochow's report of his interview with Count Nesselrode was, that the Chancellor appeared extremely desponding as to the maintenance of peace, and he added, requesting that I would consider what he was about to say as strictly confidential, that Count Nesselrode's private opinion, declared to General Rochow, was that war would not be avoided beyond six months.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 265.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August* 27.)

(No. 432. Secret.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 19, 1853.

A PERSON in whom I can place entire reliance acquaints me that Count Orloff, in conversing the other day with one of his familiar friends, by whom the statement was made to my informant, expressed plainly his opinion as to the likelihood of a speedy arrangement of difficulties, and of the arrangement being short-lived.

"We shall probably," said Count Orloff, "settle this business very shortly; but you may rely upon it, before six months are passed we shall be at war with the Turks."

I beg of your Lordship to call to mind how much this opinion agrees with those which I have heard expressed in other quarters, and with the apprehensions by which I myself have long been possessed.

Just at present public opinion runs strongly against Russia; France and England are closely united against her pretensions; and Austria (as far as we are aware) has not begun to entertain those visions of extended Empire which will hardly be long resisted, if once it be proved to her satisfaction that the downfall of the Ottoman Empire is certain and imminent.

The very position too in which Russia would find herself after a reconciliation with Turkey upon the basis of the arrangement lately made at Vienna, would afford grounds for mistrusting her intentions, since every one must feel that the object attained was far from being commensurate with the immense sacrifices made for its acquirement.

The Emperor, in fact, would have subscribed to terms which he himself told me on the 30th of May he was determined not to listen to.

I have taken care to inform my French colleagues of Count Orloff's opinion, as reported at the beginning of my despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 266.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August* 27.)

(No. 433.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 19, 1853.

THE situation in which for some days past I have been placed is a painful one: on the one hand your Lordship's despatches, the speeches delivered in Parliament, and indeed the public voice of England, render it manifest that full assurances are expected as to the Emperor's intention of ordering the evacuation of the Principalities as soon as the Vienna note shall have been delivered or even signed; on the other, not only (as my correspondence will have shown) is the Imperial Government disinclined to take this distinct engagement, but my

colleagues of France, Austria, and Prussia, have shown themselves to be very little disposed to press for it.

If I had no other object in view than to guard against personal responsibility, it might be easily obtained by calling upon the Government in season and out of season for that which the Emperor should in fairness concede, and which Her Majesty's Government have a perfect right to expect; I have been, however, unwilling to take this course, partly because I am desirous of not allowing any marked difference to be observable between the conduct of the French Envoy and mine, and partly because in the event of a failure of the negotiation, now considerably advanced, the blame would probably be thrown by the other parties upon the injudicious pertinacity of the English Mission in asking for pledges in a manner which implied suspicion in the Imperial intentions.

These considerations will, however, no longer restrain me, so soon as I shall learn that the prepared note has been accepted by the Sultan, from pressing upon the Chancellor a point, the importance of which no one feels more sensibly than myself.

According to Count Nesselrode's calculation the Porte's answer to Count Buol's communication is not to be expected at St. Petersburgh before the $\frac{1}{12}$ of the month.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 267.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(No. 437.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 19, 1853.

LOOKING to the contingency of a removal of the fleets from Besika Bay to Constantinople, I thought it advisable to state to Count Nesselrode (whom I saw this evening), that the anchorage of the former place was becoming dangerous, and that a letter from Mr. Consul Yeames acquainted me that several English and French vessels had gone ashore there in a late gale.

Count Nesselrode remarked that it was only surprising to him that the two fleets had not repaired to Mitylene, where he understood there was excellent anchorage, and which was not further than the Russian harbour of Sevastopol from Constantinople.

His Excellency again expressed his apprehensions that the proposed note would be rejected by the Sultan. He was desirous of knowing what, in that contingency, would be the line taken by Her Majesty's Government.

Not being able to supply the desired information, I replied that I did not share his fears; and that I believed the contingency to be one which had not been contemplated.

In a guarded manner I glanced at the consideration which, for the present, deterred me from saying more upon a subject respecting which Her Majesty's Government felt so much anxiety, as that of the withdrawal of the Russian forces from the Principalities.

Count Nesselrode begged me to believe that importunity upon this point would be calculated to defeat the proposed object; the Emperor's word had been, his Excellency observed, pledged by an open declaration; to doubt that word would of course be very displeasing to His Imperial Majesty.

In the absence of any renewed and more distinct engagement, even this, acknowledged by the Minister, of a self-imposed engagement by which the Sovereign is bound, appeared to me to be of value.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 268.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 27.)

(No. 329.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August* 23, 1853.

COUNT BUOL read to me the report he had received from the Austrian Consul-General at Belgrade, detailing the result of the explanations he had given to the Prince of Servia, with reference to the protest His Highness lately addressed to the Austrian Government against their supposed intention of carrying out a military occupation of his country without his consent.

The Consul having assured the Prince that he had never intended or been authorized to convey any such impression, but that the sole intention of his Government was to assure His Highness and the Sultan that if their rights were attacked by insurrectionary movements, or menaced in any other manner, they might rely upon the assistance of the military force of Austria to support them; he received from the Prince the declaration that he was perfectly satisfied with these explanations, and he acknowledged that he had been precipitate in making his protest against the supposed intentions of the Austrian Government. His Highness also stated that he should desist from carrying out the armament of the Servian provinces which had been commenced, and that he believed the Government of the Sultan would no longer think it necessary to place a corps d'armée on his frontiers.

The Austrian Consul-General reports the arrival of M. de Fonton (the Russian Chancellor of Legation in Vienna) at Belgrade, and expresses his belief that the opinions given by that gentleman as to the good feelings and good intentions of his Government towards the established order of things in Servia, and the maintenance of the Treaties with reference to that country, will have the best effect in securing its tranquillity and peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 269.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 29.)

(No. 330.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August* 25, 1853.

I HAVE this day transmitted to your Lordship two telegraphic despatches, both from Baron Bruck to Count Buol, the one of the 18th and the second of the 19th. I am happy to say this last despatch gives a more favourable explanation of what has taken place at Constantinople, as to the Vienna project of note, than the former one, as it states the acceptance of that note with modifications by the Sultan.

These modifications have been viewed by Count Buol with great regret, because they do not appear to have been sufficiently necessary to have imposed upon the Turkish Government the obligation of insisting upon them, in opposition to the advice of the Governments its allies, with the certainty of occasioning delay in the arrangement of the questions at issue, and the risk of reopening a discussion which, by the acceptation of the note by the Emperor of Russia, might have been considered as nearly closed.

Count Buol hopes, however, that this most regrettable delay may be the only check which may arise to the prompt settlement of these affairs, as the modifications in the note are generally rather verbal than affecting any material interests; and Baron Meyendorff has expressed his expectation and belief, that they will not prevent the acceptation of the note as it will now be forwarded to St. Petersburgh.

The only alteration which appears to be of any particular importance is the one in the third paragraph, which inserts the words "par la Sublime Porte" after the words "la protection."

The communications from Constantinople to which I have alluded to in this despatch, will be forwarded this day by Stettin to St. Petersburgh, where they will arrive on Tuesday next, the 30th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 270.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 30.)

(No. 640. Confidential.)

*Paris, August* 29, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DE LHUYS, who has been absent for a few days from Paris, was expected to return here to-day, but is not arrived; it is supposed that he has been summoned by the Emperor to Dieppe.

M. de Thouvenel, whom I saw this afternoon, was good enough to communicate to me (in confidence, as he had no authority to do so) the substance of the despatches of the 15th instant, received yesterday by the regular packet from Constantinople. M. de la Cour at that date foresaw the result which has since been communicated by telegraph, of the negotiations between the Representatives of the Four Powers and the Porte to induce the latter to accept the text of the Vienna note.

He gives, I am sorry to say, a very unsatisfactory account of the state of the negotiations, and of matters in general at Constantinople. The Turkish Ministers were unanimous in their opinion not to accept the Vienna note without modifications and without guarantee that in its modified form it should not become in the hands of Russia an instrument for future attack. If this could not be obtained, it was better in their judgment to continue the struggle at once, and persist in defence of their honour and independence. Reshid Pasha was looked upon with suspicion, as the representative of a pacific policy, and every effort made, even by his colleagues, to ensure his downfall; and he himself, in order to secure his place, had become as warlike in language and as untractable in negotiations as the most violent of the anti-Russian party. The very acceptance of the Vienna note by Russia, instead of proving an assistance to the Four Powers, was a fresh embarrassment. "Russia," say the Turks, "would not have accepted what it would be fit for the Porte to agree to." It was considered an insult to ask the Sultan to accept the note without the power of altering a single word.

M. de la Cour adds that he cannot conceal from himself that the behaviour and language of the Divan is in painful unison with the public feelings.

On the other hand, a correspondence which had taken place between Omer Pasha and Prince Gortchakoff, made a collision on the Danube if not probable at least very possible. Omer Pasha had, as your Lordship knows he was instructed to do, threatened to fire on Russian boats ascending the Danube above a certain height. The Prince had replied that the fire would be returned.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 271.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 337.)

*Foreign Office, August* 30, 1853.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government learn with sincere satisfaction from your Excellency's despatch No. 633, the views entertained by M. Drouyn de Lhuys in regard to Turkey and to the proceedings of Russia in reference to that Empire: and this satisfaction arises not alone on account of the sound and disinterested policy which those views indicate, but because they cannot fail more closely to cement the alliance and friendly feelings which now bind the two countries together.

The communications that have passed during the last six months between them can leave no doubt as to the sincere desire of Her Majesty's Government to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, or consequently of their readiness to cooperate with France in any measure for preventing its dismemberment.



Her Majesty's Government have reason to believe that similar views are entertained by Austria and Prussia, and they agree with M. Drouyn de Lhuys as to the importance of ascertaining the opinions of the Emperor of Russia upon the subject, although they doubt whether the present moment would be favourable for the purpose. The settlement of pending differences between Russia and Turkey would appear to be the fitting opportunity for guarding against the recurrence of events such as those which have lately caused so much alarm and inconvenience; but should the Emperor of Russia refuse to associate himself in the proposed course of policy, Her Majesty's Government consider that his determination, however much to be lamented, should not deter the Four Powers from acting in concert with respect to Turkey, and agreeing as to the measures best calculated to ensure the maintenance of peace and the existing balance of power in Europe.

Her Majesty's Government do full justice to the disinterested policy of France upon this subject, as developed to you by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, but they claim equal credit for that of Great Britain; and they desire it to be distinctly understood that territorial aggrandisement is neither sought for nor desired by the people of England.

As very erroneous ideas have at times existed with respect to our views upon Egypt, Her Majesty's Government wish also that it should be distinctly understood that we have no other object than to preserve a free communication through that country with our Indian possessions, and that no arrangement could answer our purpose better than that which now exists.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 272.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.*—(*Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, August* 30.)

*St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{1}{13}$ *Août*, 1853.

M. le Baron,

JE viens de répondre, par les deux dépêches ci-jointes adressées à M. de Kisséleff, aux circulaires que le Gouvernement Français a fait imprimer dans le "Moniteur," en date du 25 Juin et du 15 Juillet.

La communication que M. de Castelbajac a reçu ordre de nous faire de la seconde, a précédé ici celle que Sir H. Seymour avait été également chargé de me donner de la dépêche de Lord Clarendon du 16 Juillet, laquelle roule sur les mêmes objets, et sert de réponse à ma circulaire du $\frac{30 \text{ Juin}}{12 \text{ Juillet}}$. Comme les deux Gouvernements d'Angleterre et de France ont considéré sous le même point de vue et jugé de la même manière notre mesure coërcitive envers la Porte et l'appréciation que nous avons faite de leur prise de position maritime, je me verrais nécessairement, M. le Baron, en répliquant à chacun d'eux séparément, entraîné à suivre deux fois le même ordre d'idées et à répéter exactement les mêmes arguments. Le Cabinet Anglais nous permettra donc de nous référer aux observations développées en détail dans nos pièces à la France. Vis-à-vis de Angleterre, comme de celle-ci, nous ne saurions que maintenir la corrélation qui existe entre les objets qui ont formé à Constantinople l'ensemble de la mission du Prince Menchikoff; les raisons qui nous ont forcé à attribuer à l'envoi simultané et combiné des deux flottes dans le Levant le caractère d'une manifestation combinatoire; la distinction que nous établissons entre les moyens de contrainte employés par nous envers les Turcs, et un véritable acte de guerre; enfin, les divers précédents sur lesquels nous nous baserions pour rejeter la responsabilité d'avoir les premiers introduit dans le droit public Européen un principe nouveau et fécond en désastreuses conséquences.

En portant officiellement ces deux dépêches et la présente à la connaissance de Lord Clarendon, vous voudrez bien toutefois lui faire observer que, comme la France se trouve par ses antécédents dans la question des Saints Lieux, et par l'envoi anticipé de sa flotte à Salamine, dans une position qui n'est pas en tous points identique à celle de l'Angleterre envers nous, et de plus comme M. Drouyn de Lhuys a, par la forme circulaire et ostensible qu'il a adoptée pour nous

répondre, donné à ses pièces un autre caractère que ne l'a fait le Gouvernement Anglais, cette nuance essentielle a dû nécessairement influer et sur notre manière de traiter le même sujet et sur le langage dont nous avons usé pour le faire. Les procédés antérieurs de la France envers la Turquie, avant et durant les premières phases de l'affaire des Lieux Saints, et la parallèle aussi peu équitable que désavantageuse pour nous que le Gouvernement Français a cru devoir établir entre sa conduite et la nôtre, devaient donner lieu de notre part à des objections et à des remarques qui ne concernent point le Gouvernement Britannique. Nous avons donc à prier Lord Clarendon de vouloir bien, en prenant lecture de nos pièces, faire la part des nuances que nous lui signalons ici, sans appliquer à son Cabinet ce qui n'appartient qu'à la France. Nous y tenons d'autant plus, M. le Baron, que les dernières ouvertures confidentielles que Sir H. Seymour a été chargé de nous faire, attestaient de la part du Gouvernement Britannique des dispositions conciliantes que nous avons hautement appréciées, et que non obstant la divergence fâcheuse qui existe entre l'Angleterre et nous sur le fond de la question actuelle, nous désirons écarter, autant que possible, de la discussion toute expression et toute forme qui serait susceptible de l'aigrir.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 272.

*Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff.*

*St. Pétersbourg, le 1/13 Août*, 1853.

LES deux circulaires de M. Drouyn de Lhuys, en date du 25 Juin et du 15 Juillet, imprimées dans "Le Moniteur," et dont M. le Marquis de Castelbajac a été chargé de me donner lecture de la dernière, me sont parvenues ici dans un moment où nous arrivaient de plusieurs côtés, et notamment de la France elle-même, divers projets d'un accommodement à effectuer entre nous et la Porte Ottomane. Animés du même esprit de conciliation qui avait dicté ces différentes ouvertures, nous avons préféré vouer nos premiers soins à examiner ce qu'elles pouvaient présenter d'acceptable pour nous, au lieu de les subordonner à une discussion pénible, où les opinions contraires risquent plutôt de s'aigrir que de se rapprocher. Néanmoins, comme les deux dépêches du Gouvernement Français contiennent sur notre conduite antérieure et nos intentions quelques vues qui ne nous y semblent pas conformes, je ne saurais me dispenser plus longtemps de vous faire connaître à ce sujet l'impression du Cabinet Impérial.

Il nous est d'abord difficile d'admettre qu'il n'existe aucune corrélation entre l'arrangement particulier aux saints lieux, et la garantie générale que nous réclamons en faveur des priviléges religieux du culte orthodoxe. Dès l'origine du débat actuel nous n'en avons toujours fait qu'une seule et même question. Dans notre première circulaire nous avons clairement établi que les avantages conférés aux Latins à Jérusalem au détriment de nos co-religionnaires, n'avaient été que le couronnement d'une série d'actes du même genre, témoignant, de la part du Gouvernement Turc, d'une malveillance systématique contre le rit que nous professons et d'une évidente partialité pour les autres communions Chrétiennes. Nous avons ajouté que cette tendance, de jour en jour plus prononcée, avait mis l'Empereur dans la nécessité d'y apporter un terme; qu'à cette fin, Sa Majesté avait envoyé le Prince Menchikoff à Constantinople; et que si la mission de cet Ambassadeur n'avait qu'un seul but, comme nous l'avons dit effectivement en désavouant tout ce qu'on y mêlait d'étranger à la question religieuse, elle comprenait pourtant deux objets distincts:—1. Arrangement spécial des difficultés du présent. 2. Garantie générale pour l'avenir.

Ces deux objets, dès son début à Constantinople, le Prince Menchikoff les avait non moins formellement indiqués. Dans l'exposé de nos griefs, présenté par lui à la Porte le 5/17 Mars, il est dit expressement: "que l'arrangement à négocier dans un esprit de tolérance et de bonne entente ne saura plus se borner à des assurances stériles et incomplètes, lesquelles pourraient être de nouveau invalidées pour l'avenir, mais qu'un engagement solennel devra désormais attester l'accord sincère qu'il devient si urgent d'établir à ce sujet entre les deux



Gouvernements." Et plus loin, dans la même pièce, après avoir porté plainte de la manière dont la Porte Ottomane accueillait les conseils du Gouvernement Impérial dans les questions du Monténégro, du Patriarche de Constantinople, et des différentes injustices commises contre les rayas Chrétiens, &c., notre Ambassadeur insistait "sur la nécessité de faire disparaître le profond et juste mécontentement qu'en éprouve Sa Majesté l'Empereur par un acte de confiance qui écarte pour l'avenir toute nuance de désaccord entre les deux Souverains."

La note verbale, adressée par le Prince Menchikoff à Rifaat Pasha le 7/19 Avril, est encore plus explicite. Après avoir énuméré et motivé de nouveau tout l'ensemble de nos demandes antérieures, "l'Ambassadeur," y est-il-dit, "doit répéter ici à M. le Ministre des Relations Etrangères ce qu'il a déjà été dans le cas de lui exprimer plusieurs fois: que la Russie ne demande pas à la Porte de concessions politiques. Son désir est de calmer les consciences religieuses par la certitude du maintien de ce qui est et de ce qui a toujours été pratiqué jusqu'à nos temps. C'est donc à la suite des tendances hostiles qui se sont manifestées depuis quelques années contre tout ce qui touche à la Russie, qu'elle requiert, dans l'intérêt des immunités religieuses du culte orthodoxe, un acte explicite et positif de garantie, acte qui n'affecterait en rien ni les autres cultes, ni les relations de la Porte avec d'autres Puissances."

On voit donc que toutes les réclamations du Prince Menchikoff avaient été dès l'origine articulées et formulées simultanément. Comment dire d'après ce qui précède qu'il n'existe absolument aucun lien entre les deux objets dont se composait sa mission; que l'obtention seule des deux nouveaux firmans, aussi précaires que celui de 1852, ferait tomber l'unique grief que nous eussions à faire valoir contre la Sublime Porte; que la demande d'une garantie a été faite postérieurement; que c'était là une question entièrement nouvelle, et que le Gouvernement Français s'est trouvé pris au dépourvu par des exigences qu'on n'avait pu soupçonner à Constantinople? Le Gouvernement Français en particulier a été si peu pris au dépourvu que, dès le mois de Mars, la portée de nos demandes lui avait paru assez grave pour l'engager à envoyer son escadre dans le Levant, et que si ensuite cette escadre s'est arrêtée à Salamine sans pousser jusqu'aux Dardanelles, la seule cause en a été le refus de l'Angleterre de se joindre à cette démonstration.

Si en apprenant que de nouveaux firmans sur l'affaire des lieux saints venaient d'être rendus à Constantinople par le Sultan, votre Excellence et moi nous nous sommes félicités avec le Gouvernement Français et le Ministre de France à St. Pétersbourg de cette heureuse conclusion, cela prouve seulement que nous nous sentions satisfaits de voir résolue la partie des négociations qui avait pu mettre un moment nos intérêts religieux en opposition plus immédiate avec ceux du Gouvernement Français. Mais il ne s'en suit nullement que dès cet instant nous considérions la mission du Prince Menchikoff comme finie, puisque l'autre objet qu'elle avait en vue nous restait encore à atteindre.

A l'appui de la garantie générale que nous réclamons pour consolider l'arrangement relatif aux saints lieux, nous avons invoqué nos Traités et soutenu que nous ne demandions que les droits, immunités et priviléges religieux qu'ils impliquent. M. Drouyn de Lhuys nous conteste l'autorité de ces Traités. Selon lui aucune de leurs stipulations n'offre le caractère de généralité que nous voudrions y attacher, et le Traité de Kaïnardji, notamment, ne confère, dit-il, à la Russie qu'un droit de protection limité et défini sur une église desservie par des prêtres Russes, qu'il était question de fonder dans le faubourg de Galata. Mais M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères nous semble avoir perdu de vue ce qui précède ces stipulations renfermées dans les Articles VII et XIV. L'Article VII pose en principe que le Sultan promet de protéger la religion Chrétienne et ses églises. La religion et les églises Grecques étant de ce nombre, nous en concluons que qui promet de protéger une religion et ses églises ne peut faire moins pour remplir cet engagement que de leur laisser les droits, immunités, et priviléges dont elles jouissent; ces droits, immunités, et priviléges dont jouissait alors le clergé Grec et qu'il possède *ab antiquo*, sont précisément ceux en faveur desquels nous réclamons. Obtenir le *status quo* actuel, nous ne voulons pas autre chose; et si la promesse renfermée dans le Traité de Kaïnardji n'a point été jugée contraire aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan, nous ne saurions voir que sa simple confirmation y puisse davantage porter atteinte.

Pour établir qu'en principe au moins—car il ne s'agit ici que d'un principe—un droit de protection religieuse exercé sur les sujets d'un état non Chrétien,

n'est point aussi inconciliable qu'on le croit avec son indépendance politique, nous avons cité entre autres le patronage que la France a exercé de tous temps sur les Catholiques d'Orient. La circulaire de M. Drouyn de Lhuys repousse à cet égard toute analogie quelconque. Elle maintient que la France n'a jamais prétendu protéger en Orient que des sujets ou des établissements Français, sans étendre sa protection sur les Catholiques soumis au Sultan. C'est pour la première fois, Monsieur, que le Gouvernement Français tient ce langage. Car, il est de notoriété historique que de tout temps, depuis François I jusqu'à nous, la France a entendu protéger tous les Catholiques d'Orient, même sujets de la Porte Ottoman; bien plus, qu'en mainte occasion elle a prétendue exercer ce droit à l'exclusion même de toute autre Puissance Catholique. Tout récemment encore, dans les complications religieuses du Liban, qui suivirent la crise Orientale de 1840, et dans la guerre qui s'engagea entre les Druses et les Maronites, le Gouvernement Français continuait à se prévaloir de ce droit de protéger au nom de la France toute la population Chrétienne de Syrie. A l'appui de son assertion M. Drouyn de Lhuys a cité quelques phrases d'un mémoire du Comte de St. Priest, autrefois Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople. Or, l'opinion de ce diplomate prouve précisément, par le soin qu'il met à réfuter l'opinion opposée, que celle-ci était l'idée générale et dominante en France. Quoiqu'il en soit, on conviendra que l'autorité individuelle d'un Représentant Français ne saurait un seul instant entrer en balance avec celle du Gouvernement Français lui-même, constatée et consignée dans un Acte public Européen. On l'a déjà dit, le Protocole signé à Londres le 3 Février, 1830, par les Trois Puissances fondatrices de la Grèce est clair et positif sur ce point. Il établit, "que depuis plusieurs siècles la France est en possession d'exercer en faveur des Catholiques soumis au Sultan un patronage spécial que Sa Hautesse Très-Chrétienne croit devoir déposer entre les mains du futur Souverain de la Grèce, quant à ce qui concerne les provinces qui doivent composer le nouvel état:" ce qui signifie que la France se le réserve quant aux provinces qui continueront à faire partie des Etats du Sultan. Il arrête ensuite, au nom des Trois Puissances: "que la religion Catholique jouira dans le nouvel état du libre et public exercice de son culte; que ses propriétés lui seront garanties; que des évêques seront maintenus dans l'intégrité des fonctions, droits et priviléges dont ils ont joui sous le patronage des Rois de France."

Voilà donc, Monsieur, nonobstant l'autorité particulière du Comte de St. Priest, un Acte officiel revêtu de toutes les formes diplomatiques, qui constate que le patronage religieux de la France s'est exercé et s'exerce bien effectivement sur les sujets du Sultan, un Acte dans lequel l'Angleterre et nous-mêmes reconnaissons à la France la faculté de stipuler en faveur des sujets d'un Prince étranger le maintien de certains droits, immunités et priviléges religieux, sans que l'Angleterre ait plus que nous-mêmes trouvé cette faculté contraire à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté, soit du futur monarque de la Grèce, soit du Gouvernement Ottoman.

Nous ajouterons ici une remarque générale.

Ce n'est que tout récemment, qu'en cherchant à faire entrer la Turquie dans le droit Européen, on a prétendu appliquer d'une manière aussi absolue, en matière de protection, de souveraineté et d'indépendance, les principes qui guident entre elles les Puissances Européennes, à un Etat Mahométan, où toutes les notions de droit civil et politique diffèrent si essentiellement de celles en usage parmi les peuples et gouvernements de la Chrétienté. La chose a paru plausible en théorie; mais dans la pratique on s'en écarte sans cesse. Où voit-on, par exemple, un Etat Chrétien dans lequel les étrangers aient dû être soustraits à la juridiction légale des autorités du pays, pour être placés directement sous celle de leurs Ambassades ou Consulats? Toutes les fois que les intérêts d'un Catholique ou d'un Protestant sont lésés, la France et l'Angleterre interviennent activement pour lui d'une manière qui, partout ailleurs, ne se concilierait peut-être pas toujours avec les principes reconnus universellement en matière d'indépendance politique. C'est qu'en effet il ne peut en être autrement dans un Etat où les Chrétiens, en leur qualité de Rayas, et comme tels placés politiquement au-dessous de la race Musulmane, sont exposés à mille avanies et vexations de la part du peuple ou des Pachas, souvent même menacés dans leurs biens, leur religion et leur existence, comme l'ont procuré encore si récemment les massacres d'Alep, les persécutions, les exactions pécuniaires, les destructions d'églises, les conversions forcés, et les crimes de tout genre



exercées en Bulgarie, en Bosnie et en Herzégovine. Nous ne saurions donc admettre sans aucunes restrictions l'incompatibilité absolue de toute protection religieuse étrangère avec les droits souverains du Sultan; et le Gouvernement Français se souviendra peut-être que dans une occasion assez récente où nous avions insisté, l'Autriche et nous, sur l'obligation pour les étrangers d'accepter partout les lois et la juridiction des tribunaux du pays où ils résident, lui-même fit difficulté d'admettre abstraitement et sans réserves l'universalité du principe que nous posions, alléguant l'impossibilité de l'appliquer rigoureusement aux pays Mahométans ou idolâtres.

Nous aurions désiré, Monsieur, borner là nos observations, si la circulaire ne se terminait en instituant un parallèle entre notre conduite vis-à-vis de la Turquie et celle du Gouvernement Français, dans lequel on fait ressortir sous un jour peu favourable pour nous, la modération de la France à côté de nos exigences et de nos menaces. Nous sommes bien dès lors obligés de rappeler que si en effet la conduite du Gouvernement Français dans les derniers temps a fait preuve d'un esprit de conciliation auquel nous nous sommes d'ailleurs empressés de rendre hommage, son langage et son attitude dans les premières phases de la question, dans plusieurs affaires surtout concernant plus exclusivement la France, n'avaient pas toujours selon nous porté le même caractère. M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères s'autorise des sacrifices qu'aurait fait la France au repos de l'Orient et aux embarras de la Porte Ottomane, pour se croire en droit d'espérer que nous serons mûs par des considérations analogues. Nous serions peut-être nous-mêmes fondés à lui demander si le repos de l'Orient et les embarras de la Porte ont toujours été au même degré l'objet de ses préoccupations, et si le ton comminatoire, dont il nous reproche aujourd'hui d'user, a été constamment exclu de ces moyens de négociation à Constantinople? Si ce n'est point par la menace, par celle d'un bombardement appuyée de l'apparition soudaine de sa flotte, qu'il a obtenu satisfaction de ses réclamations à Tripoli; si l'affaire de Janina n'a pas été terminée par les mêmes moyens sommaires; si, avant que les autres Puissances ne se fussent employées à trouver un *medio termine* qui légitimât l'entrée du vaisseau de guerre "le Charlemagne" dans les Dardanelles, le Gouvernement Français n'insistait pas dans des formes très-péremptoires sur l'admission de ce vaisseau, malgré la lettre expresse du Traité de 1841, qu'il invoque aujourd'hui contre nous; si enfin, la menace n'a été pour rien dans les premières concessions à notre détriment qu'il a obtenues dans l'affaire des saints lieux de la part de la Porte Ottomane, et dans l'infraction subséquent des promesses les plus solennelles données à l'Empereur par le Sultan. Il nous permettra de le dire: c'est ce système d'intimidation, suivi jusqu'à ces derniers temps qui, en pesant sur la Porte, en effaçant momentanément à Constantinople toute autre influence que celle de la France, en y affaiblissant la position de tous les autres Cabinets, a récemment obligé l'Autriche, lors de la mission du Comte de Leiningen, à présenter ses réclamations sous des formes qu'elle n'est point habituée à suivre dans ses relations ordinaires d'amitié avec la Porte. C'est lui qui nous a nous-mêmes forcés à donner à la mission du Prince Menchikoff un autre caractère que celui qu'en toute autre circonstance nous eussions désiré lui imprimer. Sous ce rapport, si le Gouvernement Français veut bien ramener son attention sur toute sa conduite antérieure, il verra que nous ne saurions consentir à passer pour seuls responsables des complications qui graduellement ont amené en Turquie les choses à l'état où elles se trouvent aujourd'hui, et que lui-même n'est point à beaucoup près aussi complétement dégagé qu'il le croit de toute part de responsabilité dans la crise actuelle.

Avant de finir, Monsieur, il nous reste un dernier point sur lequel M. Drouyn de Lhuys nous permettra également de faire nos réserves.

C'est sur l'extension trop grande, selon nous, qu'il semblerait vouloir prêter au Traité de 1841, en le représentant comme une garantie collective que les Puissances auraient donnée à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et qui nous lierait par conséquent en notre qualité de signataires. Le Traité de 1841 n'a point et n'a jamais eu cette portée. Son but spécial a été simplement, de la part des Hautes Parties Contractantes, celui "de constater en commun par un Acte formel leur détermination unanime de se conformer à l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, d'après laquelle le passage des deux détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore doit toujours être fermé aux bâtiments de guerre étrangers, tant que la Porte se trouve en paix." Qu'on lise les trois seuls Articles du Traité, et

l'on n'y verra pas autre chose. En donnant par là au Sultan, suivant les termes du préambule, "une preuve du respect qu'elles portent à l'inviolabilité de ses droits souverains," les Puissances expriment bien aussi "leur désir sincère de voir se consolider le repos de son Empire." Mais l'expression d'un désir, manifestée simplement dans le préambule d'un Traité, n'est point celle d'une obligation. Il y a intention, non pas engagement formel contracté par stipulation et pour toute éventualité quelconque. Nous aussi, nous éprouvons le désir de voir consolidé le repos de la Turquie, qui ne saurait l'être selon nous que si elle donne une légitime satisfaction aux sentiments religieux de la majorité de ses populations Chrétiennes. Que notre intention soit de ne rien changer au *status quo* territorial actuel de l'Orient, c'est ce qu'attestent tous nos actes antérieurs, et la déclaration même que nous avons faite, en prenant à regret envers la Turquie une mesure de rigueur temporaire, que nous désavouons toute idée de conquête ou d'agrandissement. La garantie qu'invoque le Gouvernement Français existe donc en effet. Elle existe, moralement, dans nos vues, dans les convictions de l'Empereur, dans l'intérêt bien-entendu de la Russie qui, comme nous l'avons exposé, lui fait désirer que rien ne renverse en Orient l'équilibre actuel des choses. Mais nos rapports de politique, de religion et de commerce avec le Gouvernement Ottoman sont trop nombreux, trop compliqués, et les occasions de divergence trop fréquentes, pour que la Russie ait pu s'interdire à tout jamais et pour toute éventualité la faculté d'obtenir par elle-même satisfaction de ses griefs particuliers, et s'obliger par Traité à recourir pour chaque lésion qu'auraient soufferte ses intérêts à l'intervention des autres Puissances. Assurer d'avance la Turquie qu'elle ne court aucun risque à nous molester, la délier, par une garantie expresse, de tous motifs d'appréhension ou d'égards, et confier à d'autres qu'à nous-mêmes la tutelle de notre honneur et de nos intérêts les plus chers, c'est ce à quoi de trop graves considérations ne pouvaient nous permettre de consentir. La Russie sera toujours prête à respecter l'indépendance d'autrui; mais elle ne saurait pousser ce respect jusqu'à lui sacrifier la sienne propre.

Telles sont, Monsieur, les réflexions que nous a suggérées la première circulaire de M. Drouyn de Lhuys, et dont vous voudrez bien lui donner communication officielle.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 272.

*Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff.*

*St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{1}{13}$ *Août*, 1853.

EN répondant, par ma précédente dépêche, à la première circulaire de M. Drouyn de Lhuys, j'ai également examiné cette partie de la seconde qui a trait à la question religieuse. Il ne reste à considérer ici ce qui, dans cette dernière pièce, concerne plus spécialement notre entrée temporaire dans les Principautés, le point de vue sous lequel nous avons dû envisager l'envoi de la flotte Anglo-Française dans le Levant, et le jugement que porte le Gouvernement Français sur notre attitude actuelle.

Qu'on nous permette d'abord de laisser de côté l'assertion qu'il n'y a eu à Constantinople, de la part d'aucun des Représentants étrangers, ni pression d'aucun genre, ni ingérence quelconque dans le refus de la Porte Ottomane d'accepter les dernières conditions que lui avait offertes le Prince Menchikoff. Nous réservons là-dessus notre sentiment, fondé sur des informations qui ne concorderaient pas entièrement avec l'opinion qu'exprime le Gouvernement Français.

Mais nous ne saurions ne pas appuyer sur notre manière d'envisager et les effets et le caractère que nous avons cru pouvoir attribuer à la démonstration navale des deux Puissances.

Le rapprochement de dates établit clairement que l'ordre donné aux escadres d'aller mouiller près des Dardanelles, l'a été sur la première nouvelle de la rupture de relations qui venait d'avoir lieu entre le Prince Menchikoff et la Porte, et avant qu'on ne pût savoir à Paris ou à Londres quel parti nous prendrions. Cet ordre a donc précédé l'annonce même des mesures, purement éventuelles, dont nous subordonnions encore l'exécution à la réponse qui nous



serait donnée à Constantinople. L'arrivée des flottes dans les eaux Turques a également précédé cette réponse. Ne sommes nous pas fondés à dire que la présence des deux escadres a dû fortement influer sur les décisions finales de la Porte, par conséquent influer aussi sur nos propres décisions?

On nous oppose que nos mesures avaient été annoncées de manière à ne pouvoir laisser aucun doute sur notre ferme intention d'y donner suite. Il n'en est pas moins constant que leur exécution dépendait de la conduite incertaine du Gouvernement Turc. Le Gouvernement Turc pouvait accepter notre ultimatum. Il pouvait, tout en ne l'acceptant pas, répondre néanmoins de manière à laisser une porte ouverte à la reprise en considération de nos mesures et des instances que l'Autriche nous adressait dans ce sens, c'est-à-dire, ne pas répondre comme l'a fait Reshid Pasha, en revenant sur les engagements mêmes que son Gouvernement avait déjà pris dans le dernier projet de note adressé au Prince Menchikoff, en posant un principe qui sape par la base celui que renferme au sujet de la religion et des églises le Traité de Kaïnardji. Il ne nous paraît donc point que nos mesures, par cela seul que nous les avions annoncées d'avance, dûssent être dès-lors considérées comme étant déjà irrévocablement exécutées. On a vu d'ailleurs que c'est avant même de les connaître que les deux Puissances ont donné à leurs flottes l'ordre d'appareiller pour le Levant.

Que la démonstration des Puissances, anticipant sur nos décisions finales, ait mis en jeu notre honneur déjà engagé si avant dans la question, c'est ce que ne contestera pas M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, s'il reconnait, suivant les termes de sa première circulaire, que chaque Gouvernement est le seul juge des exigences de sa dignité.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys rejete toute parité que nous voudrions établir entre les situations respectives. Vis-à-vis de la Turquie, sans contredit, et nous n'avons jamais prétendu qu'il y eut parité de situation vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Ottoman entre nous et les deux Puissances. Ce que nous croyons pouvoir maintenir c'est que les Puissances, par la position navale qu'elles ont prise, nous ont donné une raison de plus d'en chercher l'équivalent dans une position militaire. Et quand nous disons équivalent, nous croyons rester au-dessus du vrai. Que les flottes soient ou ne soient pas en vue de la capitale Ottomane, c'est-là une question de mots qu'on nous permettra de ne point traiter sérieusement, et nous retirons volontiers l'expression si, géographiquement, elle a pu paraître inexacte. Mais toujours est-il que la Baie de Besica est à courte distance des Dardanelles; que, quand les Puissances y ont pris position, nous ignorions aussi bien qu'elles comment la Porte envisagerait notre entré dans les Principautés; que, d'après le témoignage de M. Drouyn de Lhuys lui-même, la Porte a été laissée entièrement libre de ses décisions; qu'elle avait droit, qu'elle a encore droit, selon lui, de considérer nos mesures comme un acte de guerre, et de déclarer les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore ouverts aux escadres de France et d'Angleterre. Dans une hypothèse pareille on n'a qu'à mesurer la distance ou plutôt les obstacles à franchir et à vaincre des deux parts pour décider si, non pas de nos frontières, mais même derrière le Danube, nous sommes par terre plus près de Constantinople, que ne le seraient par mer les deux Puissances de nos côtes et de nos ports.

Représenter l'attitude armée et combinée des deux plus grands Etats maritimes de l'Europe, dans un but nettement formulé, comme le mouillage inoffensif de quelques vaisseaux isolés, visitant sans y stationer des ports amis ouverts à toutes les marines, c'est, ce nous semble, faire une part bien faible à nos justes susceptibilités et à nos motifs de préoccupation non moins légitimes.

Nous avons exposé plus haut qu'en un certain cas la position prise par les deux Cours eût pu être bien plus menaçante pour nous que la nôtre ne l'est pour Constantinople. Mais ce cas extrême à part ne suffit-il pas du moindre coup de vent pour obliger les escadres alliées à changer leur mouillage actuel en une position toute différente? Pouvions nous oublier qu'en 1849, lorsque les deux Cours crurent devoir sans nécessité se placer dans la même attitude (nous disons "sans nécessité," puisque avant même de recevoir ici leurs premières communications, l'Empereur avait déjà, par déférence amicale pour le Sultan et pour l'envoi que lui fit ce Souverain d'un Ambassadeur Extraordinaire, renoncé spontanément à insister sur la partie principale de ses demandes). Pouvions nous, dis-je, oublier qu'à cette époque le mauvais temps servit à l'Amiral Parker de raison suffisante pour quitter la station de Besica et pour pénétrer dans l'intérieur des Dardanelles? Même en dehors de ce détroit, et sans être en vue

de Constantinople, les deux Cours par la présence de leurs flottes, n'en sont-elles pas maîtresses moralement. En cas de troubles dans la capitale, les destinées de l'Empire Ottoman ne seraient elles pas dans leurs mains? Et pouvons nous y voir d'un œil entièrement indifférent prédominer leur influence absolue, exclusive, au détriment de cette part d'action et d'influence que la France réclame à juste titre en Turquie, mais qu'à juste titre aussi la Russie peut réclamer pour elle-même? Il nous semble que poser ces questions cela suffit pour les résoudre.

Quand on voit, comme tout récemment dans un port de la Turquie ouvert librement à toutes les marines, les bâtiments de guerre de deux nations, également amies de la Porte Ottomane, se préparer l'une et l'autre au combat, et, en face d'un pareil fait, les autorités Ottomanes frappés d'impuissance et d'immobilité, il est facile de juger du degré d'indépendance que peut laisser à la Turquie la présence de vaisseaux étrangers dans ses ports et dans ses eaux libres.

Ce n'est donc point sans quelque raison que nous avons cru pouvoir envisager l'attitude navale des deux Puissances comme une démonstration autrement grave qu'un simple mouillage dans des ports ouverts à toutes les marines isolément, et que nous avons été contraints d'attribuer à cette attitude envers nous un caractère comminatoire, un caractère de pression exercée sur nos déterminations.

Pour compléter notre pensé nous demanderons à M. Drouyn de Lhuys de lui soumettre une hypothèse.

Supposons, ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise, qu'il vînt à survenir entre la France et l'Angleterre un de ces graves dissentiments, d'où peut sortir soudain la guerre ou qui tiennent du moins la paix en suspens. Au plus fort de ce démêlé, l'Angleterre, en vertu d'un Traité d'Alliance ou de tout autre accord préalable quelconque, nous invite à lui prêter le concours de nos forces maritimes. Tout d'un coup et sans qu'avis en ait été donné par nous au Gouvernement Français, 15 ou 20 vaisseaux Russes armés en guerre viennent du fond de la Baltique mouiller et prendre une position combinée avec les forces de la Grande Bretagne dans les ports de ce dernier pays, à portée plus au moins grande des côtes et établissements maritimes de la France. Le Gouvernement Français verrait-il là un mouillage inoffensif dans des eaux et ports ouverts librement à tout le monde? Ne se sentirait-il pas quelque droit de qualifier un pareil mouvement de démonstration comminatoire?

Nous adressons cette question avec confiance à sa loyauté et à ses sentiments d'honneur national.

La circulaire se termine par une accusation fort grave, qui n'irait à rien moins qu'à représenter le passage du Pruth par nos troupes comme introduisant dans le droit public un principe entièrement nouveau, à l'admission duquel s'oppose l'intérêt général du monde.

Un examen plus calme convaincra, nous l'espérons, M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères que notre entrée dans les Principautés n'a pourtant pas, comme précédent, toute la portée qu'il y attache.

De tout temps, dans le droit public Européen, il a existé une distinction marquée entre un acte de guerre positif et des mesures simplement coërcitives. Cette distinction, le Gouvernement Français n'aurait pas à remonter bien loin pour en trouver plus d'un exemple dans l'histoire contemporaine et dans ses propres antécédents politiques. Sans parler de l'entrée des troupes Françaises en Morée, à l'époque de la révolution Grecque, pour en chasser celles du Sultan, quand le Sultan protestait hautement contre cette atteinte portée à l'intégrité d'un territoire qu'il regardait alors comme le sien propre; du blocus des côtes; de la capture et même de la destruction des vaisseaux Ottomans; série de mesures de force qui ne déterminaient pourtant pas l'état de guerre; nous pourrions rappeler encore que la France après 1830, de concert avec l'Angleterre, mais en opposition directe aux représentations de la Russie, de l'Autriche et de la Prusse, envahissait un territoire à l'abandon duquel le Roi des Pays-Bas n'avait pas encore souscrit; exigeait de lui la retraite de ses troupes; bombardait plus tard Anvers; bloquait avec son alliée les ports Hollandais, malgré la protestation du Roi, malgré celle des trois autres Grandes Puissances, qui avaient cherché à décider ce Souverain à l'acceptation volontaire des conditions qu'on lui avait faites. Tous ces actes, la France et Angleterre les qualifiaient alors de mesures coërcitives, renfermées dans un certain cercle qu'elles avaient d'avance tracé. Nous n'avons pas, que nous sachions, poussé jusqu'ici



à un tel point l'extension des moyens de contrainte. Nous entrons, pour obtenir la satisfaction qu'on nous refuse, sur un territoire dont la Porte est Suzeraine, il est vrai, mais dans lequel il n'existe pas un seul Turc avec lequel nos troupes puissent se trouver en collision; et quels que soient les dangers attachés, nous en convenons, à ces sortes de situations équivoques, néanmoins la distinction existant déjà entre les moyens coërcitifs ou la guerre, et cette distinction se fondant sur des précédents bien plus graves que le cas actuel, nous ne saurions accepter le reproche d'avoir pour la première fois introduit un principe nouveau dans le monde, entraînant toutes les conséquences que M. Drouyn de Lhuys en fait découler.

Vous voudrez bien, Monsieur, en communiquant la présente au Gouvernement Français, lui soumettre ces réflexions, en réplique à celles qu'il nous fait entendre. Nous étions dans l'obligation de rétablir certains faits antérieurs et de maintenir quelques-unes de nos opinions, dont l'appréciation par lui ne nous a pas paru entièrement équitable pour nous. Mais, au moment même où nos dernières nouvelles de Vienne semblent nous autoriser à ne pas renoncer tout-à-fait à l'espoir d'un arrangement avec la Turquie, nous nous verrions avec regret dans le cas de poursuivre avec la France une controverse qui, roulant sur le passé, réussira difficilement à concilier les opinions divergentes. Que, nonobstant cette divergence, notre désir soit encore, ce qu'il a toujours été, de nous prêter à la recherche d'un moyen efficace de rapprochement entre la Russie et la Porte, c'est ce qu'atteste la disposition que nous venons de montrer à donner notre approbation aux dernières propositions que l'Autriche vient de faire à Constantinople. Il dépendra maintenant du Gouvernement Français de concourir, par son langage et ses conseils à la Porte Ottomane, à accélérer une solution pacifique, que personne n'accueillera plus sincèrement que l'Empereur, pour peu qu'elle demeure conforme à ses intérêts et à sa dignité.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

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No. 273.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 205.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 11, 1853.*

AT a late hour of the evening, the day before yesterday, I received from Lord Westmorland a despatch, transmitting to me in copy his reports to your Lordship of the 29th and 31st ultimo, by way of reply to the proposition which, founded on your Lordship's instructions to me, and adopted by the Porte, I had forwarded to Vienna on the 19th and 23rd of the same month, in concert with the Representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia, with the view of its being subsequently conveyed to St. Petersburgh and laid before the Russian Cabinet.

The information thus transmitted to me shows that the Austrian Government has stopped, or rather, in so far as they are concerned, set aside, the letter addressed to Count Nesselrode by Reshid Pasha, together with the Porte's ultimatum and declaration, superseding them by a *projet de note* to which the French and British Governments had given their assent, before they knew anything of the plan of arrangement adopted here.

The Internuncio's language, as addressed repeatedly to me, and, as I understand, to M. de la Cour also, had not prepared us for this. Baron Bruck had every appearance of entertaining a strong persuasion that the proposals forwarded from Constantinople would be favourably received at St. Petersburgh, and that the Porte's explanatory act of protestation alone contained enough to satisfy the Russian Government.

Be that as it may, there was no room to doubt that our communications had been suspended at Vienna, and that the Internuncio would call upon the Porte to give up its ultimatum in favour of the Austrian note.

It was, moreover, evident that Her Majesty's Representative at Vienna, in

transmitting to me the three telegraphic despatches inclosed with his despatch to me of the 1st instant, expected that I should feel bound to support the Internuncio's demand.

It remained for me to consider, what course it behoved me to take in expectation of direct instructions from Her Majesty's Government.

Looking to the telegraphic despatches I observed, that although your Lordship had directed the transmission of our communications to Petersburgh to be suspended, and had accepted, in concert with France, Count Buol's note amended in London, desiring me to be informed that Her Majesty's Government wished it to be adopted by the Porte, there was no evidence that your Lordship had received my despatches of July 20, and a moral certainty that you had not received those of the 23rd, when the last of the telegraphic notices was sent from England.

On the other hand, it was to be presumed that your Lordship would lose no time in sending back the "Caradoc" from Marseilles with instructions to me, after receiving my despatches of the 23rd; and it was reasonable to expect, on a calculation of dates and distances, that any instructions forwarded by that fast steamer would reach me in three or four days.

Such being the state of the case, and considering that as the Austrian note had been already transmitted from Vienna to Petersburgh, the delay of a few days here was of little importance, I determined not to forego unnecessarily the prospect of acting with the advantage of your Lordship's deliberate instructions.

When, therefore, the French Ambassador, wishing to compare notes with me, called here on Tuesday night, and the Internuncio on the following morning, I declined taking any official step or expressing any official opinion until I had allowed a fair time for the arrival of the expected despatches from England, they both did me the honour to acquiesce courteously in the intimation; and the Internuncio informed me, that he had communicated the substance of his instructions on the preceding night to Reshid Pasha, but had not received from His Highness any reply committing him to an opinion.

When, at an early hour next day, I saw the Ottoman Minister, he confirmed Baron Bruck's statement, and on my part I was careful not to express any opinion respecting the merits of the Austrian note. I left him with an understanding that the new proposal would not be submitted to the Council before the 14th instant, unless my instructions arrived in time to admit of an earlier meeting. Not having found the Prussian Envoy at home when I called upon him, I am unable to say how he is circumstanced on this occasion; but it is natural to suppose that if he had received fresh instructions from his Court on the question of common interest, he would not have left me in ignorance of their tenor.

It is proper for me to state in conclusion, that I have not yet received, though I have seen, the Projet de Note transmitted from Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 274.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 206. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 11, 1853.

ALTHOUGH it is not improbable that you have received from Vienna a copy of the autograph letter addressed by the Emperor of Austria to Sultan Abdul-Medjid, and consigned to the hands of Colonel Ruff, having obtained a copy of it here from the most authentic source, I make no excuse for inclosing it with my present despatch to your Lordship. As Baron de Bruck was good enough to read the letter to me when he called here yesterday, I may venture to answer for the correctness of the copy. His Excellency has applied for an audience, at which he will, no doubt, present the original to the Sultan.



I have reason to believe that the Sultan, on receiving it, will confine himself to some general expressions of the sense which he entertains of the Emperor's good-will, and of the value which he sets on His Majesty's friendly disposition towards him and his Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 274.

*The Emperor of Austria to Sultan Abdul-Medjid.*

Sérénissime et très Puissant Prince,

VOTRE Majesté connait trop bien l'amitié sincère que je lui ai vouée pour pouvoir douter que ce soit le même sentiment qui m'inspire le désir de pouvoir contribuer à mettre promptement fin à la grave complication qui la préoccupe en ce moment. Dans le but d'indiquer à votre Majesté la seule voie qui, à mon sens, puisse, au point où en sont arrivées les choses, amener le rétablissement immédiat de ses relations de parfaite entente avec son puissant voisin l'Empereur de Russie, je fais partir pour Constantinople mon Colonel Ruff, qui sera porteur de cette lettre et de nouvelles directions qui mettront mon Internonce à même de s'entendre à ce sujet avec les Ministres de votre Majesté. Qu'elle daigne donc leur donner l'ordre catégorique d'écarter toute hésitation, et d'avoir franchement recours aux moyens d'accommodement qui leur sera suggéré de notre part. Personne plus que moi ne sait rendre justice aux intentions bienveillantes qui animent votre Majesté pour le bonheur de ses peuples. Mais il est juste de ne pas l'oublier, ces vues généreuses ne pourront sortir leur plein effet qu'au milieu des bienfaits de la paix. Aussi en faisant tout ce qui dépend d'elle pour la conserver, votre Majesté est elle sûre d'acquérir de nouveaux titres à la gratitude de ses sujets comme à la sympathie des Puissances amies. Votre Majesté, je l'espère, apprécie trop bien mes sentiments pour ne pas être persuadée d'avance que je ne saurais rien lui conseiller qui soit de nature à porter atteinte à sa dignité ou à son pouvoir souverain. Je me livre dès lors à la ferme confiance que les conseils que je lui offre rencontreront auprès de votre Majesté un accueil conforme aux intentions amicales et désintéressées qui les ont dictés. Je l'espère d'autant plus que, dans le cas contraire, il ne me resterait que le regret stérile d'avoir vû méconnaître la voix de l'amitié et d'être désormais privé de moyens d'empêcher les complications ultérieures que le développement des événements, je ne le crains que trop, ne tarderait pas à amener.

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) FRANCOIS-JOSEPH.

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No. 275.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 211.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 11, 1853.

WITH reference to the subject matter of my despatch No. 197, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship translated copies of two letters addressed by the Porte to the Prince of Servia and to the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 275.

*The Porte to the Bey of Servia.*

(Translation.) *August* 8, 1853.

THE reply given by your Highness to the communication of the Austrian Consul at Belgrade relative to the introduction, on certain grounds, of troops into Servia, was such as might be expected from your sound judgment, and has met with His Imperial Majesty's approval.

The Porte cannot consent to admit the troops of any Government whatsoever into Servia, one of her provinces; and as the Sublime Porte attaches much importance to the preservation of the actual state of things in Servia under your Highness' rule and administration, his Excellency Chekib Effendi has been specially appointed by His Majesty to advise with your Highness on all necessary matters.

Of the troops under arms in different quarters owing to the dispute which has arisen between Russia and the Porte, those which are in the neighbourhood of Servia will afford every necessary support to your administration.

His Majesty the Sultan is animated with the best dispositions towards your Highness, and towards the Servian people of approved loyalty. Your Highness may, therefore, be at perfect ease, and exert yourself for maintaining the public tranquillity. Such are the Imperial orders.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 275.

*The Porte to the Ottoman Embassy at Vienna.*

(Translation.) *August* 8, 1853.

EXPLANATIONS having been demanded of the Austrian Legation here on certain communications made by the Austrian Consul at Belgrade to the Pasha in command and to the Prince, concerning the entrance of Austrian troops in Servia, grounded on certain doubts with reference to a change in the present tranquil position of that province, it was stated in reply that the Austrian Legation here had no information on the subject, but that the military preparations made in the neighbourhood of Servia were only of a precautionary nature intended to intimidate the Servians; that some parties in Servia wanted to avail themselves of the present difficulties, with the idea of creating troubles in the province; that this would neither suit the Sublime Porte nor Austria, who had so many Servian subjects; and considering that the Servian Administration would not be strong enough to meet such a contingency, Austria intended, in order that things should not come to that pass, to stifle and put down any such movements whether they manifested themselves or not.

It is inferred from this statement that it is the intention of Austria to move troops into Servia; but on the other hand, it was stated at length to the Internuncio that His Imperial Majesty the Sultan is, praise be to God, strong enough to put down any seditious movements which might take place in Servia and one of his provinces, and that the necessary measures will be looked to; that the Prince will be put on his guard, and that a functionary of distinction may be sent to Belgrade on a special mission, to act as circumstances may require, so that there would be no necessity whatever for Austria to move troops into Servia; that the Sublime Porte could never consent to such a thing, and that Austria ought to beware herself of such bad examples.

His Excellency the Internuncio admitted that there would be no occasion for Austrian troops, if such prompt and effective measures were taken by the Porte.

Your Excellency will observe from these details that the Porte, in the fulfilment of its administrative duties, is engaged in taking every measure for securing the tranquillity of Servia. A special letter has been also sent to the Prince to put him on the alert; and your Excellency is now instructed by order of His Majesty the Sultan to make known officially, and once for all, to his Excellency the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Buol, that the Porte cannot



consent to the introduction of troops by Austria into Servia, and that, in short, she cannot admit such a thing on whatever ground or pretext it may be sought to found it.

Your Excellency will therefore make this communication duly to Count Buol, and communicate his answer to me without delay.

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No. 276.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 214.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 13, 1853.

YESTERDAY evening, between 5 and 6 o'clock, Her Majesty's steam-vessel "Caradoc" arrived here, with your Lordship's despatches of the 2nd and 3rd instant. At an early hour this morning I waited on Reshid Pasha, and communicated to him the substance of your Lordship's instructions relative to the *projet de note* already received from Vienna. I called his attention to the strong and earnest manner in which that paper was recommended to the acceptance of the Porte, not only by Her Majesty's Government, but also by the Cabinets of Austria, France, and Prussia. I reminded him of the intelligence which had arrived from St. Petersburgh the day before by telegraph, purporting that the Emperor of Russia had signified his readiness to accept the same note. I urged, moreover, the importance of his engaging the Porte to come to a decision with the least possible delay, and I put him at the same time in full possession of the motives by which your Lordship had been actuated in approving the detention at Vienna of His Highness's letter to Count Nesselrode, and the transmission to St. Petersburgh and Constantinople of the above-mentioned *projet de note*, which had already received the sanction of the Four Powers, when the Porte's ultimatum reached Vienna. I added that the two Projects, besides being identic in form, would be found on examination to be essentially similar in their general tenor, not only with each other, but even, it might almost be said, with the note originally prepared by himself for communication to Prince Menchikoff.

The Pasha listened with a very good grace to all I said, and acquiesced silently in the change of plan which I had explained to him, and of which he had been previously apprised. He gave me, however, to understand that there were parts of the note which were not satisfactory to him, and to which he anticipated objections on the part of his Government.

Of the passages thus pointed out as exceptionable, two only appear to involve considerations of any weight, presenting, in the one case, a question of fact, in the other a question of unsafe interference on the part of Russia.

In the beginning of the second paragraph the Emperors of Russia are represented, hypothetically, as having at all times displayed an active solicitude for the privileges and immunities of the Greek Church. The fact, however, according to Reshid Pasha, is that the Sovereigns of Russia never displayed their zeal on behalf of those privileges before the negotiation of the Treaty at Kainardji. He therefore proposes to draw a distinction between the general freedom of worship, at all times an object of interest to Russia, with respect to the Greek Church, and the privileges granted to its clergy especially maintained by the Ottoman Sultans, marking that difference by the use of corresponding terms in the note.

Again, at the end of the third paragraph, a form of expression is used, which, in the Pasha's opinion, if not amended would have the effect of extending Russian patronage over all those subjects of the Porte who belong to the Greek Church and its establishments. A consequence of this description is apprehended, from the terms of the Note, because they would entitle Russia to participate in the concessions made to Austria by the Treaties of Carlowitz, Belgrade and Sistova, which include all persons of the Roman Catholic persuasion in Turkey, without any reservation as to the Sultan's subjects. This danger was carefully avoided in the *projet de note* drawn up here.

For your Lordship's more complete information, I have the honour to inclose herewith the Articles of the Austrian Treaties which bear upon this question, and also a paper exhibiting all the passages in Count Buol's *projet de note*

on which Reshid Pasha made any remarks, together with his Highness's proposed amendments. The remarks and the amendments are to be considered for the present as proceeding from him individually, and not with the sanction of his Government.

My own impression is that the amendments do not cover his objections, but I have abstained from telling him so, in order to incur no risk of encouraging an opposition to the note so highly recommended.

Our conversation, during the course of which I repeatedly urged the importance of an immediate decision, and the danger of declining, or only accepting with amendments, what the four friendly Powers so earnestly recommended, and what the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh had accepted in its actual state, terminated with an assurance on his part that he would bring the whole question before the Council in the course of the day, and make a suitable communication to the Four Representatives with the least practicable delay.

I must not omit that Reshid Pasha manifested an intention of insisting eventually upon the evacuation of the Principalities, before the departure of the Porte's Ambassador for St. Petersburgh, and an expectation of receiving, in some shape or other, a guarantee similar to what is contained in his declaration of the 23rd ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 276.

*Treaty of Belgrade, September* 18, 1739.

ARTICLE IX.

TOUS les privilèges qui ont été accordés aux religieux professant la religion Chrétienne Catholique pendant les règnes des Sultans précédents de glorieuse mémoire, soit par les capitulations, soit par des ordonnances Impériales et des mandements spéciaux, tant avant la paix de Passarovitz que depuis, tous ces privilèges, et spécialement ceux qui ont été accordés aux religieux Allemands de l'Ordre de la Trinité pour la rédemption des captifs, seront confirmés par le Sérénissime Empereur des Ottomans pour être observés aussi à l'avenir; en sorte que les susdits religieux puissent librement réparer et rétablir leurs églises d'une manière conforme à la loi Mussulmane et exercer leur culte accoutumé sans rencontrer aucune opposition. Il ne sera permis à personne contrairement aux lois et aux capitulations, par des demandes d'argent ou sous d'autres prétextes, de molester les dits religieux de la Trinité, ni ceux des autres ordres; au contraire, ces religieux pourront tous vivre paisiblement sous la protection de Sa Hautesse le Sultan. De plus, l'Ambassadeur de l'Empereur des Romains sera libre à son arrivée à Constantinople d'exposer ce qui leur sera commis par rapport à la religion, aux lieux que les Chrétiens visitent dans la cité de Jérusalem, et aux autres endroits où les dits religieux ont des églises.

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*Treaty of Sistova, August* 4, 1791.

ARTICLE XII.

ET quant à la liberté du culte accordée aux prêtres et aux sectateurs de la religion Catholique dans l'Empire Ottoman, ainsi que pour ce qui concerne l'entretien et la réparation de leurs églises, et la faculté de visiter, sous les auspices des autorités locales, les lieux saints de Jérusalem et autres endroits de pélerinage, la Sublime Porte Ottomane renouvelle et confirme, d'après le principe du *status quo* strict, non seulement les privilèges assurés à cette religion par l'Article IX du Traité de Belgrade, mais aussi ceux qui lui ont été particulièrement concédés par des firmans et par d'autres documents Impériaux.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 276.

*Treaty of Peace with Austria, signed at Carlowitz, January* 26, 1699.

ARTICLE XIII.

A L'EGARD des religieux et de l'exercice de la religion Catholique Romaine, le Grand Seigneur promet de renouveller et de confirmer tous les privilèges qui leur ont été accordés par ses prédécesseurs. De plus il sera permis aux Ambassadeurs de l'Empereur d'adresser leurs plaintes et demandes à la Porte au sujet de la religion et de la visitation des lieux saints à Jerusalem.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 276.

*Extract of Draft of Note recommended to be addressed by the Porte to Russia.*

SA Majesté le Sultan n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, a pris soigneusement à tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ce différend; et un iradé suprême en date de lui ayant fait connaître la décision Impériale, elle se félicite de pouvoir la communiquer à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Russie (ou à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode).

Si à toute époque les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour *le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les consacrer** de nouveau par des actes solennels qui attestaient leur ancienne et constante bienveillance à l'égard de leurs sujets Chrétiens.

Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul-Medjid, aujourd'hui régnant, animé des mêmes dispositions, et voulant donner à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un témoignage personnel de son amitié la plus sincère et de son désir intime de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui existent entre les deux Etats, n'a écouté que sa confiance infinie dans les qualités éminentes de son auguste ami et allié, et a daigné prendre en sérieuse considération les *représentations*† dont son Excellence M. le Prince Menchikoff s'est rendu l'organe auprès d'elle.

Le Soussigné a reçu en conséquence l'ordre de déclarer par la présente que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan restera fidèle *à la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traités de Kainardji et Andrinople*‡ relatives à la protection§ du culte Chrétien, et il que Sa Majesté regarde qu'il est de son honneur de faire observer à tout jamais et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit présentement soit dans l'avenir, la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui ont été accordés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté à l'Eglise Orthodoxe d'Orient, et qui sont maintenus et confirmés par elle, et, en outre, à faire participer dans un esprit de haute équité le rit Grec aux avantages *concédés aux autres rits Chrétiens par Convention ou disposition particulière.*¶

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* *Culte et l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque, les Sultans n'ont jamais cessé de veiller au maintien des immunités et des privilèges de ce culte et de cette Eglise, et de les consacrer.*
† *Communications.*
‡ *Au Traité de Kainardji confirmé par celui d'Andrinople.*
§ *Par la Porte.*
‖ *De faire connaître.*
¶ *Accordés ou qui seraient accordés aux autres communautés Chrétiennes, sujettes Ottomanes.*

No. 277.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 216.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 14, 1853.

THE *projet de note* transmitted from Vienna was laid before the Council to-day by Reshid Pasha. All the Ministers were present to the number of seventeen, including the Sheik ul Islam. A stormy debate ensued, and the majority of the Council declared it to be their firm intention to reject the new proposal, even if amendments were introduced. They founded this determination on the preference they gave to that draft of a note which the Porte had decided on forwarding to St. Petersburgh through the Austrian Cabinet, and on the declaration which had been formally made by Reshid Pasha when he consigned it on the 23rd ultimo to the Four Representatives, purporting that nothing beyond the terms of that draft would be accepted by the Ottoman Government. It was their opinion that no necessity obliged the Porte to recede from its former resolution in order to yield to a proposal which was not in accordance with their views.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs having submitted that the new *projet de note* was founded in some measure on the draft which he had himself prepared for Prince Menchikoff, the Council decided that time should be allowed for its members to compare the two papers at their leisure.

The adjournment which followed is not to extend beyond to-day or to-morrow.

Inclosed herewith is the list of the members who were present. The statement which precedes is the substance of M. Pisani's report to me on the authority of Reshid Pasha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 277.

[* Rejection. † Modification. Others said nothing.]

† The Grand Vizier.
* The Sheik ul Islam.
* The President of the Supreme Council
† Reshid Pasha.
* The Minister of Finance.
* The Capitan Pasha.
* The Seraskier.
Ahmet Fethi Pasha.
† Kiamil Pasha.
Ali Ghelib Pasha.
Hussein Bey.
Ziver Effendi.
* Nessib Pasha.
* The Grand Vizier's Moustashar.
Haireddin Pasha.
* Mahomed Rushdi Pasha.
Raouf Pasha.

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No. 278.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 219.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 14, 1853.

I HAVE to offer my acknowledgments for the endeavours made under your Lordship's instructions to do justice to my diplomatic character and conduct during the late negotiations here. I have observed in the various correspondence transmitted for my information Sir H. Seymour's recital of what passed between him and Count Nesselrode when he communicated to his Excellency your Lordship's instructions respecting me. I have been too long accustomed to indications of prejudice and unexplained ill-will from that quarter not to be prepared for more, and I feel obliged to Sir Hamilton for having done whatever depended upon him to set my conduct in a proper light. The



Emperor of Russia has done me more honour than he intended, more indeed than I can presume to deserve, in attaching so much importance to my personal influence. What little credit I may be supposed to enjoy, beyond what is naturally due to me as the Queen's Representative, has arisen in a great degree out of my resistance to proceedings sanctioned by His Imperial Majesty, which have had the effect of identifying the performance of my duty with the natural feelings and vital interests of this Government and its subjects of all classes.

But while I am more or less indifferent to attacks originating in causes which have obtained for me your Lordship's confidence and the approval of Her Majesty's Government, I observe with far other sentiments the beginnings of a jealous and insidious course of action brought to bear upon my position here by those who profess to have views in common with Her Majesty's Embassy, and whose instructions I have been led to suppose are essentially similar to mine as to the great object of our present solicitude.

It appears that Baron de Bruck has been actively employed during the last two or three days in visiting the Turkish Ministers and other members of the Council with the view of recommending Count Buol's note to their acceptance. I am far from meaning to criticise so laudable a display of zeal, but looking to what passed in the Ottoman Council to-day, I may be allowed to question the success of his exertions, and to express my surprise that some of the Ministers who voted for rejection, *sans phrase*, were exactly those whom he had visited. I regret, moreover, to learn that the language employed by his Excellency in pleading the cause of peace was understood to imply both jealousy of my influence and mistrust of Reshid Pasha, who is not of course pleased with the kind of appeal which he has made at the present critical juncture from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to that Minister's colleagues in the Council. I have reason to believe that Baron de Bruck used so little disguise as to tell Reshid Pasha himself that while he pretended to uphold the independence of his country against Russia, he did not hesitate to place it in a state of dependence on me.

What does this mean? Is there anything in my correspondence, anything in my conduct, to warrant a suspicion that I counteract the Internuncio when his objects are legitimate, and above all similar to those of Her Majesty's Government? I appeal to your Lordship's knowledge of my proceedings, and I would also appeal to the Internuncio's immediate predecessor, the late Chargé d'Affaires. Or is the spirit of Austrian policy, as applied permanently to this country, at variance with the salutary advice which, under the instructions or with the approbation of your Lordship, I tender from time to time to the Sultan and his Ministers? If so, I can understand, however little I may admire, the foresight which has led Baron de Bruck, even while we are acting in concert, to lay a foundation for the overthrow of British influence in my person at this Court.

The French Ambassador has rivalled the Internuncio in locomotive activity during the last few days. His principal object has, no doubt, been the acceptance of Count Buol's note. He has also applied for an audience of the Sultan, as likewise has Baron de Bruck, the latter having to present an autograph letter from the Emperor of Austria, and M. de la Cour wishing, as he says, to address the Sultan on the present state of affairs.

When Reshid Pasha informed me that M. de la Cour had applied for an audience, he added that the French interpreter had inquired whether he meant to attend, and on his expressing a wish to know my opinion, I advised him by no means to volunteer a retirement. The Pasha appears to have acted in consequence with becoming spirit, as your Lordship will perceive on reading the extract, inclosed herewith, of M. Pisani's report.

If M. de la Cour, like M. de Bruck, was minded to disparage Reshid Pasha, and also by a side wind to impair my influence with the Sultan, I trust that his intention is foiled for this time. But it is not the less my duty to apprise your Lordship of some passages in the conduct of that Ambassador, which seem, in my humble judgment, to be rather inconsistent with an earnest anxiety to hasten the acceptance of Count Buol's note. I would not dwell upon his having assisted Reshid Pasha in preparing amendments to that note, as he might have been actuated by mere good nature, though it is evident that such assistance given out at such a moment could hardly fail to diminish the chances of a complete acceptance. But I learn that he has informed the Ottoman Minister of Count Walewski's proposals to your Lordship, and led him to believe that the

two Governments of France and England are already prepared to take ulterior and active measures in support of this Empire. He had before made some inquiries of the Pasha with reference to the disembarkation of troops on the Turkish coasts, and he now inquired whether the Porte was disposed to consider the Dardanelles as already open to the passage of the squadrons. On receiving a negative answer, his Excellency said that he should speak with me upon the subject.

When M. de la Cour called shortly afterwards to execute this intention, I avowed my knowledge of what had passed on the question of ulterior measures between your Lordship and Count Walewski, but added my conviction, that Her Majesty's Government, though by no means blind to the eventual exigencies of the future, had not contemplated the adoption of any such measures in the present state of the negotiations.

I am the more particular in mentioning these circumstances, because I think it unlikely that M. de la Cour should take any step or employ any language not fully authorized by his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 278.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Private and most Confidential.)
(Extract.) *August* 13, 1853.

M. DE LA COUR told this morning Reshid Pasha that he thought of having his audience quite in a private manner, and consequently he would save him the trouble to assist.

His Highness replied that he might have a private interview with the Sultan if he liked, but could not have it without his being present; and that the intention he expressed denoted a want of confidence on his part.

"It is true," added the Pasha, "that the British Ambassador had a private interview with the Sultan, accompanied only by his first interpreter; but it must be borne in mind that there was no Minister for Foreign Affairs at that time. During the Ramazan Lord Stratford had a private audience of the Sultan, but I was present. Should you insist upon avoiding my being present, I shall consider it as an offence, and shall tender my resignation."

Upon this M. de la Cour answered that he never intended to offend his Highness, but only wished not to intrude upon his valuable time, in a moment when he was overwhelmed with business.

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No. 279.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 220.)
My Lord, *Therapia, August* 15, 1853.

THE accompanying copy of a report addressed to me yesterday by M. Pisani may have some interest for your Lordship in the present state of the long pending question between Russia and the Porte. It throws no feeble light on the manner in which the Turkish Ministers are disposed to view Count Buol's note, and on the sentiments excited in their minds by the apparent coldness with which their own note, protest, and final declaration, have been received at Vienna, and generally by the four Cabinets.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 279.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 14, 1853.

RESHID PASHA informs me that Baron de Bruck called on him to-day at the Porte to urge the necessity of accepting, without further delay, the draft of the note approved by the Emperor of Russia.

His Highness replied that the draft in question might perhaps be adopted, but with amendments; but as it now stands it was utterly impossible. "You saw," said the Pasha to the Internuncio, "all my colleagues, and I suppose you are in possession of their opinion on the subject." He answered in the affirmative; and added, that some appeared rather well disposed, and others very adverse. "As to making alterations," continued he, "I think it very difficult and almost impossible, the note being already accepted by the Emperor."

Upon this Reshid Pasha observed, that the Emperor, who was to receive the note, ought not to be so particular about the wording; whereas the Porte, who was to give it, ought of course to be careful and weigh every word. I really cannot conceive, said the Pasha to Baron Bruck, how the Cabinets could, previously to consulting the Porte, which is so deeply concerned in the matter, submit the proposal to St. Petersburgh. More than once, said he, the Porte was told by the Four Representatives, both verbally and in writing, that she was the best judge in the pending question, and now, in contradiction to all this, the Cabinets take upon themselves to draw up a note without the knowledge or concurrence of the party more immediately interested, and have it also accepted by the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

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No. 280.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 221. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Therapia, August* 16, 1853.

I HAD a long and interesting conversation last night with Reshid Pasha, whom I met at the French Ambassador's, where an entertainment was given in honour of the Emperor Louis Napoleon's name or birthday.

His Highness told me he had attended in the morning at three audiences, the concurrence of which had obliged the Council to postpone its adjourned meeting till to-day. It appears that M. de la Cour and Baron Bruck had, each in his turn, advised the Sultan with earnestness to accept the Austrian note, and that the Sultan had replied to both in gracious but general terms, committing himself to no opinion, and without any difference but that which was caused by the presentation of a letter from the Emperor of Austria.

The third audience had been given to General Prim, and Commander Reares, who, as your Lordship knows, is on his way to the Turkish camp, and who may be supposed to awaken the sympathies of Turkey at a moment when the Spanish and Ottoman Courts are both excluded from diplomatic relations with Russia.

The Pasha then confirmed what M. Pisani had previously reported to me respecting the state of opinions in the Council, and assured me that there was no chance of obtaining a majority in favour of accepting Count Buol's note. The only way to avoid a complete refusal was, he said, to propose the note with certain modifications. He could not, himself, sign the note as it was then worded. He gave credit to Her Majesty's Government for the most friendly intentions, and lamented on that account the more deeply that the dangerous extent, as he conceived, to which concession had been carried at Vienna should have been overlooked in London. He could not, he said, conceal from me that a persistence in the same course would alienate the sympathies of this country from England, and place our influence here on a footing quite different

from that on which it now stood. It was unnecessary for him to tell me how much he should personally regret so unfortunate a change, but it would not be in his power to prevent it.

I endeavoured to counteract these impressions to little purpose. He saw the objections to our proposal in strong colours, insisted upon the fatal consequences of accepting it in its present shape, and intimated that it would have been better for the Porte to yield in the first instance, than to have been so strenuously encouraged and then, as he thought, so unreasonably abandoned.

All that I could obtain from him was an assurance that he would endeavour to explain his amendments in the most conciliatory terms, and prevail, if possible, upon his colleagues to allow a sufficient interval between the decision of the Ministerial Council, and the meeting of the General Council, which would ensue, for communication with the Four Representatives.

It was evident, on the whole, that Reshid Pasha's disapproval of Count Buol's note had been strengthened by the opposition declared to it in Council, and that he could not hope to carry his plan of amendments unless he took colour in some measure from the hostile party.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 281.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 222.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 18, 1853.*

AS soon as I saw reason to believe that the Turkish Ministers were resolved not to accept Count Buol's note without amendment, not being authorized to use intimidating language, I felt myself free, and indeed compelled by a sense of duty, to suggest some form of decision which might present the character of an acceptance, and yet leave room for such an adjustment of terms as would completely secure the Porte. My conversation with Reshid Pasha at the French Ambassador's, following on what I had learned from M. Pisani of the opinions entertained by a majority of the Council, gave certainty to my convictions on that score. I nevertheless abstained, though not without difficulty, from making any admissions calculated to encourage the Porte in its resistance.

The Ministerial Council was to meet again on the following day, and would probably take its decision on the pending question. I employed the interval in trying to discover some adequate expedient, and finally settled upon the only one which seemed to offer a chance of success. It was simply that the Porte should signify its acceptance of the note under its own construction of the objectionable passages, and, for securities, rely on the assent and sanction of the Four Powers. A proposition to this effect, accompanied with the necessary explanations, was conveyed to Reshid Pasha by my direction, while the Council was sitting. Mr. Alison, who had charge of the message, was instructed to withhold it from the Ottoman Minister until he had ascertained, which it was not difficult for him to do, that the turn of the deliberations evinced a manifest intention to throw out the note in its present form. It was under these circumstances that the Pasha received my suggestion from Mr Alison, and, on his return to the council-room, submitted it, as such, to his colleagues before the close of the debate. This, my Lord, is what he has since told me, adding that the proposal did not meet with favour from the assembly.

On calling yesterday, to learn from his own lips the exact state of the case, I found that Reshid Pasha had drawn up a note or memorandum, explanatory of the Porte's objections, and expressive of a grateful deference to the Four Powers, but declining the object of their friendly recommendations, unless it might be amended in his sense. He translated the whole paper verbally for information. I could only return his confidence by urging once more the disappointment which the Porte's refusal would occasion to the Powers most interested in its welfare, and reminding him of the consequences which were but too likely to ensue from such a decision. The tone and language of his communication appeared to be unexceptionable, and I confess that in substance it struck me as justifying, more than I felt myself at liberty to admit, or had even in some respects anticipated, the course which his Government was prepared to adopt.



Perceiving my reserve, the Pasha was deeply affected; his eyes overflowed with tears; forgetful for a moment of his rank, he kissed my hand, and in the most moving terms implored me not to forsake his country in the midst of distresses and dangers which it could not avoid without an unworthy sacrifice. The scene was to me a most painful one, and not the less so from taking place in the presence of a Greek, whose age, experience, and British sympathies entitle him to my respect, and whose religion did not prevent him from taking, to all appearance, a cordial share in the Pasha's sentiments.

Returning home with very uneasy reflections, I determined to make one more effort before the meeting of the Great Council, in order if possible to invest the Porte's decision with that character of constructive acceptance which might enable your Lordship to exert a powerful influence, and, in concert with France and the other Powers, realize the proposed arrangement in terms satisfactory to the Ottoman Government, and on that account more likely to carry with it the general approval of Europe. My notion was, that the note or memorandum proposed by Reshid Pasha should contain by way of resumé, a passage identical with the draft inclosed, and that I should propose at a meeting of the Four Representatives a form of reply more or less similar to the words inclosed herewith under letter (B).

I am fully aware of the imperfections and difficulties which attach to this expedient, and I have ventured to put it forward solely because I can think of nothing better under circumstances fraught with danger to this Empire, and with serious disturbance to the most important interests of society.

Such as it is, I have directed M. Pisani to propose it confidentially to Reshid Pasha, as coming personally from me, and I have reason to think that his Highness will adopt the suggestion, if he can succeed in obtaining the Council's assent.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 281.

*Draft of Passage proposed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

WE still give a decided preference to the last note prepared at Constantinople; but acknowledging the friendly intentions of the Four Powers, and out of deference to their earnest recommendations, relying at the same time on their continued sympathy and support, we are willing to accept, and do in fact adopt, the note arranged by them, similar as it is in form and intent to our own, provided that the passages already pointed out as being of a doubtful and dangerous signification, should be understood in the sense explained by us and modified accordingly in the terms of expression, with the assent of the Powers, and the security resulting therefrom.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 281.

*Draft of Reply of the Four Representatives.*

WE learn with the sincerest pleasure that the Sublime Porte, though still preferring its own form of note, does justice to the friendly intentions of our respective Governments; and out of deference to their advice, and in reliance on their continued support, accepts the draft transmitted from Vienna with their concurrent recommendation.

In transmitting to our several Courts this new and signal proof of the moderate yet consistent sentiments which animate the Sublime Porte in the midst of no common provocations and difficulties, we shall be careful to fix their attention on those passages which, in the apprehension of the Porte, are liable to an uncertain or dangerous construction, and to make it clearly understood that in consenting to substitute the draft of the Four Powers for her own,

the Porte expects that the passages in question will be adapted to the interpretation assumed by her as indispensable for a just appreciation of facts and the security of her sovereign rights, in concert with the Powers her friends and sincere advisers.

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No. 282.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 223.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 19, 1853.

I AM fully aware of the honour conferred upon me by the serious attention which, as your Lordship has been kind enough to inform me, Her Majesty's Government have paid to the subject matter of my report No. 132 of this year. Encouraged by so flattering a mark of consideration, I venture to submit a few remarks suggested to me by passages of your Lordship's despatch No. 136, in reply to mine.

In advising the Sultan to meet the occupation of the Principalities by a simple protest and appeal, I had a two-fold object in view: first, to afford time for endeavouring to settle the pending difference by a well-concerted and definitive negotiation; and secondly, to prepare for the effectual employment of other means in case negotiation should fail. I was deeply impressed with a foresight of the evils attending hesitation and uncertainty, when Russia had taken so aggressive a position, when public feeling was so completely roused, and when such vast interests were at stake, not only here, but in Europe also. It was not then in weakness, or with a view to any sacrifice of principle, but in the strength of a good cause, and in order to obtain a successful issue—in peace if possible, but at all events to obtain it—that I tendered the advice which Her Majesty's Government have honoured with their approval.

I have felt from the first that a question of so much moment as that which has been brought into play by Russia, could not, if once it passed the bounds of diplomatic discussion, be brought to the desirable solution by any partial or limited application of force. At the same time it was evident that the principle for which the Porte was contending could not be surrendered without a virtual abandonment of what is called the Eastern question; nor could it be niggardly or doubtfully vindicated with any degree of satisfaction to public opinion, or any fair prospect of durable tranquillity.

Under these impressions, on the departure of Prince Menchikoff, I submitted to your Lordship whatever occurred to me at that time as to the dangers which threatened Turkey, and the momentous interests to which she could fairly appeal, in soliciting the continued good offices and active support of Great Britain.

When at a later period the Russian troops were about to enter the Principalities, I implored your Lordship with increased earnestness to contemplate the Eastern question in all its magnitude, and to pursue a course of policy which would successively enlist every kind of exertion in favour of a triumphant issue.

In proportion as I urged the claims of Turkey to a degree of support from England, which might eventually involve us in war, I felt more strongly the duty of not concealing the weak points of this Empire, but, on the contrary, of giving them a distinctive place in any calculation to be made of its internal resources, and of the means which might be required from without for its defence.

My starting points in argument were, the vastness of the interests at stake, the urgency of making timely provision for their security, and the heavy demands which might be thereby entailed on British generosity, good faith, and resolution.

It was no more an object of mine to gloss over the oppressions of Turkish administration than to conceal the vulnerable points of the Turkish Empire. Of course I did my best to obtain the correction of those evils which are always rife in declining or misgoverned countries; but I did not understand that the merits of the Eastern question were of a strictly administrative nature. I



thought that the Porte's independence and the balance of power in Europe were considerations of primary importance, and that the exigencies of the crisis were rather to be used for pleading the cause of improvement than the want of sufficient progress in that respect was to be viewed as a motive for leaving the crisis to take care of itself.

Great, no doubt, is the peril to which Turkey would be exposed in a single-handed contest with Russia, and it is probable that without succours from abroad the Sultan's Government would be compelled ultimately to submit. But there is also much danger in a continuance of the present state of expensive and irritating preparation; and the Porte, unassisted, may find a fatal result in the one case as in the other. There are, no doubt, reasons for exhausting all the means of negotiation to avert a disaster; but there are also reasons for pushing negotiation with vigour to a definite end, and still more for preparing and combining other and stronger ways of rescue in case of diplomatic failure.

I learn from the close of your Lordship's despatch, that Her Majesty's Government, though determined to leave no honourable expedient untried for the preservation of peace, are equally determined to maintain that principle which is now the main object of contention, and to take in due season, should it be necessary, more active measures for the protection of Turkey.

With such prospective intentions, Her Majesty's Government will learn with pleasure that the apprehensions of disturbance and massacre in the Turkish Provinces, and of fanatical exasperation against the Christians here, have been nowhere realized. I have reason to believe that much exaggeration has prevailed on those subjects. Greatly as a thorough redress of grievances, accompanied with administrative reform, is needed in Turkey, the present state of alarm and excitement among the Turkish population has not, with a few local and transient exceptions, had the effect of increasing the evils which existed before. Even among the Greeks and in Bulgaria the expectations of Russian partizans have not been fulfilled.

The Turkish authorities on their side have been so careful to repress any tendencies to disorder among the Mussulmans, that the painful circumstances to which I drew attention some time ago have not been followed by the consequences then apprehended.

I am able, on the contrary, to state, without fear of contradiction, that in all which concerns the political proceedings and military operations directed by the Government and its principal functionaries, a most creditable display of firmness, energy, and prudence has been maintained. The capital and its neighbourhood have enjoyed unbroken tranquillity, notwithstanding apprehensions which at first seemed to warrant the adoption of precautionary measures. The country has been traversed in various directions by bodies of armed men—regulars, irregulars, militia, and policemen—without occasioning any complaint of a serious nature not immediately attended to. The defences of the Bosphorus, of the Balkan, and of the Danube, have been brought, in the opinion of competent judges, to a state of comparative efficiency, with admirable speed. The army and navy are both described, by officers who have reported them, as most respectable in numbers, discipline, and exercise. Even money and provisions are in some way or other procured in sufficient quantities to supply the wants of the moment, and no serious anxiety appears to be entertained by the Government in these respects.

The success which has hitherto attended the progress of these operations is, no doubt, a source of confidence at the Porte; and a portion of the spirit of late exhibited there is traceable to that cause, as well as to the fear of embarrassment likely to result from dispersing the army and dismantling the squadron, without a satisfactory arrangement, obtained, if not by military, at least by diplomatic exertions.

I need not repeat that such exertions are at the same time calculated to undermine the strength of the Empire. But surely they also give the Porte an additional claim to European sympathy, and to Europe an additional motive for rescuing the object of its solicitude from peril and ruin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 283.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 224.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 20, 1853.*

AT a later hour to-day than I had expected, the Porte's definitive communication respecting Count Buol's note, was put into my hands by Reshid Pasha's confidential Secretary. It comprises a Turkish official note, accompanied with a French translation, and a copy of the Austrian note, with the Porte's proposed modifications of those passages on which she claims a right to put her own construction.

Copies of the French translation and of the amended paragraphs are inclosed herewith.

I have already prepared your Lordship for the Porte's decision, which however it may fall short of the hopes entertained in London, I beg to recommend to the serious and candid appreciation of Her Majesty's Government. It is the result of much earnest deliberation. It unites the opinions of all parties. It was voted unanimously by a Council of sixty members, comprising the most distinguished statesmen of the capital, whether in or out of office. If it does not completely represent the public feeling of this country, it only fails in being framed with too much forbearance and moderation.

Your Lordship will observe that the Porte rather accepts than refuses the plan of arrangement recommended to it by the Four Powers, and that the interpretations which qualify its acceptance are accompanied with arguments and explanations worthy of deliberate attention.

I have no hesitation in stating it as my firm conviction, that if the Porte be not secured from her present apprehensions of Russian interference, she will incur the hazards of war in preference to a tame acquiescence in terms of accommodation which she can never be persuaded to reconcile with her safety, her honour, or her repose. I may add, in conclusion, that the Sultan and his Ministers, though much disappointed of late, continue still to reckon upon the sympathy and support of the British Government, and I am persuaded that the accomplishment of their hopes would be accepted with more gratification from that quarter than from any other.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 283.

*Note addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Four Representatives.*

19 *Août*, 1853.

LE projet de note qui a été récemment fait à Vienne et remis à la Sublime Porte, a été lu et examiné au Conseil des Ministres.

Celui qui avait été précédemment rédigé à Constantinople et remis aux Grandes Puissances sous une forme propre à faire disparaître le différend qui existe entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie, faisait espérer un résultat satisfaisant. Aussi le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan est-il très peiné de voir que ce projet n'a pas été pris en considération.

Quoique le projet de note rédigé auparavant par la Sublime Porte pour être remis au Prince Menchikoff ait été pris pour base en ce qui regarde le paragraphe du projet arrivé de Vienne concernant les privilèges religieux, la question n'a pas été circonscrite dans ce cercle. Certains paragraphes superflus et incompatibles avec les droits sacrés du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan y ayant été introduits, la Sublime Porte se trouve encore dans la pénible obligation d'émettre ses observations à ce sujet.

Le Gouvernement Impérial est habitué de longue date à recevoir des témoignages d'amitié des hautes Puissances, ses augustes alliées. Il est tout particulièrement reconnaissant de tant d'efforts pleins de bienveillance qu'elles n'ont cessé de faire depuis le commencement de la question actuelle. Il est



donc évident qu'il lui répugne, en considération de ses égards particuliers pour ces Puissances, d'hésiter sur un point qui a obtenu leur commun accord. Mais le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan, qui avait été déclaré au commencement de l'affaire seul juge compétent des questions relatives à ses droits et à son indépendance, n'ayant pas été malheureusement consulté sur la rédaction du nouveau projet, est placé dans une position difficile.

On pourra dire que le Gouvernement de Russie, aussi, n'a pas été consulté sur la rédaction de ce projet. Mais les droits que l'on cherche à défendre sont ceux de la Sublime Porte, et c'est elle qui doit signer la note qui sera donnée à cet égard. Il appartient aux Grandes Puissances de juger dans leur équité reconnue s'il est juste de traiter sur ce point les deux parties sur un pied égal; il a été par conséquent jugé convenable de ne pas s'étendre en détail sur ce point.

Le premier des points qui font hésiter la Sublime Porte est le paragraphe suivant:

"Si à toute époque, les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Église Grecque Orthodoxe dans l'Empire Ottoman, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les consacrer de nouveau par des actes solennels."

Que les Empereurs de la Russie témoignent leur sollicitude pour la prospérité de l'Église et de la religion qu'ils professent, ceci est naturel, et il n'y aurait rien à dire. Mais d'après le paragraphe ci-dessus cité, on comprendrait que les privilèges de l'Église Grecque dans les états de la Sublime Porte, n'ont été maintenus que par la sollicitude active des Empereurs de Russie.

Il est à remarquer, cependant, que le fait de mettre dans une note à donner par la Sublime Porte, le paragraphe ci-dessus mentionné tel qu'il se trouve dans le projet, pour de privilèges religieux qui ont été, depuis le règne du Sultan Mehmed le Conquérant, de glorieuse mémoire, jusqu'à ce jour, octroyés et maintenus sans la participation de qui que ce soit, impliquerait et offrirait des prétextes au Gouvernement Russe pour prétendre à s'immiscer dans de pareilles choses.

Personne ne saurait consentir à s'attirer les reproches et le blâme des contemporains aussi bien que de la postérité, en admettant qu'un état de choses aussi nuisible pour le présent que pour l'avenir s'établisse.

Pas un serviteur de l'Auguste famille Impériale Ottomane n'oserait ni ne serait capable de mettre par écrit des paroles qui tendraient à infirmer la gloire des institutions que les Empereurs Ottomans ont fondées par un mouvement spontané de leur générosité personnelle et de leur éminence innée.

Le second point à relever est le paragraphe du projet de note relatif au Traité de Kaïnardji. Comme personne ne saurait nier que ce Traité existe et qu'il est confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, il est de toute évidence que les dispositions précises en seront fidèlement observées.

Si, en insérant le paragraphe susmentionné, l'on a l'intention de considérer les privilèges religieux comme le résultat naturel et l'esprit commenté du Traité de Kaïnardji, la disposition réelle et précise de ce Traité est limitée à la seule promesse de la Sublime Porte de protéger, elle-même, la religion Chrétienne.

Les paragraphes que la Sublime Porte pourrait, en ce qui regarde les privilèges religieux, insérer dans la note qu'elle signera, ne devraient, comme il a été à toute époque déclaré, soit par écrit, soit verbalement, exprimer que des assurances propres à faire disparaître les doutes mis en avant par le Gouvernement de Russie, et qui ont formé le sujet des discussions.

Mais en fortifiant, par de nouveaux liens, l'identité religieuse déjà existante entre une grande communauté des sujets de la Sublime Porte et une Puissance étrangère, donner au Gouvernement de Russie des motifs de prétendre à exercer un droit de surveillance et d'immixion dans de pareilles matières, ce serait partager en quelque sorte les droits souverains, et mettre en danger l'indépendance de l'Empire. Aussi est-il de toute impossibilité pour le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan d'y donner son assentiment sans y être forcé.

Si, enfin, le but n'est que de faire renouveller les engagements du Traité de Kaïnardji, la Sublime Porte pourrait le faire par une note séparée.

Or, le Gouvernement Impérial attache la plus grande importance à ce que, ou le paragraphe relatif à ce Traité du projet envoyé soit supprimé, ou bien que, s'il est maintenu, la promesse de protéger que contient le Traité de Kaïnardji, et la question des privilèges religieux, soient séparées d'une manière

explicite, pour qu'il soit compris, au premier coup d'œil, que ce sont deux choses différentes.

Et le troisième point c'est celui de faire participer le rit Grec aux avantages octroyés aux autres rits Chrétiens. On ne saurait douter que le Gouvernement Impérial n'hésitera pas à faire participer le rit Grec, non seulement aux avantages qu'il a de sa propre volonté accordés aux autres communions de la religion Chrétienne professée par les communautés ses sujettes, mais aussi à ceux qu'il pourrait leur octroyer à l'avenir.

Il est donc superflu d'ajouter que la Sublime Porte sera justifiée, si elle ne peut pas admettre l'emploi d'expressions aussi équivoques que celles de Convention ou de dispositions particulières en faveur d'une grande communauté de tant de millions de sujets qui professent le rit Grec.

Tels étant les points qui offrent des inconvénients à la Sublime Porte, elle ne peut, malgré ses plus grands égards pour les conseils des Hautes Puissances ses alliées, et son désir sincère de renouer ses relations avec le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie, son ami et voisin, ne peut, dis-je, s'empêcher de confier à l'équité et à la justice des Grandes Puissances les considérations relatives à ses droits de souveraineté et à son indépendance.

Si, enfin, le dernier projet de note qui a été rédigé par la Sublime Porte est accepté, ou bien si celui de Vienne reçoit les modifications désirées, le Cabinet Ottoman ne tardera point à signer l'un ou l'autre de ces deux projets, et d'envoyer immédiatement un Ambassadeur Extraordinaire sous la condition de l'évacuation des Principautés. Le Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte attend encore une garantie solide de la part des Hautes Puissances, contre toute ingérence à l'avenir et toute occupation de temps en temps des Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie. Et le but du Gouvernement Ottoman, en se prémunissant de précautions à ce degré, consiste en celui d'éviter tout ce qui pourrait ramener une mésintelligence entre les deux Empires, une fois que la Sublime Porte aura renouvellé ses relations avec la Cour de Russie.

Les points du projet de Vienne, relatifs à l'affaire des Lieux Saints, et à la construction d'une église et d'un hôpital à Jerusalem, ont reçu l'adhésion complète de la Sublime Porte.

Une copie de la note de Vienne, contenant aussi les modifications que le Gouvernement Impérial a jugé convenable de faire, a été transmise à son Excellence.

La Sublime Porte, dans l'intention de donner encore une preuve de ses égards tout particuliers pour les Puissances signataires du Traité de 1841, lors même que le projet qu'elle a rédigé précédemment lui soit naturellement préférable, est prête à accepter le projet de Vienne avec les modifications qu'elle y a faits, et espère que les Puissances qui n'ont cessé de reconnaître, dès le principe de la question, les droits du Gouvernement Impérial, et de donner des témoignages de leur bienveillance, appréciant ces modifications, agiront en conséquence.

Sa Majesté le Sultan m'ayant ordonné de communiquer ce qui précède à votre Excellence ainsi qu'aux autres Représentants ses collègues, je m'acquitte de ce devoir, en priant votre Excellence d'agréer, &c.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 283.

*Copy of the Vienna Projet de Note, as Modified by the Sublime Porte.*

SA Majesté le Sultan n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, a pris soigneusement à tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ce différend.

Un iradé suprême en date du lui ayant fait connaître la décision Impériale, la Sublime Porte se félicite de pouvoir la communiquer à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode.

Si à toute époque les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour *le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Église Orthodoxe Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les*



*consacrer** de nouveau *par des* actes solennels qui attestaient de leur ancienne et constante bienveillance à l'égard de leurs sujets Chrétiens.

Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul-Medjid, aujourd'hui régnant, animé des mêmes dispositions et voulant donner à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un témoignage personnel de son amitié la plus sincère, n'a écouté que sa confiance infinie dans les qualités éminentes de son auguste ami et allié, et a daigné prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations dont son Altesse le Prince de Menchikoff s'est rendu l'organe auprès de la Sublime Porte.

Le Soussigné a reçu en conséquence l'ordre de déclarer par la présente que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan restera fidèle *à la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traités de Kainardji et d'Andrinople, relatives à la protection du culte Chrétien,*† et que Sa Majesté régarde comme étant de son honneur de faire observer à tout jamais, et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit présentement, soit dans l'avenir, la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui ont été accordés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté à l'Eglise Orthodoxe de l'Orient, qui sont maintenus et confirmés par elle, et, en outre, à faire participer dans un esprit de haute équité le rit Grec aux avantages *concédés aux autres rits Chrétiens par Convention ou disposition particulière.*‡

Au reste, comme le firman Impérial qui vient d'être donné au patriarcat et au clergé Grec, et qui contient les confirmations de leurs privilèges spirituels, devra être regardé comme une nouvelle preuve de ses nobles sentiments, et comme, en outre, la proclamation de ce firman, qui donne toute sécurité, devra faire disparaître toute crainte à l'égard du rit qui est la religion de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie; je suis heureux d'être chargé du devoir de faire la présente notification.

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No. 284.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 225. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 20, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the letter of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in reply to the Emperor of Austria's letter dated the 1st instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 284.

*Sultan Abdul-Medjid to the Emperor of Austria.*

(Translation.) *August* 18, 1853.

I HAVE received your Imperial Majesty's letter, containing the expression of your friendly sentiments, and of the strenuous efforts made by you for the solution of the pending question; and I cannot sufficiently express my satisfaction to your Majesty.

I have paid great attention to the communications which the bearer of your Majesty's letter, Colonel Ruff, was empowered to make, and to those tendered by your Majesty's Envoy, Baron de Bruck.

However desirous I may be not to hesitate in accepting the counsels of so friendly an ally and neighbour as your Majesty, yet, as there are certain passages in the draft of the note which came from Vienna, which cannot be in harmony

* *Le culte et l'Église Orthodoxe Grecque, les Sultans n'ont jamais cessé de veiller au maintien des immunités et privilèges qu'ils ont spontanément accordés à diverses reprises à ce culte et à cette Église dans l'Empire Ottoman, et de les consacrer.*

† *Aux stipulations du Traité de Kainardji confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, relatives à la protection par la Sublime Porte de la religion Chrétienne, et il est en outre chargé de faire connaître.*

‡ *Octroyés ou qui seraient octroyés aux autres communautés Chrétiennes, sujettes Ottomanes.*

with the sovereign rights of my Sublime Porte, I am, I greatly grieve to say, under the necessity of expressing my opinion on this subject.

The sovereign rights and independence of a nation are sacred and inestimable things; and although no objections were perceived at Vienna to the draft of the note in question, all Governments have mature experience and local knowledge concerning their own affairs, and the conclusions therefore come to upon those matters which are submitted to their judgment are not without real grounds. Your Imperial Majesty's rare qualities of appreciation will enable you easily to understand this; and I am consoled with the thought that the real objections put forward by the Sublime Porte will be thus accepted.

Your Majesty will learn by the official note addressed to your Imperial Mission by my Ministers, that the course of a total rejection of the draft in question has not been adopted; but that its acceptance will be held to depend upon the execution of certain changes and assurances, without the introduction of which it is impossible that my Sublime Porte can accept this proposal. I therefore hope that your Imperial Majesty, as well as our other august allies, will thus use their endeavours for the preservation of our sacred rights.

The refusal to assent to the arrangement now put forward, after the numerous proofs afforded up to this time by the Sublime Porte (of her desire) for the preservation of peace, can neither be attributed to a change of system, nor to a want of confidence in the suggestions offered by your Imperial Majesty; but this course has been adopted with the sole intent of fully protecting the independence and the integrity of my Government, and removing all future grounds whatever of contention on this subject; and I hope that their Majesties will appreciate it in this light, and do me justice.

I have at no time doubted the sincere good intentions of your Imperial Majesty, and I beg your Majesty to rely on similar sentiments on my part. Your Majesty will afford a proof of your Imperial solicitude by advocating the acceptance of the modifications introduced into the draft of the note in question.

We avail ourselves of the occasion of Colonel Ruff's return to your Majesty's Court to offer to your Majesty the assurances of our high consideration.

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No. 285.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 227.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 20, 1853.*

AGREEABLY to the instruction contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 135 of this year, I have made inquiries as to the causes which delayed the completion of that letter, which, under the name of "fusion," was to have been composed by Reshid Pasha.

Having addressed my inquiry to the Pasha himself, his Highness informed me that sundry incidents had retarded the composition; that while it was among the papers submitted to the Sultan, the invasion of the Principalities became known, and called away his attention to the Protest.

On looking back to the dates of that period, I perceive that M. Bruck's suggestion was made about the 22nd of June, and submitted to the Sultan on the following day.

How long it remained with the Sultan I cannot say, for papers sometimes remain in the Seraglio a considerable time. But it appears that Reshid was occupied with his "fusion" on the 29th, and that next day Baron de Bruck proposed clandestinely a separate and wholly inadmissible version, copy of which was forwarded at the same time to your Lordship. The suggestion having been approved by the Council, was before the Sultan on the 4th of July, and the festival of Bayram, which occupies three or four days, followed on the 6th, a day before the intelligence arrived of the Russians having crossed the Pruth and entered the province of Moldavia. On the same day Reshid Pasha was dismissed, and a ministerial crisis, which occupied three days, succeeded.

On the whole, my Lord, it may be stated with some degree of confidence, that the delay and final relinquishment of the "fusion," however, the "suggestion" may have been approved by the Sultan, are traceable more or less to all the successive causes just mentioned. It may be added, that Reshid Pasha had no confidence in the success of the proposed notion, and the circumstances, joined to the natural effects of the Ramazan and Bayram, which are as much "thieves of time" as procrastination itself, might account for a much longer delay. The "fusion" was finally dropped in consequence of the act of protestation naturally taking its place, at a moment when the Pasha found that I could not assume the responsibility of giving an opinion on the paper he had imperfectly prepared, until it was officially communicated to the Four Representatives.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 286.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 229.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 20, 1853.*

THOUGH I scrupulously abstained from expressing any private opinion on the merits of Count Buol's note while it was under consideration at the Porte, I think it incumbent on me to state frankly to your Lordship that the decision of the Council has in no degree surprised me. In making this avowal I have exclusively in view those passages of the note to which the Porte objects. It really appears to me, with all deference to your Lordship's superior judgment, that the first two of the objectionable passages could hardly stand as they are without exposing the Porte to inferences not borne out by facts, and eventually to pretensions that it would be equally inconvenient, if not dangerous, to admit or to resist.

With respect to the third amendment, its adoption would seem indispensable, unless it be intended to give Russia the full enjoyment of that right of interference which is secured to Austria by her Treaties with the Porte, and in particular by that of Sistova. Such a concession when practically claimed by Russia, would leave her nothing to desire as to the means of exercising a powerful influence on all the concerns of the Greek clergy, and interfering even on behalf of the Greek laity subjects of the Porte. I have the honour to inclose herewith, in copy, the Article of the above-mentioned Treaty to which I particularly refer. Confined to Austria, the privilege in question may be exercised with little inconvenience to the Porte; but in the hands of Russia, applicable to twelve millions of the Sultan's tributary subjects, the same right becomes a natural object of suspicion and well-founded apprehension.

It cannot be necessary for me to trouble your Lordship further on this subject, important and delicate as it is. I am convinced that Her Majesty's Government will give it their fullest consideration, in a spirit of perfect fairness to all parties; and I venture to hope that the result of a further investigation of its merits will be favourable to the just interests and expectations of the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 287.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 230.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 20, 1853.*

I WILL not close my present batch of correspondence without stating that Reshid Pasha made a very imperfect attempt to insert in his note to the Four Representatives a passage corresponding with my suggestion as explained in a preceding number. Still, however, I might have proposed at a meeting with my colleagues to acknowledge the receipt of the Porte's note in terms similar to those which I had prepared. But the Internuncio declined to take part in any

meeting relative to the note, pleading his instructions as an excuse; and the French Ambassador, though he did not object to a meeting, showed no disposition to take part in any joint communication to the Porte.

Under these circumstances I had no choice but to relinquish my intention of acting in concert with them on the present occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 288.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 231. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 20, 1853.

I INCLOSE herewith in copy for your Lordship's information, a letter addressed by his Excellency Prince Gortchakoff to Omer Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 288.

*Prince Gortchakoff to Omer Pasha.*

*Bucharest, le* $\frac{2}{14}$ *Août*, 1853.

M. le Séraskier,

EN réponse à la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 10 Août, n. s., j'ai l'honneur de lui donner l'information suivante:

Au moment de franchir les frontières des provinces Danubiennes, je me suis fait un devoir, par la volonté de mon Auguste Maître, de communiquer à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte que les ordres que je remplissais en occupant militairement les Principautés, me prescrivaient de m'abstenir de tout mouvement hostile et agressif contre les troupes et les garnisons Ottomanes stationnées au-delà du Danube, et que c'était au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan à juger s'il devait adresser à ses commandants militaires les mêmes ordres afin d'éviter toute collision regrettable qu'une démonstration offensive de leur part, en deçà du Danube, amenerait nécessairement entre nos forces respectives.

A la suite de mon entrée dans les Principautés j'ai donné l'ordre de placer des chaloupes canonnières pour défendre les ports de Galatz et de Braïla, mesure d'autant plus motivée que j'avais été informé qu'ils étaient menacés d'une incursion à main armée. Quant à des pontoons, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que je n'en ai pas fait venir ni à Galatz ni à Braïla.

La réponse de M. le Ministre parvint entre mes mains au moment où ces chaloupes canonnières étaient déjà sur place. Son Excellence me mandait dans sa lettre que des instructions avaient été données aux commandants des troupes Ottomanes qu'ils devaient s'abstenir de tout acte d'hostilité tant qu'il n'y aura aucune espèce d'invasion de la rive gauche à la rive droite. Plus loin, M. le Ministre ajoutait que, si des bâtiments de guerre Russes remontaient au-delà de l'embouchure du Pruth, un tel acte constituerait une violation des confins riverains que la Sublime Porte ne pourra pas permettre, possédant des places fortes plus hautes que le confluent des deux fleuves.

Je ne saurais partager l'opinion de son Excellence Reshid Pasha. L'occupation des Principautés, amenée par des circonstances exceptionnelles, implique nécessairement la faculté d'en garder les ports et les côtes, et une garde fluviale est indispensablement inhérente à l'occupation des ports situés sur le même fleuve. Les chaloupes qui stationnent près de Galatz et de Braïla y sont placées dans un but évidemment défensif. Je me crois donc obligé de les laisser à leur poste et de ne pas permettre que les communications fluviales, nécessaires pour



les approvisionner, soient entravées. Mais pour éviter toute cause de conflict ou de mésentendu entre les forces des deux pays, j'ai l'honneur de prévenir votre Excellence que nos bâtiments de guerre ne s'approchent pas du rayon des fortresses Turques au-dessus de Braïla, et de lui réitérer l'assurance que conformément aux ordres précités de Sa Majesté l'Empereur mon maître, je m'abstiendrai de tout mouvement agressif au-delà du Danube.

Je suis convaincu que les lumières et l'expérience militaire de votre Excellence lui feront apprécier la justesse des considérations que je viens d'exposer, et que, de son côté aussi, elle prendra les mesures nécessaires pour qu'il n'arrive pas de conflit, qui serait contraire aux intentions des deux hautes Cours.

Au moment de terminer la présente lettre, je viens de recevoir le rapport que des soldats irréguliers de la garnison de Marzin ont traversé le Danube avec cinq barques et sont venus faucher du foin sur le territoire Valaque, au-dedans de la ligne sanitaire. Je crois devoir porter ce fait à la connaissance de votre Excellence, convaincu qu'elle voudra bien donner des ordres pour que de pareils actes, inadmissibles dans les conditions où nous nous trouvons, ne se renouvellent pas.

Je vous prie, &c.
L'Aide-de-Camp Général,
(Signé) PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF.

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No. 289.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 641. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 29, 1853.

HAVING profited by the absence of M. Drouyn de Lhuys from Paris, to pass a few days at Dieppe, I had the advantage of being able to communicate directly with the Emperor on the receipt of the telegraphic intelligence from Constantinople that the Ottoman Government had refused to accept without modification, the propositions made by the Conference of Vienna for the settlement of the Eastern question. His Majesty received me with his usual affability, and entered at once upon the subject on which I had desired to see him. He did not conceal his disappointment at what had occurred, nor his displeasure at the little deference shown by the Porte to the counsels of the Four Powers. He said that England and France were placed, by this conduct of the Turkish Government, in a position of extreme embarrassment; and that, for his part, he knew not what to advise. He thought, however, that more stringent instructions should be sent to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, with a view of yet obtaining the compliance of the Porte with the propositions made from Vienna, and already accepted by the Emperor of Russia.

I remarked that, unfortunately, this was not all that was required, since M. de la Cour had by telegraph given the French Government to understand that the signature by the Porte of the note, even if the modifications were agreed to by Russia, depended on the previous evacuation of the Principalities, and on certain guarantees—not very clearly explained—against attacks of a like nature for the future. Now, it was not likely that the Russian Government would accept the latter conditions, even if they admitted the modifications. What, then, was to become of the fleets, if both parties held out? To remain at Besika during the winter months, was all but impossible. To retire, while the Russians remained in the Principalities, was not to be expected; and yet, to advance within the Dardanelles at the moment when Russia had shown herself more conciliatory, and the Porte had refused to act upon our advice, would have the appearance of a measure of hostility towards the former, and of approbation of the conduct of the latter.

The Emperor said, that as long as the Russians were in the Principalities, the fleets could not, in his opinion, retire; but were there no other safe anchorages to which they might resort, without going to Constantinople? My knowledge of the localities enabled me to tell him that there was an anchorage at

Gallipoli, towards the other end of the Dardanelles, at the entrance of the Sea of Marmora; and I believed also, at this end of the Dardanelles, between the first and second castles. There was also the well-known Bay of Vourla, in the Gulf of Smyrna. Going to Vourla, however, would have somewhat the appearance of a retreat.

After some reflection, the Emperor said that, upon the whole, he was inclined to advise the passage of the Dardanelles whenever the fleets could no longer remain at Besika. He should wish them to anchor as near as possible to the mouth of the Dardanelles, in order that the change of position might not be considered a demonstration against Russia: and he thought that England and France might now, or later, when the change of station took place, address an amicable explanation to Russia, stating that the move had been rendered necessary for the safety of the fleets at the advanced season of the year; and adding, that the fleets would leave the Dardanelles whenever the Russian troops quitted the Principalities. Perhaps the equivalent thus offered to Russia might enable her, with less sacrifice of dignity, to recross the Pruth. His Majesty said that he should write immediately in this sense to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and I said that I should inform your Lordship.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys returned to Paris this evening; and I having arrived in the interim from Dieppe he sent immediately to desire to see me. I found him in possession of the Emperor's letter, and much disturbed at the news, which had accumulated in his absence, from Constantinople. He asked me directly whether I had communicated the Emperor's view to your Lordship; and, on my replying in the affirmative, whether you had expressed any opinion upon them. I replied, that there had not been time to receive your answer, but that I conceived it unlikely that your Lordship, or Her Majesty's Government, would form any decided opinion until you were in receipt of the despatches brought to Marseilles by the "Triton." M. Drouyn de Lhuys appeared to have adopted the Emperor's conclusions as to the best course the two Governments could now take. He saw but one difficulty to entering the Dardanelles, that being the possibility of a refusal on the part of the Porte to give the necessary firmans.

I observed, that if the Porte was so blind to her own interests as to refuse the firmans, the fleets might proceed to Vourla; and that if such a movement, under such circumstances, was looked upon in the light of a retreat, it would be a retreat undertaken to show the respect of the two Powers for the very Treaty which they had invoked against the encroachments of Russia. Nor should it be forgotten that we had always declared that the fleets would remain at Besika as long as it suited us, and no longer; that in returning to Vourla we were consulting our own interests, not submitting to any condition; and that it was not impossible that a spontaneous move of the kind on our part might induce the Russians to a correspondent spontaneous movement on the Pruth.

Your Lordship will be kind enough to bear in mind that these were not arguments used to counsel the retreat of the fleets to Vourla, but suggestions of what might be said were such a retreat deemed advisable. I was particularly careful throughout this conversation to give it a confidential character as between two persons reviewing what was possible and practicable under various circumstances.

I thought it, however, expedient on account of certain expressions which had escaped the Emperor in the conversation alluded to in the beginning of this despatch, as well as from the tenour of some of M. de Lhuys' observations, to caution the latter against too great blame of the Turks in any despatches he might address to General Castelbajac. However much he might regret and censure the conduct of the Porte in refusing our advice, regret alone should be expressed at St. Petersburgh, censure should be kept for Constantinople. Nor, considering the opinions we had expressed to the Russian Government both in regard to the armed occupation of the Principalities, and to the conduct of the Russian authorities since that occupation, would it be consistent with our honour or our dignity to upbraid the Turkish Ministers, because they refused to send a friendly Embassy to a Sovereign so long as that Sovereign held forcible possession of a part of the Sultan's dominions. I reminded M. Drouyn de Lhuys that in expressing regret that the point had not been more clearly defined by the Vienna Conference, I had foretold that it would be the stumbling block at the last moment, and I said that although diplomacy might yet find means to remove



it, the opprobrium of creating it ought to rest with the Russians. Nor would it be fair to diminish the responsibility which belonged to them by expressing disapprobation at the Porte's still insisting on the vindication of its sovereign rights. In fact, by any other language we should be turning the tables and putting Russia in the right and the Porte in the wrong.

I should add that M. de Lhuys' apprehensions that the Porte may refuse the firman to enable the fleet to pass the Dardanelles are founded on the fact that M. de la Cour asked some time back for provisional firmans for the passage of the fleet, in case its presence at Constantinople should become necessary, and that Reshid Pasha declined complying with the request.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 290.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 645.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 30, 1853.

M. DE LHUYS received this morning the despatches from M. de la Cour, brought to Marseilles by the "Triton." I have seen nothing of Lord Stratford's messenger, and presume that he is gone straight to London.

M. de la Cour's latest despatch is dated the 20th instant. That, and others of a previous date, detail the efforts made by himself and his colleagues to induce the Porte to accept the Vienna note without modifications. M. de la Cour had even had an audience of the Sultan; but all, as your Lordship knows, to no purpose. Copies of the note, as definitively modified by the Porte, and of the official note addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Representatives of the four Powers, accompany M. de la Cour's despatches.

The Ambassador enters again at some length into the aspect of affairs at the Porte. He evidently considers the situation to be one of considerable danger. He imagines the feeling of Reshid Pasha to be a desire for war, founded on the conviction that France and England must still perforce side with Turkey, and that the war will therefore be a successful one for the Sultan, and obtain for him guarantees for the future which will materially strengthen his tottering power; and M. de la Cour does not doubt that, if the Ottoman Government is deceived in this hope, the Sultan will change his Ministers and endeavour to make terms with Russia directly. But he is also of opinion, that such a change of policy may cost the Sultan his throne and his life.

The perusal of these despatches and their inclosures had, upon the whole, put M. de Lhuys in better spirits as to the final result. He regrets, of course, the introduction of any modifications into the Vienna note; but he certainly considers them to be alterations for the better, and hopes that the Russian Government will subscribe to them. He thinks the tone of the note addressed to the Representatives of the Four Powers moderate; and as the promise of the evacuation of the Principalities, and not the immediate reality, appears to be asked for, and as the Four Powers, and not Russia, are applied to for guarantees for the future, he is inclined to think that these points may be arranged satisfactorily if Russia does not demur to the proposed modifications of the note. Before I left him, M. de Lhuys again reverted to the question of the future movements of the fleets. He said, that the more he considered the matter the more he felt convinced that the Porte would make great difficulties to granting the necessary firmans to pass the Dardanelles, particularly if there was any latent idea in the Sultan's mind of treating directly with Russia. But a refusal would be very humiliating to the two Powers, and he should almost prefer that the fleets should weigh anchor, and go and sail about within reach of the Dardanelles and watching the course of events.

I remarked, that if the fleets were to act as he proposed, nothing would be more likely to precipitate an understanding between the Porte and Russia. I then suggested that the Porte might herself be made the arbiter of their future movements. Let the Ottoman Government be informed that the fleets could not remain during the winter where they now were, and let them be asked

whether they preferred that the fleets should pass the Dardanelles or seek a secure anchorage elsewhere. If she preferred the latter, the necessity of consulting the Porte's wishes would be an answer to all cavillers against what would appear to be a retreat; if the former, we should pass the Dardanelles at the Porte's desire; and if the Porte wished to save appearances with Russia, she might fix the limits within which the permission to anchor would be accorded; for instance, she might say that, without firmans, the fleets should not pass the second castles.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he wished to see the Emperor on the whole question; and that he should go to Dieppe for that purpose. I propose accompanying him, and shall have the honour of writing to your Lordship from thence. M. de Lhuys promises me, in this critical position of the question, to send no instructions referring to it which shall not have been previously submitted for your Lordship's consideration.

I venture to hope that your Lordship will take the same course.

M. de Lhuys is of opinion that it is desirable, if possible, to charge the Conference of Vienna with the care of drawing up an answer to the note addressed by the Porte to the Four Powers, in order to keep in action the union which has been established.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 291.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 1.)

(No. 332.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August* 28, 1853.

I HAVE the honour of forwarding the despatches* which I have received, under flying-seal, from Lord Stratford, with the request that they should be transmitted to your Lordship with the utmost practicable expedition.

These despatches are confirmatory of the telegraphic despatches which I forwarded on the 25th and 26th instant. I waited upon Count Buol to inquire the impression made upon him by these communications, and the measures he intended to take upon them. Count Buol stated that he should write by messenger this day to St. Petersburgh, charging Baron Lebzeltern to state to Count Nesselrode that he greatly lamented the modifications which the Porte had thought it right to introduce in the Vienna note, as it had originally been forwarded to Constantinople with the approval of the Four Governments; but that he strongly recommended their adoption as a means, without any loss of dignity to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, of bringing these unfortunate differences to a close. Count Buol would also remark, that the Porte having required an assurance as to the evacuation of the Principalities, he would leave it to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to state what answer he was to return; that, knowing that it was the intention of the Emperor that these Principalities should be evacuated, he could only express his anxious desire that the earliest period for its commencement should be named, so that he might make that communication both to the Porte and to the other allied Governments, with the view of preparing the execution of this most desirable object.

Count Buol stated, with respect to the declaration in the note of Reshid Pasha: "Que la Sublime Porte attend encore une garantie de la part des Hautes Puissances contre toute ingérence de," &c.; that as this did not refer to the Russian Government, but to the allies in general, he should not bring it forward officially at St. Petersburgh; that it was a question rather to be treated after the pressing difficulties of the present moment should be arranged; and as it was not made by the Porte a condition of that settlement, he should abstain from making any further comments with regard to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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* Nos. 283 and 284.



No. 292.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 203.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 1, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the modifications proposed by the Porte of the note sent from Vienna may receive the assent of the Emperor of Russia.

His Imperial Majesty accepted the note upon condition that no change in it should be made at Constantinople, and he is, therefore, perfectly free to reject the modifications. But Her Majesty's Government are confident that the Emperor, animated by a spirit of justice, will admit that the Turkish Government have a right to express their opinion upon the note they are required to sign, and their scrupulous attention to forms is no small proof that they recognize the binding character of the engagement they are about to contract, while there can be no doubt that the note as amended will effectually secure the maintenance of existing Treaties and of the *status quo* in religious matters which Russia has throughout declared to be the objects she had in view.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—In the event of the modifications not being accepted, you will endeavour clearly to ascertain from Count Nesselrode the reasons of their rejection.

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No. 293.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 347.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 2, 1853.

COUNT WALEWSKI called upon me yesterday and held precisely the same language upon the Eastern question as that of the Emperor and M. de Lhuys to your Excellency.

Count Walewski lamented that the Turkish Government had declined to accept the note, and said that their decision caused great difficulty as to the disposal of the fleets, which could not remain much longer in the Bay of Besika; but if they were sent to a more distant anchorage, it would appear as if France and England were retreating; and that the preferable course would perhaps be for them to enter the Dardanelles without proceeding to Constantinople or beyond the castles, an explanation being at the same time given to the Emperor of Russia that this change of position had been rendered necessary by the advanced state of the season, and that the fleets should withdraw altogether if the Principalities were evacuated.

I said that without consulting my colleagues, all of whom, with the exception of Lord Aberdeen, were out of town, I could give no definitive answer upon a question so important as that of settling where, under existing circumstances, should be the winter quarters of the fleets, and, according to this suggestion, involving the violation of a Treaty: but it appeared to me that the longer they could remain at their present anchorage the better; and I understood that during the month of September there would be no danger in their so doing, but that no decision could be taken until we know whether the Emperor of Russia would accept the modification proposed by the Porte. If he did, minor difficulties might easily be overcome; but if he rejected them, he must give his reasons, and we should then, more clearly than at present, be able to judge what course it would be fitting for England and France to adopt.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 294.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 442. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 23, 1853.*

GENERAL DE ROCHOW returned to St. Petersburgh on the 20th instant, from his visit to Robscha, where he had held a very long conversation with the Emperor, who, as he stated, had recapitulated to him with remarkable clearness and talent the various events connected with the Turkish question which have occurred during the last five or six months, making it of course appear throughout his narration that his conduct could not have been other than what it has been.

Before leaving me General de Rochow said, "The sum is this. All now depends upon the Sultan's acceptance of the note: in that case the affair is finished. I do not venture to give you any advice, but I will express an opinion and a wish; I will say that I desire eagerly that you may refrain from pressing upon the Government the evacuation of the Principalities, because I am convinced that such representations will do harm. I can, I think, give you my word of honour, yes, I can almost give my word of honour, that the orders for the retreat of the troops will be issued as soon as the Turkish Minister arrives here; and I will add that according to my belief the Emperor is eager that the order should be given as soon as possible."

Upon my inquiring of General de Rochow upon what evidence he formed his opinion as to the Emperor's eagerness to fall back from a position which had been taken up with considerable forwardness (empressement), he replied that he had ascertained that although up to the present time the reports of the sanitary condition of the Russian troops was satisfactory, considerable anxiety was felt as to the maladies to which they would be exposed if not very speedily withdrawn from their present quarters.

The Prussian Envoy desired to remind me of the former understanding which existed between us. He should be always glad to give me any information which he had the power to offer, but would beg of me to consider these communications as made in strict confidence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 295.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 446.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 25, 1853.*

AS I have learnt that certain assurances with regard to the conciliatory intentions of the Emperor which had been transmitted to his Government by General Castelbajac had been considered at Vienna as constituting an engagement entered into by the Russian Government to recall their troops from the Principalities as soon as intelligence should reach St. Petersburgh of the note having been accepted by the Sultan, and of the Turkish Ambassador having set forth, I have taken an opportunity of questioning my French colleague as to the causes of this misapprehension.

General Castelbajac with his usual frankness stated to me (at the same time authorizing me to take down his words in writing) that what he had said to some of the members of the Corps Diplomatique, and as well to his own Government, was that "aussitôt que l'Ambassadeur de Turquie aurait remis la note à St. Pétersbourg, l'ordre d'évacuer les Principautés serait donné."

The General added that this conclusion followed naturally (découla naturellement) from the assurance given him by the Chancellor, which was to the following effect: "Aussitôt les formalités de la reception de la note remplies, tout rentrera dans l'ordre et la bonne entente passé."

In other words General Castelbajac considered the immediate withdrawal of



the invading army from the Principalities as forming part of that "ordre et bonne entente" which was announced as the immediate result of the delivery of the note by the Sultan's Ambassador.

The above explanation has been given by the French Envoy to Baron Lebzeltern as well as to myself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 296.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 447.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 26, 1853.*

I WOULD beg to call your Lordship's attention to the inclosed article from the "Zeit," a Prussian newspaper said to be under the influence of Russia, which has appeared in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of this date.

The object of the article is to prove that Russia shares with Turkey those suzerain rights upon the Danubian provinces which hitherto have been supposed to belong exclusively to the latter of these empires.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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Inclosure in No. 296.

*Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg."*

LE "Zeit," dans son numéro du 16 Août, contient sur l'occupation des Principautés par les troupes Russes, un article de fond, dont nous reproduisons les passages suivants:

"Il était à prévoir que de nouvelles complications surgiraient de l'occupation des Principautés Danubiennes; toutefois nous pensons qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'y attacher une aussi grave importance qu'on essaye de le faire en supposant que ces complications puissent compromettre l'œuvre de la paix, laquelle a gagné une base assurée par la sanction provisoire des propositions de médiation adoptées par la Conférence de Vienne. En portant un jugement sur les mesures prises par la Russie à l'égard des Principautés, il est essentiel de ne pas perdre de vue que ces Principautés, bien que, en vertu des Traités existants, formant une partie de l'Empire Ottoman, se trouvent placées dans des rapports tout-à-fait exceptionnels, qui leur assignent une position d'un caractère double entre la Russie et la Turquie. On sait que les deux Principautés n'ont jamais été des Provinces proprement dites de l'Empire Ottoman; jamais elles n'ont été comprises dans la division du pays par Pachaliks et Sandjaks, par la raison qu'elles n'ont point été conquises par les Turcs, mais qu'elles se sont soumises volontairement à la suzeraineté de la Porte, en se réservant, par des Traités formels, une certaine indépendance, qui, dans la suite des siècles, a subi, il est vrai, plus d'une vicissitude, mais qui n'a jamais été entièrement écartée, et a été, au contraire, garantie et assurée, à une époque récente et de nos jours, par des Traités internationaux. Déjà, par le Traité de Kaïnardji, qui confirma aux Princes de Moldavie et la Valachie le titre de Souverains, et stipula que chacun d'eux aurait un Chargé d'Affaires spécial à Constantinople, agent que la Porte s'engageait à traiter d'après la stricte teneur du droit des gens; déjà par ce Traité, qui date de l'année 1774, et qui forme la base de toutes les relations existantes entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane, la première de ces Puissances acquit le droit de faire à Constantinople des 'représentations' en faveur des deux Principautés, représentations que la Porte promettait expressément de 'prendre en considération.' A ce droit de représentations, qui du reste devait se restreindre au maintien des stipulations mêmes du Traité, vint se joindre, en vertu du Traité de 1781, le droit d'établir dans les Principautés un Consul-Général, qui eût, en même temps, à exercer les fonctions de censeur de la conduite des Hospodars. Ce n'est point le lieu ici de démontrer, de quelle façon ces droits primitivement si

restreints de la Russie ont pris graduellement les proportions du droit de protection, dont la Grande Puissance voisine dispose actuellement. Nous nous bornerons donc à faire observer, que les Princes de Moldavie et de Valachie, bien que, d'après les Traités existants, ils soient vassaux de la Porte, à laquelle ils payent un tribut déterminé, se trouvent néanmoins, en vertu de ces mêmes Traités, sous la dépendance directe de la Russie, sans le consentement de laquelle ils ne peuvent nommément (d'après le Traité d'Akerman du 7 Octobre, 1826) ni abdiquer spontanément, ni être destitués par la Porte, pour quelque motif que ce soit. Reshid Pasha a donc évidemment agi d'une manière irréfléchie, en ordonnant aux Hospodars, à la suite de l'interruption de leurs rapports avec la Porte et de la suspension du tribut, de quitter les Principautés, la Porte n'étant investie, à l'égard des Princes, d'aucun pouvoir répressif dont elle puisse faire usage autrement que d'accord avec la Russie. A cela il faut ajouter, que, d'après le Traité de Balta-Liman, du 1er Mai, 1849, la situation actuelle des Principautés n'est que provisoire, arrêtée, d'un commun accord entre les Cours de St. Pétersbourg et de Constantinople, pour un terme de 7 ans, à l'expiration duquel seulement doivent entrer en vigueur les dispositions définitives, lesquelles auront à être arrêtées par une nouvelle Convention entre les deux Cours, une année d'avance, c'est-à-dire, avant le 1er Mai, 1856. Des pays, dont les rapports sont encore si peu déterminés, ne sauraient être considérés comme des Provinces de l'Empire Ottoman. Ce sont plutôt des Principautés à demi-Souveraines, à l'égard desquelles une espèce de suzeraineté appartient tant à la Russie qu'à la Porte."

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No. 297.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 449.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 26, 1853.

IT has been my duty, in compliance with the instruction given to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 181, to read to the Chancellor Mr. Colquhoun's despatch of the 29th ultimo, marked No. 22.

His Excellency observed that no reliance was to be placed in the suppositions or statements of Mr. Colquhoun with regard to the Russians, his strong feelings against Russia being a matter of notoriety.

With respect to the "mass of 40,000 or 50,000 men who could be brought to bear on any one given point," this, Count Nesselrode said, was about the amount of the Russian forces in the two provinces; while Mr. Colquhoun himself states in another despatch, that from 40,000 to 50,000 men were to be quartered within a *rayon* of 15 miles round the capital.

That with regard to the "settled unshaken determination to cross the Danube," all that need be said is that the Government have a settled determination of not allowing them to pass, unless it should unhappily prove that the Sultan should decline signing the note; in that case he said he could take no engagement—"ce sera alors comme alors."

The truth is, Count Nesselrode observed in conclusion, that Mr. Colquhoun, perceiving that a great deal of irritation prevails, has been doing his best to increase it; instead of water, he seeks to throw oil on the fire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 298.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 450.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 26, 1853.

THE messenger Webster arrived here on the 23rd instant, placing me in possession of your Lordship's despatches down to No. 182, inclusive.

In obedience to the orders contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant, marked No. 180, I have read to Count Nesselrode Mr. Colquhoun's



report upon the state of the Danubian Provinces under occupation, as given in his despatch No. 19. His impatience as I proceeded was plainly, or I should more properly say strongly, marked.

Again, Count Nesselrode said, I will affirm that, instead of suffering, the Principalities will gain by the occupation; a great deal of ready money is spent there by the officers, and the Government pays for everything that is required for the troops.

With regard to the abuses laid to the charge of the local district governors, that, his Excellency observed, regards the authorities of the country, and not the Russian officer in command.

The supposition, he continued, of its being intended to quarter from 40,000 to 50,000 men about Bucharest, within a *rayon* of 15 miles round the capital, is absurd, as it would be to condemn that force to the danger of wanting supplies; and equally to be rejected are all suppositions founded upon any enmity entertained towards a connection of Prince Ghika, that Prince being considered by Russia as her friend.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 299.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 452.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 26, 1853.

I HAD the mortification of learning to-day from the Chancellor that the news of the Sultan's acceptance of the note which had been communicated to me on the 24th instant is incorrect, the Government having received intelligence from Constantinople of a later date by three days than that of the day on which the Sultan's consent had been supposed to be given, and this intelligence stating that no decision had been taken by the Porte.

The Chancellor alluded to the orders sent by the Sultan to the Hospodars to withdraw from the Principalities, and stated that news had been received of their having declined to obey the summons. I replied that in that case I took for granted that they would be recalled by the Porte.

Count Nesselrode observed that this could hardly be, inasmuch as, without the consent of Russia, the removal of the Hospodars would not be legal.

I begged to remark in return that a very anomalous state of things had been created in the Principalities, and that if the removal of the Hospodars by Turkey constituted an illegality, that an illegality at least as striking was involved in their occupation by a Russian army.

The Chancellor could not admit that the Russian Government had acted illegally or wrongfully, and would repeat that the removal of the Hospodars could not be valid without the Emperor's consent, which certainly would not be given; at the same time he did not apprehend that in the event of the note being signed by the Porte this incident would give rise to any serious complication.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 300.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 3.)

(No. 654.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 2, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me yesterday, that upon the receipt of the intelligence from Constantinople that the Porte had refused to accept the Vienna note, he had addressed a short despatch to M. de la Cour, and another to General Castelbajac. The purport of the former was to express the disappointment and displeasure with which the Emperor had learned the little attention paid by the Sultan's Ministers to the advice of His Majesty's allies, and to prescribe to M. de la Cour to use all his efforts to induce the

Porte to rescind its present decision. The purport of the latter was to desire General Castelbajac to assure Count Nesselrode of the dissatisfaction (déplaisir) with which the news from Constantinople had been received at Paris, and the hope of the French Government, that, as the modifications desired by the Porte did not alter the sense of the original note, they would be admitted by the Emperor of Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 301.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 3.)*

(No. 655.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 2, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS, after receiving the despatches brought by the "Triton" from M. de la Cour, proceeded to take the Emperor's orders at Dieppe, and returned to Paris last night. He informed me that he had found the Emperor more anxious respecting the issue of the Eastern question than he had yet known him to be, and that His Majesty was much displeased at the little respect evinced by the Ottoman Government for the counsels and advice of their allies. His Majesty still hoped that the Emperor of Russia would accept the modifications introduced by the Porte into the Vienna note; but should he not do so, the negotiations might be prolonged *ad infinitum*, the occupation of the Principalities be continued, and the Cabinets of England and France must come to some decision respecting the winter quarters to be taken up by the fleets. His Majesty would prefer that the fleets should remain where they now are, but he had been informed by naval authorities that Besika Bay was not tenable in winter, and he could not therefore take upon himself the responsibility of risking the loss of his ships and the lives of his sailors, by ordering the French fleet to remain at an anchorage declared dangerous by those best able to inform him upon the subject. The fleets then being unable to remain at Besika should in His Majesty's opinion pass the Dardanelles, for he knew of no other station they could take which would not imply a retreat, and he considered that a retreat would place the two Governments who had approached the Dardanelles in consequence of the menacing attitude of Russia—an attitude now likely to be prolonged—in a very false position.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys had therefore received His Majesty's commands to address very positive and urgent instructions in this sense to Count Walewski, and he gave me further to understand, that His Majesty, should his views not be partaken by Her Majesty's Government, would consider himself absolved from all responsibility of the consequences which a contrary policy would, he feared, entail.

I confined myself in answer to saying, that as I inferred from M. de Lhuys' statement that Her Majesty's Government were to be consulted before any final decision was taken by that of the Emperor, and as I knew that Her Majesty's Government would form no opinion until they were in possession of Lord Stratford's opinions upon the subject, I had nothing to observe beyond that I trusted that your Lordship's reasons, should you differ from the French Government, would be attentively considered.

I mentioned to your Lordship in my despatch No. 645, that the French Government was under the idea that the Porte would very possibly refuse to give the fleets the necessary firmans to pass the Dardanelles. On my reminding M. Drouyn de Lhuys of this, he replied that the Emperor conceived that a representation might be made by the two Governments to the Porte, stating that as the fleets were brought to Besika for the assistance of the Sultan, it was His Highness's duty to offer them shelter within the Dardanelles, whenever Besika became untenable. If the Porte replied that she preferred that the fleets should go elsewhere, the responsibility of a seeming retreat would remain with the Porte, and not with the two Governments. If the fleets passed the Dardanelles it was the Emperor's wish that they should anchor as near the mouth as possible, and that a communication should be made to the Russian Cabinet, explaining the reasons which had necessitated the change of position. It should



at the same time be intimated to the Porte that the two Governments had no intention of being dragged into a war on account of the unreasonable obstinacy of the Turkish Government, and that they held themselves completely free, whatever the consequences of that obstinacy might be, to act as they thought proper.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys proceeded to say, that he was anxious that some endeavours should be made to ensure the continuance of the united action of the Four Powers, and that he thought this might be obtained by charging the Conference to reply to the note addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople. A further advantage might be gained if something resembling a renewed acknowledgment of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire could be introduced into the answer, because it would be an admission on the part of Austria that she ought not to occupy Servia, which M. de Lhuys could not help entertaining certain suspicions was not beyond the contemplation of the Austrian Government.

I said that it was difficult to discuss papers of this kind without seeing them, and I recommended him to draw up such a declaration as he thought would produce the effect he desired, and send it to Count Walewski for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 302.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 3.)*

(No. 656.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 2, 1853.*

I HAD some conversation yesterday with Vely Pasha, who, evidently alarmed at the false position in which the Porte has placed herself, and at the displeasure evinced by the French Government, came ostensibly to inquire whether I could suggest any means by which the Ottoman Government could extricate themselves, but in reality to find out whether the opinion of Her Majesty's Government agreed with those of the French, and whether the late conduct of the Porte had altered the friendly feelings of Her Majesty's advisers towards Turkey. In doing this he endeavoured to explain the necessity for his Government to act as they had done, his arguments being identical with those addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople.

I said that no doubt Her Majesty's Government were much disappointed at the turn which the Eastern question had taken, in consequence of the refusals of the Porte to accept the solution proposed by the Four Powers, and that they could not but feel that their position towards Russia, who had accepted that solution, became necessarily modified. Further than this I could not say, as when I last heard from your Lordship you were not in possession of Lord Stratford's despatches explanatory of the conduct of the Porte. Speaking unofficially, I thought it greatly to be regretted that if the Porte considered the Sultan's honour and independence were not sufficiently assured on certain points by the proposed note, the Turkish Government did not adopt the suggestion of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and, while signifying their acceptance of the note as being offered by the Four Powers, place on record in a separate paper their interpretation of the objectionable passages contained in it. This or some other mode might easily have been found to guarantee the Porte against undue admissions; whereas the Porte having now declared the note to be unacceptable, except with certain modifications, rendered the offer of any advice very difficult. Perhaps Russia would admit the modifications, but if she did not I thought the Porte would do wisely to reconsider its decision, and, trusting to the good intentions of the Four Powers, sign the Vienna note.

With regard to the question of the evacuation of the Principalities, and to guarantee against all similar attacks for the future, I remarked that no condition of the kind had accompanied the note which Reshid Pasha had declared himself to be willing to sign. He had then evidently intended to trust to the honour of Russia for the one, and to the continued friendship of the Four Powers for the other. It was difficult indeed to see in what way guarantees could be given, and

Turkey ought to take the present attitude of Europe, united in remonstrating against the unjust and aggressive acts of Russia, as the surest guarantee which could be offered. If, therefore, any opening was given from Vienna or elsewhere, of which the Porte could avail herself, to reconsider her late determination, I was sure she would do well to profit by it.

In the course of this conversation Vely Pasha said that he was instructed to tell the French Government that the Porte would not sign the Vienna note unmodified with her consent (avec son consentement). I inquired what that meant, as although I could understand a person signing a paper unwillingly, I did not understand a person signing without his consent. He replied, that he supposed it meant that the Porte would sign if there was greater danger in persisting in her refusal than in signing; a curious way, I could not help observing to Vely Pasha, of a Government showing its respect for its own independence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 303.

*M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, September 3, 1853.)*

M. le Comte, *Paris, le 1 Septembre*, 1853.

JE vous ai déjà fait connaître sommairement l'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale sur la complication inattendue que les résolutions de la Porte ont fait naître dans un débat que nous pouvions croire arrivé à son terme.

Ce n'est pas, du reste, à ce point, quelle que soit son importance, que s'appliquent nos préoccupations les plus immédiates. La position de nos escadres à Besika devient, chaque jour, plus embarrassante, et le moment approche où elles devront quitter ce mouillage, si nous ne voulons pas compromettre leur sûreté. Je n'ai pas à exposer de nouveau les raisons qui ne nous permettent point de les rappeler à Toulon et à Malte—un mouvement en arrière est moralement impossible aujourd'hui; et néanmoins, il est indispensable de chercher, pour nos vaisseaux, un abri contre la mauvaise saison. L'Empereur pense donc que nous ne devons pas tarder davantage à demander à la Porte que nos forces navales, sans dépasser les châteaux, jettent l'ancre à l'entrée des Dardanelles de façon à être protégées contre les vents du Nord qui, à partir de la fin de Septembre, règnent avec violence en dehors du détroit. En même temps, nous ferions clairement savoir à St. Pétersbourg que le parti auquel nous nous serions arrêtés, nous a été dicté non par le désir d'encourager la Porte dans un refus que nous désapprouvons, mais par des considérations purement nautiques; et nous nous engagerions à nous retirer aussitôt que l'ordre d'évacuer les provinces Danubiennes aurait été donné.

Sa Majesté, profondément convaincu de l'urgence d'une pareille mesure, et ayant à cœur de ne pas encourir la responsabilité des graves conséquences que pourrait avoir, pour nos escadres, un manque de prévoyance ou d'opportune résolution dans les circonstances actuelles, vous charge de recommander instamment à l'attention du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique le contenu de cette dépêche, dont vous voudrez bien laisser copie à Lord Clarendon.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

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No. 304.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 338.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 27*, 1853.

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 195, inclosing copies of despatches to the Representatives of Prussia at Constantinople and St. Petersburgh on the Eastern question, which have been communicated to you by Chevalier Bunsen, reached me on the 25th instant.



In obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I have stated this day to Baron Manteuffel that Her Majesty's Government were not satisfied with the language which the Russian Government had latterly held, and had directed me to make some observations on the subject. I then read to his Excellency an extract from your Lordship's despatch which I had taken with me, beginning with the words "I have to instruct you to state to Baron Manteuffel," to the end; and I trust that your Lordship will approve of my having afterwards left this extract with him, which I thought it advisable to do in order to place the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on record in the exact form in which I had made them known.

His Excellency did not express the least unwillingness to receive this paper, but he endeavoured to justify the proceedings of the Government, saying that they were dictated solely by a desire to contribute in the way which they considered most likely to attain the object of peace which all the Powers had in view, and they believed the tone of the instructions to St. Petersburgh to have been better calculated than any other would have been to promote the common object.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD

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No. 305.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 339. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 27*, 1853.

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel this morning his Excellency read to me a despatch of the 25th instant from Baron Canitz, reporting the arrival at Vienna of intelligence that the Porte had suggested some modifications in the note which had been proposed for a settlement of their differences with Russia, and that these modifications had been forwarded to St. Petersburgh, and recommended for the adoption of the Imperial Cabinet by Count Buol.

Baron Manteuffel explained to me what he understood the alterations to be, adding that Baron Meyendorff had expressed his private opinion that the Russian Government would not object to them; but his Excellency observed with deep regret that delay was caused in the solution of the question, and that a fresh argument was furnished to the Emperor for not withdrawing his troops at once from the Principalities.

His Excellency mentioned nothing which will not have been reported to your Lordship by Lord Westmorland, but it is unfortunate that this intelligence did not arrive here a few hours sooner, in order that Baron Manteuffel might have been enabled to send instructions to General Rochow at St. Petersburgh, by the packet of to-day, to support the suggested alterations, which there has been no time to do.

After some discussion on this new phase in the affair, our conversation reverted to the despatch from General Rochow, which arrived here on Wednesday, and to which I alluded in my despatch No. 337, of the 24th instant. Baron Manteuffel said that the Emperor of Russia maintains that he bears no ill-will to Turkey; that she is "bête et perfide," but that he is always her best friend, and that the advice which England has been giving her will only lead to her destruction, and hasten instead of retard her downfall.

I observed to his Excellency, that such assertions only proved that any improvements introduced into the system of government of Turkey, and which rendered it more humane and European, were distasteful to Russia; and more particularly so when those reforms were not calculated to prepare the subjects of the Porte for Russian rule.

Baron Manteuffel then spoke in strong terms reprobating the conduct of Russia, saying, that though she certainly had a right to obtain reparation from Turkey after the proceedings of the latter in the affair of the holy places, still that nobody could approve of what she had done; and he gave me clearly to understand that the feelings of the Prussian Government had not undergone the least change; that Russia does not appear to care for the arguments of anybody; that she marches on her way; and that the Emperor seems under

the impression that his policy is moderate and reasonable; that the whole world is unjust towards him, for that he desires, as much as they can do, a peaceful termination of the business.

It is right that I should inform your Lordship that this part of my conversation took place before I communicated to Baron Manteuffel the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 195.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 306.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 6.)

(No. 344.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September* 3, 1853.

IN the course of conversation with Baron Manteuffel this evening, his Excellency said, with reference to a communication which I had made to him by your Lordship's instructions, as reported in my despatch No. 338 of the 27th ultimo, stating the dissatisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the tone lately assumed by the Prussian Government on the affairs of the East, that he had considered it necessary to justify himself, and had written to Chevalier Bunsen.

His Excellency observed that he thought Her Majesty's Government had been hard upon him, and that he had not deserved the attack made upon his conduct; that certainly there might appear to be some inconsistency in it, but that this was as much our fault as his; that we had ourselves shifted our ground, and that at the opening of the negotiations, when the Prussian Government were disposed to take a more decided policy, it had been thought that the time was inopportune for so doing; and yet, notwithstanding the difficulties resulting from her peculiar position, Prussia had always been of the opinion that the time was come for the Four Powers to adopt a common policy and to unite for the purpose of checking the progress of Russia in the East; that he certainly did not wish to throw blame on Austria, but that he thought the mistake in conducting the negotiation was that no Power had come forward with any preconcerted plan, and that none had been followed up.

I replied that the blame, if any existed, could not be laid at our door, for we had been ready enough to take a decided line; but that out of deference for the opinions of our allies, and especially for those of Austria, whose cooperation we must always consider essential in attempting to arrest the power of Russia, we had felt the great difficulty of the position, and that we had always proclaimed an anxiety that the affair should be concluded by peaceful negotiations.

Baron Manteuffel rejoined, that the case continued, he feared, to be one of the greatest moment; that he had directed General Rochow to support the amendments of the note as proposed at Constantinople, but that he scarcely expected that the Emperor of Russia would agree to these terms; nevertheless he had been assured by General Rochow, and he believed the opinion was participated by General Castelbajac, that the Emperor was desirous to be able honourably to withdraw his troops from the Principalities, and would do so at the earliest moment.

I then asked if the Turkish communication of the 19th ultimo, which had been addressed to the Four Powers, had been sent to St. Petersburgh; that I hoped not, as it would only create irritation. He answered that he certainly had not sent it to Russia, but that it probably would find its way there. Then I said, Who can have sent it? it could not get there from London or Paris; was it from Vienna? If so, it would be a proof that Austria had no secrets from the Russian Court, and it would consequently be no easy matter to persuade her to unite with us in any project for the guarantee of the Ottoman dominions, which the Porte sought for with such anxiety.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 307.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 351.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 6, 1853.

ON the 3rd instant, Count Walewski placed in my hands the inclosed copy of a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I told his Excellency that the Earl of Aberdeen, Lord John Russell, and Viscount Palmerston, were then in London, and that I would immediately consult them upon the important subject to which the despatch refers.

On the following day I saw Count Walewski and informed him that my three colleagues and myself were unanimously of opinion that any movement of the fleets that should have the character of a retreat, or of abandoning the policy which France and England had been engaged in upholding, was not for a moment to be thought of; but that the future course of the two Governments must in a great measure depend upon that of the Emperor of Russia and upon his reasons for declining, if he does not accept, the modifications proposed by the Porte; and we therefore thought it advisable to come to no final decision respecting the fleets until the answer from St. Petersburgh, which must arrive in the course of this week, had been received. Moreover, there did not appear to be any urgent necessity for a decision, as we had every reason to believe that throughout the month of September the fleets would be perfectly safe at their present anchorage.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 308.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 283.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 7, 1853.

IT appears from a despatch from Count Nesselrode to the Russian Minister at Vienna, dated the 22nd August, which has been shown to me by Count Colloredo, that subsequently to the acceptance by Russia of the Vienna note, Baron Lebzeltern was instructed to inquire of Count Nesselrode what steps would be taken for the evacuation of the Principalities in the event of the Porte's agreeing to the note without alteration.

The reply of the Russian Government seems to have been a reference to the terms of the Circular of $\frac{\text{June 20}}{\text{July 2}}$, and more particularly to those of the Manifesto, as establishing clearly the temporary character of the occupation, and the intention to bring it to a close as soon as the Porte signed the note which Russia had stated she looked upon as a sufficient satisfaction; and as soon as that note should be delivered at St. Petersburgh by a Turkish Ambassador, orders would be immediately issued for the return of the Russian troops within their own frontier.

This being the case the Emperor was somewhat surprised and grieved at the question which had been put to him; but he was led to suppose that Austria shared the doubts which had been stated in the British Parliament, that independently of the satisfaction required of the Porte, Russia required, as the condition of the evacuation of the Principalities, the previous withdrawal of the English and French squadrons.

Russia disclaimed any such interpretation of the circular. She never required that the squadrons should quit their position before the Russian troops quitted theirs; what she meant was, that, in the existing circumstances, the presence of the two squadrons had the appearance of menace and pressure directed towards Russia, and so long as that menace and pressure lasted, Russia could not abandon her military position. But now that the Maritime Powers, instead of employing their squadrons to encourage the resistance of the Porte, were engaged in advocating at Constantinople the plan of arrangement proposed at Vienna, and thereby obtaining the satisfaction due to Russia, the case is different; and if, at the same time, the required satisfaction is offered by the Porte, Russia would no longer have any reason for maintaining the position which she had taken up, and she conceived that the Powers would, on their

side, no longer find it necessary to maintain theirs, after the reasons which had induced them to take it up had ceased to exist. And if the Powers, like Russia, have no intention of gratuitously prolonging the existing crisis, there was nothing to prevent the simultaneous withdrawal of their squadrons and of the Russian troops being the natural result of the settlement of the questions between Russia and the Porte, and being coincident in point of time without any sacrifice of honour on either side.

If such is the solution desired by Austria, Russia will give her an assurance to that effect, which she may make use of towards the Maritime Powers; and Russia repeats that she has no intention to raise, with reference to the withdrawal of the squadrons, any discussion of principle; and that, as far as she is concerned, if the note as drawn up at Vienna is delivered without alteration at St. Petersburgh by a special ambassador, the immediate evacuation of the Principalities will be decided.

Count Colloredo having asked me what answer I wished him to give to this despatch, I said that the renewed pledge to evacuate the Principalities, given by Russia, was satisfactory, and in the name of Her Majesty's Government I begged to thank Count Buol for having obtained it; but I must then, as on previous occasions, decline entering into any discussion respecting the withdrawal of the fleets. The Austrian Government, however, could hardly doubt that they would not remain at Besika Bay a moment longer than was necessary.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 309.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 284.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 7, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol, dated August 31, stating that on the 28th of that month he had sent to Baron Lebzeltern the modifications which the Porte desired to have made in the note which it was proposed from Vienna that the Porte should address to Russia, with instructions to express the hope that they would be considered by the Emperor of Russia as not of sufficient importance to induce him to change his pacific intentions. Count Buol remarked to Count Colloredo upon the absence in the note returned from Constantinople of the concluding passage of the Vienna note; and inferring from thence that those passages are not objected to, he has inserted them in the amended copy which he has sent to St. Petersburgh.

Baron Lebzeltern, it appears, is further instructed to request the Russian Government to enable the Cabinet of Vienna to give assurances to the Porte in regard to the evacuation of the Principalities.

Count Buol then goes on to observe, with reference to the expectation of the Porte to receive from the Powers a guarantee against any future interference on the part of Russia in its affairs, and against the eventual occupation of the Principalities, that the Internuncio had been instructed to declare to the Porte that Austria did not look upon the expression of this expectation as a condition on the realization of which the settlement of the existing differences with Russia was to depend; and that, for her part, Austria could not enter into any engagement such as the Porte seemed to contemplate. Austria considered that the Porte would find its best security against such contingencies in maintaining relations of friendship and confidence with all the Powers of Europe, and in the wisdom and efficaciousness of the measures which it might adopt for the improvement of its internal administration, and for the amelioration of the condition of its Christian subjects; and that Austria was of opinion that such a guarantee from the Powers as the Porte seemed to require would amount to a humiliating avowal of weakness, and a virtual sacrifice of its independence.

At all events, Count Buol observes, the question thus raised by the Porte ought not to be mixed up with that now pending; but appertaining, as it does, to the future, it should be entertained as one bearing on the general interests of Europe, and not exclusively and singly on those of the Ottoman Empire.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 310.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.*

(No. 204.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 7, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 344 of the 3rd instant, reporting the substance of a conversation which you have had with Baron Manteuffel on the Eastern question, I have to instruct your Lordship to express the thanks of Her Majesty's Government, which I have also requested the Chevalier Bunsen to convey to Baron Manteuffel, for the communication alluded to in your despatch respecting the policy of Prussia. It certainly appeared to Her Majesty's Government, that Prussia for some time past was not holding the same course as when the rupture between Russia and Turkey first took place; and Her Majesty's Government, having at heart to cooperate cordially with Prussia, thought it their duty to state this opinion without reserve. They receive, therefore, with great satisfaction, the renewed assurances given by Baron Manteuffel, that the views and policy of Prussia have undergone no change; and, they hope, not only as regards the present state of affairs, but also as to future contingencies in the East, that the moral influence of union among the Four Powers may remain unimpaired.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 311.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 8.)*

(No. 153. Secret.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 28, 1853.*

I HAVE been for some time aware of the disparaging language which has been held at Peterhof with regard to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who has been unjustly and unworthily spoken of as being certain to employ his influence for the purpose of causing the Porte to reject the Vienna note.

It was not in my power to meet these underhand insinuations openly, but your Lordship will believe that every motive, public and private, conduced to impel me to do so by such means as I had the opportunity of employing.

It has now come to my knowledge, that the Russian Government have received intelligence (I believe from Vienna) of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's conduct having been the very reverse of that which had been predicted; and I have learned (under a promise of strict secresy), that Count Nesselrode had communicated this intelligence to one of my colleagues, although he had not sufficient candour to speak to me upon the subject in the conversation which we held yesterday.

I have accordingly written his Excellency the private and friendly note of which I beg to inclose a copy, in which I make known to him the account which has reached me of the zealous support given by Lord Stratford to the plan of accommodation prepared at Vienna.

It is hardly necessary that I should observe, that this private account is no other than that which, having been received by the Chancellor himself, had been brought to my knowledge by one of my diplomatic brethren.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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Inclosure in No. 311.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.*

(Private.)

My dear Count Nesselrode, *St. Petersburgh, August* 27, 1853.

YOU will remember the entire confidence which I expressed to you in the devotion of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the public service, and my conviction that he would leave no effort unturned to induce the Porte to accept the note to which the Emperor had given his sanction.

A private account which has just reached me, entirely justifies these opinions. I learn, I believe from a certain source, that Lord Stratford has been unremitting in his endeavours to overcome the hesitations of the Porte, and, as I confidently expect, his efforts will prove eventually successful. If he was destined to incur blame in case of failure, it will be only right that he should come in for a large share of approbation if, as I trust, all should now go right.

The weather is perfect for sailing and marching; and I am, more than ever, anxious to see all our difficulties brought to a close—a real, final close.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 312.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 8.)

(No. 456. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 29, 1853.

IN one of the despatches which reached the French Mission by their last courier, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observes "that he has frequently asked himself whether the Emperor's ready acceptance of the Vienna note may not have been occasioned by His Majesty's belief that the note was likely to be rejected by the Porte."

It is certain that the same suspicion has frequently presented itself to my mind; and in proof of its having done so, I need only remind your Lordship that when Count Nesselrode spoke to me of that fanaticism which was likely to impel the Turks to refuse the proposal made to them by their allies, I took care to establish to what circumstances that fanaticism (supposing it to exist) was to be attributed.

But I would venture to remark to your Lordship that, under all circumstances, it can hardly be otherwise but that the Emperor must be desirous of altering the situation in which he finds himself placed, which, notwithstanding the supposed excellency of Russian diplomacy, is a very disadvantageous one.

Even in the supposition of His Imperial Majesty entertaining these ambitious views, which by some are attributed to him, and of his being determined upon carrying them into execution upon the first favourable opportunity, he must see that the occasion does not offer itself at present, when England and France are standing shoulder to shoulder, and when the utmost that Austria has been disposed to do in favour of their Imperial allies and benefactors was to lend her aid in extricating them from the false position in which they had placed themselves.

Under such circumstances, even without reference to the line which might be taken by the Porte, it would be, I think, the obvious policy of Russia to adhere to the proposal of her allies, and to wait for better times.

It is probably not considered in the nature of things that the harmony which has of late prevailed between the English and French Governments should be of eternal duration; and the Emperor, at the meeting which he proposes having with his Imperial friend at Olmutz, hopes probably to be able to show reason why that alliance, which recent events have a little shaken, should be made as intimate as heretofore.



I will conclude my despatch by repeating to your Lordship an observation of General Castelbajac, which appears to me to be very judicious.

General Castelbajac, I should remark, has been very desirous of ascertaining the amount of the Russian forces in the Principalities, and, after having made the most diligent inquiries, has perfectly satisfied himself that they cannot exceed 50,000 men, although, by having been a good deal moved about, their numbers have been made to appear much more considerable.

In making this statement to me, General Castelbajac said, "Il est clair pour moi que la Russie qui s'est fourvoyée dans cette affaire, qui a fait faute sur faute, avait cherché à rassurer l'Europe, et à intimider la Turquie. Malheureusement pour elle c'est le contraire qui est arrivé. Les Turcs n'ont pas eu peur, et c'est l'Europe qui s'alarme."

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 313.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 8.)

(No. 457. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 29, 1853.

ATTENTION appears to have been turned in Austria to the proceedings of the Russian Secretary of Legation, M. Fonton, who was known to have left Vienna for the purpose of visiting Servia.

I am informed that M. Fonton had been instructed to report upon the state of that province; and that, in the despatches which he has written, he speaks of the tranquillity and order which he observed there.

This circumstance gives me an opportunity of remarking upon the hollowness of Russian diplomacy, and the facility which it exhibits in dealing in a summary way with facts.

Some three months since, as your Lordship will recollect, the "Chancellerie" spoke in moving terms of the condition of Servia, of the uncertainty of property and life there, and the cruel treatment to which Christians were subjected, &c.

It is probable at that period, either that the Russian Cabinet had not determined what should be the extent of their invasion into the Sultan's dominions, or that they were anxious to prepare the public for an explosion for which some preparation had been made.

Suddenly the Austrian Government takes alarm, or resorts to precautions which leads to the gathering of a force on the Servian border, a proceeding which Russia (no longer quite confident in the support of her Austrian ally) views with certain misgivings. The necessities of the moment accordingly become different: it is important to prove to Austria that her military precautions are unnecessary, and with that view M. Fonton is dispatched to Servia, no doubt with instructions to find the country in a very satisfactory condition.

It has been with some pleasure that I have reflected upon the entire incredulity which I had opposed at the time to Count Nesselrode's alarming Servian intelligence, and he, no doubt, recollecting the language he had held, has refrained from observing to me, as he has done to some other persons of the diplomatic corps, upon the tranquillity which prevails in Servia.

At the risk of "throwing oil upon fire," to use an expression which I borrow of the Chancellor, I have pointed out to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires the contradiction in the language of the Russian "Chancellerie," and have offered him what I believe to be the true explanation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 314.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 232.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 20, 1853.

THE Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, though offering laboured excuses to the Porte, are in fact contumacious, and have hitherto held back from the execution of its orders to quit the Principalities.

Mr. Colquhoun and his French colleague have lowered their respective flags. Mr. Gardner has suspended the execution of my instructions in that respect, although M. Testa, the French Consul at Jassy, has acted upon his Ambassador's instructions and ceased to hoist his colours.

It is the Porte's intention to repeat its commands to the Hospodars on pain of dismissal.

I purpose to direct Mr. Gardner to execute without farther delay the instructions which he has already received from me.

The correspondence relating to these transactions is not prepared for transmission to your Lordship by the present opportunity; I hope to forward it by the next.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 315.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 233.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 24, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the note by which I have acknowledged the receipt of the Porte's official communication of its decision respecting Count Buol's draft, as already forwarded with my preceding correspondence. My note, though bearing the date of the 20th instant, was not sent to Reshid Pasha till after the departure of the "Caradoc" with my despatches.

Baron Bruck's acknowledgment bears the same date as mine, as your Lordship will perceive by the copy inclosed herewith, and obtained confidentially from the Porte.

I am not yet apprized of what answers were sent in by the French Ambassador and the Prussian Envoy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 315.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.*

LE Soussigné a l'honneur d'accuser la réception de la note officielle que son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient de lui faire passer relativement aux modifications que la Sublime Porte croit nécessaires pour bien expliquer certains passages du projet de note qui lui avait été récommandé comme moyen sûr de terminer à l'amiable les différends survenus entr'elle et le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie.

Le Soussigné se rejouit d'observer que le Ministère Ottoman, tout désireux qu'il soit de mettre à l'abri de toute incertitude ses droits souverains et son indépendance, ne s'est pas écarté de la modération conciliatrice dont il avait déjà donné plus d'une preuve. Il s'empressera de transmettre au plutôt à sa Cour et au Représentant de Sa Majesté la Reine à Vienne la pièce explicative, avec une annexe que le Secrétaire d'État Ottoman lui a fait l'honneur de lui



adresser; et il ne saurait douter que les raisons, développées par son Altesse avec tant de clairté, ne réçevoivent de leur part toute l'attention qu'elles semblent mériter.

Le Soussigné, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

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Inclosure 2 in No. 315.

*Baron Bruck to Reshid Pasha.*

*Bujukdere*, 20 *Août*, 1853.

LE Soussigné, Internonce et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note du 15 Zilkaadé, 1269, par laquelle son Altesse Reshid Pasha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, a bien voulu lui communiquer les modifications que la Sublime Porte a cru devoir apporter au projet de note élaboré à Vienne.

Le Soussigné, lié par ses instructions qui lui prescrivent d'employer tous ses efforts pour engager la Sublime Porte à l'acceptation pure et simple du dit projet de note, doit, par conséquence, se limiter pour ce qui régarde les modifications susmentionnées à en référer à son Gouvernement; et saisit, &c.

(Signé) BRUCK.

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No. 316.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 234.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 24, 1853.

THE Austrian Internuncio had another audience of the Sultan the day before yesterday. His object was to receive His Majesty's answer to the Emperor of Austria's letter, brought by Colonel Ruff, who accompanied Baron Bruck to the audience.

It appears that the Sultan, in delivering his letter, made a verbal appeal to the friendly and sympathetic feelings of the Emperor as equally concerned with himself in maintaining the rights of sovereignty.

Baron Bruck expressed a hope that the Sultan would be prepared to listen to any further representations which he might have to make on the subject matter of the letter, as he anticipated difficulties with respect to the proposed amendments.

The Sultan made no reply, and Reshid Pasha, on leaving the presence chamber, told Baron Bruck that the Porte was determined to persist in its intention of not signing the Austrian note as lately transmitted from Vienna.

For your Lordship's more complete information I forward herewith a copy of M. Pisani's report conveying these circumstances to my knowledge.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 316.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Pera, August* 22, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to report that Colonel Ruff, accompanied by Baron Bruck, repaired to-day to the Mabim to receive the Sultan's reply to the Emperor of Austria's autograph letter.

The Sultan in delivering his letter to Colonel Ruff also entrusted him with a verbal message, that "he was persuaded that his good and faithful friend and ally the Emperor of Austria will take into due and serious consideration the

well-grounded motives which induce the Porte not to accept the note arranged at Vienna; that being himself in a position to know the extent and value of sovereign rights, he, the Sultan, was led to hope that His Imperial Majesty would appreciate his resistance in not adopting the note as it now stands; and that he relies upon his good offices and friendly solicitude to urge the acceptance of the modifications proposed." The Colonel made a low bow, and promised faithfully to execute the Sultan's orders.

Before leaving, Baron Bruck told the Sultan that he entertained an earnest hope that His Majesty would, with his usual benevolence, condescend to listen to any further representations he might perhaps be called upon to make on the question at issue, as he anticipated difficulties as to the adoption of the proposed amendments. The Sultan abstained from returning any answer, but appeared very serious.

On quitting His Majesty's apartments, Reshid Pasha observed to the Internuncio that he might rest assured, that unless the alterations pointed out by the Council were fully admitted, the Porte was determined to adhere to its decision not to sign the note as presented to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. A. PISANI.

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No. 317.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 230.)
My Lord, *Therapia, August* 24, 1853.

WITH the despatches which were forwarded from here by the "Caradoc," I sent your Lordship in copy a letter addressed by Prince Gortchakoff to the Commander-in-chief of the army in Bulgaria. The Turkish General sent the letter to his Government, and Reshid Pasha has communicated it to me confidentially, requesting, at the same time, my opinion as to the course which it would be most advisable for the Porte to pursue. I have replied that it rests with the Sultan's Government to take the line they deem best, but, for myself, that, much as I deprecate any unnecessary chances of collision, I saw no reason to warrant my advising the Porte to depart from the resolution previously adopted and announced to the Russian General.

I find, my Lord, on reading Prince Gortchakoff's letter with attention, that the reasons alleged by him for insisting on a right to violate the river Convention are as futile as they are illegal. He claims to set aside the Treaty in virtue of his military occupation of the Principalities, declared to have no object but that of giving Russia a pledge for the acceptance of Prince Menchikoff's note, and provisionally respected *de facto* by the Porte. He rests this pretension on the necessity of sending armed vessels up the river to obtain provisions for those which he has stationed in the Turkish waters for the protection of Ibraila and Galatz; places which, under the existing circumstances, require no protection at all. He expects, on the other hand, that the Turkish authorities shall rely upon his assurance for the safety of their fortresses above the confluence of the two rivers; and he leaves out of view the facility with which his ostensible object of provisioning the armed Russian vessels near Galatz and Ibraila can be accomplished by means of mercantile vessels unarmed.

It appears to me that the Porte cannot reverse on such grounds the resolution which it had previously announced, without serious discredit and danger; nor should I feel myself justified, as British Representative, in counselling a change of purpose which, under the circumstances, would obviously lie open to the suspicion of weakness, and operate unfavourably on the Porte's position towards its army and people.

Your Lordship may remember that a suggestion of mine, similar to Prince Gortchakoff's intimation, was formerly overruled by the Turkish Government. The case is widely different now that the Porte is called upon to withdraw its deliberate and declared intention, resting on Treaty, for reasons which, far from having any weight, go far to justify the Porte's mistrust, while they leave the infraction of Treaty without excuse.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.



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No. 318.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 238. Secret.)
My Lord, *Therapia, August* 24, 1853.

THE French Ambassador, acting apparently under recent instructions, continues in some degree to take a line not quite consistent with the position in which we had previously stood towards each other. The day before yesterday he sent to Reshid Pasha, repeating his proposal that the military commander of the Dardanelles should be instructed to let the French squadron pass up to Constantinople, on the application of Admiral Hamelin.

When Reshid requested to know the meaning of this haste, he was told that the Emperor of Russia might take some precipitate resolution on learning the fate of Count Buol's note, and that if such a result were to occur, the news of it would be likely to reach Paris much sooner than Constantinople, and that, consequently, as orders would probably then be given for the advance of the squadron, it was desirable that no obstruction should be encountered at the Dardanelles.

When the French interpreter was further requested to state whether the English squadron was included in M. de la Cour's application, he replied that he was not aware of it. I know from undoubted authority that on the same night Reshid Pasha received a visit from the French Ambassador, who communicated to him in strict confidence, that his Government intended to propose a new Convention to supersede the Treaty of 1841, and in concert with England, Austria, and Prussia, to establish the Porte's independence, together with the integrity of its empire, on more distinct and solid foundations.

Reshid Pasha appears to be much pleased with this overture. He inquired whether M. de la Cour had said anything to me upon the subject, and received for answer that he was instructed to confine his communications to his Highness alone. The Pasha is of opinion that an arrangement in the sense proposed would be very advantageous to the Porte, but that Constantinople is the place at which it ought to be concluded.

I called upon M. de la Cour to-night, in ignorance of his secret proposal, and put him upon the subject of the squadrons. He kept strict silence upon the former question, but, touching the latter, told me that his communication to Reshid Pasha originated in what had passed between our respective Governments on the supposition of further concerted measures being rendered necessary by the refusal of Russia to accept any reasonable terms of arrangement. I observed, in reply, that although your Lordship had agreed with Count Walewski in principle, you had differed in some degree as to the time of application, and that I was ignorant of any sufficient reason for bringing up the squadrons to Constantinople, while I felt strongly the inconvenience of exhibiting any difference in the proceedings of the two Governments on the pending question. The discussion proceeded no further, and I hope to find a sufficient remedy at the Porte, unless any occurrence altering my present impression should intervene.

Meanwhile, I solicit your Lordship's timely attention to the disadvantage under which I shall have to labour, if the course thus taken by France on the one side, and by Austria on the other, be allowed to proceed without some counterpoise in favour of British influence, whose ascendency for the best purposes it has been my constant effort to uphold and improve.

Whether the present negotiations terminate in peace or in war, it will doubtless be most desirable that some kind of barrier should be raised against the recurrence of any such attempts at encroachment as those which we are now resisting. But it is equally desirable that the improvement of Turkish

administration and the relief of the Sultan's Christian subjects from much unjust and oppressive legislation, should be simultaneously secured, not as the means of increased influence to any particular Power, but as an object of common solicitude, scarcely less useful to Europe at large than to Turkey itself.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 319.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 239.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 25, 1853.*

IN writing to you on the 20th instant, I was so much hurried by my anxiety to send off the Porte's note and the correspondence relating to it with the least possible delay, that I fear I must have expressed myself even more imperfectly than usual. I entertain this apprehension particularly with respect to those weak points of the Empire, or the causes of danger, to which in the conscientious performance of an important duty I had drawn your Lordship's attention in my despatch No. 132 of the current year. I have it now at heart to observe, that in exposing those vulnerable parts my purpose was not to brand the Turkish Empire with a character of helplessness and incurability, but to prepare Her Majesty's Government in time for the direction which an active and calculating enemy in the unfortunate eventuality of war would probably give to its offensive operations against this country. I was under an impression that it might seem presumptuous for me to suggest any means of counteraction, when those who wielded the power of Great Britain commanded so large a portion of the knowledge on which that power depends.

Experience has since shown that in some respects the danger was expanded into undue proportions, and that insufficient credit was given to the Mussulman population of Turkey and its Government for those qualities and resources which are the best supports of an independent State. On this score I have already endeavoured to do justice to both; and the favourable accounts which had previously reached me from the army are amply confirmed by information conveyed to me this morning by General Sir Charles O'Donnell, who returned only yesterday from the scene of defensive operations in Bulgaria, after visiting the principal military stations, inspecting the Turkish camp under the auspices of its commander, and witnessing the field exercises of the troops. A corresponding spectacle is at this moment before me. I have only to raise my eyes from the paper in order to see two squadrons and a camp, comprising altogether between soldiers and sailors a population of nearly 30,000 men. The discipline and perfect quietness which reign among them would do honour to the most civilized nation; and though the surrounding villages are principally inhabited by Christians, not an instance of personal aggression, and scarcely two or three of accidental insult, have come to my knowledge.

The extraordinary expenses incurred by the Government are no doubt heavy, but the Minister of Finance appears to have little anxiety for the future; the advances required from capitalists are comparatively small; individuals of substance are prepared to make voluntary sacrifices in aid of the State; and the founders of the Bank have made up their minds, as I am assured by one of them, to open their institution in October, with the assent of those parties in England who are to supply a large portion of their capital. It may be added, that notwithstanding the concentration of nearly 100,000 men in Bulgaria, a considerable army is collected on the frontier of Georgia; and no hesitation has been shown in proceeding to form a separate, though smaller, army on the frontier of Servia.

What I remarked before as to the exhausting consequences of so much exertion still holds good; but the exertion itself, and its accompaniments, are not only creditable to the Porte and to the nation, but indicative to a signal degree of what they are still equal to when duly supported and prudently directed; though it must be allowed that actual war would test their means of resistance far more severely than its probability or its approach.



To judge from present appearances no spirit of discontent and insubordination is sufficiently matured to threaten an immediate outbreak in Bulgaria, Servia, or Albania. The Consular reports from nearly all the principal places of the Empire in Europe and Asia have greatly softened their original tone of alarm, and I am inclined to think, that notwithstanding the absence of the Sultan's regular forces, there is less disturbance and perhaps even less oppression than usual. I learn from your Lordship's own correspondence that the apprehension of fresh incursions from Montenegro is far from being well founded. The fanatical excesses which were so naturally dreaded and predicted after Prince Menchikoff's departure have hitherto been no more realized than the rumours of intended massacre when he was here at Easter.

Looking to dangers from without, to the ambition of Greece and the animosity of Persia, I cannot affirm that the grounds of mistrust are removed; but the Porte must be friendless indeed if means be not found, in the event of war, to impress on these countries the duty and interest of respecting a neighbour's rights unjustly assailed from other quarters.

Not to weary your Lordship with superfluous or unreasonable remarks, I conclude under a strong impression, that if Turkey be pushed against her will to extremities, she will fight even single-handed with partial success, and if sustained by her maritime allies alone with corresponding determination, that she will have a hopeful prospect of getting through her present difficulties, and in some measure relieving Europe from a constant source of political anxiety and commercial embarrassment.

Though it cannot be denied that the vices of Turkish Administration, and the future relations subsisting between the Mussulman and Rayah classes of the Empire, have improved but little in proportion to the need and promise of improvement, prejudices are daily softening down, and sounder principles are gradually gaining ground. The nearer contact of Turkey with Europe, its greater dependence on some of the Christian Powers, and a progressive acquaintance with their manners, which passing events occasion, can hardly fail to advance the work of civilization; and the Turks would not be men if gratitude for benefits received did not induce them to respect the superiority of their benefactors, and to rely with some degree of confidence in their counsels.

I have &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 320.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 243. Secret.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 26, 1853.*

I AM just returned from a visit to Reshid Pasha, whom I found enjoying his Turkish Sunday, under some trees in the neighbourhood of his country house. He confirmed what I had learnt before respecting the French Ambassador's confidential proposals. M. de la Cour still insists upon orders being sent down to the Dardanelles for the admission of the French squadron on Admiral Hamelin's application. His Excellency had also communicated a despatch from M. de Lhuys, stating that he had written to London, Vienna, and Berlin, proposing a Convention for the more complete recognition of the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire.

The Pasha agreed with me in thinking it singular, under the circumstances of cordial understanding between England and France respecting the Eastern question, that M. de la Cour's demand and overture should be alike separate, and the latter secret. It seems to be his intention to decline acceding to the demand until some change of circumstance shall induce him to desire the presence of both squadrons here, and to express his satisfaction at the overture as leading to an arrangement of the nature described among the Four Powers. But as he means to talk these matters over with his colleagues, they may perhaps suggest a different reply, and he may find it necessary to acquiesce in their opinion. He is anxious that I should not acquaint the French Ambassador with my knowledge of his "secret." His Excellency, he told me, had already intimated some dislike

of his having made known to me what had passed between them respecting the French squadron.

In contrast with M. de la Cour's application on this subject, appeared the desire which he had expressed to know from Reshid Pasha whether the Porte might not accept Count Buol's note without modifications, if a guarantee could be obtained from the Four Powers. I am mistaken if there is any inclination on his Highness's part to accept such a proposal, after the declaration which he recently made to the Four Representatives in a formal note.

In the course of our conversation, Reshid Pasha informed me that the Turkish Commander-in-chief at Shumla had stated, in reply to a question addressed to him from the Porte, that if additional troops, to the amount of 40,000 men, were placed at his disposal, he could effect a passage over the Danube, and probably find means to drive the Russian army out of the Principalities.

It would seem that orders were given some time ago to add that number to the Imperial army in Bulgaria.

I avail myself of this opportunity to forward the draft inclosed herewith of a letter prepared for Omer Pasha to address to Prince Gortchakoff. Some latitude will probably be left to the Turkish Commander as to its delivery, which may be left to depend upon the General's view of the danger or inconvenience likely to result to the Porte from allowing Russian armed vessels to go up the Danube beyond its point of confluence with the Pruth.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 320.

*Copy of Draft.*

DANS la réponse que je viens de recevoir de votre Excellence, en date du se trouve la promesse que les bâtiments qui sont actuellement dans les ports de Galatz et d'Ibraila, ne seront pas envoyés dans le rayon des forteresses de la Sublime Porte. Il y est en même temps question de la nécessité que des bâtiments remontent plus haut que le confluent du Pruth avec le Danube afin de transporter des vivres.

Il est clair que tant que ces bâtiments qui se trouvent dans les ports en question n'iront pas plus haut qu'Ibraila, et qu'ils voudront s'en retourner à l'endroit d'où ils sont venus, l'on n'aura rien à leur objecter.

Comme le transport de vivres n'est pas exclusivement réservé aux bâtiments de guerre, mais qu'au contraire c'est par les bâtiments de commerce qu'il devrait s'effectuer, je me vois dispensé d'adhérer à vos considérations.

Il est donc certain, comme j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous le déclarer précédemment, que si vos bâtiments de guerre dépassaient de nouveau l'endroit désigné par le Traité, je me trouverais contraint d'exécuter mes instructions à l'égard de la prohibition, et c'est pour obvier à tout malentendu que je me crois en devoir de répéter ici cette circonstance.

Je saisis, &c.

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No. 321.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September 9.*)

(No. 244.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 26, 1853.*

I AVAIL myself of the present occasion to forward, in copy, the correspondence, noted in the margin, respecting the withdrawal of the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia.

I request your Lordship's particular attention to the despatches which have passed between Mr. Gardner and myself.

The Porte is preparing to address further directions to the two Hospodars,



and I shall have occasion to accompany their transmission with an additional instruction to Mr. Colquhoun and Mr. Gardner.

The Hospodars will probably be commanded to retire, notwithstanding their late representations to the Porte, unless it shall appear distinctly that the Russians have revoked the injunctions laid upon them to suspend their communications with the Porte and to retain the tribute.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 321.

*Prince Stirbey to Reshid Pasha.*

Monseigneur, *Bucarest, le* $\frac{21 \text{ Juillet}}{2 \text{ Août}}$, 1853.

J'AI reçu la dépêche que votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du $\frac{1}{13}$ courant, pour m'annoncer que la Sublime Porte a jugé nécessaire de m'ordonner de quitter provisoirement cette Principauté.

Tous mes préparatifs de départ étaient faits, j'allais partir aujourd'hui même, et j'étais sur le point d'expédier à votre Altesse ma lettre pour l'en informer; lorsque les Membres du Conseil Administratif Extraordinaire et plusieurs habitants notables parmi les bazars et le corps des négociants sont venus me faire les plus vives représentations sur les conséquences funestes que mon départ produirait immanquablement pour le pays qu'il laisserait livré à l'anarchie et en proie à la plus complète démoralisation, l'opinion publique s'étant déjà vivement émue à la seule annonce de mon départ; ils m'ont vivement conjuré de prendre en mûre considération les circonstances critiques où se trouvait le pays et de ne rien précipiter, afin de pouvoir prendre des mesures pour sauvegarder les intérêts publics.

Votre Altesse peut être convaincue que ce n'est qu'à mon corps défendant que j'ai dû fléchir devant ces considérations impérieuses exprimées avec une vive conviction, et consentir à différer un départ que j'avais sans hésitation décidé. J'ai donc cru devoir convoquer l'Assemblée du Divan *ad hoc* extraordinairement pour après demain Lundi, afin d'arrêter les meilleures mesures à adopter dans l'intérêt de la Principauté, et je me ferai un devoir empressé de soumettre sans rétard le résultat de sa délibération à votre Altesse.

J'ose me flatter que Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan daignera dans son inépuisable indulgence étendre sa haute compassion aux angoisses et aux anxiétés d'un population fidèle, et ne voir dans cette mesure qu'une preuve de mon vif désir de me conformer en toutes occasions à sa paternelle et bienfaisante sollicitude pour le bien-être et le soulagement des habitants des Principautés. C'est avec pleine confiance que j'espère dans sa haute clémence et dans l'intercession bienveillante et éclairée de votre Altesse.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) STIRBEY.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 321.

*Prince Stirbey to Reshid Pasha.*

Monseigneur, *Bucarest, le* $\frac{30 \text{ Juillet}}{11 \text{ Août}}$, 1853.

J'EUS l'honneur de soumettre à votre Altesse par ma dépêche du $\frac{21 \text{ Juillet}}{2 \text{ Août}}$ que pendant que je me préparais à partir, j'ai dû céder aux représentations sérieuses et pressantes des membres du Conseil Administratif, ainsi que des notables des différentes classes d'habitants; et que pour prévenir de fâcheuses conséquences résultant d'un départ subit, qui laisserait le pays sans autorités et privé de toute administration dans les circonstances graves et complexes au milieu desquelles il se trouve, j'ai du convoquer extraordinairement l'Assemblée National des Divans à fin d'aviser aux mesures à prendre dans l'intérêt du pays.

Les membres de cette Assemblée, réunis à Bucarest dans le local ordinairement consacré à ses séances, ont delibéré avec un calme parfait et la plus grande dignité sur la situation actuelle de la Principauté, qu'ils ont jugée telle que rien

ne pouvait suppléer à ce moment à la présence du Hospodar. Ils viennent de voter à l'unanimité, et de me remettre, l'adresse ci-jointe en me priant de la déposer aux pieds du Trône de Sa Majesté Impérial le Sultan pour implorer sa haute et généreuse sollicitude.

Je me fais, en conséquence, un devoir empressé de solliciter la bienveillante intercession de votre Altesse auprès de Sa Majesté Impériale, qui daignera, j'ose m'en flatter, ne mettre aucune doute sur les sentiments invariables de soumission et de fidélité dont nous sommes animés pour son auguste personne, et accueillir favorablement les vœux suppliants d'un pays fidèle dont elle n'a cessé d'être le bienfaiteur et dont l'abandon mettrait le comble aux épreuves nombreuses qu'il a subis.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) STIRBEY.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 321.

*Prince Ghyka to Reshid Pasha.*

Monseigneur, *Jassy, le $\frac{5}{17}$ Août*, 1853.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir à temps l'ordre en date du $\frac{1}{13}$ Juillet, que votre Altesse Sérénissime m'a fait parvenir de quitter le pays en considération des circonstances dont son occupation par les troupes Russes a été accompagnée. Je me suis empressé, en conséquence, d'établir une entente avec mon collégue le Prince de Valachie, non seulement dans le but de concerter nos demarches pour un cas qui nous était commun, mais à fin de m'éclairer jusqu'à quel point notre volonté serait exempte de toute entrave. Dans cette intervalle la nouvelle de notre rappel, répandue dans le pays par la voie du "Journal de Constantinople," a produit une vive sensation parmi les populations habituées à trouver en moi la garantie de leur sécurité et de la protection de leurs droits et de leurs intérêts. De tous les districts et de toutes les classes des habitants des adresses revêtues de nombreuses signatures me sont parvenues pour me prier de soumettre aux pieds du Trône Impérial le vœu général de la nation Moldave qui, au milieu des conjonctures critiques où le besoin de la présence de son chef se fait le plus sentir, a osé placer son espoir dans la magnanimité de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, dont le cœur miséricordieux témoigne une si précieuse sollicitude pour le sort des populations de son Empire.

L'importance de cette manifestation, qui implique une intervention de la nation entre la Sublime Porte et moi, non moins que la gravité des circonstances qui semblent la légitimer, ont dû m'imposer le devoir de prendre en considération le vœu général qui consiste à porter, avant toute démarche, le cas à la connaissance de la Sublime Porte.

C'est en raison de ces motifs impérieux que j'ose soumettre aujourd'hui à la haute appréciation de votre Altesse Sérénissime le rapport du Conseil Administratif Extraordinaire, accompagné de l'adresse du haut clergé, ainsi que de celles des municipalités des treize districts de la Principauté, auxquelles se sont associés par leurs signatures des habitants de toutes les classes de la société.

Il appartient à votre Altesse Sérénissime de peser dans sa sagesse les considérations d'intérêt majeur qui ont dicté le vœu de la nation Moldave. Quant à moi, puisant ma justification dans l'accomplissement d'un devoir sacré, je vous prie, Monseigneur, d'agréer, &c.

(Signé) G. GHYKA.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 321.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Gardner.*

Sir, *Therapia, August* 22, 1853.

THOUGH I received on the 14th instant your answer to my despatch of the 4th, I delayed the repetition of my instructions, partly in the hope of learning from your next communication that on further reflection you had acted in obedience to their contents. Being now in possession of your despatch



No. 15 of the 11th instant, which shows that you still remained in error, while your colleague, the French Consul, acting under instructions from M. Boujade at Bucharest as well as from his Ambassador, had hauled down his Consular flag, as M. de la Cour informs me, I have to repeat my instruction that you cease to hoist yours from the receipt of this despatch, and, in concert with M. Testa, execute in all respects the instructions which I addressed to Mr. Colquhoun on the th, and sent to you in copy that you might act in the same manner.

The Hospodar's excuses are not accepted at the Porte, and the orders previously sent to him are to be repeated. There is no question of intrigue as his Highness appears to have supposed. The Porte in ordering his retirement for the reasons known to you, acted on political and not on administrative grounds. It was his obvious duty to obey the Sovereign's command.

I abstain from any remarks upon your despatch of the . The correspondence must necessarily go to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I expect to hear from you in reply to this instruction without any unnecessary delay.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 5 in No. 321.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Gardner.*

Sir, *Therapia, August* 23, 1853.

SINCE I addressed to you the number which immediately precedes this, I have received your despatch of the 13th instant.

For the present I have only to repeat my instructions that you cease forthwith to hoist your Consular colours, and that you suspend your official functions, lending privately your assistance to such of Her Majesty's subjects as may apply for it on proper grounds.

Independently of other considerations this step is required, and cannot be dispensed with, as a point of honour towards France, whose Consul, your colleague, has acted with so much good sense and propriety, not to say in vindication of the orders which I had previously conveyed to you, on a perfect understanding with the French Ambassador as well as with the Ottoman Porte.

You will hear from me further as soon as I have communicated fully with Reshid Pasha and M. de la Cour on the subject of Prince Ghyka's excuses, received, I believe, yesterday at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 322.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 245. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 26, 1853.

FOR your more complete information I have the honour to inclose herewith, in copy, a letter from the Prince of Wallachia to Reshid Pasha, marked most confidential, and communicated to me in strict confidence by the Ottoman Secretary of State.

I take the opportunity to forward herewith a despatch together with its inclosure, addressed to me by Mr. Cunningham.

The inclosure is a kind of protest drawn up by a Moldavian Boyard of distinction in testimony of his objections to the conduct of the Hospodar in that Principality.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 322.

*Prince Stirbey to Reshid Pasha.*

(Très Confidentielle.)

Monseigneur, *Ce* $\frac{20 \text{ Juillet}}{1^{er} \text{ Août}}$, 1853.

MA pleine confiance dans la sagesse et la bienveillante sollicitude de la Sublime Porte, et la connaissance que j'ai toujours eue de mes devoirs, me donnent tout lieu d'espérer qu'elle ne trouvera pas que j'ai dévié de mes sentiments de loyauté et de dévoûment en soumettant à sa haute décision les vœux du pays alarmé par les effets de mon départ subit, dans des conjonctures si graves et si délicates.

Comme j'ai à cœur de ne pas laisser exister le moindre nuage à cet égard, je prends la liberté de soumettre à l'appréciation éclairée de votre Altesse quelques considérations qui, j'ose m'en flatter, pourront la convaincre de la nécessité et de la loyauté des motifs impérieux qui m'ont guidé dans cette circonstance. Ces motifs sont en résumé les suivants :—

1. L'intérêt de la Sublime Porte, dont les droits seraient infiniment mieux sauvegardés par la conservation à son poste du Hospodar, qui représente l'autorité légitime, et qui n'a cessé de former le lien par lequel le pays continue à être attaché au Gouvernement Ottoman et à lui donner des marques de la soumission et de sa fidélité.

2. L'intérêt du pays lui-même, qui a toujours excité la sollicitude paternelle du Gouvernement Impérial, et qui se trouverait tout d'un coup exposé à l'anarchie, à la désorganisation, en un mot à la perturbation profonde que doit amener infailliblement le manque subit de toute autorité légale au milieu de l'inquiétude et des appréhensions sans nombre qui agitent les esprits en ce moment.

Je n'hésite pas à affirmer à votre Altesse qu'il n'a fallu rien moins que les symptômes alarmans qui se sont manifestés dès que la nouvelle de mon départ a transpiré dans le public, et la certitude acquise qu'une administration militaire Russe remplacerait l'autorité régulière aussitôt que j'aurai quitté la ville, pour me porter à conjurer la Sublime Porte de ne rien précipiter à cet égard avant nouvelles et mûres délibérations. D'autre part, l'ordre de quitter le pays n'était-il pas un peu tardif? Après que les droits et la dignité de la Sublime Porte ont été réservés et sauvegardés par la protestation contre l'occupation et contre toutes ses conséquences, cette nouvelle mesure, avec les graves inconvéniens qu'elle entraîne, est-elle bien indispensable? Si je l'avais reçu avant le passage du Pruth, j'aurais été heureux de n'avoir pas à subir une position épineuse et pénible. Mais votre Altesse peut-elle croire que cette retraite soit facile, et même possible, maintenant en présence d'une armée de 80,000 hommes; et ne susciterait-elle pas une nouvelle complication au moment même où les efforts les plus actifs et les plus louables sont faits avec la perspective d'amener une solution pacifique et prochaine de la crise qui pèse sur toute l'Europe, et plus particulièrement sur la malheureuse et innocente Valachie?

Sans vouloir me faire un mérite de ce qui n'est que l'accomplissement d'un devoir, je puis assurer que c'est uniquement à ma présence et à mes efforts soutenus que le pays est redevable d'être allégé du poids inséparable de l'occupation militaire, et qu'il doit aussi l'ordre et la régularité que je me sens attaché à faire observer, dans les fournitures réclamées afin de prévenir toute perte ou surcroit de charge pour les habitants. Mais en cas de mon départ on doit s'attendre à ce que le pays, abandonné à la merci d'une foule d'agents subalternes désormais sans contrôle et dont la rapacité n'aura plus aucun frein, soit complètement épuisé et ne se relève longtemps.

J'ose espérer que ces considérations très-essentielles auront assez de poids auprès de votre Altesse Sérénissime pour justifier de tous points ma démarche. Bien que je n'aie fait qu'indiquer sommairement ces considérations sans leur donner les développements qu'elles comportent et que n'échapperont point sans doute à la pénétration et à la haute perspicacité de votre Altesse, j'ose la supplier de vouloir bien en tenir le contenu exclusivement réservé pour elle, excepté le seul cas où elle jugerait convenable de la soumettre à la haute connaissance de Sa Majesté Impériale.



Mais je ne puis me résoudre à achever cet exposé sans protester contre le procédé précipité et pour le moins peu-bienveillant de Mr. Colquhoun, par le canal duquel votre Altesse a bien voulu me faire parvenir sa dépêche. Cet agent a cru devoir interpréter arbitrairement ma conduite et la préjuger au point d'écrire au Secrétaire d'Etat en motivant la suspension de ses relations officielles avec le Gouvernement local, sur ce "qu'il aurait acquis la conviction que je ne suis pas dans l'intention d'obtempérer à l'invitation qui m'a été faite par la Sublime Porte de quitter de suite et provisoirement la Principauté."

Je ne puis qu'en appeler aux témoignages des faits comme du public entier de même que de tous les Agents Consulaires, pour démontrer l'inexactitude et le mal-fondé de cette assertion tout-à-fait hazardé. Je me réserve de faire appel en tems opportun à la Seigneurie Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, juge compétent en matière d'honneur et de loyauté.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) STIRBEY.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 322.

*Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord, *Galatz, August* 16, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship an original protestative letter, addressed to me just now by M. P. Balsch, a Moldavian Boyard.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 322.

*M. Balsch to Consul Cunningham.*

Monsieur, *Tortelesty, 4 Août*, 1853.

Il est sans doute parvenu à votre connaissance que la Sublime Porte a jugé à propos de rappeler nos Hospodars. Au lieu d'obéir immédiatement à l'ordre suprême de notre Auguste Suzerain, l'Hospodar de Moldavie a chargé son Ministre de l'Intérieur, M. le Logothète Constantin Stourdza, qui a envoyé trois émissaires dans le pays recueillir des signatures dans tous les districts, engageant le Prince de ne pas quitter le pays lorsqu'il est occupé militairement, et pour qu'il n'arrive aucun accident.

Vous conviendrez, M. le Consul, que l'Hospodar, pour couvrir sa désobéissance à l'ordre de Sa Hautesse Impériale, veut par ce moyen compromettre tout le pays et les paisibles habitants qui n'en savent rien. Il veut nous rendre traîtres vis-à-vis de la Sublime Porte, et se couvrir de notre défense pour répondre à sa désobéissance, et pour cela il se prend d'une manière unique dans ce genre: les uns il les effraie en les chassant de leur emploi, les autres en leur disant que c'est la volonté de la Russie, quand le Commandant-en-chef de l'armée Russe, interpellé sur ce sujet par l'Hospodar de Valachie, a répondu que cela ne le régarde pas. L'Hospodar veut se couvrir d'un masque pour ne pas obéir à l'ordre Impérial, et puisqu'il s'est compromis lui-même, il veut avec lui compromettre le pays entier. Cependant, M. le Consul, ce n'est que les employés et les nécessiteux qui ont signé le papier en question. Aucun véritable Boyard n'a pas apposé sa signature, et pour ma part je proteste devant vous, M. le Consul, de ma fidélité envers notre Auguste Suzerain, et je vous supplie de porter à la connaissance de la Mission Britannique à Constantinople, ainsi qu'à la connaissance de la Sublime Porte, puisque tout autre moyen nous est fermé de plaindre à notre Souzerain, de quelle manière l'Hospodar se prend pour compromettre le pays entier et pour lui attirer toutes sortes de désagréments. Je vous prierais de faire parvenir cette notion par le bateau de demain, puisque notre Prince envoie aussi demain sa justification.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) BALSCH.

No. 323.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 246.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 26, 1853.*

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, is the copy of a letter which I received yesterday from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Odessa. It relates to the number of Russian troops either sent into the two Principalities, or stationed as reserves in Bessarabia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 323.

*Consul-General Yeames to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.) *Odessa, August 22, 1853.*

THE whole of the 4th Corps d'Armée is now between the Pruth and the Danube, excepting its reserves, which are still kept far in the rear. The three divisions of infantry comprise twelve regiments or forty-eight battalions, and one battalion of riflemen and one of sappers are attached to it. There is further a brigade or eight battalions belonging to one of the divisions of the 5th Corps quartered in and about Jassy, thus making fifty-eight battalions; and if the present strength of the battalion be estimated at 700 men under arms, I believe this appreciation will exceed rather than be below the truth. At most, therefore, the infantry may amount to 40,000 men. Of regular cavalry there are the 4th and 5th Divisions, comprising together eight regiments of lancers and hussars, and, I am told, four or five regiments of Cossacks. It is with reserve that I should state the actual force of horsemen to be 10,000 to 12,000. Of artillery, twelve batteries or ninety-six guns are attached to the three divisions of infantry, and two batteries or sixteen guns to the cavalry.

On this side of the Pruth, four battalions of the 15th Division of Infantry, belonging to the 5th Corps d'Armée, are at Leova and Rickness, and four battalions at Ismail, where they had been sent by forced marches early in July, in consequence of a report, now considered absurd, of some hostile plan of attack on the part of the Nekonsopti, a fugitive remnant of the old Tapoooques, settled about Pulcha and Isakcha. The 14th Division of Infantry is now quartered between the Dniester and Odessa; and the remaining division of the 5th Corps (the 13th) is stationary at Sevastopol. The reserves are arrested on the left side of the Dnieper.

The 3rd Corps d'Armée is still moving to take up the former position of the 4th Corps, facing the Polish frontier of Austria.

The flotilla in the Danube consisted in January last of about thirty gunboats stationed at Ismail, and a few more may have come from Nicolayeff. Of this force a statement was lately made in the House of Lords monstrously exaggerated.

A part of the fleet has been throughout the season at sea for evolutions, at no distance from Sevastopol, and the troops there have been practised in embarkation and landing.

The intelligence lately received here has raised the hope of a speedy cessation of all warlike measures, and that peace will secure the prosperity of these ports, which otherwise would be annihilated.

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No. 324.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 666. Confidential.)

My Lord; *Paris, September 8, 1853.*

M. DE HUBNER made yesterday a communication to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which the latter repeated confidentially to me.

Count Buol informs the French Government that the Emperor of Russia has addressed a despatch to the Austrian Cabinet, announcing his intentions in regard to the Principalities. His Imperial Majesty does not mean to make the evacuation of them depend on the departure of the English and French fleets from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles; but he will not order the Russian troops to recross the Pruth until a Turkish Ambassador shall have reached St. Petersburgh and placed in his hands, without any alteration, the note drawn up at Vienna, of which His Majesty has signified his acceptance.

As a similar communication will no doubt have been made to your Lordship by Count Colloredo I do not enter into the minutiæ of the Russian despatch.

M. de Hübner added, that Count Buol considered this decision of the Emperor of Russia to be quite satisfactory, and trusted that it would meet with the approbation of the French Government.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that, with regard to the fleets, he could only repeat what M. de Hübner knew, that France would not permit any condition respecting their movements to be made. With regard to the Emperor of Russia's intentions relative to the Principalities, he could say nothing officially without taking the orders of the Emperor; but he had no objection to state, as his personal opinion, that the Emperor of Russia's conduct appeared harsh in the extreme. There were different stages at which His Majesty might have announced his intention to order the evacuation of the Principalities—upon the acceptation of the note by the Porte; or upon the nomination of an Ambassador to proceed with it to Russia; or upon the departure of that Ambassador from Constantinople; or upon his arrival at Vienna; or again, upon his reaching St. Petersburgh; or lastly, upon the actual receipt of the note from the hands of that Ambassador. The Emperor had chosen the last, and consequently the most humiliating to the Porte. Now Turkey, and with her France and England, had also different stages at which they might consider this matter as settled. Upon the acceptance of the above-mentioned note by the Emperor of Russia, or upon his promise to evacuate the Principalities, or upon orders being sent for that purpose, or upon the commencement or during the progress of the evacuation, or lastly when the last Russian soldiers should have crossed the Pruth.

After giving me these details of his conversation with M. de Hübner, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he wished I would inquire of your Lordship, at which of these stages Her Majesty's Government would consider that the Porte might direct her Ambassador to leave Constantinople.

I said that I would not fail to convey his inquiry to your Lordship; but that I thought that it should be addressed rather to the Porte, who must be the supreme judge as to the moment when it would be compatible with her honour to direct a special embassy to proceed to Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 325.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 358.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 10, 1853.*

IN reply to the inquiry which, at the request of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, your Excellency has addressed to me in your despatch No. 666, marked confidential, I have to state that Her Majesty's Government entirely agree with M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the course which the Emperor of Russia proposes to pursue is

the most illiberal and humiliating towards Turkey that he could adopt; but in answering a categorical question of the Austrian Cabinet which threw some doubt upon the Emperor's previous assurances regarding the evacuation of the Principalities, it was, perhaps, not to be expected that he should lower his demands with respect to receiving the note before the orders for withdrawing the Russian troops were given, in ignorance, as he then was, whether the note would be accepted by the Porte; but whenever a note is agreed to, it is to be hoped that the remonstrances which should then be addressed to His Majesty by the Four Powers, will induce him to act in a manner consistent with the dignity of the Sultan.

It should be remembered that the offer to send an Ambassador to St. Petersburgh first emanated from the Porte; before the evacuation of the Principalities, it is true; but the offer was subsequently repeated, without reference to their evacuation, in the note sent by Reshid Pasha to Vienna, and it was, for the first time, made an absolute condition in the note addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Four Representatives at Constantinople.

It seems then to Her Majesty's Government that in the event of the Turkish modifications being accepted by the Emperor of Russia, or of any form of note being agreed upon between the two Governments, the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna might be charged to be the bearer of it to St. Petersburgh, but that he should not take his departure until he had received such assurances respecting the evacuation of the Principalities as the dignity of the Sultan would demand.

The Emperor could hardly refuse to give the necessary orders for withdrawing his forces when he knew that the note he was prepared to accept had actually arrived at Vienna; while, on the other hand, the Turkish Ambassador would not set foot on the Russian territory until the honour of the Sultan was satisfied.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 326.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 359. Secret.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1853.

I INCLOSE herewith copies of two despatches* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople relative to a proposal made by M. de la Cour to Reshid Pasha that conditional orders should be sent to the Pasha of the Dardanelles for permitting the French squadron to pass through the Straits. I likewise inclose a copy of my reply† to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, and I have to instruct your Excellency to inquire what demand M. de la Cour was really instructed to make.

Her Majesty's Government are disposed to think that it could not have been exactly that which was communicated by Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, as it is not in harmony with the tenour of the announcement made to your Excellency by M. Drouyn de Lhuys as reported in your despatch No. 641 of the 28th ultimo.

Nevertheless, it is to be regretted that any cause should have been given to the Turkish Ministers for supposing that there could be any difference in the policy between the two Governments, or diminution of that cordial understanding which exists between them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* See Nos. 318 and 320. † See No. 327.



No. 327.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 183. Secret.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1853.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to M. de la Cour, as reported in your secret despatch No. 238 of August 24, with reference to a proposal which he had made to Reshid Pasha, that conditional orders should be sent to the Pasha of the Dardanelles, for permitting the French squadron to pass through the Strait on the application of the French Admiral.

Her Majesty's Government regret that this demand should have been made by M. de la Cour, without communication to your Excellency, and also without any communication to Her Majesty's Government by that of France that such a demand would be made; and a representation will be addressed to M. de Lhuys in order to prevent the recurrence of acts which might lead the Porte into the error of supposing that there was any difference in the policy of the two Governments. Your Excellency will of course understand that the instructions which you have already received with regard to the disposal of the British fleet remain in full force.

It is the wish of both the English and French Governments—and that wish there is reason to believe is shared in by Austria and Prussia—to come to an agreement for better securing the future independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and your Excellency will find a distinct proposition to that effect in Lord Cowley's despatch No. 633 of August 24, of which a copy was transmitted to you in my despatch No. 179 of the 8th instant.

In my answer to Lord Cowley, No. 337 of August 30, of which a copy was transmitted to you at the same time, you will see that Her Majesty's Government, while concurring in the views of the French Government, think the proper time for giving effect to them would be when the question now pending between Russia and the Porte is settled. In the meanwhile Her Majesty's Government observe with satisfaction that the opinions of the Austrian Government, of which you will find an account in my despatch to the Earl of Westmorland No. 284 of the 7th instant (also sent to you in copy on the 8th), respecting the future policy of the Porte and the administration of the internal affairs of Turkey, are in harmony with those of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 328.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 184.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government have had under their serious consideration the note addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople on the 19th of August, explaining the modifications proposed by the Porte to the project of note sent from Vienna.

Reshid Pasha appears to complain that the Porte was not consulted; and I have to observe that the course previously pursued by the Porte, when a proposal for settlement was submitted to it, appeared to render subsequent consultation inexpedient, as leading only to further loss of time. For it must be borne in mind, that on the 22nd of June the Internuncio, in pursuance of instructions given to him by Count Buol in anticipation of the possible refusal of the Porte to comply with the requisition contained in Count Nesselrode's letter to Reshid Pasha of the 31st of May, suggested to the Porte again to examine Prince Menchikoff's proposed note, and to compare it with that which Reshid Pasha was himself prepared to address to the Prince previously to his departure from Constantinople; and if the Porte was inclined to propose any alteration in the

Russian draft which it could accept itself, and which was likely to be accepted by Russia, the Internuncio offered to convey to his Government the proposals of the Porte as the basis of its further mediation, and with a view to preparing a favourable reception for the Ambassador whom the Porte intended to send to St. Petersburgh.

Upon this suggestion being made known to your Excellency, and to your colleagues of France and Prussia, by Reshid Pasha and also by the Internuncio, you assembled the Representatives of the Four Powers at your house, and they concurred in agreeing to suggest to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to frame a draft of note which should combine Prince Menchikoff's draft and that of Reshid Pasha, in the hope that a note might be drawn up which should be at once acceptable to Russia, and should at the same time not trench upon the principle which the Porte considered essential for the maintenance of its sovereign rights.

This suggestion was laid before the Sultan; and, as stated in your Excellency's despatch No. 145 of the 9th of July, after an unexplained delay of several days, returned to Reshid Pasha with His Majesty's sanction; but no subsequent communication was made either to your Excellency, or, as far as you knew, to your colleagues, on the subject.

Her Majesty's Government thought it most unfortunate, as well as ungracious towards the Austrian Government, that this opportunity for effecting an arrangement should thus, and without even a reason for it being assigned, have been neglected; but it was not unnatural for the Austrian Government to suppose that a repetition of the request would be useless; and considering that the occupation of the Principalities was fraught with danger, not to Turkey alone, but to the peace of Europe, Count Buol thought it advisable to call together the Representatives of England, France, and Prussia, and with their concurrence to prepare a note that might prove acceptable both to Russia and to the Porte.

With this object they took the note which had been drawn up by the French Government, and which having been at one time communicated by the French Minister at St. Petersburgh to Count Nesselrode, had been favourably received; and Her Majesty's Government and the French Government were consulted as to adopting this note with certain modifications that it seemed to require; and both Governments replied that, without seeing the modifications, they could give no assent; but upon their being transmitted and carefully considered, they appeared to be unobjectionable, and were approved, although afterwards an alteration was made by Her Majesty's Government more effectually to guard the interests of Turkey. And it is hardly necessary to add, that if the English and French Governments had not concurred in thinking that those interests were protected, and that the principle for which we had all along been contending was maintained, neither Government would have assented to the note.

When things had thus far advanced the Turkish project arrived at Vienna. It consisted of the protest against the occupation of the Principalities, inclosed in a note from Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode, and to be followed by another note less definite in its meaning than that which he had been ready to address to Prince Menchikoff. Such a proposal could not have led to the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two countries—it was sure to be declined by Russia; the forwarding it to St. Petersburgh could only have been productive of further loss of time—a consideration of the utmost importance; and a preference was therefore unanimously given to the note which in substance had been well received at St. Petersburgh, and which there was every reason to expect would meet the views of the Turkish Government. This project was received at Constantinople on the 9th ultimo; but it was not until the 19th that the note was accepted with modifications.

Her Majesty's Government are far from denying that these modifications are in themselves unobjectionable; but they do not consider them of that vital importance, nor that they offer such additional security to Turkey, as to counterbalance the risks to which the Ottoman Empire is exposed by further postponing the settlement of this unfortunate question.

The first objection taken by the Porte is to the following paragraph: "Si à toute époque les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Église Grecque Orthodoxe dans



l'Empire Ottoman, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les consacrer de nouveau par des Actes solennels."

Now it appears to be natural that the Emperors of Russia should exhibit solicitude for those who profess their religion, and are living under Mahomedan rule; but Her Majesty's Government cannot consider that by the paragraph in question this solicitude shown in times past can be taken to have imposed any obligation, or to imply that the acts of the Sultans in favour of the Greek Church were not voluntary and spontaneous; and upon no construction of this passage could Russia found any future claim to require of the Sultan to perform such acts. The passage is simply historical, and may be true or false; but Russia establishes no right, and Turkey takes no engagement by the recital. The Great Powers of Europe have at different times manifested their active solicitude for the Christian subjects of the Porte; none more frequently and energetically than England. They have done so in behalf of suffering humanity and outraged religion; and their just remonstrances have met with more or less success. But the power of the Sultan not to listen to them has never been questioned; and the right of Christian Powers thus to interfere may again and again be exercised without prejudice to his independence. Can there be any doubt that the firmans which the Sultan of his own free will lately issued, were in consequence of the anxiety for his Christian subjects felt by his Christian allies; or that those Christian subjects will not obtain some alleviation of the sufferings and injustice to which they are exposed, by the powerful protests which your Excellency a short time ago felt yourself compelled to address to the Porte? In listening to such remonstrances and in acting upon them, the Porte acquires respect and esteem, but it parts with no right and contracts no engagement.

Reshid Pasha says, with reference to the paragraph, that no one would consent to draw down upon himself the reproaches and the blame of his contemporaries, as well as posterity, by admitting the establishment of a state of things as injurious for the present as the future; or to put in writing words that could detract from the glory of institutions that the Ottoman Emperors have founded by a spontaneous movement of their personal generosity and innate clemency. But the paragraph neither warrants any such interpretation, nor calls for any such censure; and if it did, it would be as applicable to Great Britain, to France, and to Austria, as to Russia.

In considering the original draft of the note, the special attention of Her Majesty's Government was directed to the Treaty of Kainardji, for the purpose of securing that the Porte should be called upon to do no more with respect to religious privileges than that to which Reshid Pasha says it is ready to consent, namely, to express "des assurances propres à faire disparaître les doutes mis en avant par le Gouvernement de Russie, et qui ont formé le sujet des discussions."

But the paragraph states "que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan restera fidèle à la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traités de Kainardji et d'Andrinople relatives à la protection du culte Chrétien."

To this there can be no objection, because Reshid Pasha says, "Comme personne ne saurait nier que ce Traité existe, et qu'il est confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, il est de toute évidence que les dispositions précises en seront fidèlement observées."

The second part of the paragraph, however, is in no way dependent on the first, but on the contrary is disconnected from it. It does not say that as a consequence of the Treaty, the Sultan "will regard," &c., but the word "and" is expressly introduced to guard against such a consequence being assumed. The true reading, therefore, is, "the Sultan will remain faithful to the Treaties." His Majesty also "regarde comme étant de son honneur de faire observer à tout jamais et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit présentement, soit dans l'avenir, la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui ont été accordés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté à l'Église Orthodoxe de l'Orient, et sont maintenus et confirmés par elle."

Now if any part of this paragraph can justify the fears entertained by Reshid Pasha of giving "au Gouvernement de Russie des motifs de prétendre à exercer un droit de surveillance et d'immiscion dans de pareilles matières," it assuredly is not the first passage nor its supposed connexion with the second; but it is the second itself, by which the Sultan makes no ordinary engagement,

but pledges his honour to maintain for ever inviolate all the privileges enjoyed by the Greek Church; and this second passage is taken verbatim from the note which Reshid Pasha was prepared to address to Prince Menchikoff.

With respect to the third paragraph objected to by the Porte, the view of Her Majesty's Government was precisely that which is taken in the note of Reshid Pasha, namely, "On ne saurait douter que le Gouvernement Impérial n'hésitera pas à faire participer le rit Grec non seulement aux avantages qu'il a de sa propre volonté accordés aux autres communions de la religion Chrétienne professées par les communautés ses sujettes, mais aussi à ceux qu'il pourrait leur octroyer à l'avenir."

The passage which follows the words "en outre" was meant to have a prospective sense, and the words "rits Chrétiens" were understood to apply to subjects of the Porte.

It would be simply absurd to suppose that the idea ever could have been contemplated of extending to several millions of the subjects of the Porte religious privileges granted at different times to the subjects of other Powers residing within the Ottoman territory. Her Majesty's Government had not, nor have they now upon reconsideration, any fear that this passage could be interpreted in the sense attributed to it by Reshid Pasha; nor do they conceive that there is really any substantial difference between the passage in the Vienna note and the modification proposed by the Porte, which could leave room for misunderstanding hereafter.

Such being the opinions of Her Majesty's Government, they cannot but regret the course that has been pursued at Constantinople. They do not question the right, or the propriety, on the part of the Turkish Government, to examine closely the note that was proposed for their adoption; but if it had been signed subject to any reservations that the Porte thought necessary, or if the judicious proposal of your Excellency, as reported in your despatch No. 222 of the 18th of August, had been acted upon, great delay would have been avoided, and some important advantages might have been gained.

Such a mode of proceeding would at once have removed the doubts which now generally prevail respecting the desire or intention of the Porte to effect a peaceful settlement; and as the modifications proposed by the Turkish Government merely interpret the note in the sense intended by the Four Powers, they could not have hesitated to accept them, and thus give the Sultan a security for the future. In fact, they would have constituted themselves referees as to the true interpretation of the note, in the event of any difference arising hereafter upon it between the Porte and Russia. Not only were these modifications considered unimportant and as not altering the sense of the note by the Austrian Government, but by the Russian Minister at Vienna; and it might reasonably therefore have been expected, that if the note had been signed Russia would have joined the Four Powers in agreeing to its right interpretation.

Your Excellency will understand that the modifications, although in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government unnecessary, are not objected to as unreasonable, but that the mode of proposing them is likely to be productive of embarrassment, and to retard the solution of a question which Turkey is so deeply interested in settling; and they do not disguise from themselves that the Emperor of Russia, with reference to the condition upon which he reluctantly adhered to the note, may now decline to agree to the changes, notwithstanding that they have been strongly recommended by the Four Powers to his acceptance.

Reshid Pasha in his note says, that in the event of the modifications being adopted the Porte will immediately send an Ambassador Extraordinary, upon condition of the evacuation of the Principalities; and he adds, that a solid guarantee will be expected from the Powers "contre toute ingérence à l'avenir et toute occupation de tems en tems des Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie."

With respect to the first, it has always been considered, not only by Her Majesty's Government, but by the four Powers, that the evacuation of the Principalities was the *sine qua non* of any arrangement being concluded on the part of the Porte; and they have no reason to doubt, but on the contrary they have cause to believe, that if the note had been accepted by the Porte the orders for the withdrawal of the Russian troops would long before this time have been given.



As regards the solid guarantee expected by the Porte, Reshid Pasha must well know that it is utterly impossible for the Four Powers to enter into any such engagement. The term "ingérence" by itself is most vague, and might be held to apply to the legitimate reclamations and remonstrances that, according to international law and usage, every Government is entitled to address to another; nor could the Four Powers make such a proposal to Russia, and still less give any guarantee upon the subject, without reciprocally imposing upon themselves similar conditions, and thus leaving the Turkish Government at perfect liberty to deal as it pleased with the religious, the social, and the commercial interests of their respective subjects throughout the Ottoman Empire. In short, it would be as impossible to promise that for the future there shall be no "ingérence" on the part of Russia, as it would be to undertake that towards that Power there shall never be a just cause of complaint given by Turkey; and if any such engagement were entered into by the Four Powers, it might be justly considered by Turkey as an insult to her honour, and a disregard for her independence which she would not endure.

Equally difficult would it be to give a solid guarantee against any future occupation of the Principalities with reference to the peculiar Treaty which exists between the Two Powers respecting those provinces, and which under certain circumstances (of which the Powers could not always constitute themselves judges) gives to Russia as well as to Turkey the right of sending troops there. That Treaty, it is true, has now been grossly violated; but it is to be hoped that there will be no renewal of an act against which the opinion of Europe has been unequivocally pronounced.

The Porte, however, may be well assured that its own interest can hardly exceed that of its allies in endeavouring by every means in their power to prevent the recurrence of events such as those which for some months past have endangered the peace of the world.

In conclusion, I have to observe that these last conditions were not made in the note sent to Vienna, and which, without them, the Porte was prepared to sign as a final settlement of the question. There is consequently some reason to apprehend that they have since been brought forward, under the conviction that they could not be complied with; and should this unfortunately be the case it will verify the prediction of your Excellency made as long ago as the 16th of July, that there would soon be more to apprehend from the rashness than from the timidity of the Turkish Ministers; and it will confirm the opinion lately communicated to Her Majesty's Government, and which they gather also from the tone of your Excellency's despatches, namely, "that the feeling of the Turkish Government is a desire for war, founded on the conviction that France and England must still perforce side with Turkey, and that the war will, therefore, be a successful one for the Sultan, and obtain for him guarantees for the future which will materially strengthen his tottering power."

England and France will shrink from no obligation that their honour and their duty clearly prescribe, let the sacrifice be what it may of fulfilling that obligation. Although bound by no Treaty stipulations, they look upon the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as a great feature of European policy, and they desire to uphold the dignity and independence of the Sultan. But other interests besides those of Turkey are committed to their charge, and before they expose these to the dangers and the injury that war would inevitably entail, they are bound to take care that no effort for the preservation of peace has been omitted; and it is, therefore, in the most friendly spirit, and with a sincere regard for the best interests of Turkey, that Her Majesty's Government advise the Porte not to be dazzled by the military preparations which with laudable zeal for their own defence they have lately made, not to yield to the religious fanaticism for which such just provocation has been given, nor to think that war under the present circumstances of the Ottoman Empire can fail to be attended with consequences most disastrous; but, on the contrary, that they should exhibit a cordial readiness to adopt, and not a desire to evade, such an adjustment of their present unfortunate differences with Russia as they may think safe and honourable.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 329.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 10.)*

(No. 460.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 2, 1853.*

THE Russian Government are still without any details as to the objections entertained by the Sultan as to the *projet de note* in its present form, which was sent from Vienna.

Their Vienna intelligence comes down only to the 25th ultimo, and acquaints them simply that the Sultan's acceptance of the note is subjected to its receiving several modifications, the nature and extent of which are not indicated.

When I saw the Chancellor yesterday, he spoke to me with some animation, I should perhaps say asperity, of the conduct of the Turks. If they had, he said, the faintest perception of their own interests, they ought to have given their adhesion to the *projet de note* with alacrity (des deux mains). That which the Emperor had received without change or hesitation in the course of twenty-four hours, should unquestionably have been received by the Turks with the same expedition; their hesitation or their refusal was most deplorable, and it led to the suspicion of the Turkish Government not having been made sufficiently sensible of the dangers to which they were exposing themselves.

I replied, that I regretted as much as Count Nesselrode could do that the note had not been accepted as it stood; but that when he blamed the Turks, I must only remind him that every allowance was to made for a people who were trembling not only for their religion, but for their very existence. That it must not be forgotten that the late conduct of Russian agents in Bulgaria, who had been disseminating translations of the Imperial Circular and Manifesto, was calculated to arouse the religious and political feelings of a sensitive people, and that it appeared to have that effect to such a degree, that the suspicions of the Turks were directed not only against their avowed enemies, but against their Christian friends and allies.

This I said I should remark, not so much as a reproach as in the way of history, and as explaining a resistance which Count Nesselrode had considered incomprehensible.

The Chancellor retorted with considerable animation, that the conduct ascribed to Russian agency would have no influence upon the Turks, or upon their interests; that what must infallibly affect them would be the persecutions which the Christians were enduring in Bosnia.

Of them, as I stated, I had no knowledge, and I thought that any facts bearing upon these accusations required close examination.

The Chancellor proceeded to remark, that being unacquainted with the details of the alterations required by the Porte, and not having seen the Emperor since the arrival of the Vienna intelligence on the 30th ultimo, he really was unable to speak with certainty of the Emperor's intentions. He could only say, that after all the concessions which had been made by the Emperor, it might be conjectured that concession had reached its term; this, indeed, had been plainly stated in the despatch to Baron Meyendorff, signifying His Majesty's acceptance [*sans variante*] of the Vienna *projet de note*.

This despatch, dated the 28th July, was, Count Nesselrode said, known to your Lordship, and a copy of it, which he took from his portfolio, he begged me to read.

In conclusion, the Chancellor expressed his apprehensions that no further Constantinople intelligence was to be expected before Tuesday next, the 6th instant.

I may state to your Lordship that the language of military men here is, that the evacuation of the Principalities must take place very speedily, if it is to take place at all this year, as the roads become so deep in the provinces and in Bessarabia after the autumnal rains as to be impassable for artillery, and very trying to troops of all descriptions.

It appears to me that the Sultan's conduct at this crisis of affairs is deeply to be regretted. At this moment every day lost or saved is a matter of great importance; and whether the Emperor rejects the modifications desired at Constantinople, or whether he admits them, the loss will be on the Turkish side.



In the by far less probable hypothesis, a dangerous question, after being made more serious, is left open as before. In the other, the unwillingness of the Sultan to bend to the suggestions of his allies would offer an unfavourable contrast to the readiness with which they were acceded to by the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 330.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 355.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 9, 1853.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 204 of the 7th instant, directing me to express the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the late communication respecting the policy of Prussia on the Eastern question.

I called on Baron Manteuffel this afternoon, and after reading to his Excellency your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch, the contents of which appeared to cause him much gratification, I thought it advisable to leave it with him for communication to the King; and I trust that it may assist in obtaining the cordial cooperation of Prussia in whatever future negotiations may become necessary concerning the affairs of the East.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 331.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 13.)*

(No. 675.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 12, 1853.*

I HAVE questioned M. de Lhuys this morning relative to the proposal mentioned in your Lordship's secret despatch No. 359, as having been made by M. de la Cour to Reshid Pasha, that conditional orders should be sent to the Pasha of the Dardanelles for permitting the French squadron to pass through the Straits. I found that his Excellency had received a despatch from Count Walewski upon the same subject, and that he understood your Lordship to be annoyed at an appearance of want of confidence on the part of the French Government in not having informed you of the demand made by them upon the Porte.

"But," said M. de Lhuys, "if my memory does not deceive me, I gave full information of the whole circumstance to Count Walewski. At all events I had no intention to keep it, as I could have no advantage in keeping it, a secret from the British Government. The idea," he continued, "originated with the Emperor, who, in anticipation of the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to accept the Vienna note, and of the possible advance of the Russian troops upon Turkey, had thought it prudent that the fleets should be prepared to enter the Dardanelles, and had consequently desired him to take measures for procuring the necessary firmans. This he had done by telegraph through Vienna, and, as he thought, had communicated it to London."

He then sent for his despatches on the subject. It appeared that the telegraphic despatch was sent off on the morning of the 6th ultimo, and that on the same day Count Walewski was instructed to inform your Lordship of what had been done, and to ask whether Her Majesty's Government would not adopt a like precautionary measure. But after these despatches were expedited, the news of the Emperor of Russia's acceptance of the note was received here and in London, that is, on the evening of the 6th; and when Count Walewski got his instructions, the contingency on which they were framed no longer existed; therefore in acknowledging the receipt of them on the 8th he informed M. de

Lhuys that he had only mentioned them inadvertently to your Lordship, and the necessity for immediate action having passed over, he had not pressed the point.

On the other hand, M. de la Cour received in due course the instructions addressed to him, but without the accompanying intelligence of the Emperor of Russia's acceptance of the note, and acted on them; but why he had wished to make a secret of them to Lord Stratford, M. de Lhuys was at a loss to conceive. Certainly no order had been sent in the telegraphic despatch respecting a communication to be made to Lord Stratford; but M. de la Cour ought to have understood, that in a matter in which the two Governments were acting together, there would be no intention on the part of the French Cabinet to take a separate line, or to make a mystery of so important a step as asking for firmans to enable the fleet to pass the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 332.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 13.)*

(No. 676.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 12, 1853.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has informed M. Drouyn de Lhuys that Admiral Dundas will receive orders to detach from the fleet under his command two or three vessels at a time to cruise about. The French Government highly approves the plan, and thinks that good may result from it in more ways than one. Similar orders will consequently be sent to Admiral Hamelin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 333.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 13.)*

(No. 679.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 12, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informed me this morning that he had received letters from General Castelbajac of the 5th instant, which made him forbode the rejection by the Emperor of Russia of the modifications proposed by the Porte to the project of note which His Majesty had accepted. His Excellency seemed, however, to cling to the hope that some means would be found at Olmutz of bringing about an arrangement upon the Eastern question. The Emperor Nicholas was to leave St. Petersburgh the 13th, to reach Warsaw the 19th, and to arrive at Olmutz on the 23rd. His Majesty had abandoned for the present the journey to Kieff, Odessa, and Sevastopol, which he had previously announced his intention to undertake. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, after giving me this information, said that in the present state of the question four hypotheses were possible, two favourable and two unfavourable:—

The Emperor might accept the note with its modifications, in which case his Excellency thought that the question of the evacuation of the Principalities ought to find an easy solution. A Turkish Ambassador might be sent to Vienna, on his way to St. Petersburgh, with the note signed, and await there the issuing of the orders for the retirement of the Russian troops, setting out further on his journey on assurances being given by the Austrian Government that those orders were issued. The Emperor of Russia could hardly refuse his participation in an arrangement of the kind. Or, as your Lordship proposed, the note signed might be sent to Vienna, and orders given to the Ottoman Envoy at Vienna to proceed with it to Russia on the conditions stated above.

Again, the Emperor might refuse the modifications. What was to be done in that case? In his opinion the Porte should be invited to reconsider her



decision, and, in order to induce her to do so, the Four Powers might assure her that their understanding of the note did not differ from hers. Or, the Porte might sign the note and adopt Lord Stratford's suggestion of making a separate communication to the Four Powers, stating the interpretation which she gave to the objectionable passages.

These are the favourable hypotheses. The unfavourable were:

The Emperor, in refusing the modifications, might say that the Porte, in not adhering to the note, had absolved him from all engagements. Or, His Majesty might refuse the modifications, putting forward as his reasons for so doing claims as objectionable as those urged by Prince Menchikoff.

But in mentioning these last hypotheses, M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he could not bring himself to believe that the Emperor would take a line which must be so distasteful and embarrassing to Austria. If, unfortunately, His Majesty should be so advised, he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) feared that there would be an end of the unity which now prevailed among the Four Powers, for France and England could not hold a different language now from that which they had held in the beginning of this affair, and he could hardly hope that Austria and Prussia would go as far in their condemnation of Russia.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys appears to think that some days will elapse before the Emperor of Russia's decision is known, and, indeed, that His Majesty may not declare himself before his arrival at Olmutz. Under these circumstances, he is about to absent himself for some days from Paris, though he will be sufficiently within reach to be enabled to return in the course of a few hours if wanted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 334.

*Mr. Addington to the Secretary to the Admiralty.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 14, 1853.*

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to request that you will state to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that an instruction should, without loss of time, be conveyed to Admiral Dundas, authorizing him, in case the crews of Her Majesty's ships now in Besika Bay, under his command, should still be suffering from sickness, to direct the captains of such ships, to the number of two or three at a time, to quit Besika Bay, and to cruize in the Archipelago for such moderate time as the Admiral may think expedient for the restoration of the health of the men.

I am, &c.
(Signed) H. U. ADDINGTON.

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No. 335.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 681.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 15, 1853.*

TIME failed to enable me to state to your Lordship, by the last messenger, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had had a further conversation with M. de Hübner relative to the communication mentioned in my despatch No. 666, which that Envoy had made to him respecting the answer given by the Emperor of Russia to the inquiries of Austria as to the time when the Principalities would be evacuated by the Russian troops. Your Lordship will recollect that when M. de Hübner made this communication to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the latter replied that he could add nothing to his previous statements without a reference to the Emperor, who was then absent from Paris. On Sunday last, the Emperor having returned, M. Drouyn de Lhuys mentioned to His Majesty what had passed between the Austrian Minister and himself, when the Emperor desired

him to tell M. de Hübner, that although His Majesty was sorry that the Porte had not adhered to the Vienna note, he could not employ force (*des coups de canon*) to coerce her into adherence; that he trusted that the Emperor Nicholas would accept the modifications of the Porte, and order the evacuation of the Principalities, the utmost concession which His Majesty would be willing to make being, that Vienna should be the spot where assurances might be given to the Emperor Nicholas respecting the signature of the note, and corresponding assurances on His Imperial Majesty's part regarding the evacuation of the Principalities, and whence the departure of a Turkish Ambassador for St. Petersburgh might take place. As to the fleets, no condition could be made; but he had no objection to say that their prolonged stay in the Turkish waters was very tiresome, and that he should be glad of any door being opened which would permit them to retire.

In saying this M. Drouyn de Lhuys begged M. de Hübner to mark well in any communication he might make to his Government on the subject, that no engagement was implied, and that his words must only be taken as forming part of a friendly and confidential conversation between M. de Hübner and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and not between the Austrian Envoy and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 336.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 468.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 8, 1853.*

I HELD yesterday a short but important conversation with the Chancellor.

The subject of the late decision of the Porte having been broached, Count Nesselrode said that he could only confirm the decision for which his previous remarks must have prepared me.

It would, he said, be impossible for the Emperor, after the concessions which he had already made, to abate any further his demands upon the Porte, and to admit any alterations in a document which he had accepted with the alterations in it made by the English and French Governments, and that within twenty-four hours.

I begged to remind Count Nesselrode that I had upon more than one occasion forewarned him as to the possibility of a Government acted upon by so many circumstances calculated to arouse religious and national feeling, being betrayed into imprudent resolutions; and that now, as before, I would express the hope that general interests would not be placed in danger by too close an attention to resolutions adopted under the influence of such natural excitement.

To this Count Nesselrode replied, that if I would only remember from what point we had started, and to what the satisfaction which it was proposed to afford to Russia now amounted, it would be seen what the course must be which a sense of her dignity imposed upon Russia.

"The note," he said, "was not ours; we had no hand in drawing it up, nor indeed did it suit us; but we accepted it in the state in which it was received (*telle quelle*) out of deference to the wishes of our allies; and beyond this point we have not, you will allow, been encouraged to proceed. You have seen by the newspapers of England, France, and Germany, that in acting as we have done, our motives have been misconstrued, and that we have been represented as having been compelled by the allied Powers to abate our pretensions, and to accept a compromise which is unacceptable to us."

In reply to further observations of mine, which went to show that the resolutions of the Sultan had been taken not so much from anti-Russian feelings as from considerations of his own security, and those which he was obliged to keep in view in face of a party bent upon pushing matters to extremity, Count Nesselrode remarked, that he would repeat what he had long ago said to me, that the Turkish Government had not been addressed in a proper tone; that



instead of being consulted, they should have been told that such and such terms were considered advisable, and must be subscribed to by them; that nothing was to be obtained from the Turks by persuasion, while every point is to be carried by decision and menace. Do not deceive yourself, Count Nesselrode continued to say; were it even possible for us to give way, nothing, you may be sure, would be gained by the concession; the triumph of the Turks would be complete, and their insolence would become such that war within six months would become inevitable.

This same expression, as it will be in your Lordship's recollection, was employed by Count Nesselrode upon a former occasion.

As I was rising to take my leave, the Chancellor stated his intention of addressing to Baron Brunnow, by a messenger who would be sent off to London on the 10th instant, a despatch, in which the Emperor's final resolution and the grounds on which it is taken would be made known to him, for communication to Her Majesty's Government. This despatch his Excellency promised to read to me if I would call upon him on the day previous to the messenger's departure.

I should be wanting in duty if I failed to remark to your Lordship, that the unfortunate decision taken at Constantinople appears to have had the untoward effect of completely inverting the positions of the Emperor and the Sultan in the estimation of my diplomatic colleagues. Hitherto there has been on their part an all but unanimous readiness to blame the conduct of Russia towards the Porte; there is now the same unanimity in blaming a resolution which, if acted upon, would be fatal to Turkey, and which is calculated to involve in serious difficulties those of her allies who were the most intent upon preserving her independent existence.

I will only add, that a person very high in the Emperor's confidence observed to me yesterday, that he could affirm positively, and as a matter within his personal knowledge, that had the Sultan signified his unconditional acceptance of the Vienna note, the Imperial forces in the Principalities would be already on their homeward march.

Upon reading over my despatch, I find that I have neglected to state to your Lordship, that having requested Count Nesselrode to point out to me what the particular alteration or alterations suggested by the Turks were to which the Russians object, his Excellency replied, that what was objected to was, to any alteration having been proposed, to the principle of alteration, to the fact of the Porte having done that which, out of regard for the wishes of the Allied Powers, His Imperial Majesty refrained from doing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 337.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 475.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 10, 1853.*

WHEN I waited upon Count Nesselrode to-day, he placed in my hands the despatch which has been addressed to Baron Meyendorff, explaining the grounds upon which the Emperor finds himself unable to accede to the changes which the Porte proposes in the *projet de note* sent to them on the part of the Four Powers at Vienna.

It is a copy of that despatch dated the [illegible], which will be transmitted to-morrow to Baron Brunnow, for the purpose of being communicated to Her Majesty's Government.

With its general substance your Lordship will be already acquainted from the report of my conversation upon the subject, and as the paper itself will be communicated to you, it is not necessary that I should offer your Lordship a summary of the whole.

The most important passages which it contains are to the following effect. The conviction expressed by Count Nesselrode that the course alone calculated to settle the pending question would be that the Allied Powers "declarent franchement et fermement à la Porte que lui ayant en vain ouvert la seule voie que pût mener au rétablissement immédiat de ses relations avec nous [with Russia], c'est à elle-même que désormais elles en abandonneraient la tâche."

"A declaration of this sort would," the Chancellor observes, "be certain to bring the Porte to an immediate sense of its interests."

The concluding paragraphs of the despatch are perhaps of even greater significancy. After stating that the Emperor will not admit of any negotiation for the purpose of obtaining the evacuation of the Principalities, Count Nesselrode refers to his despatch to Baron Meyendorff of the $\frac{19}{31}$ August (of course well known to the Austrian Government) as containing the declaration that orders for the evacuation of the Principalities will be immediately given so soon as a Turkish Ambassador shall arrive here charged with the note of which the project was settled at Vienna.

The despatch appeared to me, judging from a hasty perusal, to be powerfully written, and to be altogether free from the objections to which some of the papers lately issued by the Imperial Chancellerie have been notoriously open.

I will only add that Count Nesselrode's tone to-day in speaking of the Turkish question was, like that of his despatch, calm and moderate, and that in the course of conversation he remarked that he learned with satisfaction that the feelings towards Russia which had been entertained in England had of late undergone a change. A person usually in possession of good information acquaints me, that looking to the acceptance of the note by the Porte, the Emperor had originally intended to receive the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow or at Kieff, whereas now whenever such a diplomatic agent may be sent here he will be received only at St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 338.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 476. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 10, 1853.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 198, I have the honour of informing you that a few days since the French Minister acquainted me that the Emperor, whilst at the camp, had spoken to him of the crumbling state of the Ottoman Empire, and of its fall being much nearer at hand than was believed, or at least admitted, by most of the European Governments.

His Imperial Majesty, according to General Castelbajac's statement, further remarked that it would become necessary that some understanding should exist among the Great Powers as to the measures to be taken on the occurrence of an event so much to be anticipated; but observed, at the same time, that the unsettled state of the Turkish question rendered the present moment inopportune for any such exchange of explanations.

I told General Castelbajac that it appeared to me that a concert among the Great Powers for the purpose of securing the Porte against a series of such shocks as must destroy the validity of that or of any other country, appeared to me a much more judicious measure than any which was contingent upon an event attended with great danger to Europe, and which a little forbearance on the part of the more powerful of the European States might easily avert.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 339.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(No. 209.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 16, 1853.*

BARON BRUNNOW called upon me yesterday, and in the course of conversation inquired if I should object to inform him of the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government now that the modifications of the Vienna note proposed by the Porte had not been adopted by the Emperor of Russia.

I replied that as the fact of their rejection alone was known by the telegraph, and that we were as yet ignorant in what manner or upon what grounds they had been rejected, I could not say what course it might be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to pursue, but that I should have no difficulty in stating to him the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting the modifications themselves; they were thought unnecessary, as affording no additional security or guarantee to the Porte, and because the note was originally framed, and of course was now interpreted by the Four Powers in the sense of the modifications; and it was therefore a matter of regret that they should have been proposed and insisted upon by the Turkish Government. The Four Powers, however, had not hesitated in recommending them to the acceptance of the Emperor, for they were not looked upon as altering the character of the note; and as the true meaning and intention of that note was not to confer any new power or right whatever upon Russia in Turkey, the Four Powers expected that the amendments would not have been disapproved by His Imperial Majesty, who on various occasions had declared that he looked for no new right nor increased power in Turkey, but desired simply the maintenance of existing Treaties, and the strict *status quo* in religious matters.

The Emperor had, reluctantly as I was aware, accepted the note upon a condition (which might be binding upon himself, but could not be so either on the Conference at Vienna or on the Porte), that no change was made in it at Constantinople; but it must be borne in mind that it was on the part of the Sultan, and not of the Emperor, that the note was to be signed, and that the Turkish Government had therefore a right narrowly to examine the terms in which it was framed, and to propose any amendments they might think indispensable for the future safety and independence of the Ottoman Empire.

The amendments were not viewed in that light by the Four Powers, and the course pursued by the Porte was the more to be regretted, as it delayed the evacuation of the Principalities, which they did not permit themselves to doubt would at once have taken place on the acceptance of the note by the Turkish Government. Nevertheless the modifications could not be disregarded, because they were thought to be of importance at Constantinople, and because they were not at variance with the intentions of the Conference at Vienna.

But, I added, if the Emperor adheres to his intention of seeking no increase of power in Turkey, if he retains his opinion that the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire is a great principle of European policy, and that its dissolution would be a great European catastrophe, it was difficult to understand why he should object to these amendments of the note, or to believe that he would expose Europe to the dangers of war, and hasten the event he deprecates, rather than adopt certain modifications, unimportant as they were assumed to be, simply because they were proposed by the Porte.

Baron Brunnow said that as he had not then received the despatches he was expecting from St. Petersburgh, he could give me no information as to the grounds upon which the Emperor had rejected the modifications, but he asked me if it was still the intention of Her Majesty's Government to cooperate with Austria towards bringing about a peaceful solution of the question; and I answered that such was their intention, as we had every reason to believe that no difference of opinion existed between the two Governments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 340.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, September 16.)*

*St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{30 \text{ Août}}{7 \text{ Septembre}}$ 1853.

NOUS venons de recevoir avec les rapports de votre Excellence, en date du $\frac{12}{24}$ Août, les modifications apportées par le Gouvernement Ottoman au projet de note rédigé à Vienne.

Il suffira à M. le Comte de Buol de se rappeler les termes de notre communication du 25 Juillet passé, pour se rendre compte de l'impression que ces modifications ont dû faire sur l'esprit de l'Empereur.

En acceptant, au nom de Sa Majesté, le projet de note que l'Autriche, après l'avoir préalablement fait agréer et approuver par les Cours de France et d'Angleterre, nous avait annoncé comme un ultimatum qu'elle se proposait de présenter à la Porte, et de l'acceptation duquel dépendrait la continuation de ses bons offices, j'ajoutais, M. le Baron, dans la dépêche qu'il nous était prescrit de communiquer au Cabinet Autrichien les réflexions et réserves suivantes:

"Je crois superflu de faire observer ici à votre Excellence qu'en accueillant, comme nous le faisons par esprit de conciliation, l'expédient concerté à Vienne et l'envoi d'un Ambassadeur Turc, nous entendons bien ne plus avoir à examiner ou à discuter de nouvelles modifications et de nouveaux projets élaborés à Constantinople sous les inspirations belliqueuses qui paraissent dominer à cette heure le Sultan et la plupart de ses Ministres, et que dans le cas où le Gouvernement Ottoman rejetterait encore ce dernier projet d'arrangement nous ne nous considérerions plus comme liés par le consentement que nous y donnons aujourd'hui."

Des paroles aussi positives ne sauraient avoir laissé au Gouvernement Autrichien un doute sur nos intentions actuelles.

Je n'examinerai point ici les changements de rédaction qui viennent d'être faits à Constantinople. J'en ai fait dans une autre dépêche l'objet d'un travail à part. Je me bornerai pour le moment à demander si l'Empereur, après s'être interdit la faculté de changer même un seul mot à un projet de note arrêté sans sa participation, peut admettre que la Porte Ottomane se réserve à elle seule cette faculté, et souffrir que la Russie soit ainsi placée vis-à-vis de la Turquie dans une position d'infériorité? Nous pensons que la dignité de l'Empereur s'y oppose. Qu'on veuille bien se rappeler comment les choses se sont passées. Au lieu de la "note-Menchikoff," dont nous avions posé l'adoption sans variantes comme condition du rétablissement de nos relations avec la Porte, on nous a proposé une note différente. Nous aurions pu pour cette raison seule refuser de la discuter. Nous aurions pu, tout en nous y prêtant, trouver plus d'une objection à y faire, plus d'un changement de termes à y introduire. Vous savez bien, M. le Baron, que du moment où nous consentions à modifier notre ultimatum de Constantinople, la forme d'une note n'est pas celle qui aurait pû nous convenir. Vous connaissez le plan et la forme d'arrangement que nous aurions préférés. Cependant nous n'avons pas insisté sur ce plan. Nous l'avons mis complétement de côté du moment où d'autres ouvertures nous ont été faites. Pourquoi? Parcequ'en s'opposant à celles-ci un contre-projet ou des contre-propositions quelconques, ce que pourtant nous étions parfaitement et pleinement en droit de faire, nous aurions pu encourir le reproche de chercher à traîner la chose en longueur, de prolonger gratuitement une crise qui tient en anxiété l'Europe. Désirant, tout au contraire, faire cesser cette crise le plus tôt possible, et allant sous ce rapport au-devant des vœux qui nous étaient exprimés, nous avons fait le sacrifice de nos objections de fond et de forme. A la simple réception du premier projet de note concerté à Vienne, et avant même de savoir s'il serait approuvé à Londres et à Paris, nous vous avons fait savoir notre adhésion par le télégraphe.

Le projet finalement arrêté nous a été plus tard transmis, et bien qu'on l'ait modifié dans un sens sur lequel nous ne pouvions nous méprendre, nous n'avons pas néanmoins pour cela révoqué notre adhésion ou élevé la moindre difficulté. Etait-il possible, nous le demandons, de témoigner plus d'empressement et des dispositions plus conciliantes? Mais quand nous agissions ainsi, c'était, bien entendu, à la condition qu'un projet que l'Empereur accueillait sans le discuter serait accueilli de la même façon par la Porte. C'était dans la conviction que l'Autriche l'envisagerait comme un ultimatum auquel il n'y avait plus rien à



changer, comme un dernier effort de son entremise officieuse qui, si l'effort venait d'échouer contre l'obstination du Divan, cesserait par le fait même. Nous regrettons de voir qu'il n'en est point ainsi. Mais si le Cabinet de Vienne conviendra de son côté que s'il s'est agi, non pas d'un ultimatum, mais d'un nouveau projet de note à laquelle chacune des deux parties pouvait apporter telle ou telle modification, nous rentrons dès-lors dans le droit dont nous avions fait volontairement abandon, de proposer à notre tour nos propres variantes, de reprendre en considération le projet d'arrangement et d'en altérer non seulement les termes mais la forme.

Ce résultat pourrait-il entrer dans les vues de l'Autriche? Conviendrait-il aux Puissances qui, en modifiant et en adoptant son projet de note, en ont fait leur œuvre commune? Il leur appartient de peser les délais qui en seront la conséquence nécessaire, ou d'examiner s'il est de l'intérêt de l'Europe qu'il soit coupé court à ces retards. Nous ne voyons qu'un seul moyen d'y mettre fin. C'est que l'Autriche et les Puissances déclarent franchement et fermement à la Porte que lui ayant en vain ouvert la seule voie qui pût mener au rétablissement immédiat de ses relations avec nous, c'est à elle-même que désormais elles en abandonneront la tâche. Nous pensons que si elles lui tiennent ce langage unanimement, les Turcs, cédant aux conseils de l'Europe au lieu de compter sur son assistance dans une lutte contre la Russie, accepteront la note telle quelle, et cesseront de compromettre leur situation d'une manière aussi grave pour se donner la satisfaction puérile d'avoir modifié quelques termes de la pièce que nous avions acceptée sans discussion. Car, de deux choses l'une: ou les modifications que la Porte réclame sont importantes, et alors il devient fort simple que nous refusions d'y consentir; ou elles sont insignifiantes, et alors pourquoi la Porte continuerait-elle sans nécessité à y subordonner son acceptation?

En résumé, M. le Baron, l'ultimatum arrêté à Vienne n'est point le nôtre. C'est celui de l'Autriche et des Puissances qui après l'avoir concerté, discuté et modifié préalablement dans son texte originaire, l'ont reconnu acceptable par la Porte sans compromis pour ses intérêts et pour son honneur. C'est donc à elles, et non point à nous, à faire cesser un moment plus tôt les incertitudes de la crise actuelle. Nous avons fait de notre côté tout ce qui pouvait dépendre de nous pour abréger d'inutiles délais, en renonçant, quand l'arrangement nous a été soumis, à toute espèce de contre-propositions quelconques. C'est un témoignage que personne ne refusera de rendre à la loyauté de l'Empereur. Ayant épuisé depuis longtemps la mesure des concessions sans que la Porte en ait fait jusqu'à présent une seule, Sa Majesté ne peut aller plus loin sans compromettre toute sa position, et sans s'exposer à renouer ses relations politiques avec la Turquie sous des auspices défavorables qui leur ôteraient pour l'avenir toute solidité, et amèneraient inévitablement une nouvelle et plus éclatante rupture. Dans le moment même de nouvelles concessions sur les termes de la note ne serviraient à rien: car nous voyons d'après vos dépêches que le Gouvernement Ottoman n'attend que notre adhésion aux changements apportés à la note de Vienne pour en subordonner la signature, comme l'envoi de l'Ambassadeur qui doit la porter ici, à de nouvelles conditions, et qu'il a déjà mis en avant, au sujet de l'évacuation des Principautés, des propositions inadmissibles. Sur ce dernier point, M. le Baron, nous ne saurions que nous référer aux assurances et explications renfermées dans notre dépêche du 10 Août, et répéter qu'il suffira de l'arrivée à St. Pétersbourg de l'Ambassadeur Turc, porteur de la note Autrichienne sans changements, pour que l'ordre soit immédiatement donné à nos troupes de repasser notre frontière.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

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No. 341.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, September 16.)*

*St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{30 \text{ Août}}{7 \text{ Septembre}}$ 1853.

JE me suis abstenu d'examiner dans la dépêche précédente les modifications qu'on a fait subir à Constantinople au projet de note Autrichien. Elles ne sont point à beaucoup près aussi insignifiantes par l'esprit et les arrière-pensées

qu'elles indiquent qu'on pourrait le croire au premier coup-d'œil. Votre Excellence en jugera par l'analyse ci-jointe. J'appelle surtout son attention sur la modification ad 3me. Elle impliquerait des conséquences auxquelles nous ne saurions consentir dans aucun cas.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

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Inclosure in No. 341.

*Analysis of the Three Modifications introduced by the Ottoman Porte into the Vienna Note.*

1. DANS le projet de Vienne il est dit: "Si à toute époque les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman, &c."

On modifie ainsi ce passage: "Si à toute époque les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le culte et l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque."

Les mots "dans l'Empire Ottoman," ainsi que ceux, "le maintien des immunités et privilèges, &c.," ont été éliminés, pour être transposés plus loin et appliqués uniquement aux Sultans. Cette omission ôte toute portée, tout sens même, à la phrase tronquée. Car personne assurément ne conteste aux Souverains de la Russie leur active sollicitude pour le culte qu'ils professent eux-mêmes, et qui est celui de leurs sujets. Ce qu'il s'agissait de reconnaître, c'est qu'il y a de tous tems sollicitude active de la part de la Russie pour ses coreligionnaires de la Turquie, comme pour le maintien de leurs immunités religieuses; et que le Gouvernement Ottoman est disposé à avoir égard à cette sollicitude comme à laisser intactes ces immunités.

La phrase actuelle devient d'autant plus inacceptable que, par les termes qui suivent, on attribue au Sultan plus que de la sollicitude pour le culte orthodoxe. On affirme qu'on n'a jamais cessé de veiller au maintien de ses immunités et priviléges, non plus que de les consacrer par des actes solennels. Or, c'est précisément le contraire de ce qu'on affirme qui, ayant eu lieu dans les derniers tems à plus d'une reprise, et notamment dans l'affaire des lieux saints, nous a obligé d'y porter remède par la demande d'une garantie plus expresse pour l'avenir. Si nous nous prêtons à reconnaître que le Gouvernement Ottoman n'a jamais cessé de veiller au maintien des privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque, que deviennent les plaintes que nous avions formées contre lui? Nous reconnaissons par là même que nous n'avions pas de griefs légitimes; que la mission du Prince Menchikoff était sans motif; qu'en un mot la note même qu'on nous a adressée était parfaitement superflue.

2. Les suppressions et additions de mots introduits ici avec une affectation marquée, ont pour but évident d'invalider le Traité de Kaïnardji, tout en ayant l'air de le confirmer.

Il était dit dans la rédaction originairement conçue à Vienne que "fidèle à la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traités de Kaïnardji et d'Andrinople relatives à la protection du culte Chrétien, le Sultan regarde comme étant de son honneur . . . . de préserver de toute atteinte . . . . les immunités et privilèges accordés à l'Eglise Orthodoxe." Cette rédaction, qui fesait dériver de l'esprit même du Traité, c'est-à-dire, du principe général déposé dans l'Article VII, le maintien des immunités, était conforme à la doctrine que nous avons soutenue et soutenons. Car, selon nous, la promesse de protéger un culte et ses églises, implique de nécessité le maintien des immunités dont ils jouissent. Ce sont deux choses inséparables. Cette rédaction primitive concertée à Vienne a subi plus tard à Paris et à Londres une première modification, et si nous n'y avons pas objecté dans le tems, comme nous aurions eu le droit de le faire, ce n'est pas que nous nous soyons mépris sur la portée de ce changement. Nous nous étions bien apperçus de la distinction introduite entre deux points qui sont pour nous indissolublement liés l'un à l'autre; mais cette distinction était pourtant encore indiquée d'une manière assez délicate pour que nous ayons pu, par esprit de conciliation, et désir d'arriver promptement à une solution définitive, accepter telle quelle une rédaction que nous regardions dès-lors comme invariable. Ces motifs de déférence ne s'appliquent plus à la nouvelle modification du même passage qui vient d'être faite à Constantinople. La ligne de démarcation entre les deux objets y est beaucoup trop nettement tranchée pour que nous puissions l'accepter sans donner un démenti à tout ce que nous avons dit et écrit. La mention du Traité de Kaïnardji devient superflue, et sa confirmation sans objet, du moment qu'on cesse d'en appliquer le principe général au maintien des immunités religieuses du culte. C'est dans ce but qu'on a supprimé ces deux mots, "la lettre et l'esprit." On appuie sans nécessité sur le fait que la protection du culte Chrétien s'exerce "par la Sublime Porte," comme si nous prétendions exercer cette protection nous-mêmes dans les Etats du Sultan; et comme on néglige en même tems de rappeler qu'aux termes du Traité la protection est une promesse faite, un engagement pris par le Sultan, on a l'air de jeter un doute sur le droit que nous avons de veiller à la stricte exécution de cette promesse.

3. Le changement que l'on propose dans cet endroit de la note Autrichienne est surtout inadmissible.

Le Gouvernement Ottoman ne s'engagerait à faire participer l'Eglise Orthodoxe qu'aux avantages qu'il octroyerait à d'autres communautés Chrétiennes *sujettes de la Porte*. Mais si ces communautés, bien que Catholiques ou autres, n'étaient pas formées d'indigènes rayas, mais de religieux ou laïques étrangers (et tel est le cas de la presque totalité des couvents, hospices, séminaires et évêchés du rit Latin en Turquie), et si, disons-nous, le bon plaisir de la Porte était d'accorder à ces établissements des avantages et privilèges religieux nouveaux, les communautés Orthodoxes, en leur qualité de *sujettes Ottomanes*, n'auraient pas, d'après les termes que l'on veut introduire dans la note, le droit de reclamer les mêmes faveurs, ni la Russie le droit d'intercéder pour elles.

L'intention malveillante des Ministres de la Porte deviendra plus évident encore si nous citons un exemple, une éventualité possible. Supposons le cas très probable où le Patriarche Latin de Jérusalem, préconisé en dernier lieu, obtînt de la Porte des prérogatives dont le Patriarche Grec ne jouit pas. Toute réclamation de la part de ce dernier serait rejettée, vu sa qualité de *sujet de la Porte*.

La même objection serait faite par le Ministère Ottoman par rapport aux établissements Catholiques de la Palestine, dans le cas où quelque nouvel avantage ou droit non spécifié dans les derniers firmans, vint à leur être accordé par la suite au préjudice des communautés indigènes.



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No. 342.

*Telegraphic Correspondence with the Earl of Westmorland.*

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*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September 14, 1853, 4 P.M.*

NOUS venons de nous réunir, M. Bourqueney et moi, chez le Comte Buol. Considérant qu'il pourrait y avoir de la difficulté à recommander à Constantinople l'adoption de la note de Vienne sans aucune compensation, l'Autriche engage le Sultan à accompagner la note d'une lettre autographe à l'Empereur Nicholas, et elle prouet ses bons offices pour que la réponse rassure la Porte sur les dangers qu'elle a cru trouver dans le texte original. Ne pourrions nous donner nous-mêmes une déclaration qui calme le Divan sur ses appréhensions actuelles, et qui même lui serve de garantie contre les dangers à venir? Ne pourrions dans ce sens de l'Empereur d'Autriche dans la lettre qu'il a déjà écrite au Sultan? Les notes mêmes dont je me sers ont reçu l'approbation du Comte Buol. M. de Bourqueney a suggéré l'idée d'une lettre de l'Empereur Napoleon au Sultan.

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No. 342*a*.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.) *September* 15, 1853.

J'AI attendu une réponse de Paris. Elle n'est pas arrivée, M. Drouyn étant absent. J'ai tout lieu de penser que M. Bourqueney recevra une dépêche semblable à ce qui suit.

Les Quatre Puissances ont engagé la Russie à accepter les modifications parcequ'elles n'ont pas pensé que ces modifications altérassent le sens de la note. La même considération les détermine à conseiller au Gouvernement Turc de la signer, en lui faisant savoir que les Quatre Puissances sont disposées à declarer, en réponse à la note de Reshid Pasha, qu'elles considèrent que la note de Vienne ne confère à l'Empereur de Russie aucun droit d'ingérence entre le Sultan et ses sujets ; et qu'elles adhèreront en toute occasion à cette interprétation. Une semblable déclaration est pour la Porte une bien meilleure garantie que les modifications à la note de Vienne proposées par le Divan.

Si la conférence y adhère, transmettez-la à Lord Stratford sans délai.

Le Sultan ne pourrait guères écrire à l'Empereur sans savoir d'avance quelle réponse il recevrait.

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No. 342*b*.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September* 16, 1853.

J'AI reçu votre dépêche d'hier. M. de Bourqueney a soumis à la Conférence le projet de note de M. Drouyn de Lhuys auquel votre dépêche refère. Le Comte Buol a exprimé la crainte que ce document ne suffit plus à conjurer les perils de la situation. Il a fait observer que les démarches prescrites à M. de Bruck par ses dépêches d'avant hier allant beaucoup plus loin que celles qui lui étaient proposées, il ne pouvait les faire suivre par un conseil plus affaibli. Les nouvelles reçues aujourd'hui de Constantinople confirment les progrès du parti de la guerre. Le Cabinet Autrichien adjure les Puissances Occidentales d'adresser sans délai à leurs Représentants les instructions les plus péremptoires dans le sens de l'acceptation pure et simple de la note de Vienne. L'action collective n'est plus possible en ce moment ; mais l'action individuelle dans le même sens la remplace, et chaque Puissance peut y joindre les garanties qu'elle jugera convenable offrir à la Porte. Le Comte Buol a aussi tenu un langage satisfaisant sur la date de l'évacuation des Principautés dans le cas de l'acceptation. Le Comte Arnim s'est associé à l'opinion du Comte Buol. Dans cette position j'en avertis Lord Stratford en lui disant que je réclame de nouvelles instructions.

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No. 342*c*.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.) *September* 17, 1853.

DANS ma dépêche du 15 je n'ai nullement parlé du projet de note proposé par M. Bourqueney. La déclaration collective contenue dans ma dépêche télégraphique du 15, "que la note de Vienne ne confère à la Russie aucun droit d'ingérence entre le Sultan et ses sujets, et que les Quatre Puissances adhèreront en toute occasion à cette interprétation," est le meilleur moyen de décider la Porte à accepter la note, et aura plus d'effet que les instructions envoyées à M. Bruck. Insistez pour que la Conférence promette cette déclaration à Constantinople. M. Bourqueney vous soutiendra.

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No. 342*d*.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September* 18, 1853, 4 P.M.

LA Conférence de Vienne avait cru que votre dépêche du 15 se référait au projet de note de M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Je sors de chez le Comte de Buol. Pendant que je discutais avec lui votre projet de déclaration daté d'hier, M. de Bourqueney s'est réuni à nous, et l'a appuyé avec toute l'énergie prescrite par son Gouvernement. Le Comte Buol nous a longtemps opposé les arguments contenus dans ma dépêche télégraphique du 16, se référant à la déclaration qu'il avait adressé à M. de Bruck, que la note de Vienne ne renferme rien qui peut être regardé comme attentatoire aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan ; se référant aussi à la lettre déjà écrite par l'Empereur au Sultan qui est explicite à cet égard. Nous avons réussi enfin à obtenir du Comte Buol la promesse de la déclaration suivante, qui sera remise à la Porte en échange de la signature de la note de Vienne: "Les Représentants des Quatre Puissances déclarent que la rédaction de la note originale de Vienne ne contient aucun des dangers que la Porte avait cru y voir pour les droits de souveraineté ici du Sultan." Nous nous réunissons ce soir en conférence avec le Ministre de la Prusse pour prendre une délibération définitive. Le Comte Buol croit que Lord Stratford n'a pas encore reçu des instructions de son Gouvernement pour appuyer la signature par la Porte de la note originale de Vienne, et il demande instamment que vous les envoyez le plutôt possible. Le Comte Arnim vient d'expédier des instructions à cet effet à M. Wildenbruch.

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No. 342*e*.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September* 18, 1853, 8 P.M.

JE sors de la Conférence chez le Comte Buol. Comme supplément à ce que je viens de vous communiquer par ma dépêche télégraphique de 4–5 heures, je vous envoie le texte de la déclaration identique proposée pour la signature des Représentants des Quatre Puissances à Constantinople en échange de la signature de la note originale de Vienne, "que la dite note ne contient aucun des dangers que la Sublime Porte y avait cru voir pour les droits de souveraineté du Sultan, et dont la crainte avait motivé ses premières hésitations." Il est essentiel que vous me fassiez savoir avec le moindre délai possible si cette réduction qui s'approche de la note, et qui a en outre l'avantage d'être agréée par l'Autriche et la Prusse, et pour laquelle M. de Bourqueney réclame comme moi les instructions de son Gouvernement, peut être transmise à Lord Stratford avec l'invitation d'appuyer l'acceptation de la note de Vienne par la Porte. Je ne crois pas possible d'atteindre sous la forme collective un résultat du rapproche de votre proposition.

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No. 342*f*.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.) *September* 20, 1853.

TACHEZ de faire constater par la signature d'un Protocole l'opinion de la Conférence, "que la dite note ne contient aucun des dangers que la Sublime Porte y avait cru voir pour les droits de souveraineté du Sultan." Mais depuis la dépêche explicative de la Russie, nous ne pouvons plus conseiller à la Turquie de signer la note de Vienne, car la Russie ne la comprend pas comme nous. Je vous écris par la poste plus au détail à cet égard.

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No. 343.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 346.)

My Lord, *Vienna, September 14, 1853.*

I HAVE already reported to your Lordship by telegraph this day, that the despatches from Count Nesselrode announcing the decision of the Emperor Nicholas not to accept the modifications of the Vienna note which had been proposed by the Porte, had been received by Baron Meyendorff. These despatches were communicated by the Russian Minister to Count Buol, who immediately requested the members of the Conference, Count Arnim, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, to meet him at his residence.

Count Buol placed in our hands the despatch of Count Nesselrode announcing the receipt of the Vienna note, amended according to the proposals of the Turkish Government; and after entering into various details as to the manner in which the original note had been submitted to the Emperor and had been accepted by him, Count Nesselrode announces that His Imperial Majesty, while adhering to his acceptation of the note as it had been originally presented to him by the Austrian Government, with the sanction of the Governments of England, France, and Prussia, declined to agree to any modification of it.

Count Buol informed the members present that the despatch of Count Nesselrode had been communicated by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to our respective Governments; and as it will consequently be in your Lordship's possession before this despatch can reach you, I need not enter into any further description of its contents.

Count Buol then stated that he admitted the perfect right of the Emperor of Russia (after having accepted a proposal which had been submitted to him by the Four Powers) to refuse to adopt any alterations in the character of that note which the Governments in alliance with Turkey had not considered necessary for the maintenance of her dignity and independence; and although he had recommended to the Cabinet of His Imperial Majesty the adoption of the modifications, yet, as that advice had not been accepted, he felt that he had now no other course to pursue than to report this failure to the Government of the Sultan, and to reiterate to them in the strongest manner the advice he had originally given them to accept the note such as the Four Powers had proposed it. Count Buol remarked upon the importance of the Emperor of Russia's declaration that in adhering to his acceptation of the original note, he was still in the intention (as soon as it should be presented to him by an Ambassador) to order the evacuation of the Principalities, and from that moment to consider the relations between Russia and the Porte as reestablished.

Count Buol stated that Baron Meyendorff had received a second despatch from Count Nesselrode, expressing the great disappointment felt by the Emperor of Russia at the modification of the original note by the Porte, and his regret at the consequent delay in the execution of the order which had already been prepared for commencing the evacuation of the Principalities, and which would have taken place immediately upon the Emperor's receiving the assurance that that note had been adopted by the Porte, and would be presented to him. Count Nesselrode declares in this despatch that this measure will still be carried out, if the Emperor should receive a satisfactory assurance from the Sultan in time for the evacuation to take place during the month of October; later in the year it would not be possible to move the troops.

Under these circumstances, Count Buol expressed his hope and his belief that the other Governments who had hitherto acted in concert with Austria in endeavouring to arrive at a peaceable solution of this question, would agree to the decision which, under the orders of his Sovereign the Emperor, he had now announced; and he requested each of the members of the Conference to call for the earliest decision of their Governments upon this subject, and to recommend to them, in case they adhered to the course he had adopted, to lose no time in sending instructions to their Representatives at Constantinople.

Count Arnim stated that, without waiting for more particular instructions, he adopted, on the part of the Prussian Government, the recommendation of



Count Buol. Baron Bourqueney and myself assented to the request of Count Buol, and with that view I addressed to your Lordship the telegraphic despatch of this day, to which I have already alluded.

Count Buol read to the Conference the despatch he had addressed to the Internuncio at Constantinople, directing him to use every means to induce the Turkish Government to adhere to the original note which had been submitted to them, and to represent to them that the Austrian Government adopted that course in the fullest persuasion that it was entirely consonant with what was due to the honour of the Sultan, and that it was the only proposal they could suggest, or could undertake to bring forward, which would at once secure the termination of the dangerous and distressing complications at present existing.

The substance of this despatch and the advice contained in it has been communicated to the Turkish Ambassador here, who has written to his Government recommending its adoption.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 344.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 360.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 16, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL read to me this morning a despatch which he had just received from Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, giving an account of the meeting of the Representatives of the Four Powers which had been held on the 13th instant, when Count Buol communicated to them a despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff on the 7th instant, announcing the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to accept the Turkish amendments of the Vienna note.

Your Lordship will receive from Lord Westmorland by the present messenger a report of what occurred at this Conference, and the few observations made to me by Baron Manteuffel are unimportant; he sees the imperative necessity under existing circumstances of urging the Porte to accept the original note, and has this day addressed by telegraph an instruction to Baron Wildenbruch at Constantinople to act in concert with his colleagues in giving his support to the steps which Baron Bruck has been directed to take in this matter.

Baron Manteuffel thinks it not impossible that the Porte's answer may be received at Vienna before the departure of the Emperor of Russia from Olmutz, and if so that some step towards the evacuation of the Principalities might be taken before the return of His Imperial Majesty to Warsaw.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 345.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 248.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 27, 1853.*

I LEARN from M. Pisani that the Porte, in transmitting to Omer Pasha the draft of an answer to Prince Gortchakoff's letter to that Commander, copy of which draft was forwarded confidentially to your Lordship a few days ago, has directed him not to send it on to its destination, unless he is quite satisfied that the intended passage up the Danube of armed Russian vessels, in search of provisions, would prove dangerous to the interests of Turkey; that is, to the safety of the Turkish fortresses on the right bank of the river.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 346.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 249. Secret.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 29, 1853.*

THE secret overtures urged upon the Turkish Ministers by M. de la Cour within the last few days, do not appear to have been attended with much success. The notion of a conventional agreement among the four, if not the five principal Powers of Europe, guaranteeing the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire, offers naturally to the Porte an agreeable, though distant and uncertain, prospect. It required no advice from me, though I gave it when asked, to induce the Porte to make its acknowledgments for the idea, and to express the satisfaction with which it looked forward even to the possibility of realizing such a plan. But the accompanying advice to accede to Count Buol's note, without the proposed modifications, experienced a different reception.

Reshid Pasha has informed the French Ambassador, that neither he nor his colleagues are prepared to entertain any suggestion of that kind. It appears that the Sheikh-ul-Islam declared in Council, the day before yesterday, that he would rather break his seal than put it to a note like that which had been transmitted from Vienna.

If I am rightly informed, as I believe myself to be, the French Ambassador called upon several of the Turkish Ministers separately, and held the same language to all that he held to Reshid Pasha, requesting each to guard a strict silence as to the nature of his communication. This came out when they met together, and was the occasion of some merriment. The Ambassador fancied that he had made a favourable impression on Mehemet Ali, the Seraskier, but it proved a mistake. He has shown a more particular anxiety that I should be kept in ignorance of his proceedings. He sounded me yesterday respecting the Convention and the guaranty, but limited his confidence to the idea as proceeding from his Government, and as having been a subject of deliberation between your Lordship and Count Walewski. I told him that I was aware of something having passed between the two Governments, but that I had no instructions thereon, and that in London the question was possibly considered a little premature.

The Porte, meanwhile, persists in completing quietly and vigorously its defensive preparations. New levies, as I mentioned before, have been ordered, to the amount of 40,000 or 50,000 men. In some parts of the country the remaining portion of the redif, or militia, is called out, and from every quarter we hear that small detachments, of 400 or 500 men each, are constantly embarking for Bulgaria, or marching towards one of the military stations. The Porte has declined, for the present, sending orders to the Dardanelles for the eventual admittance of the French squadron.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 347.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 250. Secret.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 29, 1853.*

DESIROUS that your Lordship should be fully informed respecting the separate communications of M. de la Cour with Reshid Pasha and others of the Turkish Ministry, in so far as they are known to me, I forward herewith in copy two very confidential reports addressed to me by M. Pisani under the respective dates of yesterday and the day before.

Your Lordship, I feel certain, will have the goodness to take care that Reshid Pasha shall not be compromised in any way by the confidence which he has reposed in me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 347.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 27, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. de la Cour called to-day on Reshid Pasha at the Porte, and told him that the Convention he spoke of two days ago would not be entered into by the Four Powers unless the Porte accepted the note drawn up at Vienna as it stands; that the Porte would derive a great advantage by that Convention, if agreed upon; and that the acceptance of the note as approved by the Four Powers, without further delay, will have the best effect in Europe, and will produce an important change in the public opinion in favour of Turkey.

Reshid Pasha replied, that when the Cabinets and the public will be made acquainted with the well-grounded motives which induced the Porte not to adopt the note without the modifications proposed, he is pretty certain that the Four Powers, and especially England and France, will duly appreciate the Porte's objections, if indeed they wish to safeguard and maintain its independence and sovereign rights; but if, on the contrary, they are seeking for an opportunity to disengage themselves from their repeated promise to support the Sultan's rights, the Porte cannot force them to afford either moral or material assistance; but she will then be called upon to submit the whole question to the consideration of public opinion, and leave it to pronounce its judgment, which will be impartial and favourable to the Porte.

All I can tell you, proceeded Reshid Pasha, is, that I will by no means put my seal to a paper which, to my appreciation and that of my colleagues, is detrimental to the honour, the dignity, and independence of my Sovereign and his Government. And, besides, how can we go back without disparaging ourselves in the eyes of our own people, towards whom we are engaged thus far? He moreover stated that so long as he (Reshid Pasha) remains in office, he will never give his assent to the acceptance of the note in question; and should the Porte be forced to show compliance, both he and his colleagues will instantly tender their resignation. If you think, he continued, that those who come afterwards will act otherwise, it is a great mistake. We are all unanimously determined to adhere to our former decision. My sole regret is that the line pursued just now by the Western Powers will have for final effect to compel the Porte to throw itself into the arms of Russia, and come to some settlement which would probably change the policy of Europe.

You mean, said the French Ambassador, that the Porte would enter into a Treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with Russia: Europe will never allow the Porte to be preyed upon by Russia. In that case, observed his Highness, you must adopt a different view of the pending question, and not endeavour to humiliate the Porte by compelling it to act against its dignity and independence.

M. de la Cour said that the Seraskier Pasha, to whom he had paid a visit in the morning, seemed rather to like his proposal; and added, that he was also going to wait on the Grand Vizier to speak to him on the same subject.

Reshid Pasha could not help observing to M. de la Cour that, if he recollected right, he thought that in the despatch he communicated to him two days ago, there was only question of the Convention, and not a single word about the acceptance or rejection of the note. I suppose, said he, you will talk the matter over with the British Ambassador. M. de la Cour replied in the negative, and again recommended his Highness not to make any allusion whatever to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. PISANI.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 347.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 28, 1853.

WITH reference to my report of yesterday's date, I have the honour to state, that the First Interpreter of the French Embassy having this morning waited on Reshid Pasha to urge the acceptance of Count Buol's note, and to advise the Porte to do so without delay if they wished to produce a good effect in Europe, his Highness took this opportunity to ask whether France was acting separately from the others, and whether M. de la Cour had instructions to press the adoption of the note in question. M. Schefer replied negatively, but said that it was the Ambassador's private opinion that if the Porte were to pursue the line he advises, she will decidedly gain in the opinion of the Cabinets.

His Highness further stated to me that, having asked the Seraskier whether he had given his assent to M. de la Cour's proposal, he denied the fact, and authorized Reshid Pasha to say so to the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. PISANI.

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No. 348.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September* 19.)

(No. 251.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 29, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a letter addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, with the view of confirming the Sultan's previous command that their Highnesses should retire, unless the restrictions laid upon them by the Russian authorities are really and in fact abandoned.

Copies are also inclosed herewith of the instructions which I have addressed on the same occasion to Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 348.

*Reshid Pasha to the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia.*

*Le* 30 *Août*, 1853.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la dépêche de votre Altesse en date du 11 Août que je me suis empressé de soumettre à Sa Majesté le Sultan avec l'adresse qui l'accompagnait, et dans laquelle il est dit qu'il ne serait pas convenable à votre Altesse de quitter la Principauté dans les circonstances actuelles.

Les attributions de l'assemblée qui a rédigé cette adresse étant exclusivement limitées à l'expédition des affaires courantes et ordinaires de la Province, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne peut nullement reconnaître à cette assemblée le droit de discuter et de délibérer sur une mesure purement politique et dépendante absolument des droits souverains de la Sublime Porte, comme celle du rappel temporaire de votre Altesse de la [illegible].

Sa Majesté le Sultan, qui, dans sa haute bienveillance a toujours à cœur le bien-être et la sécurité des habitants de la Moldo-Valachie formant partie intégrante de ses Etats Impériaux, ne veut certainement pas permettre que la moindre atteinte soit portée à leur système administratif. Mais malheureusement la rupture des relations des deux Principautés avec la Sublime Porte et la suspension du tribut, signifiées aux Hospodars par la Cour de Russie, ont



entraîné après elle la dernière décision du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

L'importance que la Sublime Porte attache à la continuation de ses relations ordinaires avec votre Altesse n'est point basée sur le désir de s'enquérir du nombre, des dispositions, ou de mouvement des troupes Russes. Et la suspension du tribut qui n'est que bien peu de chose comparativement aux sommes considérables dépensées par le Gouvernement Ottoman pour les préparatifs qui se poursuivent, ne peut non plus porter le moindre inconvénient à la marche des affaires les moins importantes de l'Etat. Si la Sublime Porte insiste sur ce point, ce n'est pas évidemment par un besoin urgent de toucher les fonds de ce tribut; mais comme la continuation des rapports des deux Principautés avec Constantinople comme par le passé, et le paiement sans délai du tribut établi à ses échéances respectives font, en conclusion, partie des attributions ostensibles de l'autorité de la Sublime Porte, le Gouvernement Impérial autorise votre Altesse à rester à son poste, si elle est à même de respecter ces attributions comme auparavant. Si, au contraire, il lui est impossible de s'y conformer, il sera de nouveau constaté que l'exercice du pouvoir légitime dans les Principautés est impossible.

Par conséquent le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan renouvelle, dans ce cas, à votre Altesse ses ordres de quitter immédiatement le pays.

Je saisis, &c.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 348.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy.*

Sir, *Therapia, August* 29, 1853.

I AM authorised by my communications with the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform you that the Porte has not allowed itself to be warped from its original intention with respect to the retirement of the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia in consequence of the restrictions laid upon them by the Russian authorities. After weighing with due consideration the motives alleged by their Highnesses for demurring to execute the commands of their Sovereign, the Porte has repeated its previous instructions, and I inclose herewith for your confidential information a copy of the despatch addressed for that purpose to each of the Princes by the Secretary of State. You will observe that the only contingency admitted by the Porte as warranting a further postponement of their departure is the revocation or relinquishment of the restrictions lately imposed upon them by the Russian authorities. I need not remark to you that such a return to the common principles of justice must, to have its effect with any degree of propriety, be made so clear as to leave no doubt whatever of its reality.

The Porte's instructions are forwarded by express from Constantinople to-day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 348.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy.*

(Most Confidential.)

Sir, *Therapia, August* 30, 1853.

IT is much to be feared that, owing to intrigues and private interests, one, or both, of the Hospodars will continue to evade the execution of the Porte's commands. For themselves, as well as for the Sultan's interests, such a course of proceeding would be a subject of deep regret, and I think it will be desirable for you to express confidentially this sentiment to Prince Stirbey [Ghika] with my respectful compliments. I have reason to believe, and you may give his Highness this assurance from me, that the Porte in ordering his retirement under present circumstances is influenced by no personal views, but simply by

those high political considerations which are inseparably connected with the present unauthorised occupation of the Principalities.

In the event of its appearing that the Russian injunctions are really withdrawn, and no restrictions whatever laid upon the Hospodars affecting their duty towards the Porte and the provinces under the existing institutions, you will nevertheless abstain from resuming your Consular functions or rehoisting your flag until you report to me and receive my answer.

It is desirable at the same time that you should act in that respect as much as possible in concert with your French colleague.

It is obviously desirable that measures adapted to the existing institutions should be taken by the local authorities to secure the tranquillity, welfare, and loyalty of the provinces after the retirement of their respective Hospodars.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 348.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Colquhoun.*

Sir, *Therapia, August* 29, 1853.

I AM happy to assure you that your proceedings in execution of my instructions respecting the Hospodar, and the suspension of your Consular functions in consequence of the course pursued by his Highness, have met with my entire approbation; and I shall have much satisfaction in learning that they have equally obtained the more important approval of Her Majesty's Government.

I avail myself of the same opportunity to acknowledge the zealous attention with which you have kept me informed of such occurrences in the Principality as necessarily carry with them a more than usual degree of interest under present circumstances.

I have noted with particular satisfaction the general understanding and identity of conduct which have marked the joint proceedings of yourself and the French Consul, under instructions from Constantinople.

I have directed Mr. Gardner to lose no time in correcting the misapprehension under which he postponed execution of my instructions with respect to the Hospodar of Moldavia, notwithstanding the example so properly given by his French colleague.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 349.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 19.)

(No. 255.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 1, 1853.

I RECEIVED last night from your Lordship's office a printed copy of the speech delivered on the 20th ultimo to both Houses of Parliament by the Lords Commissioners, in Her Majesty's name. Anticipating the interest with which those paragraphs of it that allude to the Eastern question would be read by the Turkish Ministers, I sent it down at an early hour this morning to Reshid Pasha. M. Stephen Pisani being confined to his bed by indisposition, I directed Mr. Alison to take charge of it. Though Reshid Pasha was already informed of its contents, he received my communication with every appearance of interest. In the conversation which ensued, his language, as reported to me by Mr. Alison, was that of a man who, in concert with his colleagues, had made up his mind to hold firm to the decision taken, as your Lordship knows, by the Sultan and his Council. It appeared distinctly that the present Ministers are prepared to go to war rather than give way, and, if restrained by the Sultan, to resign; leaving to His Majesty the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of replacing them by a more pacific Administration. It may be conjectured that



they speculate on the war spirit roused in their nation and army, and the danger of disappointing it, for motives wherewith to counteract the fears, were such to predominate in the Sultan's mind, of a contest singlehanded with Russia. The national will would thus, as in former times, be brought to bear in a flood tide on the hesitations of the Palace, and prejudices which have hitherto obstructed the introduction of useful measures, particularly in respect of foreign capital and industry, would, they imagine, yield to the pressure of war and its accompanying necessities.

An anonymous Turkish placard, which appeared two or three days ago on the gate of a mosque at Constantinople, may be taken as a shadow of the coming event. Its style is that of an educated person; and it was thought of importance enough to be conveyed to the Sultan, who read it, however, without any apparent emotion. A translation of the writing in question is inclosed herewith.

The Sultan reviewed the Egyptian army the day before yesterday. He was received with great demonstrations of loyalty by the squadrons as well as by the troops. His Majesty was in a single boat unattended; the appearance of the ships and the precision of the salutes were remarkable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 349.

*Anonymous Placard.*

(Translation.)

OH mighty Padishah! All your subjects are ready to sacrifice their lives, their property, and their children in your cause. Like unto your ancestors it is incumbent on you to draw from the scabbard the Mahommedan sword of the Holy Aboo-Eyoob-Ansari, with which you are girt. The hesitation shown by your Ministers on this subject arises out of the complaint which they have been for some time past suffering under of "selfish carefulness," and it is likely that we shall all be thus plunged into danger and difficulty, from which God defend us!

Your victorious armies, therefore, and your faithful subjects, call for war in defence of their rights and Sovereign!

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No. 350.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 19.)

(No. 258.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 5, 1853.

THE day before yesterday I had a long conversation with Reshid Pasha at his house on the Bosphorus. In seeking this interview I had more purposes than one. I wished to ascertain from his own lips that he was fully alive to the embarrassments and dangers of the Porte's situation. I was anxious also to know whether he continued entirely of the same mind, and what course the Government intended to pursue in the event of being left to itself. I felt it moreover to be my duty to put distinctly before him the adverse chances indicated by such communications as had hitherto reached us. Lastly, I had it in view to urge once more the importance of turning the present circumstances to account for the permanent advantage and regeneration of the Empire. Under this head I united, without going into detail, the various suggestions of external arrangement and internal improvement, which I have so frequently pressed not only on his Highness's attention, but also on that of his colleagues, and of the Sultan himself.

Except that the Pasha cannot easily realize in his thoughts what he calls the abandonment of Turkey by France and England, I found him quite prepared for the difficulties which might ensue if the Four Powers were to reject the Porte's amendments, and equally determined to risk the chances of

war, in preference to giving up the interests involved in them. He assured me that his colleagues continued to be unanimous on this subject, and repeated that they would all retire from office rather than put their signatures to Count Buol's note as sent from Vienna; intimating at the same time that if persons could be found to occupy the vacant places, they would be composed of those by whom a close connection with Russia is held to be the safest policy.

He grounded the determination of his Government not only upon the importance of what remains to be settled with Russia, but also upon the danger of throwing the people and army, now thoroughly roused, into a state of painful disappointment and angry discontent. It is more than probable that the hope of being ultimately seconded by England and France, if fortune went strongly against Turkey, is by no means excluded from the calculation.

Be that as it may, the Ottoman Secretary of State expressed himself with the confidence of a man whose mind is thoroughly made up; and when I brought strongly before him the various causes of discouragement presented by the present state of affairs, more particularly in connection with Count Buol's note, he showed not the slightest symptom of change or of doubt. I did not, however, leave my remarks without proof of their correctness, for I read him several passages of my correspondence, and reminded him of facts which show concurrently to what immediate difficulties and dangerous contingencies the Porte is now more than ever exposed. I allowed no room for doubt as to the intentions, in so far as they are known to me, of Her Majesty's Government, repeating my conviction that Turkey would continue to be supported from that quarter while the pretensions of Russia were such as to render resistance necessary. It might however be presumed, I added, that the auxilliary would claim a right to judge of the necessity, and that no superfluous or uncalled for objections were likely to be countenanced by the most friendly of the Porte's allies.

I went on to say, that whether the exertions of diplomacy terminated in peace or war, it was incumbent on the Porte, in consideration of its most essential interests, to take a lesson from experience, and adopt without further delay those remedial measures which we had so long recognized as indispensable for the tranquillity and improvement of the Ottoman Empire, with respect both to its foreign and to its administrative relations. I pointed in particular to a more effective protection of the Sultan's Christian subjects, to a more equitable administration of justice, and to the removal of that odious tax which perpetuates the brand of conquest and humiliation throughout the tributary millions of Turkey. The complaints of Persia and the intrigues of Greece were the more immediate objects of admonition with reference to danger coming from without; and for the twentieth time, I deprecated that infatuation which so often tempted the Porte to trifle with interests, by no means indifferent in times of peace, and which in the prospect of war assumed a character of vital importance.

Reshid Pasha admitted most readily the force of my arguments, and accepted as usual my suggestions as those which he had long entertained himself; but I fear that some latent obstacle which his influence is unable to surmount, continues to obstruct the passages to improvement of a real and comprehensive description, and indeed he left me to understand that the best possible intentions in the highest quarter being paralyzed by a mistrustful and unsteady mind, he knew not where to look with confidence for the means of carrying our views into effect. He engaged, nevertheless, to take the whole subject into fresh consideration, and to communicate with me again respecting it in the course of a few days.

In looking back to the earlier part of this conversation, of which I have scarcely given more than the general purport, your Lordship will not fail to observe how deeply Reshid Pasha, and to all appearance his colleagues also, must be impressed with the soundness of their objections to the Austrian note, and with the reality of those internal dangers to which their military exertions, justified by Russian intimidation and European encouragement, have necessarily given birth.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 351.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 259.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 5, 1853.*

I LEARN from undoubted authority that M. Argyropulo, the Russian interpreter, has lately visited two or three, if not more, of the Turkish Ministers, under circumstances which have attracted attention. Yesterday he called upon Reshid Pasha, and leaving in doubt whether his visit was authorized or otherwise, talked over the Porte's amendments to Count Buol's note. His remarks, as repeated to me, may be summed up thus. He thought that Russia might accept the first amendment, but that the second and third would meet with determined resistance. In corroboration of this opinion he added, that the Court of St. Petersburgh would insist in having a full participation in all the religious privileges accorded by Treaty in past times to France and to Austria. He went a step further, and seemed to anticipate a perfect agreement between his Court and those of the other four Powers concerning the Austrian note. He apprehended that the Porte would find herself in the same insulated position from which the acceptance of that note had rescued his Government.

It does not appear that Reshid Pasha relaxed, in consequence of M. Argyropulo's remarks, from the determination which he had previously taken, in common with the whole Ministry and Council; but curiosity, and possibly some degree of uneasiness, has been excited in his mind by learning that Mehemet Rushdi, the late Seraskier, a person of considerable influence, had been closeted with M. Argyropulo for more than an hour, and that the Pasha had made no mention of the circumstance either to him or to any one of their mutual colleagues.

I am informed, moreover, that the French Ambassador, though he told me that he had received nothing new from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, has twice resumed his solicitations to Reshid Pasha, either in person or by message, since the arrival of the last steam-packet on the 1st instant. In conversing with me, though he said nothing of his overtures to Reshid Pasha, he inquired whether I did not think that some opening towards further concession might be made at the Porte by means of Mehemed Rushdi Pasha, and the present Seraskier, Mehemet Ali. I replied that I had no instructions on which to act under the present circumstances; that whatever was to happen I conceived that, in common self-respect, the Porte must wait quietly for a reply to its demand of amendments, and that I should have thought that the leaders of the war party would be the last persons from whom spontaneous, not to say premature concession, was to be expected.

If any change has really taken place in the counsels of any, or of all the Sultan's Ministers, I am ignorant of it; and the departure now preparing of the Egyptian contingent for Varna, seems to bear me out in continuing to believe the contrary.

It cannot, at the same time, be doubted, that as danger approaches and difficulties thicken, the sense of responsibility and the apprehension of disastrous eventualities, weigh more heavily on the firmest minds; and still less can it be denied that Turkey, encouraged by the approval of all Europe, animated by the appearance of the British and French squadrons at Besika Bay, and justly fearful of further invasion from Russia, has advanced into a position from which, if it be not providentially rescued or seasonably succoured, it can only escape by a sacrifice which it deems no less perilous than humiliating, or by a conflict but too likely to end in defeat or exhaustion.

Hitherto the prognostications of massacre and insurrection have singularly failed. I have already paid a just tribute of admiration to the good order which has been uniformly maintained among the troops and squadrons of the Sultan. But this advantage is chiefly attributable to the hope of a successful contest, and to reliance on the firmness of the Sultan and the wisdom of his Ministers. Greatly would the case be altered if the Porte, no longer upheld by the firmest of its allies, were compelled to disperse its military and naval forces without the satisfaction of being able to assure them that the Sultan's rights had been firmly

maintained, and the independence of his empire completely secured. Rumours already prevail of intimidating language, used in the anticipation of such a result by officers in the Sultan's army; and I am not without suspicion, that the dethronement of the Sultan is contemplated by certain individuals, and not altogether excluded from popular speculation as an eventual expedient.

These alarms may be mere inventions, or at least exaggerations, but they carry enough of probability to make it imprudent to neglect them; and I have no doubt that they operate more or less on the minds of those who have attached their fortunes to the fate of the Government.

The consequences to be apprehended from even a partial accomplishment of such contingencies need not be pointed out to your Lordship's sagacity. The most immediate and inevitable would be one which, by placing the reins of government in the hands of an ignorant and high-spirited young man, under circumstances of unequalled difficulty, would increase immeasurably the hazards of the crisis, and stave off an impending catastrophe only to replace it by another less imminent, but, perhaps, in the issue, more fatal still.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 352.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 308.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 20, 1853.*

I INCLOSE copies of despatches* which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and to Sir G. H. Seymour, respecting the modifications of the note sent from Vienna that have been proposed by the Porte.

It is important that your Lordship should be in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon this subject, as you are going to Olmutz, and may possibly have an opportunity of communicating with the Emperor of Russia, or with Count Nesselrode, who it is understood will accompany His Imperial Majesty.

Your Lordship will perceive that Her Majesty's Government considered the modifications to be unimportant, and regretted that they had been proposed. Her Majesty's Government were accordingly prepared still to recommend that the note should be accepted by the Porte upon their interpretation of it, which was that of the Conference at Vienna; for the Four Powers, who have anxiously laboured to effect a peaceful and honourable solution of the question, thought they did justice and gave ample security to the Porte by acting upon the declaration so repeatedly made by the Emperor, that he sought for no new right and no increase of power in Turkey, but desired only the maintenance of existing Treaties, and the *status quo* in religious matters. Upon this principle, and with no other intention, the note was framed, and Her Majesty's Government considered that no other meaning could be attached to it; but the reasons given by Count Nesselrode in his despatch to Baron Meyendorff for objecting to the modifications induce Her Majesty's Government to think that the apprehensions entertained by the Porte, so far from being groundless, are to a great extent justified by the construction put upon the original note by Count Nesselrode.

I do not propose to enter into a discussion upon the objections raised by Count Nesselrode. It is sufficient to say, that they are at variance with the intentions of the Four Powers; and Her Majesty's Government feel that it would not be just or honourable, either towards the Emperor or the Sultan, to press the acceptance of the note upon the Porte so long as any misunderstanding existed upon its true meaning; and they feel, moreover, that the reestablishment of real and permanent friendly relations between Russia and Turkey, the object which the Four Powers have sincerely at heart, would be defeated if the note which they looked upon as the basis of reconciliation were hereafter to be made a cause of irritating discussion with respect to claims which it might be held to justify, and the resistance to them which, on the other side, would appear

* See Nos. 328 and 339.



equally warrantable. The importance of avoiding all misunderstanding upon the question itself, and at the critical period at which it has arrived, cannot be exaggerated; and Her Majesty's Government, therefore, in the interest of peace, and possibly as the last hope of perserving Europe from the danger which now appears imminent, are anxious to learn whether the Emperor is still determined to seek no new right and no further extension of power in Turkey; and as they feel convinced that His Imperial Majesty will not hesitate to renew his former declarations to that effect, they cannot either believe that he will object to such alterations of the Vienna note as would have the effect of quieting the alarm of the Porte, and that he will not, upon a misunderstanding that it is in his power to rectify, permit the recent negotiations to prove fruitless and thus expose Europe to the risks of war, which would entail the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire—an event which the Emperor, in common with all his allies, has never ceased to deprecate as a calamity of the greatest magnitude.

In the event of your Lordship being honoured by an interview with the Emperor at Olmutz, you will govern yourself by the language of this despatch and its inclosures, and you will make the views of Her Majesty's Government known to Count Nesselrode, who, with reference to the importance and pressing nature of the subject, will doubtless overlook the irregularity of the communication being made through your Lordship, who has no official relations with the Court of Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 353

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(No. 312.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 21, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO communicated to me confidentially, yesterday, two despatches, dated the 13th instant, which had been addressed by Count Buol to Baron Bruck, on the receipt of the intelligence of the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to acquiesce in the modifications which the Porte desired to introduce into the Vienna note.

The first of these despatches purports to give the substance of the answer from St. Petersburgh; that the Emperor of Russia's consent to accept the Vienna note was contingent on its acceptance, unaltered, by the Porte; that having renounced for himself the pretension to change the terms of the note, the Emperor could not admit that the Porte was entitled to make any alteration, and by so doing place Russia in a position of inferiority towards Turkey: that the Emperor had done all that could be required of him in accepting, without hesitation, a note which, in various respects, could not but be distasteful to him; and that though entitled to make alterations if Turkey might do so, His Imperial Majesty had considered that the Porte would, like himself, look upon the note as not open to alteration, and on this understanding His Imperial Majesty had accepted it. That the Emperor, therefore, insisted upon the acceptance of the note by the Porte; and although released from his engagements by the refusal of the Porte, he was nevertheless still ready, on the arrival at St. Petersburgh of a Turkish Ambassador with the note unaltered, and without any conditions being attached to it, to withdraw his troops from the Turkish territory.

Such being the tenor of the accounts from St. Petersburgh, Count Buol goes on to say, that nothing remained but to exhort the Porte duly to weigh the serious consequences of rejecting the only remaining chance of an amicable arrangement. Austria, undeterred by any feeling of pique at the rejection of the note which she had proposed, had urged Russia to accept the modifications, of which Austria herself did not approve. Whatever shades of difference might exist in the language and views of their Representatives at Constantinople, the Four Powers were unanimously of opinion that the note was worthy of acceptance by the Porte, and was not calculated to prejudice either the interests or the dignity of the Sultan. With no less unanimity did they regret the hesitation shown by the Porte to listen to their advice; and the Austrian Government felt sure that they would now all agree in urging the Porte no longer to refuse

accepting the note as it stood. At all events, if her counsels were again disregarded, Austria, while deploring the fatal consequences which must ensue from a fresh refusal on the part of the Porte to defer to the wishes of the Powers, could only consider her efforts to effect a reconciliation as at an end.

In the second despatch Baron Bruck is directed to urge, not only the influential members of the Ottoman Ministry, but even the Sultan in person, no longer to defer adopting the only course which the state of affairs required; to press for the immediate dispatch of the note in its original shape by a special ambassador to Vienna, or that the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna should be authorized to seek an opportunity to place it before the Emperor Nicholas: and the Austrian Government would, in that case, endeavour to obtain an audience for the Ambassador before the Emperor of Russia set out from Warsaw on his return to St. Petersburgh, as the only means of effecting the evacuation of the Principalities before the winter.

Count Buol goes on to say, that it might be suggested to the Sultan to accompany the note with an autograph letter to the Emperor Nicholas, in which His Highness might express the doubts which had occasioned the hesitation of the Divan, and so afford the Emperor an opportunity of tranquillizing the alarm which had been excited. Austria would, in that case, exert herself, and she had reason to suppose not without effect, to obtain still greater concessions for Turkey; for Austria could not doubt that the views of the Emperor were pacific, and his desire sincere to effect a reconciliation with the Porte; no better proof of which could be adduced than the fact that the Russian Army had already been ordered to prepare for the evacuation of the Ottoman territory, in case the Vienna note had been accepted by the Porte. In fact, Austria knew that the arrival of the Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburgh would not have been waited for as a preliminary to the commencement of the withdrawal of the Russian forces.

When Count Colloredo had finished reading these despatches he said, it was of the utmost importance that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople should receive instructions similar to those which had been transmitted to the Internuncio, again to press the Vienna note on the acceptance of the Porte.

In reply, I expressed my regret that such instructions could not be sent, as I had that morning received despatches from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, stating that it was utterly impossible for the Turkish Government to agree to the note without modifications; but that the chief reason which must influence Her Majesty's Government no longer to urge the Porte on this subject, was the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff, explaining the grounds upon which the Russian Government objected to the modifications; and I could not help expressing my surprise, that no allusion should have been made to that document in the despatches which Count Colloredo had just read, for it was now clear that the Russian Government endeavoured to give to the note a construction not intended by the Four Powers who framed it.

Count Colloredo said, that if instructions in the sense that Count Buol requested were not sent to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, there would be an end to the Conference at Vienna. I answered that that would be a matter of sincere regret to Her Majesty's Government, who had considered that united opinion and action of the Four Powers upon not only the present, but future questions, between Russia and the Porte, would tend to preserve peace and to uphold the Ottoman Empire; but that no advantage could be worth purchasing by dishonesty; and Her Majesty's Government would consider it nothing short of dishonesty to persuade the Turkish Government to sign the note, now that they were made aware that their interpretation of it was not that of the Emperor of Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 354.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 21.)

(No. 692.)
My Lord, *Paris, September* 19, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that M. Drouyn de Lhuys returned to Paris last night. I received a note from him this morning, inviting me to call upon him. Upon proceeding to his residence I found that he had gone to the Emperor at St. Cloud, and it was not until a late hour this evening that I succeeded in having an interview with him.

He adverted immediately to the proceedings of the Conference of Vienna, since the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to accept the Vienna note, as modified by the Porte, was known in that capital.

He read me two telegraphic despatches received from M. de Bourqueney, the one dated yesterday, informing M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the Representatives of the Four Powers had signed a Protocol for communication to the Porte, declaring that there was nothing in the note emanating from the Vienna Conference subversive of the sovereign rights of the Sultan; the other, dated 9 o'clock this morning, showing that this declaration had not been obtained without considerable resistance on the part of Austria and Prussia, who had refused to subscribe to the more extended form proposed by Lord Westmorland in your Lordship's name.

Still M. de Bourqueney considers that a great point has been gained in obtaining any collective declaration whatever from the Representatives of the Four Powers, and he argues that there is nothing to prevent England and France from adding on their parts such further assurances as the nature of the case may require. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has adopted this view, and he proposed this morning to the Emperor that the French Government should adhere to the Protocol signed yesterday at Vienna, and that M. de la Cour should be further instructed to state to the Turkish Ministers that France would be ready to give this interpretation to the Vienna note whenever circumstances required her to do so. Under such assurances the Porte ought to be pressed to sign the original Vienna note.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys hoped that your Lordship would adopt the same course. He would have preferred that your Lordship's projet of declaration communicated to him by Count Walewski, and strenuously supported by M. de Bourqueney, should have found favour at Vienna; but this not being the case, the next best thing in his opinion was to carry the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, as far as practicable, with those of London and Paris. Nothing need then prevent the two latter from giving for themselves such further explanations or assurances as they might think proper. The Protocol of Conference, if it did nothing else, recognized the existence of Turkey, and asserted a principle in regard to her. He thought this preferable to no declaration at all.

The Emperor agreed in this opinion, and it had been telegraphed to London for communication to your Lordship. No answer would be sent to Vienna respecting it until your Lordship's reply should be received. When I left M. Drouyn de Lhuys at 6 o'clock, he was anxiously expecting it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 355.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 21.)

(No. 693. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, September* 19, 1853.

M. DE BOURQUENEY, in his telegraphic despatch dated this morning, of which mention is made in my preceding despatch, informs M. Drouyn de Lhuys that M. de Hübner is desired to inquire what further steps the French Government will be ready to take should the Porte persist in her resolution

to refuse the Vienna note without modifications. Count Buol is desirous that the Cabinets should not be taken by surprise (au dépourvu) as they were by the late refusal of Russia, but that some plan of action should have been agreed upon. He wishes that all the efforts of France at Constantinople should then be directed to prevent the Porte from commencing hostilities, Austria undertaking a similar task towards the Emperor of Russia. M. de Bourqueney adds, that he should not be surprised if a desire was expressed that the English and French fleets should come up to Constantinople to impose by their arrival upon the Porte, and that their presence in the Bosphorus should be turned to account to make Russia believe that they were acting as a pressure on the Porte. M. de Bourqueney appears to doubt the policy of such a proceeding. M. Drouyn de Lhuys inquired of me what I thought of it. I replied that it seemed to me impossible to admit the parity which Count Buol seemed disposed to establish between the relative positions of Turkey and Russia. In fact, Count Buol's proposition went to state that if Russia was allowed to remain quietly in the Principalities, she would give an equivalent by promising not to advance across the Danube, whereas the real state of the case was that Russia had no business in the Principalities, and that she would put herself still more in the wrong if she advanced further; while the Porte in abstaining from any attempt to drive the Russians back, was foregoing a right which, although it might be prudent not to exercise, was nevertheless a right that no one could contest. The two Cabinets of England and France had, in the interests of general peace, counselled this moderate conduct to the Porte, and they might continue to counsel it abstractedly; but it seemed to me next to impossible that they should admit it to be implied that Russia was making a concession in abstaining from further aggression. With regard to the appearance of the fleets at Constantinople, I said that I felt convinced that Her Majesty's Government would never allow Her Majesty's fleet to be considered by Russia as intended to coerce the Porte into the acceptance of a note which she had a perfect right to modify or reject, however much it might be regretted that that right had been exercised.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys appeared to coincide in this opinion, but he reserved to himself to reconsider it before he pronounced any decided judgment upon it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 356.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 695. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 19, 1853.*

M. DE KISSELEFF communicated this afternoon to M. Drouyn de Lhuys two documents, of which I have no doubt your Lordship has knowledge through M. de Brunnow; the one being a despatch stating why the Emperor of Russia has determined on rejecting the Vienna note as modified by the Porte; the other being a memorandum examining the modifications themselves, and showing the points on which the Russian Government differed from the interpretation sought to be put upon them by the Porte.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys described the first of these papers as being most ably drawn up; the second he thinks bad in argument and worse in principle. He said that a certain interference in the welfare of the Christian subjects of the Porte is unmistakeably claimed in it as a deduction from the Treaty of Kainardji. He told M. de Kisseleff that he regretted that he had read the second paper to him, as it opened afresh the whole discussion, and almost placed matters where they were at the beginning of this regrettable affair.

M. de Kisseleff inquired what the French Government proposed doing. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that they were still anxious that the Porte should sign the Vienna note; that they still advised her to do so; but that Russia also should lend her aid. M. de Kisseleff rejoined, that that could not be, and that it rested with the Representatives who had proposed the note to insist on its acceptance. "And indeed," he asked, "how could we assist you?" M. Drouyn



de Lhuys answered that Russia might show a more conciliatory disposition towards Turkey; that the Emperor had given, since the commencement of this affair, many satisfactory assurances as to his objects and intentions. Let His Majesty collect these together, and repeat them at Vienna. Such a proceeding would strengthen the hands of the Conference. M. de Kisseleff asserted that this was the business of the Conference, and not of the Emperor. "Am I to understand thereby," exclaimed M. Drouyn de Lhuys, "that the Emperor of Russia declines to take his part with the other Great Powers in promoting the continuance of peace? Does he abjure the noble part he has played until now in the Councils of Europe? What has induced France to interfere in this quarrel? A wish to prevent the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, because such a catastrophe would probably lead to an European war. But the Emperor of Russia has besides the duties of a neighbour to perform; and he claims to watch over the interests of eleven millions of the Porte's subjects. Is he not then doubly bound to aid in the preservation of peace? and why should he try and devolve this duty on others? If such is his policy, let him state it openly. The Emperor of the French will not then shrink from the additional burthen sought to be laid upon his shoulders."

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S. September 20.—M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in referring again to this conversation, added, that M. de Kisseleff, seeing the bad impression made by his communication of the memorandum, said that it was not to be considered as an official paper, nor too much importance given to its contents. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, that before he could consider it in any other light than an official communication, he must have an official declaration from M. de Kisseleff that it had no real value.

C.

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No. 357.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 701.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 20, 1853.*

I HAVE just seen M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who read to me a despatch which he had received this morning from Count Walewski giving an account of a conversation which that Ambassador had held with your Lordship yesterday in the presence of the Earl of Aberdeen. Count Walewski stated that your Lordship had read to him the copy of a communication made to you by M. de Brunnow, giving the reasons why Russia refused to adhere to the modifications demanded by the Porte before the latter could accept the Vienna note; that these reasons showed that Russia put a very different interpretation upon the sense of the Vienna note from that intended by the Conference; that it appeared consequently to Lord Aberdeen and to yourself that any further proceedings at Vienna would be useless, for that it would not be fair to urge the Porte to sign a document which would give Russia such advantages as it was now clear the Russian Government expected from it. Count Walewski however continuing to press your Lordship to send instructions to Lord Westmorland in the sense indicated in my despatch No. 692 of yesterday's date, you promised to give him a more positive answer to-day.

Count Walewski states further that he insisted upon the necessity of the two Governments taking some decided resolution as to their future action, the present crisis rendering any further hesitation extremely dangerous. Such, in a few words, is the substance of a long despatch from the French Ambassador in London.

After reading it to me, M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed himself as still desirous that the declaration emanating from the Vienna Conference should be sent to Constantinople, accompanied by such further assurances as the French and English Governments might think it expedient to give.

He told me further that after his conversation with M. de Kisseleff yester-

day, to which reference is made in my despatch No. 695, he had sent a telegraphic despatch to M. de Bourqueney desiring him to demand categorically of M. de Buol whether the Austrian Cabinet adhered to the Russian interpretation given to the Vienna note or not. He appears to hope that this summary demand will force an explanation unfavourable to Russia from Count Buol, who will be placed in the dilemma of having expressed an opinion in the first instance that the Turkish modifications were of no importance, and of expressing a contrary opinion now, if he accepts the interpretation given to them by Russia.

I observed that whatever might be the result of the step which he had indicated he had taken at Vienna, it would not obviate the inconvenience which your Lordship had signalized to Count Walewski, namely, the difficulty, not to say the impossibility, of still recommending the Porte to sign a note from which Russia expected to derive advantages which that note was not intended to confer. I think that before I left him he had made up his mind to consider the late Vienna negotiations as abortive, and to look for some fresh combination which may yet avert the storm ready to burst in the East.

He will see the Emperor in Council to-morrow, and I am to have an interview with him afterwards.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—I ventured to ask your Lordship to-day, by telegraph, to send me copies of M. de Brunnow's communications to which Count Walewski refers, as M. de Kisseleff has left no copies with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as M. de Brunnow appears to have done with your Lordship.

C.

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No. 358.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 196.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 21, 1853.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 251 of the 29th of August, that Her Majesty's Government approve the instructions which you have given to Her Majesty's Consular officers in Wallachia and Moldavia with reference to the reiterated orders sent by the Porte to the Hospodars to withdraw from those provinces in the event of the continued opposition of the Russian authorities to their maintaining their proper intercourse with and deference to the Porte.

Your Excellency will acquaint Mr. Consul-General Colquhoun that I approve of the manner in which he is acting at the present crisis.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 359.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 199.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 21, 1853.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Reshid Pasha in the conversation with that Minister of which you give a report in your despatch No. 258 of the 5th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 360.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September* 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September* 22, 1853, 2½ P.M.

VOTRE dépêche télégraphique du 21 est arrivée. M. de Bourqueney a reçu une en partie semblable datée du 21. Nous avons prié le Comte Buol de réunir la Conférence aujourd'hui. Nous en sortons: j'y ai communiqué votre dépêche. M. de Bourqueney en fit autant de la sienne qui ne contient que le premier paragraphe de la vôtre. Nous avons fortement appuyé votre proposition. Le Comte Buol a objecté que la condition sur laquelle il avait accepté la déclaration proposée pour la signature des quatre Représentants, était en échange de la signature de la note originale de Vienne. Cette condition étant écartée par vos paroles, "nous ne pouvons plus conseiller à la Turquie de signer la note de Vienne," il regarde la déclaration projetée comme n'étant plus applicable. M. de Bourqueney et moi nous avons fait des efforts inutiles pour combattre cette opinion complètement partagée par le Comte Arnim. Le Comte Buol a déclaré qu'il avait reçu les ordres de l'Empereur de signer la déclaration collective arrêtée dans la conférence du 18, sous la forme d'une note identique et collectivement adressée aux quatre Représentants à Constantinople pour être remise par eux à la Porte. Le Comte Arnim a reçu les mêmes pouvoirs. Le Comte Buol et le Comte Arnim suspendent toute action jusqu'à ce que vos intentions ultérieures soient connues. Le Comte Buol se rend demain à Olmutz.

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No. 361.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September* 23.)

(No. 350.)

My Lord, *Vienna, September* 17, 1853.

UPON the receipt yesterday of your Lordship's despatch dated the 15th instant, I wrote to Count Buol stating that I should wish to communicate it to him, and that I thought it would be advisable to assemble the Conference. Count Buol appointed 3 o'clock, when I was met by my other colleagues. I read to them your Lordship's despatch, and M. de Bourqueney also read the despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the 12th, which he had received, and which contained the draft of a note to be addressed to Reshid Pasha, which is alluded to in your Lordship's despatch. Count Buol stated what I have reported in my telegraphic message of yesterday's date, that having already written to the Internuncio the despatch which he had read to us on a former day, directing him in the most anxious terms to press upon the Porte the importance of accepting the original note as it had been proposed by the Four Powers, he felt that it would be impossible he could now associate himself to any communication which appeared to him less calculated to obtain the object which all the Powers were anxious for; and he particularly remarked upon the absence in the note proposed by the French Government, of any mention of the recommendation to adopt the Vienna note as it originally stood, although in your Lordship's telegraphic despatch that advice was tendered. On the other hand Count Buol remarked, while he admitted the ability with which the French note was drawn up, yet that it was not conformable to the statement in your Lordship's despatch upon the subject of the declarations and assurances to be given to the Turkish Government. Count Buol being therefore of opinion that he could not now associate himself to any collective action which would not correspond with the communications he had already transmitted to Constantinople, and which he had believed were conformable to the intentions of the other Powers, he recommended that we should each of us report to our Governments the urgency of instructing their Representatives to bring before the Porte their desire that the original note should be adopted by the Turkish Government, accompanying that recommendation with such guarantees and assurances as they should each of them deem it advisable to offer.

In stating this Count Buol announced that he had received such information from Constantinople as made him most anxious that no time should be lost in bringing before the Porte the opinions of the allied Governments, so that the importance of the decision it was about to take might be clearly explained; and he had transmitted to Count Colloredo a copy of his instructions to the Internuncio, to be communicated to your Lordship. You would see the earnestness with which he had pressed the Porte, by accepting the terms of a document which the allied Governments had agreed to in the perfect conviction that it contained nothing which could in any way compromise the honour or dignity of the Sultan or his Government, to put an end to the occupation of the Principalities, and to the dangers which must necessarily arise from its continuation. When Count Buol read this instruction to the Conference I remarked upon some of the expressions, as of a character too menacing to be justified while the Government of the Sultan was suffering from so great a grievance as the forcible occupation of two of its provinces; but he stated, that the dangerous posture of affairs required that they should be pointed out without reserve. Before the Conference closed Count Buol read a despatch from M. de Hübner, in which he reports a conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in which that Minister had stated his having instructed M. de la Cour to press upon Reshid Pasha, in the strongest manner, his advice that the unmodified note should be accepted, as the Government of the Sultan would otherwise render themselves responsible for the consequences which might ensue. Baron Bourqueney replied that he had no instructions which contained such a menace, although he was aware of the great anxiety of his Government that the note should be adopted; and with that view, after the Conference was ended, he wrote to M. de la Cour a despatch, the substance of which I transmitted to your Lordship on the evenings of the 16th-18th September.

I had written the foregoing part of this despatch when I received, this morning, your Lordship's telegraphic message of yesterday's date. I have to express my regret at having misunderstood the meaning of your previous telegraphic message of the 15th; I certainly thought that the words "J'ai tout lieu de croire que M. de Bourqueney recevra une dépêche semblable à ce qui suit," referred to the one which had just reached that Minister, and which he brought with him to the Conference; more particularly as it corresponded in part to the description your Lordship gave of it. I must add, that all the members of the Conference partook entirely of the same opinion. I very much regret this mistake, as it has led to a delay in bringing your Lordship's views before the Conference.

Upon the receipt, this morning, of your Lordship's message I waited upon Count Buol, and placed it in his hands. I have transmitted to you, by my two telegraphic despatches of this day, the result of my interview. I am extremely sorry I was not able, with every exertion that I made, and in which M. de Bourqueney (who joined me during the discussion) assisted with the most anxious zeal, to obtain the object of your Lordship's instructions. I have already informed you that Count Buol, at our former conferences, had stated, that having sent his instructions to the Internuncio he could not take part in any collective communication upon the same subject to the Government of the Sultan. Such a communication must now arrive too late to alter the impression made by his despatch, and therefore it would be better that each Government should separately forward their own instructions to their own Representatives, particularly as they would thus be enabled to direct them to give such guarantees and assurances as they conceived it would be advisable to offer.

I combatted this reasoning, which Count Buol immediately reproduced by pointing out the immense importance, in the present decisive crisis of this question, of the maintenance of that unity of counsel which had hitherto been attended with advantage, and which would still offer the most probable chance of a favourable result. Count Buol expressed his anxious desire that the same unity of action should continue amongst the allied Powers; but that upon the present case it had been rendered impossible from the pressing necessity of acting without delay, which had been thrown upon him in consequence of the absence of any previously concerted line of conduct amongst the Powers upon he emergency which had arisen.

I recapitulated to Count Buol the great advantages which might be expected from the assurances and guarantees which your Lordship proposed to



render to the Government of the Sultan, in inducing them to adopt the course which the Four Powers so strenuously recommended. and I expressed the most anxious hope that this opportunity of maintaining an attitude of impartiality between the conflicting parties would not be thrown away.

Count Buol replied that he felt himself obliged, under the circumstances which pressed upon him, to come to a decision, which he must maintain. He added that in no case could he agree to a pledge of "adhérence en toute occasion," to the interpretation of any document, because he considered engagements binding for the future at all times as much as possible to be avoided; but he declared himself willing to take part with the other Powers in a declaration that the terms of the Vienna note could in no way be considered as menacing or derogatory to the independence or authority of the Sultan.

M. de Bourqueney, who had taken an active part in this discussion, adhered, in conjunction with myself, to the acceptation of this proposal as a means of continuing the common action of the Four Powers, and of giving the Porte the benefit of their declared interpretation of the note and the security thereby afforded against any perversion of its terms to sanction pretensions prejudicial to the interests or independence of Turkey.

It was under these circumstances that the project of the declaration which I forwarded to your Lordship in my first telegraphic message was drawn up; and as only Baron Bourqueney and myself had been present at this meeting with Count Buol, we repaired to Count Arnim's to obtain his sanction to the declaration, and we fixed a conference for the evening, at which the amended document was agreed to, which I transmitted in my second despatch.

I beg your Lordship to believe that with the zealous assistance of M. de Bourqueney, no exertion was spared on my part to secure the entire adoption of your Lordship's proposals, and that what we at last accepted only as a project to be submitted to your Lordship's decision, has been the utmost which, under the circumstances I have detailed, it was possible to obtain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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No. 362.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(*Received September* 23.)

(No. 365. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September* 18, 1853.

I HAD an opportunity yesterday at the review of taking leave of the King of Prussia and of the Princes, on the occasion of my approaching departure for England. I was charged by His Majesty to convey to the Queen the expressions of his unalterable feelings of devotion and attachment to Her Majesty. The Prince of Prussia charged me also with the like assurances.

In the course of the conversation which I had the honour of holding with the King, His Majesty alluded to Eastern affairs. I regretted to observe that he appeared extremely apprehensive that the Porte would refuse to adopt the original Vienna note, and that it consequently was impossible to foresee what calamities might not be entailed on Turkey in the event of their refusal. I availed myself of an opportunity which offered of inquiring if His Majesty thought that there was a chance of the immediate evacuation of the Principalities, provided the Porte acceded to the recommendations which would be urged on her conjointly by the Four Powers; and he replied that notwithstanding the Emperor of Russia's declaration that this would not take place until the Turkish Ambassador had reached St. Petersburgh, it was his conviction that His Imperial Majesty would order the troops to move from those Turkish provinces as soon as he learned that the note had been agreed to. The King's conversation turned on various points connected with this question, and one of his greatest apprehensions was that, even if the note was accepted, serious troubles might occur at Constantinople, and perhaps end in the deposition of the Sultan or some other disastrous event.

His Majesty ended by requesting me to state to your Lordship his anxious

desire to cooperate with England in this question, for it was the common interest of both countries to leave no means untried to preserve the peace of the world.

The Prince of Prussia alluded to his journey this week to Olmütz, and assured me that he believed the King had no intention whatever of going there.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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No. 363.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 378.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 23, 1853.

YOUR Excellency's report in your despatch No. 692 of your conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the proceedings of the Vienna Conference, subsequently to the rejection by Russia of the Turkish modifications of the Vienna note, has been read with interest by Her Majesty's Government, who, under the altered phase of affairs caused by the recent interpretation given by Russia to that note, do not think it expedient further to press the note on the acceptance of the Porte, nor to offer the British interpretation of it as an inducement to the Turkish Government to adopt it.

The reasons which have induced Her Majesty's Government to come to this determination are fully explained in my despatch No. 308 to the Earl of Westmorland, of which, as well as of Count Nesselrode's despatches to Baron Meyendorff detailing the Russian objections to the modifications of the Porte, copies were forwarded to you in my despatch No. 372.

It will be a satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government to find that the French Government concur in their views on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 364.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 379.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 23, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which you state in your despatch No. 693 that you held to M. Drouyn de Lhuys upon the subject of the measures to be adopted by England and France in regard to the Eastern question, with reference to observations made by Count Buol to M. de Bourqueney urging that Turkey should be deterred by France from resorting to hostilities, while Austria would exert her influence to prevent further aggression by Russia.

However much Her Majesty's Government will lament the commencement of active hostilities, yet they will certainly offer no advice to the Turkish Government contrary to the interests of the Porte; and those interests might be seriously affected by the maintenance of the actual *status quo*, which would leave Russia in peaceful possession of the Principalities during the winter.

It is to be hoped that the Austrian proposal adverted to by M. de Bourqueney to call up the fleets to Constantinople under false pretences, and in order to make Russia believe that they were sent to the Bosphorus to overawe the Porte, has not been seriously contemplated, or at all events that it will not be made, as Her Majesty's Government and that of France will not then be under the disagreeable necessity of treating such a proposal in the manner it deserves.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 365.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September* 23.)

(No. 703.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 22, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that he transmitted to Count Walewski immediately on its receipt a telegraphic despatch, dated the 11th instant, from Constantinople, which apprised him that, in consequence of the great fermentation reigning in that city, the Ambassadors of England and France had decided on calling up two ships each from the respective fleets for the protection of the Christian population and of the Sultan himself, should the fanaticism of the Mussulmans threaten danger to either. In making me this communication M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, that it being the opinion both of the Emperor and himself that two ships would not suffice for the service required, should the threatened danger be realized, he had, through Count Walewski, proposed to your Lordship to send instructions for the advance of the whole of both fleets to Constantinople. When M. Drouyn de Lhuys made me this communication, he had not received any positive answer from your Lordship to his proposition; but he informed me that he had taken the Emperor's orders, His Majesty being about to leave Paris for a few days, as to his conduct during his absence. They are to the effect that, if Her Majesty's Government agree to the proposition, instructions founded on it are to be sent to Constantinople without further reference to the Emperor. If, on the other hand, Her Majesty's Government decline the proposition, and if intelligence should arrive from Constantinople which should induce M. Drouyn de Lhuys to advise the advance of the French fleet alone, he is not to act without further reference to His Majesty.

In giving me this information, M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, that he had been informed by Count Walewski that your Lordship had instructed Lord Westmorland to sign the Vienna Protocol, but that his Lordship was directed to state at the same time that Her Majesty's Government could no longer advise the Porte to sign the Vienna note in face of the interpretation put upon it by the Russian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 366.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(No. 382.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 23, 1853.

I INCLOSE the copy of a telegraphic despatch from M. de la Cour which has been communicated to me by Count Walewski, stating the serious apprehensions that were entertained of a catastrophe of which the European inhabitants of Constantinople would be the first victims, and which might endanger the Throne of the Sultan, and that Reshid Pasha and the Grand Vizier had informed the French and English Ambassadors that the lives and properties of their countrymen might thus be exposed to serious danger, which the Government would be powerless to avert.

M. de la Cour further states, that having consulted Viscount de Redcliffe they had determined each to send for two war-steamers from Besika for the purpose of protecting their respective countrymen, and in case of need to contribute to the personal safety of the Sultan.

Count Walewski then informed the Earl of Aberdeen (who was present at the interview) and myself, that his Government, with reference to the crisis which appeared to be imminent, thought it indispensably necessary that both fleets should be ordered up to Constantinople; and his Excellency added that he was directed to ask for the immediate decision of Her Majesty's Government,

in order that no time might be lost in sending instructions to the Ambassadors and Admirals.

I told Count Walewski that no intelligence of the nature referred to by M. de la Cour had been received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and that so long as the Porte did not declare war against Russia and desire the presence of the British fleet, it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government scrupulously to observe the Treaty of 1841 ; but Lord Aberdeen and I concurred in stating to Count Walewski that under such circumstances as those reported by M. de la Cour the provisions of any Treaty must necessarily, and as a matter of course, be set aside, and that we would without hesitation take upon ourselves to agree to the proposal of the French Government that the Ambassadors should be instructed to call up the fleets to Constantinople for the security of British and French interests, and, if necessary, for the protection of the Sultan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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Inclosure in No. 366.

*M. de la Cour to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.*

(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, le* 11 *Septembre*, 1853.

L'Ambassadeur de France, à Constantinople, à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères :

LA position du Gouvernement Turc s'aggrave de plus en plus, et les choses sont au point de faire craindre sérieusement une catastrophe dont les habitants Rayahs ou Européens seraient les premières victimes, et qui menacerait même le trône du Sultan.

Reshid Pasha et le Grand Vizir m'ont fait part de ces appréhensions. Ils ne m'ont pas caché que les personnes et les intérêts de mes nationaux seraient dans cette occurrence exposés à de graves dangers qu'ils se sentaient impuissants à conjurer par suite de la désunion qui existait dans le Ministère, et les menaces qui sont dirigées contre eux-mêmes.

Le même avis a été donné à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, et après nous être concertés, nous avons décidé à faire venir de Besica, chacun, deux navires à vapeur de haut bord, pour renforcer la station de Constantinople, et avoir sous la main des ressources suffisantes pour protéger nos nationaux, et même, au besoin, prêter appui au Sultan si le mouvement provoqué par la partie de la guerre allait jusqu'à menacer son autorité.

(Signé) DE LA COUR.

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No. 367.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(No. 205.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 23, 1853.

BY a telegraphic despatch of the 11th instant from M. de la Cour to his Government, which has been communicated to me by Count Walewski, Her Majesty's Government have learnt the alarming state of affairs which then existed at Constantinople ; and that, upon the representations of Reshid Pasha and the Grand Vizier to your Excellency and M. de la Cour, you had each determined to send for two war-steamers from Besika.

The latest date of the despatches received from your Excellency at this office is the 5th instant, and Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, no information of the events alluded to by M. de la Cour; but assuming, of course, that his report is correct, I have the satisfaction of conveying to you the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

Under ordinary circumstances, and as long as the Sultan does not declare war against Russia, nor demand the presence of the British fleet, we must scrupulously observe the Treaty of 1841, and your Excellency's original instructions on this matter remain therefore in full force. But when it appears



that the lives and properties of British subjects are exposed to serious danger, and that the Turkish Government declares itself unable to avert that danger, it is clear that the Treaty has no longer a binding force upon us, and that urgent necessity supersedes its provisions.

Your Excellency is therefore instructed to send for the British fleet to Constantinople, and, in conjunction with the Admiral, to dispose of it in the manner you deem most expedient for protecting British interests and the personal safety of the Sultan; and Her Majesty's Government have no doubt that the Turkish Government will, without hesitation, furnish the necessary firmans for that object.

Similar instructions will be sent to M. de la Cour ; and I need hardly say, how essential it is that your Excellency should act in entire concert with your French colleague.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 368.

*Mr. Addington to the Secretary to the Admiralty.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 23, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government have learned that much excitement prevails at this moment at Constantinople, and being apprehensive that danger may thereby be occasioned to the lives and property of British subjects in that capital, have instructed Her Majesty's Ambassador, in case he should consider it expedient, to call upon the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's fleet in Besika Bay to bring up the whole, or any part, of the ships under his command for the protection of British subjects, and also, in case of necessity, for ensuring the personal safety of the Sultan.

I am accordingly to request that you will move the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send out forthwith the necessary instructions to enable Admiral Dundas to comply with the requisition of Her Majesty's Ambassador to the above effect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) H. U. ADDINGTON.

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No. 369.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September* 27.)

(No. 714.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 26, 1853.

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the copy of your Lordship's despatch No. 308 to Her Majesty's Envoy at Vienna ; and I told him at the same time, as directed in your despatch to me No. 378, that it would be a satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government to find that the French Government concur in their views respecting the present state of the Eastern question, as developed in those instructions to Lord Westmorland. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, without hesitation, that he subscribed entirely to your Lordship's reasoning.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 370.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September* 27.)

(No. 715.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 26, 1853.

I HAVE communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch No. 382, in which you inform me that Her Majesty's Government assents to the proposition made by the French Government, that the fleets should be ordered

up to Constantinople; and I have read to him also, the instructions which you have addressed in consequence to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has read me, in return, the despatches which were sent to M. de la Cour last night, to be forwarded by a special steamer from Marseilles. The French Ambassador at Constantinople is enjoined to spare no effort to obtain the acquiescence of the Ottoman Government in the contemplated advance of the fleets. The French Government justifies the act on the advantage of getting out of a false position, now that the real intentions of Russia are known; on the impossibility of the fleets wintering in Besika Bay; on the need of their presence at Constantinople to protect French subjects, the Christian population, and perhaps the Sultan himself; and on the necessity of letting it be seen that the voice of France is not silenced in the affairs of the East.

M. de la Cour is desired to employ these arguments, should he find the Porte unwilling to take the step of declaring the *status belli* which would justify her in calling up the fleets; arguments which, M. Drouyn de Lhuys says, he has made use of towards the Turkish Ambassador in Paris.

Two dangers are signalized to M. de la Cour to avoid: either discouraging hostilities on the part of Turkey by any show of apathy, or exciting the Porte by showing too great an enthusiasm in her course.

Finally, he is instructed to act in complete concert with Her Majesty's Ambassador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 371.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 718.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 26, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received despatches from Constantinople up to the 15th instant. In them M. de la Cour relates the reasons which led the Ottoman Minister to ask for the presence of a few vessels from the combined fleets, those reasons being an attempt made by the Ulemas, but which failed, to excite the Turkish population of Constantinople to dictate terms to the Sultan. The vessels sent for had arrived, and together with those previously stationed or accidentally at Constantinople, made a squadron of some nine or ten ships.

M. de la Cour states further, that there was no longer the same hesitation in the Divan about admitting the two fleets within the Dardanelles; and, indeed, that he had found, on applying for a firman to admit the vessels to which allusion has been made above, that a firman had been dispatched some weeks ago to the Pasha of the Dardanelles, authorizing him to allow any French or English vessels, that might desire it, to pass up the Straits.

The situation of the Turkish Ministry, M. de la Cour represents to be most deplorable—no two Ministers agreeing, and the Sultan at his wit's end.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 372.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 28.)*

(No. 272.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 15, 1853.*

ALTHOUGH we have no messenger to go by the French steam-packet to-day, I avail myself of the opportunity to inform your Lordship of some important occurrences which have taken place within the last week.

I stated on a former occasion that a placard urging the Government to declare war had been posted on one of the mosques at Constantinople. That demonstration of popular excitement was followed after several days by a petition of the same purport presented to the Council and to the Sultan himself



by a knot of individuals belonging to the class of muderris, or theological students. The paper was signed by thirty-five persons of no individual distinction, but having the corporate importance of belonging to the "Ulemah." Though free from menace, it was worded in serious and impressive terms, implying a strong sense of religious duty, and a very independent disregard of consequences. The Ministers took alarm, and conceived it to be the immediate forerunner of a revolution. Those who first communicated with me upon the subject suspected that one of their colleagues was the secret instigator of the movement, that his views were of a most ambitious character, and that supported by partizans high in office, he might succeed in sacrificing his adversaries, dethroning the Sultan, and plunging the country into war. I was admonished of personal danger if the storm were to burst, and implored to take part in measures calculated to maintain the public tranquillity.

The French Ambassador called upon me to compare his information with mine, and to consult as to the course which it would be most advisable to pursue. The Internuncio also, retained at home by business or indisposition, sent his principal interpreter to make me a similar communication. Both had been apprized by his Highness the Foreign Secretary of danger impending in the shape of a popular revolution, and both were ready to join with me in adopting measures adequate to the occasion.

I expressed in reply a cordial readiness to act in concert with them, but I declared at the same time that I was desirous of taking no step unwarranted by the necessities of the case, and that I wished to guard myself against mistake or exaggeration by a more precise knowledge of circumstances. Any joint interference on our parts, whether by note to the Minister or by direct application to the Sultan, would in my judgment be attended with serious inconvenience; and I was still less inclined to join in bringing up the squadrons to Constantinople without more proofs of urgent peril than we had yet obtained. I suggested, as an opinion of my own, that we should do well, in the actual state of our information, to procure from our respective Admirals such an addition of steam force as might protect us from any immediate attack, and enable us to assist the Government in case of an outbreak threatening its existence, without attracting any unusual attention, or assuming an air of intimidation. This limited plan could easily be executed under cover of the steam communication continually plying between the squadrons and the capital, and it might be accompanied with separate representations from us to such of the Ottoman Ministers as were most to be relied upon at so critical a juncture.

Reshid Pasha approved of this idea, and it has been carried into effect with much appearance of success by the French Ambassador and myself. The Admirals at Besika Bay have complied with our request; and my private advice to the Sultan induced His Majesty to send for his principal Ministers, and by their agency to restrain the enthusiasts or instruments of intrigue, whose conduct had caused the prevailing alarm.

I have since received, not only from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but also from the greater part of his colleagues, including the Grand Vizier and Sheik-ul-Islam, a strong assurance that the revolutionary movement is checked for the present, and that its revival, though by no means impossible, is scarcely to be apprehended.

In this state of things I should now feel myself at liberty to release the extra steamers from their attendance here, did not the daily expectation of a final answer from Russia, and the impression likely to be made upon the fanatics at Constantinople by a pacific one, make it an object of prudence to postpone their departure, until an incident as near at hand as it may prove critical, shall have actually occurred.

Such are the principal features of the crisis, in so far as it affects the stability of the Government, the peace of the capital, and the safety of its Christian inhabitants. I have spared your Lordship a recital of particulars, as they have already lost much of their interest, and would require more time to relate than I can at present dispose of.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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